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Fabian Klose and Mirjam Thulin
Introduction
European Concepts and Practices of Humanity 
in Historical Perspective
I have seen those immense and miserable countries, which seemed destined 
to no other purpose than to cover the earth with herds of slaves. At their vile 
appearance, I turned away my eyes out of disdain, horror and pity; and on 
beholding one fourth part of my fellow-creatures transformed into beasts for 
the service of the rest, I could not forbear lamenting that I was a man.1
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Julie ou la Nouvelle Héloïse, 1761
One time we rescued 10 migrants. When they got on the boat two of them 
started praying. It gave me chills, all over my body. We are fisherman [sic]. 
We are here to make a living. We are not here to rescue people, but we have 
a feeling of humanity. So if I find someone on the sea I will save him.2
Captain Slaheddin, Tunisian fisherman, on rescuing refugees, 2015
In January 1873, a diplomatic delegation led by Sir Henry Bartle Frere, former 
governor of Bombay and professed abolitionist, arrived on the East African 
island of Zanzibar to negotiate by order of the British government with 
Sultan Barghash bin Said on the abolition of the slave trade in his domain.3 
In the course of their stay the British delegates also took the chance to visit 
the notorious slave market in Stone Town, the undisputed center of the East 
1 Quote from Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s best-selling novel Julie ou la Nouvelle Héloïse, published 
for the first time in 1761. For an English translation see: Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Julia: or, The 
New Eloisa. A Series of Original Letters, vol. II (Edinburgh 1773), 282.
2 “Fishermen stepping in to save migrants stranded in the Mediterranean”, Interview by Lisa 
Desai, 26 July 2015, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/cant-just-see-people-die-mediterranean- 
fisherman-saving-african-migrants/.
3 For this special diplomatic mission see: Reginald Coupland, The Exploitation of East Africa 
1856–1890. The Slave Trade and the Scramble (London 1968), 183–216; R. J. Gavin, “The Bartle 
Frere Mission to Zanzibar, 1873”, in Historical Journal 5 (1962), 122–148; R. W. Beachey, The 
Slave Trade of Eastern Africa (London 1976), 108–114.
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African slave trade, to which an average of 20.000 captured Africans from 
various parts of the continent were deported each year and from where they 
were then sold again to various destinations, mainly in the Arab world. In an 
official memorandum special envoy Bartle Frere reported back to London the 
appalling scene they had witnessed there:
And now came a cruel time. With a true knowledge of business, the sickliest and most 
wretched slaves were trotted out first, led round by the hand among the crowd, and 
their price called out. The price of one boy was seven dollars; he was stripped and 
examined by a connoisseur, his arms felt, his teeth examined, his eyes looked at, and 
finally he was rejected. The examination of the women was still more disgusting. 
Bloated and henna-dyed old debauchees gloated over them, handled them from head 
to foot before a crowd of lookers-on, like cow seller or horse dealer, and finally, when 
one was apparently satisfactory, buyer, seller, and woman all retired behind the curtain 
of the shed to play out the final scene of examination.4
In such stirring reports Europeans – explorers, missionaries, merchants, 
 delegates and consuls – characterised the market as a place of brutal in- 
humanity where captured Africans were examined and treated like animals 
rather than beings with human dignity forming an undeniable, essential part 
of humankind. They used their outcry to attack especially the Arab slave 
dealers and to demand intervention against them, obviously forgetting that 
Europeans had engaged in exactly the same practice for hundreds of years in 
Africa and the Americas. Accordingly, special envoy Bartle Frere justified 
maritime action by Great Britain by “[…] seeing no other means open for 
securing their just and righteous demands in the interests of civilization and 
humanity”.5 Thus, the Royal Navy intervened against the Sultan of Zanzibar 
forcing him to sign the abolition treaty, which led to the closure of the slave 
market in June 1873.6 Subsequently, British missionaries built an Anglican 
cathedral on this ground as a symbol of the final triumph over the slave trade 
and the alleged transformation from a place of inhumanity into one of Euro-
pean humanity. 7
4 “Memorandum on the Present State of the Slave Market in Zanzibar, 17 January 1873”, in 
Houses of Parliament (ed.), Correspondence Respecting Sir Bartle Frere’s Mission to the East 
Coast of Africa. 1872–73 (London 1873), 27.
5 Bartle Frere, “Memorandum on the Position and Authority of the Sultan of Zanzibar, 17 April 
1873”, in The National Archives, Kew, Foreign Office 84/1391, 19.
6 “Treaty Between Her Majesty and the Sultan of Zanzibar for the Suppression of the Slave 
Trade, 5 June, 1873”, in Houses of Parliament (ed.), Correspondence Respecting Sir Bartle 
Frere’s Mission to the East Coast of Africa, 154f. 
7 Today the cathedral and the memorial site erected in 1998 are an integral part of Stone Town. 
They are also designated as a World Heritage Site. One criterion for the UNESCO decision 
was the great symbolic importance for Zanzibar in the suppression of slavery, i.e. criterion VI: 
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The slave market in Zanzibar constitutes a significant example for the 
general issue of slavery and the slave trade, which triggered substantial 
debates on human dignity and the nature of being human from the sixteenth 
century onwards. Without a doubt, these themes are major case studies – and 
accordingly form an important part of this volume – for analysing concrete 
implications of European concepts of humanity to practice. However, as a 
matter of fact the relationship between concepts and practices of humanity 
or rather concepts of humanity in practice is not only a field of historical 
research but is of enormous relevance today. Confronted with the tremendous 
humanitarian crisis of hundreds of thousands of people trying to escape from 
disaster, war, and persecution – many of them drowning and dying on their 
perilous journeys to the supposedly safe haven of Europe – voices are loudly 
raised appealing to common humanity and demanding appropriate action by 
the international community. Horrified by the loss of thousands of lives in the 
Mediterranean Sea and on the occasion of the appalling discovery of 71 dead 
refugees asphyxiated inside an abandoned lorry near the Austrian-Hungarian 
border, the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon launched an urgent appeal 
on 28 August 2015. He stated that
[a] large majority of people undertaking these arduous and dangerous journeys are 
refugees fleeing from places such as Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan. International law 
has stipulated – and states have long recognized – the right of refugees to protection 
and asylum. When considering asylum requests, States cannot make distinctions 
based on religion or other identity – nor can they force people to return to places from 
which they have fled if there is a well-founded fear of persecution or attack. This is not 
only a matter of international law; it is also our duty as human beings. […] I appeal to 
all governments involved to provide comprehensive responses, expand safe and legal 
channels of migration and act with humanity, compassion and in accordance with their 
international obligations.8
In his statement, Ban Ki-moon purposely referred to international law, and 
framed the relief for refuges as a fundamental common duty of all human 
beings in order to counter the growing perception of fleeing people as a 
quantitative problem without acknowledging the true human tragedies 
involved. Instead of acting in accordance with the principles of empathy 
and humanity as demanded by the UN Secretary-General, states started to 
erect new barbed-wire fences to seal off its borders pushing back people 
“Zanzibar has great symbolic importance in the suppression of slavery, since it was one of the 
main slave-trading ports in East-Africa and also the base from which its opponents such as 
David Livingstone conducted their campaign.”, cf. http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/173.
8 Ban Ki-Moon, “Statement attributable to the Secretary-General on recent refugee/migrant 
tragedies”, 28 August 2015, http://www.un.org/sg/statements/index.asp?nid=8938. 
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desperately seeking asylum. Right-wing politicians across Europe started to 
refer to refugees merely as statistical numbers without any human attributes 
or even worse as an unwanted, anonymous swarm approaching the fortress 
Europe and endangering health, prosperity, and security on the continent. 
A dangerous tendency of deliberately dehumanising fugitives and degrad-
ing them to annoying problem has started and is still gaining strength. 
Accordingly, the current crisis is becoming an increasingly serious challenge 
to Europe’s sense of humanity and its capacity for appropriate humanitar- 
ian action.
In this context Owen Jones, a journalist for the British newspaper The 
Guardian, reminds the public of a simple but fundamental fact that seems to 
be forgotten recently: “Refugees are human.”9 Jones maintains that migrants 
are not just statistical numbers. He strongly argues for a strategy of human-
ising faceless refugees and showing their true human nature by pointing to 
the fact that
[i]t is only when we strip the humanity from people – when we stop imagining them as 
being quite human like us – that our empathic nature is eroded. That allows us either 
to accept the misery of others, or even to inflict it on them. […] We need to show the 
reality of refugees: their names, their faces, their ambitions and their fears, their loves, 
what they fled.10
This argument by a twenty-first-century journalist closely resembles to the 
humanitarian narrative and strategies of abolitionists in earlier centuries. 
Both cases, though stated in different times and on different issues, fighting 
for the cause of slaves and for the relief of refugees, rest upon the common 
idea of mobilising humanitarian practice by showing that those who suffer 
are the same human being as we are. Both issues raise fundamental questions 
that this book grapples with, namely: What does it mean to be human and 
being part of common humankind? What did this mean before our time, and 
9 Owen Jones, “Refugees are human. This simple fact seems to have been forgotten”, in The 
Guardian, 28 August 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/aug/28/
migrants-humans-drowning-suffocating-safety-statistics. For a similar argument see: David 
Marsh, “We deride them as ‘migrants’. Why not call them people?”, in The Guardian, 28 August 
2015, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/aug/28/migrants-people -refugees-
humanity; “Refugees have to be dealt with as human beings, stresses senior UN official”, 
8 September 2015, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=51820#.VjEVpE2FOUk. 
See also Ban Ki-moon’s statement on 20 June 2015: “Refugees are people like anyone else, 
like you and me. […] On this World Refugee Day, let us recall our common humanity, celebrate 
tolerance and diversity and open our hearts to refugees everywhere.” in Ban Ki-moon, “Sec-
retary-General’s Message, World Refugee Day”, 20 June 2015, http://www.un.org/en/events/
refugeeday/2015/sgmessage.shtml.
10 Jones, “Refugees are human”. 
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how did earlier advocates argue? What are the significant consequences, 
duties and obligations arising from concepts of humanity for concrete prac-
tices? Furthermore, what does it mean to act in the name of humanity?
However, the notion of humanity is a malleable concept, which exists in 
various languages as well as in diverse cultural and geographic contexts, 
having very different meanings at different times. It is invoked in an extra-
ordinary array of circumstances. Being aware of this huge spectrum, the aim 
of this book is not to present a history of this notion and concept in general.11 
It rather seeks to analyse the varieties and shifting meanings of humanity and 
the preceding practices within the European context 12 as well as in the con-
text of Europe’s relations to other world regions from the sixteenth century 
up to the present. Despite the fact that, in various European languages, the 
definition of the term varied over time and context, some core meanings are 
significantly and repeatedly associated with the word humanity. For instance, 
in Samuel Johnson’s A Dictionary of the English Language, first published 
in 1755 and regarded as a seminal dictionary in the history of the English 
language, the word humanity (together with a direct reference to the French 
translation of humanité and the Latin translation of humanitas) was defined 
as the “nature of man” as well as “Human kind; the collective body of man-
kind”.13 Beyond this description as the natural characteristics of individual 
human beings as well as the collective noun for the body of the whole human 
species, the dictionary provided another significant definition, namely the 
practice of “Benevolence; tenderness”. In order to explain this third defi-
nition more concretely to the reader, Johnson’s dictionary referred to the 
English philosopher and influential Enlightenment thinker John Locke, who 
had written that “All men ought to maintain peace and the common offices 
of humanity and friendship in diversity of opinion”.14 In Denis Diderot’s 
11 For this approach see: Hans Erich Bödeker, “Menschheit, Humanität, Humanismus”, in Otto 
Brunner et al. (ed.), Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe. Historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen 
Sprache in Deutschland, vol. 3 (Stuttgart 1982), 1063–1128; Henri Duranton, “Humanité”, in 
Rolf Reichardt / Hans Jürgen Lüsebrink (ed.), Handbuch politisch-sozialer Grundbegriffe in 
Frankreich 1680–1820, vol. 19 (Munich 2000), 9–52.
12 On the discourse on “Europe” in a narrow and broad sense, cf. for example Hartmut Kaelble, 
Europäer über Europa. Die Entstehung des modernen europäischen Selbstverständnisses 
im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert (Frankfurt/M. 2001); Wolfgang Schmale, “Die Konstruktion des 
Homo Europaeus”, in Comparative European History Review 1 (2001), 165–183; Jost Dülffer, 
“Europa – aber wo liegt es? Zur Zeitgeschichte eines Kontinents”, in Archiv für Sozialge-
schichte 44 (2004), 524–564. 
13 Samuel Johnson, “Humanity”, in id., A Dictionary of the English Language: in Which the 
Words are Deduced From Their Originals, and Illustrated in Their Different Significations by 
Examples Form the Best Writers, vol. 1 (London 1755). As a fourth definition, the dictionary 
referred to “Philology, grammatical studies”. 
14 Johnson, “Humanity”.
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famous Encylopédie the term humanity is also closely related to social prac-
tices. Diderot and his collaborator Jean Baptiste le Rond d’Alembert define 
humanity (humanité) as
a feeling of good will toward all men. Ordinarily only great and sensitive souls are 
consumed by it. This noble and sublime enthusiasm is tortured by the sufferings of 
others and tormented by the need to relieve such suffering; it fills men with the desire 
to traverse the world in order to do away with slavery, superstition, vice, and mis-
fortune.15
According to these definitions, the term humanity was not just some lofty, 
abstract idea, but implied a guiding norm for societal behaviour among 
human beings and had concrete consequences for various practices.16
This notion gets additional confirmation when we take a close look at the 
influential book The Law of Nations; or, Principles of the Law of Nature 
by the Swiss legal scholar and philosopher Emer de Vattel, which was first 
published in French in 1758. It was published just three years after Johnson’s 
dictionary and became a foundational text of modern international law. In 
book II, de Vattel deliberately called the duties of a nation towards others 
“offices of humanity”17 (offices d’humanité) and described them in detail as:
The offices of humanity are those succours, those duties, to which men are recipro-
cally obliged as men, that is, as social beings which necessarily stand in need of a 
mutual assistance for their preservation, for their happiness and for living in a manner 
conformable to their nature. Now the law of nature being no less obligatory to nations 
than individuals […] what a man owes to other men, a nation, in its manner, owes to 
15 See the English translation: The Encyclopedia of Diderot & d’Alembert, trans. by Nelly S. 
Hoyt et. al., http://hdl.handle.net/2027/spo.did2222.0000.172. For the original French version, 
cf. “HUMANITÉ, f. f. (Morale.) c’est un sentiment de bienveillance pour tous les hommes, qui 
ne s’enflamme guere que dans une ame grande & sensible. Ce noble & sublime enthousiasme se 
tourmente des peines des autres & du besoin de les soulager; il voudroit parcourir l’univers pour 
abolir l’esclavage, la superstition, le vice, & le malheur.”, in Denis Diderot / Jean Baptiste le 
Rond d’Alembert, Encyclopédie ou Dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métiers, 
vol. 8 (Paris 1765), 348.
16 A similar notion of the term “humanitas” can be also found in Kant’s “Metaphysik der Sitten”, 
published in 1797, cf. Immanuel Kant, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 6: Die Religion innerhalb 
der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft. Die Metaphysik der Sitten (Berlin 1907), 456f. In this 
context, see also for the understanding of humanity of Kant’s contemporary Johann Gottfried 
Herder: Sonia Sikka, Herder on Humanity and Cultural Difference. Enlightened Relativism 
(Cambridge, MA 2011).
17 The book was first published in 1758 in French as “Le droit des gens ou principes de la loi 
naturelle: appliqués à la conduite et aux affaires des nations et des souverains”. Here we use 
the English translation, cf. Emer de Vattel, The Laws of Nations; or Principles of the Law of 
Nature: Applied to the Conduct and Affairs of Nations and Sovereigns, book II, ch. I (Dublin 
1792), 211. 
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other nations […]. Such is the foundation of the common duties of those offices of 
humanity to which nations are reciprocally bound one to another. They consist gener-
ally in doing for the conservation and happiness of others all that is in our power, as far 
as this reconcilable with our duties towards ourselves.18
In order to illustrate what does it mean to fulfil these “offices of humanity”, 
de Vattel referred to the English and Spanish relief operations to Portugal 
after the devastating earthquake of 1755, which destroyed large parts of 
Lisbon and killed more than 30.000 people.19
In addition to the philosophical definitions, in international law the term 
humanity was directly related to concrete practices. It was even constituted as 
a fundamental principle for the relationship not only between individuals, but 
also between nations. In general, we have to relate this emerging notion to a 
broader “humanitarian revolution” taking place in the Enlightenment during 
the second half of the eighteenth century.20 People increasingly expressed 
18 Ibid., § 2, 213.
19 Ibid., § 5, 215. On the earthquake see Christiane Eifert, “Das Erdbeben von Lissabon 1755: Zur 
Historizität einer Naturkatastrophe”, in Historische Zeitschrift 274:3 (2002), 633–664; Russel 
R. Dynes, “The Lisbon Earthquake of 1755. The First Modern Disaster”, in Theodore E. D. 
Braun / John B. Radner (ed.), The Lisbon Earthquake of 1755. Representation and Reactions 
(Oxford 2005), 34–49; Jürgen Wilke, “Das Erdbeben von Lissabon (1755)”, in European 
History Online (EGO), published by the Leibniz Institute of European History (IEG), Mainz 
2014-12-18, http://www.ieg-ego.eu/wilkej-2014-de. Peter Walker and Daniel Maxwell argue 
that the relief operations related to the earthquake of 1755 mark the beginning of the system of 
humanitarian aid, cf. Peter Walker / Daniel Maxwell, Shaping the Humanitarian World (New 
York 2009), 16f.
20 Here we refer to the term “humanitarian revolution” in the sense of the revolutionary emer-
gence of humanitarian sensibility and activities rather than as a decline in violence, as it 
is interpreted by Steven Pinker, The Better Angels of Our Nature: The Decline of Violence 
in History and Its Causes (London 2011), 129–188. For this “humanitarian revolution” and 
emerging humanitarian sensibility see Thomas Laqueur, “Bodies, Details, and the Humanitar-
ian Narrative”, in Lynn Hunt (ed.), The New Cultural History (Berkeley, CA 1989), 176–204; 
Samuel Moyn, “Empathy in History: Empathizing With Humanity”, in History and Theory 45 
(2006), 397 –415; Lynn Hunt, Inventing Human Rights: A History (New York 2007); Richard D. 
Brown / Richard Wilson (ed.), Humanitarianism and Suffering. The Mobilization of Empathy 
(Cambridge 2009); Lynn Festa, “Humanity Without Feathers”, in Humanity 1 (2010), 3–27; 
A. R. Humphreys, “ ‘The Friend of Mankind’ (1700–60). An Aspect of Eighteenth-Century 
Sensibility”, in Review of English Studies 24 (1948), 203–218; Chester Chapin, “Shaftesbury 
and the Man of Feeling”, in Modern Philology 81 (1983), 47–50; Norman S. Fiering, “Irre-
sistible Compassion: An Aspect of Eighteenth-Century Sympathy and Humanitarianism”, in 
Journal of the History of Ideas 37 (1976), 195–218; Karen Halttunen, “Humanitarianism and 
the Pornography of Pain in Anglo-American Culture”, in American Historical Review 100 
(1995), 303–334, on pp. 304–307; Natan Sznaider, “The Sociology of Compassion: A Study in 
the Sociology of Morals”, in Cultural Values 2 (1998), 117–139, on pp. 124–127; Ildiko Csengei, 
Sympathy, Sensibility, and the Literature of Feeling in the Eighteenth Century (Basingstoke 
2012), 29–62; Thomas L. Haskell, “Capitalism and the Origins of Humanitarian Sensibility, 
Part 1”, in American Historical Review 90 (1985), 339–361; id., “Capitalism and the Origins of 
Humanitarian Sensibility, Part 2”, in American Historical Review 90 (1985), 547–566.
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empathy for their fellow human beings, not only within their own country, 
but across borders and even on distant continents. They were mobilised by 
a sentimental and moral “humanitarian narrative”, which had its origins in 
a broader “sentimental revolution”21 in literature emerging in the course 
of the eighteenth century. This new sentimentalism, which was originally 
influenced by religious ideas and emphasised the openness for emotional 
expression, spread across Europe and chiefly prepared the grassroots of a 
new thinking about humanity.22 Thus, humanity as a sentiment increasingly 
gained crucial ethical qualities and transformed evermore to a kind of “moral 
compass” for social behavior within human societies.23
In this volume, we look at European concepts of humanity in practice in a 
wide time horizon. Although research mostly agrees that the eighteenth cen-
tury is central to the notion and practice of “humanity”, some studies argue 
that “humanity” as a concept only emerged in the context of global war and 
modern genocide after 1945.24 In contrast, we do not focus on one particular 
time frame but aim to cover a period beginning with early modern human-
ism up to most recent developments. Thus, this book takes a longue durée 
approach, which explicitly takes account of various crucial early modern 
debates about human nature, the issue of slavery and behaviour towards 
indigenous peoples.25 Moreover, not particular concepts and practices are 
21 Geoffroy Atkinson coined this term in the mid-1960s. Since then it is in use to describe the 
literarily “sentimentalism” in mainly Western Europe, cf. Geoffroy Atkinson, The Sentimental 
Revolution. French Writers of 1690–1740 (Seattle, WA 1965).
22 For a study focusing specifically on humanity in the age of the Enlightenment, see Alexander 
Cook et al. (ed.), Representing Humanity in the Age of Enlightenment (London 2013).
23 Kenan Malik, The Quest for a Moral Compass. A Global History of Ethics (London 2014), 
189–217.
24 For instance, in his book The Idea of Humanity in a Global Era, Bruce Mazlish prominently 
argues “that out of an epochal crime – global war and modern genocide – has emerged the idea 
of crimes against humanity. And out of crimes against humanity has emerged the concept of 
Humanity”. Furthermore, he emphasizes that the “transformation of the notion of humanity 
into the concept of Humanity takes place in the context of humankind entering upon a time of 
total war” and derives its legal status only from the precedent set by the Nuremberg trials, cf. 
Bruce Mazlish, The Idea of Humanity in a Global Era (New York 2009), 15, 35f. Moreover, in 
their intriguing edited volume In the Name of Humanity, the anthropologists Ilana Feldman and 
Miriam Ticktin investigate the relationship between government and humanity, thus focusing 
exclusively on issues of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, cf. Ilana Feldman / Miriam 
Ticktin (ed.), In the Name of Humanity. The Government of Threat and Care (Durham, NC 
2010).
25 For these early modern debates see esp. Francisco Bethencourt, “Humankind: From Division 
to Recomposition”, Mihai-D. Grigore, “Humanism and its Humanitas: The Transition From 
Humanitas Christiana to Humanitas Politica in the Political Writings of Erasmus”, and Thomas 
Weller, “Humanitarianism Before Humanitarianism? Spanish Discourses on Slavery From the 
Sixteenth to the Nineteenth Century”, in this volume.
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essential for our analysis but rather “concepts in practice”, that is, unspoken 
practices prior to the concept and term “humanity” as well as shifting con-
cepts shaped and informed these practices at the same time.
In order to connect contemporary developments with early modern times, 
this volume presents case studies from the sixteenth century up to the pres-
ent. As “humanity” is invoked in a remarkable array of contexts, the book 
focuses on issues such as humanism, colonial expansion and imperialism, 
missions, abolitionism, international humanitarian law, humanitarianism, 
human rights, solidarity, charity, and philanthropy. In our understanding, 
these are crucial arenas, in which concepts and practices of humanity were 
sustainably shaped, defined, questioned and reconfigured. While there exist 
many studies on every single topic, the book seeks to connect these various 
themes and fields, and analyse their entanglements under the overarching 
theme of “humanity” as a concept in practice.26
Accordingly, we understand the notion of “humanity” not as static and 
related only to one specific century but as a dynamic concept that emerged 
in the course of several centuries. One of our central aims is to show its 
procedural and evolutionary character with ambiguities and inconsisten-
cies in the context of Europe itself as well as the continent’s relation to the 
wider world. In this context we look especially at how humanity in practice 
helped to overcome fundamental divisions but also created new hierarchies 
at the same time. Beyond Europe, the volume covers three geographical 
26 For studies on each field, see exemplary: Erica Bornstein / Peter Redfield, “An Introduction 
to the Anthropolgy of Humanitarianism”, in id. (ed.), Forces of Compassion. Humanitarian-
ism Between Ethics and Politics (Santa Fe, NM 2011), 3–30; Horst Gründer (ed.), Geschichte 
und Humanität (Münster 1994); Michael Barnett, Empire of Humanity. A History of 
Humanitarianism (Ithaca, NY 2011); Stefan-Ludwig Hoffmann, “Introduction: Genealogies 
of Human Rights”, in id., Human Rights in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge 2011), 1–26; 
Seymour Drescher, Abolitionism. A History of Slavery and Antislavery (Cambridge 2009); 
Hugh Cunningham / Joanna Innes (ed.), Charity, Philanthropy, and Reform. From the 1690s 
to 1850 (Basingstoke 1998). Peter Stamatov, The Origins of Global Humanitarianism. Reli-
gion, Empires, and Advocacy (New York 2013); Johannes Paulmann, “Humanitarianism and 
Empire”, in John M. MacKenzie (ed.), The Encylopedia of Empire, vol. II (Oxford 2016), 1112–
1123; Alan Lester / Fae Dussart, Colonization and the Origins of Humanitarian Governance. 
Protecting Aboriginies Across the Nineteenth-Century British Empire (Cambridge 2014); Rob 
Skinner / Alan Lester, “Humanitarianism and Empire: New Research Agendas”, in The Jour-
nal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 40 (2012), 729–747; Ian Tyrrell, Reforming the 
World. The Creation of America’s Moral Empire (Princeton, NJ 2010), 98–145; Caroline Shaw, 
Britannia’s Embrace: Modern Humanitarianism and the Imperial Origins of Refugee Relief 
(Oxford 2015); Andrew Thompson, “Humanitarian Interventions, Past and Present”, in Fabian 
Klose (ed.), The Emergence of Humanitarian Intervention. Ideas and Practice From the Nine-
teenth Century to the Present (Cambridge 2016), 331–356; Michael Geyer, “Humanitarianism 
and Human Rights. A Troubled Rapport”, in ibid., 31–55; Abigail Green, “Humanitarianism 
in Nineteenth-Century Context: Religious, Gendered, National”, in Historical Journal 57 
(2014), 1157–1175; Franklyn K. Prochaska, “Philanthropy”, in F. M. L. Thompson (ed.), The 
Cambridge Social History of Britain 1750–1950 (Cambridge 1990), 357–393. 
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regions – Africa, America, and Asia – thus seeking to combine European 
history with approaches of transnational and global history. While taking 
into account the multidimensional character of the topic and underlining 
the enrichment of research from different perspectives, the book adopts an 
interdisciplinary approach.27 Without doubt in the debates around the idea 
of humanity, religion played a remarkable role. Jewish, Catholic as well as 
Protestant teaching shaped the notion in many significant ways. Religion or 
religious convictions served various actors such as philosophers, reformists, 
missionaries, abolitionists, and legal scholars frequently as a fundamental 
source for developing their theories and influencing their actions.28 For this 
reason, theologians and historians provide, for the first time together, inno-
vative perspectives on European concepts of humanity in practice. Thus, we 
promote an integrative approach by combining not only different geograph-
ical regions but also various historical epochs and academic disciplines in 
this volume.
By taking a comparative approach and exploring the intersections of 
religious studies, international law and philosophy as well as history, the 
contributors deal with three essential areas: morality and human dignity; 
humanitarianism, violence, and international law as well as, finally, charity, 
philanthropy, and solidarity. Within these key areas, we ask which actors 
used the concept of humanity for which purposes. In other words, what are 
the concrete implications of theoretical discourses on the concept of humanity 
regarding the practices in various fields? Furthermore, we investigate to what 
27 There are a number of interdisciplinary studies on the topic of humanity, which discuss various 
notions and perspectives of the term rather than relate it to special practices. For instance see: 
Marianne Heimbach-Steins / Rottraud Wielandt (ed.), Was ist Humanität? Interdisziplinäre und 
interreligiöse Perspektiven (Würzburg 2008); Jörn Rüsen (ed.), Perspektiven der Humanität. 
Menschsein im Diskurs der Disziplinen (Bielefeld 2010); Longxi Zhang (ed.), The Concept of 
Humanity in an Age of Globalization (Göttingen 2012); Jörn Rüsen (ed.), Approaching Human-
kind. Towards an Intercultural Humanism (Göttingen 2013); Andrea Radasanu (ed.), In Search 
of Humanity: Essays in Honor of Clifford Orwin (Lanham, MD 2015).
28 For the importance of religion here, a few references to texts from a large body of literature 
must suffice: Roy A. Rappaport, Ritual and Religion in the Making of Humanity (Cambridge 
1999); Heimbach-Steins / Wielandt, Was ist Humanität?; Rainer Liedke, Religion und Zivilge-
sellschaft in der europäischen Zivilgesellschaft. Entwicklungen im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert 
(Paderborn 2009); John Macquarrie, In Search of Humanity. A Theological and Philosophical 
Approach (London 1984); Katell Berthelot / Matthias Morgenstern (ed.), The Quest for a Com-
mon Humanity. Human Dignity and Otherness in the Religious Traditions of the Mediterranean 
(Leiden 2011); Michael Barnett / Janice Gross Stein (ed.), Sacred Aid. Faith and Humanitari-
anism (Oxford 2012). See also Wolfgang Huber, Gerechtigkeit und Recht. Grundlinien christ-
licher Rechtsethik (Darmstadt 2006); id. / Heinz Eduard Tödt, Menschenrechte. Perspektiven 
einer menschlichen Welt (Stuttgart 1977). Here we cannot discuss the “Church” or “Religion 
of Humanity” that was initiated by the sociologist, mathematician and religious philosopher 
Auguste Comte in the nineteenth century. For the influence of Comte’s convictions see e.g. 
Terence R. Wright, The Religion of Humanity. The Impact of Comtean Positivism on Victorian 
Britain (Cambridge 1986).
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extend the term humanity is connected to the emergence of normative con-
cepts and guiding principles, implying moral and religious commandments 
as well as humanitarian obligations, international law, and human rights. The 
basic questions are therefore the following: Did humanity become a “moral 
compass” for social relationships between human beings from the sixteenth 
century to the present? If so, how did this development exert a lasting influ-
ence on their actions? Instead of only asking what the idea of humanity is, 
we reconsider the concept of humanity in practice itself. We ask how taking 
care for the “unfree”, the “uncivilized”, the non-Christian, the wounded, the 
suffering, the underprivileged, the persecuted, or the helpless was embedded 
in the notion of a common humanity. Therefore, we focus in case studies on 
the entanglement of diverse actors but also of religious, political, military, 
civil, legal, and cultural relations as well as of national, international and 
transnational perspectives.
Considering the fact that the discourse on humanity as well as its prac-
tices relied on some sort of counterpart and divide as for instance god and 
man / woman, human and animal, adult and child, saviour and victim,29 we 
survey how the emerging concept of humanity lead to the overcoming of 
fundamental divisions on the one hand and the emergence of new hierarchies 
on the other hand. For instance, the British legal philosopher James Lorimer, 
one of the co-founders of the influential Institut des droits international 
in Ghent, plainly argued in his seminal book “The Institutes of the Law of 
Nations” in 1883:
As a political phenomenon, humanity, in its present condition, divides itself onto three 
concentric zones or spheres – that of civilized humanity, that of barbarous humanity, 
and that of savage humanity. To these, whether arising from peculiarities of race or 
from various stages of development in the same race, belong, of right, at the hands of 
civilized nations, three stages of recognition – plenary political recognition, partial 
recognition, and natural or mere human recognition.30
Such a notion contributed to the establishment of an international legal and 
political hierarchy, which served significantly to legitimate violent colonial 
and imperial expansion often disguised as a humanitarian endeavour. In his 
writings on the concept of the political in the 1920s the controversial German 
political theorist and jurist Carl Schmitt even described the whole concept 
29 On these divisions, esp. in the context of the human / animal divide, see Joanna Bourke, What It 
Means to Be Human: Historical Reflections From the 1800s to the Present (Berkeley, CA 2011).
30 James Lorimer, The Institutes of International Law. A Treatise of the Jural Relations of Sepa-
rate Political Communities, vol. I (Edinburgh 1883), 101.
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of humanity as a particularly useful ideological instrument of imperialist 
expansion, claiming that
Whoever invokes humanity wants to cheat. To confiscate the word humanity, to invoke 
and monopolize such a term probably has certain incalculable effects, such as denying 
the enemy the quality of being human and declaring him to be an outlaw of humanity; 
and a war can thereby be driven to the most extreme inhumanity.31
However, still today the invocation of the term humanity is used by vari-
ous actors to legitimate military interventions, which follows the logic of a 
distinctive hierarchy of humanity. For instance, Didier Fassin clearly indi-
cates this fact by referring to NATO air strikes in the case of Kosovo and 
the US invasion in Iraq, when both military operations were legitimised by 
supposedly just, even human itarian reasons, but in fact rested on unequal 
valuations of the lives of Serbian and Iraqi civilians heavily suffering under 
theses military strikes.32
The book is arranged in thematic order and consists of four main sections, 
within which the structure is chronological. The first section establishes the 
wider context for the essays that follow and offers important general reflec-
tions on crucial developments over the course of a time period covering more 
than four hundred years, namely from the sixteenth century up to the present. 
In Chapter 2, Francisco Bethencourt identifies categories and practices of 
distinction that have shaped the notion of humankind in a crucial way from 
the early modern period to the twentieth century. He discusses fundamental 
divisions between free people and slaves, “barbarians” and “civilised”, white 
and black, male and female, rich and poor. Thus, he analyses how these cate-
gories and related practices emerged, overlapped, changed and finally influ-
enced concepts of humanity. Overall Bethencourt argues that these striking 
historical divisions of humankind have been partly overcome and a notion 
of a common humanity based on respect for the dignity of all human beings 
has gained ground. Nevertheless, Bethencourt makes clear that some of these 
fundamental divisions still exist and continue to structure societies today. 
Thus, he finally argues for a re-configuration of a comprehensive notion of 
humankind based on an ever-evolving set of human rights.
In Chapter 3, Paul Betts picks up the thread of Bethencourt’s essay and 
shifts the focus to the twentieth century, when humanity became one of the 
31 As an example, Carl Schmitt refers here to the colonial extermination of the “Indians of North 
America”, cf. Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political (Chicago, IL 1996), 54 (German 1927).
32 Didier Fassin, “Inequality of Lives, Hierarchies of Humanity. Moral Commitments and 
Ethical Dilemmas of Humanitarianism”, in Feldman / Ticktin, In the Name of Humanity, 
238–255, on pp. 243f., 255. On the controversial issue of humanitarian intervention see also 
Klose, The Emergence of Humanitarian Intervention.
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most contested terms reflecting the hopes as well as the disappointments of 
“the Age of Extremes”33. Many camps and causes invoked the concept. The 
use of the term ranged from being an article of faith to a term of derision, 
from a romantic dream of redemption to failed social engineering projects. 
Betts takes a close look at the alternating meanings of the concept, which 
was sometimes consistent with related terms such as civilisation and human 
rights, while at other times it meant something completely different. In his 
contribution he reflects on how the concept was used, abused and politicised 
at various moments over the last century, with particular emphasis on World 
War I, 1945, and the period of decolonisation.
In Part II, the fundamental issues of morality and human dignity are 
discussed and analysed against the backdrop of major developments and 
movements such as humanism, colonialism, pietism, protestant missionary 
activities and Post-war Catholicism. In Chapter 4, Mihai-D. Grigore sur-
veys the crucial epoch of early sixteenth century-humanism and one of his 
most important representatives, Erasmus of Rotterdam. By analyzing two 
of Erasmus’s influential political writings, Institutio Principis Christiani 
(Education of a Christian Prince, 1516) and Querela Pacis (The Complaint 
of Peace, 1517), Grigore discusses the transitional process from a humanitas 
Christiana to humanitas politica. He argues that in early modern political 
anthropology a significant shift concerning the term humanity can be iden-
tified: from a concept understood in relation to an external transcendental 
factor such as God to a new paradigm based on the fundamental notion of 
the human nature of human beings. In other words, the notion of humanity 
significantly changed from one exclusively defined by the relationship to 
God into an anthropocentric concept.
In Chapter 5, Mariano Delgado deals with the emergence of a universalist 
notion of a common “family of mankind” and the “unity of mankind”. In 
light of the rise of the Spanish colonial empire in America in the course of 
the sixteenth century, he analyses the discussions about the nature of indig-
enous Americans. In particular Delgado concentrates on the famous debate 
of Valladolid in 1550 between the Dominican friar Bartolomé de Las Casas 
and his opponent Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda. While his counterpart denied the 
native inhabitants of the “New World” recognition as full members of human 
kind, Las Casas strongly argued against their exclusion. Consequently, Las 
Casas criticised their violent subjugation as totally unjustified. By focusing 
on this debate, Delgado stresses the significant contribution made by early 
modern Christian thinkers to the genealogy of a universalist notion of a 
“family of mankind”.
33 Eric Hobsbawm, The Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century, 1914–1991 (London 
1994). 
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In Chapter 6, by focusing on the Basel Mission, Judith Becker raises 
the question how German missions of the nineteenth century understood 
“humanity” and how this concept formed a foundational element for them. 
According to Becker the idea of the unity of humankind constituted a major 
impulse for Pietists to missionise abroad. Becker focuses on the Indian 
context, where in contact with Hinduism a discussion about the definition 
of “humaneness” and about who a human being is evolved. Another aspect 
was the paradox between the emphasis on unity and equality as aspects of a 
common “humanity” and the introduction of new hierarchies in the colonial 
context. Finally, Becker looks at notions of humanitarianism in the Basel 
Mission, which in the Indian context mainly meant poor relief but in a mod-
ified way.
In Chapter 7, Robert Brier explores the multi-layered relationship of 
human dignity, human rights, and Catholicism in the twentieth century. His 
aim is to discuss how dignity featured in Post-war Catholic discourses and 
which understandings of humanity emerged from them. Furthermore, Brier 
asks how significant these Catholic notions were for the wider Post-war cur-
rency of human dignity. In his perspective, the concept of human dignity 
was never exclusively religiously defined, but always a contested idea, which 
various actors reinterpreted in specific historical contexts. Brier argues that 
the introduction of this concept opened up a field of contestation where 
different imaginaries of humanity, religious and secular, could significantly 
clash. Accordingly, he seeks to show that Catholic views of dignity were 
neither quite as dominant after 1945, nor did they disappear entirely in the 
subsequent decades of the twentieth century.
In Part III, the book seeks to connect the fields of humanitarianism, 
violence, and international law to humanity as a concept in practice. In 
general, the antislavery movement is regarded as the first humanitarian 
movement in history. It attacked the violent practice of enslaving people 
and demanded legal standards to abolish the slave trade and slavery itself. 
As Thomas Weller shows in Chapter 8, however, the British and American 
abolitionists were not the first to campaign against Atlantic slavery. Already 
in the context of the Spanish colonial empire, theologians, missionaries, and 
jurists fundamentally criticised the practice of enslaving Africans at the 
beginning of the sixteenth and in the course of the seventeenth centuries. 
By examining this often neglected Spanish discourse, Weller reveals that 
concerns for the distant suffering of others have a much older tradition than 
the history of modern humanitarianism usually claims. The authors of these 
early modern documents made use of humanitarian narratives in basing 
their arguments on their own experience as eyewitnesses of human suffering 
and appealing to their readers’ empathy, compassion and practical sense of 
humanity. In his contribution, Weller seeks to shed new light on the origins 
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of humanitarianism prior to the alleged “humanitarian big bang”34 in the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.
Despite these earlier debates, the period at the turn from the eighteenth to 
nineteenth centuries remains crucial. As Fabian Klose shows in Chapter 9, 
long-term implications of a theoretical debate about the concept of “human-
ity” to an interventionist practice in international politics can be identified 
during this period. In their campaign, British abolitionists successfully 
mobilised public opinion in favour of their cause by explicitly referring to 
common “humanity”. In doing so, they evoked the moral argument that the 
slave trade was contrary to all principles of humanity and managed to find 
legal recognition for this notion on the national as well as the international 
level. Furthermore, Great Britain initiated an international treaty network to 
enforce abolition, based on the emerging consensus that human trafficking 
constituted a “crime against humanity”. Therefore, it is his central argu-
ment that by abolition and the related practice of enforcing it the concept of 
humanity developed from a moral category into an accepted norm and thus 
contributed significantly to the emergence of the concept of humanitarian 
intervention in the long nineteenth century.
In Chapter 10, Kerstin von Lingen directly picks up the theme of violence 
and international law. From an intellectual historian’s perspective, she looks 
at the term and concept of “crimes against humanity” as it developed as a 
legal tool in the tribunals in the twentieth century. The concept is based on 
earlier attempts to civilise warfare, beginning in the mid-nineteenth century, 
in particular on the two The Hague Peace Conferences in 1899 and 1907. 
Von Lingen argues that the underlying understanding of “humanity” and 
“civilized nations”, laid down within the so-called Martens Clause of 1907, 
became the blueprint for later attempts to prosecute war crimes and in par-
ticular crimes against civilians until the Nuremberg Tribunal, when a new 
agenda was set with an legacy enduring to this day.
In Chapter 11, Esther Möller addresses humanity as one of the terms most 
frequently used by the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, 
finally becoming one of its seven principles in 1965. However, the meaning 
and use of the term were not undisputed within the movement. By focusing 
on the interactions between Western and Non-Western Red Cross and Red 
Crescent societies between 1948 and 1973, Möller seeks to show that the 
reference to humanity fulfilled various functions on the practical and struc-
tural as well as the normative levels. She argues that in the second half of 
the twentieth century, the term humanity became both a central category of 
34 Barnett, Empire of Humanity, 57.
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international humanitarian law but at the same time also one of the Red Cross 
and Red Crescent Movement’s litmus tests for the challenges of decolonisa-
tion and globalisation.
Part IV finally deals with social and benevolent practices closely linked 
to the concept of “humanity”, such as charity, philanthropy, and solidarity. 
In Chapter 12, Joachim Berger reflects on the issue of internationalism in 
relation to Freemasonry in the second half of the nineteenth century. Berger 
addresses the debates about the proclaimed ideal of “humanité” (Humanität, 
umanità, humanity) in the national as well as international context. Within 
national masonic bodies, the virtue of (brotherly) love as an emanation of 
“pure humanity” was applied to divergent fields of action such as relief 
for needy fellow-masons, aid and assistance for underprivileged groups as 
well as solidarity with all forces in society that fought for peace, freedom 
(of conscience), and justice. Furthermore, Berger argues that on the inter-
national level the reference to “humanity” was primarily seen as an impor-
tant instrument to bridge emerging differences between various national 
Freemason branches. Thus, speaking “in the name of humanity” became a 
testing ground for negotiating religious, ideological, societal, and national 
differences.
In Chapter 13, Katharina Stornig analyses the fundraising texts issued by 
three European Catholic associations (Holy Childhood Association, Hilfs-
verein zur Unterstützung der armen Negerkinder, St. Petrus-Claver-Sodality) 
that promoted the saving of children in Africa and Asia in the long nineteenth 
century. Inspired by domestic child-saving campaigns as well as European 
religious and secular expansion, these associations promoted aid for distant 
children as religious and humanitarian. Stornig discusses the various ways in 
which authors used the notion of humanity and its cognates in order to raise 
support and donations. She argues that Catholic philanthropists employed the 
notion of humanity with the particular goal to expand child-centred charity 
from domestic contexts to geographically distant settings in Africa and Asia. 
In doing so they appealed to a sense of Christian and human solidarity with 
distant children, who were represented as the most vulnerable, needy and 
innocent part of humankind.
In Chapter 14, Gerhard Kruip picks up the crucial issue of solidarity. By 
analysing fundamental documents such as “De iustitia in mundo”, the final 
declaration of the Roman Bishop’s Synod of 1971, and “Laudatio si”, the 
encyclical of Pope Francis from 2015, he argues that the notion of the unity 
of the whole human family constitutes one of the key concepts of Catholic 
social teaching. Moreover, in his contribution Kruip raises the fundamental 
question about concrete consequences of this notion for the idea of global 
justice and asks whether this concept can also gain importance outside the 
context of Christian faith. He pleads for a significant change in the concept 
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of catholicity itself, which would make the Catholic Church less western, 
less centralised and thus more open to the various cultures of the human 
family.
Finally, in chapter 15, Johannes Paulmann presents lines of enquiry that 
are fundamental for the investigation of humanity as a concept in practice. 
He distils four major perceptions drawn from the various contributions in 
this volume concerning the reliance of humanity on antonyms, the various 
functions of humanity, the dynamic nature of the concept, and the hierarchies 
of humanity. Furthermore, he discusses the global dimension of European 
and Western humanitarianism respectively as one of the most important and 
relevant current practices by focusing on the contemporary formation of a 
new moral economy called humanitarian reason. Thus, Paulmann addresses 
the imperial roots of humanitarianism. These roots offer – in the past and the 
present – a productive frame of reference for understanding how concepts of 
humanity and humanitarian practice affect each other.
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Humankind
From Division to Recomposition
Humanity has been perceived in different parts of the world as divided or 
segmented, according to different hierarchies, throughout history and up 
to the present. This reality has not been sufficiently taken on board in the 
recently burgeoning debate on the history of human rights. After discussing 
some of the main issues raised by this debate, my chapter explores these hier-
archies in the long term and looks at how social movements have contributed 
in different ways to changing perceptions and have to some extent overcome 
engrained social divisions.
The bibliography on the history of human rights is vast. I have only selected 
three authors who have been at the centre of the discussion to express my 
critical vision. I decided not to engage with the discussion on the history of 
humanitarianism, since its goal of alleviating suffering presupposes a moral 
discourse and a culture of compassion, but must not be confused with the 
legal discourse of rights.1
My argument is that we need to address the long-term divisions of human-
kind that have been partly ignored by political scientists and modernist 
historians in this debate. I will address here the rooted discrimination against 
slaves, “barbarians”, ethnicities (or races), women and minorities. Some of 
these divisions formally collapsed in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, 
but others still structure societies.
1. The Debate on Human Rights
Paul Gordon Lauren highlights a universal sense of the dignity of human 
life and of a duty of responsible behaviour toward those who suffer that is 
shared by Hinduism, Judaism, Buddhism, Confucianism (even if this is not 
a religion), Christianity and Islam.2 The idea that basic notions of humanity 
had been inscribed in the main religious texts of the “axial civilisations”, 
1 Michael Barnett, Empire of Humanity: A History of Humanitarianism (Ithaca, NY 2011); for a 
more entangled vision see Michael Geyer, “Humanitarianism and Human Rights. A Troubled 
Rapport”, in Fabian Klose (ed.), The Emergence of Humanitarian Intervention. Ideas and 
Practice From the Nineteenth Century to the Present (Cambridge 2016), 31–55.
2 Paul Gordon Lauren, The Evolution of International Human Rights (Philadelphia 2011), 4–36.
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which emerged between 600 BCE and 700 CE in different parts of the 
world, was emphasised after the Second World War, particularly by United 
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), 
which discussed the divisive theory of races responsible for the extermina-
tion of many millions of people.3 Lauren acknowledges the conflict between 
principles and realities, defined by oppression and the absence (or the with-
holding) of rights, which lasted until the late twentieth century. The major 
strength of his book is that the narrative is built on specific cases of social 
struggles for human rights, particularly the abolitionist movement against 
the slave trade and slavery, the protection of prisoners of war and the wom-
en’s movement for voting rights.4 Lauren attempts to be comprehensive and 
wide-ranging, based on an enormous and useful fund of information; but 
the accumulation of examples concerning the development of human rights 
is sometimes schematic and insufficiently critical of the shortcomings of 
humanitarian positions: for example, the protection of the welfare of natives 
at the Berlin conference in 1885, which was used to justify the division 
of Africa among the European powers.5 Its implicit evolutionary vision is 
another problem of this book, which does not sufficiently highlight the gaps, 
regressions and alternative paths to overcoming oppression, which hindered 
the assertion of human rights.
Lynn Hunt’s Inventing Human Rights does not pretend to have the same 
universal scope as Lauren’s work.6 It focuses on eighteenth-century Europe 
as a turning point in the definition of human rights. The novelty of this work 
lies in Hunt’s astute analysis of the literature of that period, which trans-
formed maidservants, women, sailors and employees into major characters. 
Novels, plays and short stories elicited empathy from readers through 
emotional descriptions of unfair rules and undue suffering. Richardson and 
Rousseau, among other authors, transposed the old Christian values relat-
ing to human dignity to make them part of a secularised setting in which 
a new consciousness of inequity emerged. Situations of oppression at the 
domestic level were widely depicted and placed within a framework in which 
abuse was exposed and the relative position of masters and servants chal-
lenged by a new vision of the rights of the humiliated, including women.7 
3 On axial civilisations see S. N. Eisenstadt (ed.), The Origins and Diversity of the Axial Civili­
zations (Albany, NY 1986); Johann P. Arneson / S. N. Eisenstadt et al. (ed.), Axial Civilizations 
and World History (Leiden 2005). For UNESCO’s contribution see Ashley Montagu, Man’s 
Most Dangerous Myth: the Fallacy of Race (New York 21946); Claude Lévi-Strauss, Race and 
History (Paris 1952); and Jeanne Hersch (ed.), The Birthright of Man (Paris 1969).
4 Lauren, The Evolution of International Human Rights, 37–71.
5 Ibid., 56.
6 Lynn Hunt, Inventing Human Rights. A History (New York 2007).
7 Ibid., 35–69.
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The possibilities created by the atmosphere of the Enlightenment, based as 
it was on ideas of self-direction and the autonomy of the individual, are at 
the core of Lynn Hunt’s approach. It is not by chance that she started her 
book with a genealogy of rights, from Rousseau to the American Declaration 
of Independence and the declaration of the “rights of man” (the universal 
male formula then prevalent) during the French Revolution. The eighteenth 
century discussion of torture and the death penalty is also analysed, as well 
as the consequences of the above declarations of rights, extended to religious 
minorities and, in time, to slaves. The psychological side of the emergence 
of the notion of human rights in this period is convincingly demonstrated. 
Moreover, Lynn Hunt deals with the debate on the individualistic meaning of 
human rights opened up by Karl Marx and other socialists in the nineteenth 
century, who resented the crucial notion of rights protecting private property. 
The theory of races is briefly mentioned, but its specific chronology and 
plurality of visions is missed. Hunt also touches on the link between human 
rights and imperialism, but she does not engage with the debate on European 
universal values as a rhetoric of power denounced by Immanuel Wallerstein, 
among other authors.8
Samuel Moyn rightly criticises Lynn Hunt for the bridge she posits be- 
tween the emerging notion of human rights in the eighteenth century and 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the United Nations in 1948 
(and beyond).9 Hunt considers that human rights failed only to succeed in 
the long run; but hers is deductive reasoning; there is insufficient discussion 
of the different periods between the end of the eighteenth century and the 
mid-twentieth century. Moyn’s argument is that human rights never had a 
truly universal meaning before the Universal Declaration of 1948, and they 
were not really actively promoted before the 1970s.10 The advantage of this 
argument is clarity: it is true that human rights only became widely accepted 
after the 1970s. They cannot be left out of the picture when we discuss the 
end of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. Moyn argues that human rights 
finally emerged due to the collapse of both Marxism and formal colonial-
ism, but also due to the crisis of the nation state. He refers to the concept 
as “the last utopia”, an ideology that asserted itself after the failure of other 
ideologies based on grand utopias.
8 Immanuel Wallerstein, European Universalism. The Rhetoric of Power (New York 2006). 
I disagree with this dismissive and schematic vision of human rights as rhetoric of power. More 
interesting is Boaventura Sousa Santos, If God Were a Human Rights Activist (Stanford, CA 
2015), who underlines the fragile hegemony of conventional human rights under threat from 
both political theologies and counter hegemonic conceptions and practices of human rights. 
9 Samuel Moyn, Human Rights and the Uses of History (London 2014), 1–18.
10 Id., The Last Utopia. Human Rights in History (Cambridge, MA 2012).
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Samuel Moyn has a point about the problem of chronology, supposed 
bridging links and the backdating of human rights. He rightly criticises many 
under-researched assumptions, particularly the difficult intersection between 
anti-colonialism and human rights.11 However, his narrative is rather sche-
matic, sources predating the twentieth century are quoted from secondary lit-
erature, and references to universalism or cosmopolitanism are interchange-
able.12 My critique is that, in this book, left-wing contributions are dismissed 
because Marxism criticised the individualist approach based on property 
rights, while economic and social rights resulting from social movements are 
undervalued. The crisis of the nation-state is arguably overstated, as recent 
developments have shown. Human rights have probably been overestimated as 
a new and universal ideology, while their formal diffusion has been followed 
by new challenges from religious and ethnic factionalism. The main prob-
lem of this intelligent approach is that anachronism, though justly criticised, 
risks being replaced by historicism (vision defined by compartmentalised 
chronology): the recent configuration of human rights based on protection 
of the individual against the state is taken as a yardstick to measure rights 
in other periods of time. I agree that the concept of human rights has only 
recently become predominant in international law and international values; 
but I believe that human rights have had different configurations in time and 
place and these have resulted directly or indirectly from social movements.
My argument is that, up to the present day, humankind has been defined 
much more by divisions than by a common perception of universal attri-
butes. The nineteenth and twentieth centuries presented gaps, regressions, 
and alternative paths, only for the notion of rights to be vindicated after 
the devastation of the Second World War. The recent apparent triumph of 
human rights is dominant from an ideological point of view, but fragile in 
implementation inside and outside the Western world. That is why I con-
sider it more productive to reflect on the successive visions of segmented 
humanity that prevailed up until the present and to analyse how these visions 
were successively addressed and challenged, one by one, with regard to their 
inherent hierarchical logic. This is not an inverted history of human rights, 
here avoided as a minefield charged with ideology, but a history of how hier-
archical, divisive and exclusionary visions were targeted over time by social 
movements, which contributed to the ongoing process of building a more 
unified vision of humankind.
11 Ibid., 84–119.
12 See the distinction between universalism, cosmopolitanism and cultural relativism in 
Steven Vertovec / Robin Cohen (ed.), Conceiving Cosmopolitanism. Theory, Context and 
Practice (Oxford 2002), 1–22 and 227–239 (by David A. Hollinger, “Not Universalists, Not 
Pluralists”).
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2. Slaves
The epic poem Mahabharata, which probably originated in the ninth and 
eight centuries and found a durable form in the fourth century BCE in South 
Asia, has as its turning point the tragic scene of a game of dice, in which King 
Yudhisthira loses his kingdom, all his possessions, his freedom, and the free-
dom of his four brothers and their joint wife Draupadi to their unscrupulous 
cousin Duryodhana. Gambling represents an offence against Dharma, and 
is punished by the loss of royal rights, property and control of one’s own 
life.13 Enslavement of all the family is the terrifying moment of the poem; 
the reversal of the fortunes of the Kurava royal family, all children of gods, 
could not be more extreme. But the greedy and treacherous behaviour of the 
winners, who try to drag away Queen Draupadi as a slave during her period, 
allows the intervention of the old King Dhrtarastra. He accords three favours 
to Queen Draupadi, who asks and obtains liberation from slavery to the 
Kurava.14 The sequence of the story does not concern us here: it is the crucial 
divide between free people and slaves, independent and dependent people, 
that I want to highlight. It expresses the abyss of the human condition in 
ancient times: to serve, receive orders, obey, wait, live one’s life as a function 
of the life of one’s master. In this episode, the horror felt by Queen Draupadi 
does not concern her and her husbands alone; it concerns her children, who 
are demoted from royal privilege to servitude. Slavery generally meant a per-
manent and perpetual condition transmitted from generation to generation.
We know that different forms of dependence, including slavery and serf-
dom, were spread all over Asia until the nineteenth century.15 Debt was one of 
the main reasons for bondage, which could be transformed from a temporary 
to a permanent condition, alongside conventional slavery, mostly due to war 
or birth. The text An Account of My Hut, written by the Japanese Kamo no 
Chōmei in 1212, gives us an insight of the logic of a system that was prevalent 
in different parts of the world:
13 Gambling is explicitly forbidden in The Laws of Manu, trans. by Wendy Doniger (London 
1991), 80, 133f., 222f.
14 The Mahabharata, trans. by J. A. B. van Buitenen (Chicago, IL 1973), books 2 and 3.
15 Anthony Reid (ed.), Slavery, Bondage and Dependency in Southeast Asia (New York 1983); 
Indrani Chatterjee / Richard M. Eaton (ed.), Slavery and South Asian History (Bloomington, 
Ind. 2006); Gwyn Campbell (ed.), The Structure of Slavery in Indian Ocean, Africa and Asia 
(London 2004). 
Open-Access-Publikation im Sinne der CC-Lizenz BY-NC-ND 4.0
34 Francisco Bethencourt
Those who are powerful are filled with greed; and those who have no protectors 
are despised. Possessions bring many worries; in poverty there is sorrow. He who 
asks another’s help becomes his slave; he who nurtures others is fettered by 
affection.16
Political and economic power are here implicitly mentioned as the sinews 
of lordship and superiority, condemned as greedy and insatiable. Poverty is 
equated with a lack of protection or dependence; but asking for help entails 
becoming a slave. Providing charity, a universal prescription made by dif-
ferent religions, is here seen as becoming subject to the bounds of affection. 
The Ballad of Selling a Child, written by the Chinese Wang Chiu-ssu three 
centuries later, concludes the sad narrative of a village woman selling her 
children to pay taxes and private debts in this humane way:
The rich grow crueller as their fields increase,/ and they buy servants and slaves with 
their wealth./ Then, one day, they curse them in anger,/ whipping them unfeelingly 
until their blood flows!/ Don’t they know that all flesh and bone comes from the same 
womb,/ that another’s son and my son are of one form?17
Humility among the powerful, respect for the weak and poor, distribution of 
land and measured taxation, already prescribed by Kong Qiu (Confucius) and 
Meng Ke (Mencius), envisaged a certain level of harmony to avoid social con-
flict.18 These general precepts can also be found in the Hindu texts The Laws 
of Manu or the Arthashastra.19 But bondage was nowhere forbidden, merely 
regulated, which meant the definition of duties and obligations between mas-
ters and slaves. Bondage is even enshrined in the Hindu tradition: The Laws 
of Manu stipulate that “even if he is set free by his master, a servant is not 
set free from slavery; for since this is innate to him, who can take it from 
him”?20 However, the Arthashastra, also probably written by several hands in 
the same period of time, between second century BCE and third century CE, 
establishes that “when a slave gives birth to a child of her master, both the 
16 Kamo no Chōmei, “An Account of My Hut”, in Anthology of Japanese Literature From the 
Earliest Era to the Mid­Nineteenth Century (1955), ed. Donald Keene (Tokyo 2006), 205.
17 Wang Chiu-ssu, “Ballad of Selling a Child”, in The Columbia Anthology of Traditional Chinese 
Literature (New York 1994), 274.
18 Confucius, The Analects, trans. by Raymond Dawson (Oxford 1993), 65; id., The Most Vener­
able Book (Shang Shu), trans. by Martin Palmer (London 2014), 120, 136; Mencius, trans. by 
D. C. Lau (London 2004), 21, 56, 141, 163. While Confucius has sup posedly lived in the sixth 
till the fith century BCE, Mencius lived in the fourth till the thrid century BCE. The attribution 
of books to Confucius is highly disputed, mainly The Most Venerable Book. 
19 The Laws of Manu, 140–142; The The Arthashastra, trans. by L. N. Rangarajan (London 
1997), 152–156. 
20 The Laws of Manu, 196.
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mother and the child shall be recognised as free. If the mother continues to 
stay with the master and look after the house, her brothers and sisters shall 
be considered free”.21 Thus offences could lead to emancipation.22 Finally, 
an Arya minor (a Hindu child of any of the four varna or recognised castes) 
could never be sold or mortgaged into slavery, while Arya families were 
subject to easier conditions for redeeming themselves from bondage due to 
debt or war.23
In Africa the same divide occurred for many centuries. Slavery and slave 
trade left an infamous heritage which meant stagnation of population and 
lineages of outcasts still stigmatised to this day in west, central and east 
Africa. The complexity of forms of slavery and serfdom from different 
origins that were found in Asia had a parallel in Africa, where local bondage 
as a result of war, debt, birth or kidnapping fed a powerful stream of slave 
trading first to the Mediterranean, then to the Middle East and finally to the 
Americas, causing an outflow of more than twenty million people between 
the fourth and nineteenth centuries.24 Local oral law regulated these practices 
of bondage, and this was matched by Roman law and Islamic law, which 
framed the activities of external traders.25 The exchange of forms of slavery 
and the continued slave trade had a visible impact, not only on structuring 
caste societies in different parts of Africa, mainly in west and central Africa, 
but also on increasing political instability in coastal areas affected by the 
transatlantic slave trade. Persistent poverty was partly the result of these 
forms of bondage and the informal caste systems they created.26
In Europe the same contrast between slaves and free people was crucial 
in the Greek and Roman world. Greek philosophy reflected on the condition 
of slaves – considered animated property but endowed with the capacity 
for reasoning and affection – and slavery, which entailed exclusion from 
citizenship, from decision-making, from having a voice in the community.27 
This notion, developed by Plato and Aristotle, was adopted by Roman law, 
which defined in detail all the possible conditions of slavery and their con-
sequences, along with an inventory of masters’ responsibilites detailed in 
Justinian’s compilation known as Corpus Iuris Civilis (529–535). However, 
slavery was defined as an institution of the law of nations (ius gentium), 
21 The Arthashastra, 415. 
22 Ibid., 414.
23 Ibid., 412f.
24 Paul Lovejoy, Transformations in Slavery. A History of Slavery in Africa (Cambridge 32012); 
The Cambridge World History of Slavery, vol. 3, ed. by David Eltis and Stanley L. Engerman 
(Cambridge 2011).
25 John K. Thornton, Africa and Africans in the Making of the Atlantic World (Cambridge 1992).
26 John Iliffe, The African Poor: A History (Cambridge 1988).
27 Plato, The Laws (London 2004), 74–109, 212–214 (676a–701d, 776b–778a). Aristotle, Politics 
(Oxford 1995), 8f., 13, 35–37 (I.2–3, I.13). 
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not of natural law (ius naturalis), since it was considered against nature to 
become a property of another person. Roman Law distinguished between 
born slaves and slaves made through war or debt.28 They were considered the 
property of owners, but there were clear restrictions concerning bad treat-
ment. Emancipated slaves did not attain the same status as free-born people. 
It was this legal background that defined the main ways to regulate slavery in 
medieval Europe, although slavery receded after the implosion of the Roman 
Empire, largely replaced by serfdom due to political instability and economic 
need to guarantee settlement and agricultural output.29 With the conquest of 
Constantinople in 1453, the import of slaves from the Black Sea was replaced 
by a supply of African slaves diverted from the Muslim networks of trade 
with North Africa and the Middle East.30 Re-direction of part of this flux to 
the New World in the early modern period represented a significant change in 
the division of the world into slave and free people. In the Americas, slavery 
was extensively developed after the European conquest.
In the eighteenth century, the loss of the American colonies, economic 
reflection on the advantages of free labour, and the resistance of slaves 
expressed by revolts triggered a British debate on ethical issues concerning 
overseas expansion.31 The abolition of the slave trade and slavery became 
a mainstream movement in British public opinion, initially pushed by 
several branches of the Protestant confession, particularly the Quakers.32 
Abolitionists found support for their cause in the idea of rights inspired by 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau and consecrated by the declarations of the American 
and French Revolutions, although these texts were meant for white people, as 
was the idea of shared human dignity, which inspired humanitarianism.33 The 
28 The Digest of Justinian, 4 vols (Philadelphia 1985), esp. book 1.5.1, 4–7, 9, 17f.; book 38; and 
book 40. See also the Institutes, book 1, http://legacy.fordham.edu/alsall/basis/535institutes.
asp.
29 The Cambridge World History of Slavery, vol. 1, ed. by Keith Bradley and Paul Cartledge 
(Cambridge 2011).
30 Charles Verlinden, L’esclavage dans l’Europe médiévale, 2 vols (Bruges 1955–1977).
31 Christopher Leslie Brown, Moral Capital: Foundations of British Abolitionism (Chapel Hill, 
NC 2006). 
32 See the related chapters by Mariano Delgado, “ ‘All People have Reason and Free Will’: 
The Controversy Over the Nature of the Indians in the Sixteenth Century”, Thomas Weller, 
“Humanitarianism Before Humanitarianism? Spanish Discourses on Slavery From the Six-
teenth to the Nineteenth Century” and Fabian Klose, “ ‘A War of Justice and Humanity’: Aboli-
tion and Establishing Humanity as an International Norm”, in this volume.
33 Although the idea of human rights was not meant to slave people at the very beginning, it 
was immediately appropriated and transformed by slave revolts and anti-slavery move-
ments. See Seymour Drescher, Abolition. A History of Slavery and Antislavery (Cambridge 
2009), 10–118, 159–163. This is a moment of entangled history of ideas; for a different per-
spective, relating abolitionism exclusively with humanitarianism, see Samuel Moyn, “Die neue 
Historiographie der Menschenrechte”, in Geschichte und Gesellschaft 38 (2012), 545–572, on 
pp. 559–561.
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movement spread, albeit with some difficulty, to all Europe; the principle of 
free soil had been established in Britain and Western Europe, although the 
abolition of serfdom only occurred in Russia in 1861.34 The long sequence 
of abolitions of slave trade and slavery from the 1800s to the 1880s, in the 
European colonial world and the independent new countries in the Americas, 
eloquently expressed these social and intellectual changes, although in the 
European colonial world slavery was often replaced by native forced labour 
and indentured labour from India and China. In the Americas the movement 
for the emancipation of slaves played a crucial role, but in other parts of the 
world the new Western system of values had to confront ingrained practices 
of slavery and serfdom, particularly in the Muslim world, in India and in 
Africa, while in China forms of bondage persisted until the early twentieth 
century.35 In time, local oppressed populations appropriated antislavery 
values to contest their social position.
The abolition of slavery was extended to the whole world and enshrined 
by the universal declaration of human rights ratified by the United Nations in 
1948; the last country officially to abolish slavery was Saudi Arabia in 1960. 
The dignity of the human being was at the core of this movement, although 
the supposed superiority of the white man was not really questioned in the 
West until the Second World War. Slavery became illegal, but forced labour 
was practiced on a large scale in the colonial empires even after the Second 
World War, by the Nazis during the War, targeting Jews, Slavs, Roma and 
their political opponents, and by the Soviets from the 1930s to the 1950s, 
targeting political opponents and supposedly unreliable ethnicities.36 Formal 
and informal forms of bondage still exist in different parts of the world. As 
we have seen with serfdom, slavery was not the only criterion by which to 
define dependent work. The notion of domestic service, for instance, had 
long-term consequences, being excluded from electoral rights in the nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries.37 In this period, large sections of the 
population did not have access to full citizenship due to the notion of depen-
dent labour. The extension of the notion of citizenship, however, created 
a new norm that pushed the most debasing practices of social oppression 
to the margins.
34 David Moon, “Peasants and Agriculture”, in The Cambridge History of Russia, vol. II: Imperial 
Russia, 1689–1917 (Cambridge 2006), 369–388.
35 Mohammed Ennaji, Slavery, the State and Islam (Cambridge 2013); Drescher, Abolition. 
36 Drescher, Abolition, 415–455; Francisco Bethencourt, Racisms: From the Crusades to the 
Twentieth Century (Princeton, NJ 2013), 335–365.
37 Even the liberal Spanish constitution of 1812 excluded dependent work from elections: https://
es.wikisource.org/wiki/Constituci%C3%B3n_espa%C3%B1ola_de_1812. Lucy Delap, Know­
ing Their Place: Domestic Servants in Twentieth Century England (Oxford 2011); Inês Paulo 
Brasão, O Tempo das criadas: A condição servil em Portugal (1940–1970) (Lisbon 2012). 
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3. Barbarians
The second major division in humankind formulated both by Greek and 
Chinese societies concerned foreigners. The noun “barbarian” has its origin 
in the Greek barbaros, which designated non-Hellenic people, taken from 
the Sanskrit barbara, and used in the plural for foreign peoples. It is an 
onomatopoeic noun which imitates the babbling sounds of someone inca-
pable of speaking the language of reference. Etymology stresses its cultural 
meaning: it meant a foreigner, someone rude, without manners, a stranger 
to urban or policed society.38 The Greeks used the noun barbarian to reflect 
upon other societies they were in conflict with, mainly the First Persian 
Empire (c. 550–330 BCE). Political despotism, the subjection of peoples, the 
absence of political participation, the absence of notions of citizenship, and 
acceptance of tyranny equated with slave behaviour were the main features 
attributed by the Greeks to the Persians. Violence, cruelty, luxury, sensuality, 
idleness and cowardice were part of the Greek vision of the Persian Empire.39
This perception was to have a long-term impact on Roman and then West-
ern political thought on Oriental despotism, defining an East / West divide 
concerning models of political regimes. Aristotle justified predatory conquest 
by equating this supposed absence of the idea of citizenship among barbar-
ians with natural slavery, a vision projected onto Native Americans by Juan 
Ginés de Sepulveda in the sixteenth century debate with Bartolomé de Las 
Casas on indigenous freedom, dignity and capacity for self-government.40 
The idea of self-enslavement was also to have an extraordinary impact, in 
the sixteenth century, with Étienne de La Boétie and the idea of voluntary 
servitude; and in the eighteenth century, with Giambattista Tiepolo and the 
representation of the slave next to Asia locking manacles onto himself in 
the fresco of the four continents painted on the ceiling of the Stairway Hall 
in the archiepiscopal palace at Würzburg.41 The idea of voluntary servitude 
inspired first Tolstoy and then Gandhi to challenge political power through 
collective widespread disobedience, following the idea that tyranny is only 
sustained by undue acquiescence.42
38 Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (Oxford 52002), 184.
39 Herodotus, The Histories (London 1972), books VII–IX; Thucydides, History of the Pelopon­
nesian War (London 1972), book I.
40 Anthony Pagden, The Fall of Natural Man. The American Indian and the Origins of Compara­
tive Ethnography (Cambridge 1982). See the chapter by Delgado, “ All People have Reason and 
Free Will”, in this volume.
41 Étienne de la Boétie, Discours de la servitude volontaire (1576) (Paris 1983); Giambattista 
Tiepolo, Apollo and the Continents, fresco, staircase, Residenz, Würzburg – see the analysis 
in Svetlana Alpers and Michael Baxandall, Tiepolo and the Pictorial Image (New Haven, CT 
1994), particularly on p. 132. 
42 Leo Tolstoy, The Kingdom of God is Within You, trans. by Constance Garnett (London 1894); 
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The Greeks were using the Persian case – but also Scythian, Egyptian and 
Phoenician examples, among others – to reflect on their own identity.43 The 
divide between the Hellenic and the Barbarian worlds meant the assertion 
of their own forms of political regimes, and their own notions of citizenship 
and democracy based on free, adult, male members of the community, even 
if the political model of Athens prevailed in historical memory. This divide 
is visible in philosophical and political treatises, epic poems, chronicles 
and plays, although the main Greek literary authors, such as Herodotus, 
Aeschylus, Thucydides and Euripides, were critical of the Hellenic world, 
blurring differences between Greek and barbarian characters and dissolving 
stereotypes by the use of irony.44 Despite these challenges to simple polar-
isation, the long-term prejudices against barbarians became equated, in the 
Christian world, with the notions of heathens and pagans inherited from the 
Jewish culture.45 Those who were outside the oikouménē (the known world 
under the Greeks and the civilised world under the Roman Empire) were seen 
as strangers and inferiors, lacking mainly religion but also knowledge and 
capacity. In this tradition, attested and critically discussed by Montaigne with 
reference to the extreme case of cannibalism, the barbarian does not have only 
defects; in certain cases he is supposed to be a brave and courageous warrior, 
qualities lost or at risk from an excess of refinement in Europe.46 However, 
even with nuances, barbarian is a noun with clear ethnocentric implications, 
since it supposes the superiority of one’s culture, a feeling shared by the 
Chinese civilisation.47
The notion of a savage is the extreme case in the hierarchy of human 
beings, beyond barbarian, and deprived of the rudiments of civilisation, 
living a nomadic life, without knowledge of writing, equated with beasts 
and cannibals. It was used to underline opposition between civilised and 
uncivilised and taken on board by José de Acosta in late sixteenth century to 
renew the old prejudice against people who did not form permanent settle-
ments.48 It became a persistent stereotype used constantly by the Europeans 
Mahatma Gandhi, The Essential Writings, ed. Gopalkrishna Gandhi (Oxford 2008), 33, 
366–371.
43 Kostas Vlassopoulos, Greeks and Barbarians (Cambridge 2013). 
44 See among others Aeschylus, Persians and Other Plays, trans. by Janet Lembke and C. J. Her-
ington (Oxford 2009); Edith Hall, Inventing the Barbarian: Greek Self­Definition Through 
Tragedy (Oxford 1989).
45 John Marenbon, Pagans and Philosophers. The Problem of Paganism From Augustine to 
Leibniz (Princeton, NJ 2015). 
46 This was the line of reasoning exposed by Cornelius Tacitus, The Agricola and The Germania, 
trans. by S. A. Handford (Harmondsworth 1970).
47 Confucius, The Most Venerable Book, 101, 169; for a precise historical context see Evelyn 
S. Rawski, Early Modern China and Northeast Asia: Cross­Border Perspectives (Cambridge 
2015).
48 José de Acosta, De procuranda indorum salute (1588), vol. I (Madrid 1984), 62–70.
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in their voyages of exploration to define tribal people or people living close 
to nature. It was even used by Charles Darwin in his Voyage of the Beagle, 
horrified in Tierra del Fuego by the communitarian sharing of all goods and 
the absence of private property, the latter seen as the lever for improvement 
under the influence of Thomas Malthus.49 However, the notion of the savage 
was soon questioned by Jean de Léry, the Protestant pastor who founded 
the French settlement in Guanabara Bay in the mid-sixteenth century, and 
who equated the Catholic understanding of the Eucharist with cannibalism.50 
The notion was also derided by Montaigne, who used it to reflect on the 
European presumption of civilisation in a century of atrocious religious wars. 
He exposed the double standards of European ideas and asked who were 
the savages or the cannibals after all.51 Curiously, a long time ago in China, 
this conversation attributed to Confucius was recorded in The Analects: “The 
master wished to dwell among the nine wild tribes of the East. Someone said: 
‘They are uncivilized, so what will you do about that?’ The Master said: 
‘If a gentleman dwelt among them, what lack of civility would they show?’ ”52 
This is a clear statement in favour of the possibility of improvement shared 
by all human beings, long before the theory of races started to be elaborated 
in Europe.
The long-term assimilation of populations considered to be barbarians in 
China is a very interesting case of ethnic re-composition due to the centrali-
sation of the state, leading to more than 90 % of the population claiming Han 
ancestry. However, there are still traces of old divisions due to late conquest 
of territories in Central Asia, particularly in Xinjiang, where the Uyghur 
were recently subjected to overwhelming immigration that has changed the 
demographic balance of the region. In other areas where the integration of 
populations has proved difficult, such as the mountainous areas of the South-
west, there are still populations considered tribal. From the 1930s onwards 
there was an intellectual movement praising cultural mixing and infusion of 
new blood. In Japan, certainly a much less extensive territory, the vast major-
ity of the population claim Yamato ancestry, although there is a traditional 
divide concerning the Ainu population (native to the Northern Hokkaido and 
Kuril islands), considered tribal and also subject to extensive immigration 
from the other islands.53 This underlying vision of tribal people as ‘primitive’ 
49 Charles Darwin, Journal of Researches Into the Natural History and Geology of the Countries 
Visited During the Voyage of H. M. S. Beagle (1839) (London 2003), 403f., 417–419, 432f., 
445–450. 
50 Jean de Léry, Histoire d’un voyage fait en la Terre du Brésil (1580), ed. Frank Lestringant 
(Montpellier 1992), 143–150. 
51 Michel de Montaigne, Essays (1580), trans. by M. A. Screech (London 2013), 79–84.
52 Confucius, The Analects, 32.
53 Richard Siddle, Race, Resistance and the Ainu of Japan (London 1996). 
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lasted until the present in different parts of the world, mainly in the Americas 
and Oceania. In the United States, for instance, Native American peoples 
were considered foreign nations until 1871, when the Supreme Court defined 
them as domestic dependent nations, wards of the government, without full 
sovereignty. Native Americans only received citizenship in 1924.54 Although 
there were attempts to protect their way of life in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries, particularly in Brazil, constant white pressure for land and hier-
archical perception of Native Americans prevailed until very recently. But 
if we turn to the growing field of international law by the end of the nine-
teenth century, we will see that the division between civilised, barbarian and 
savaged humanity was still argued by the main legal philosophers such as 
James Lorimer.55
4. Racism
The third division of humankind concerns the transformation of ethnocentrism 
into racism. While ethnocentrism views ‘others’ with fear or contempt 
but allows for the integration of individuals, racism combines prejudice 
concerning ethnic descent with discriminatory action. It is systematic dis-
criminatory action that defines racism.56 The first obvious case in history 
concerns discrimination against converted Jews and Muslims in Iberia after 
the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries; and it breaches the universal tradition 
of Christianity since Paul of Tarsus’s decision to preach to the heathens. Jews 
and Muslims were uprooted from their religious traditions through violent 
conversion; but they were not fully integrated in the Christian community. 
They became labelled as New Christians and Moriscos; they were viewed as 
having the same attributes as their ancestors; and finally they were excluded 
from public offices, colleges, religious orders, military orders, confraternities 
and guilds.57
Racism preceded and informed the theory of races. The notions of blood 
and genealogy, which had defined high and low birth in late medieval 
Europe, was followed by the notion of “tainted blood”, first targeting the 
Iberian New Christians and Moriscos, then the African slaves brought into 
54 William C. Sturtevant (ed.), Handbook of North American Indians, vol. 4 (Washington, DC 
1988); Wilcomb E. Washburn (ed.), History of Indian­White Relations (Washington, DC 1988).
55 I thank Fabian Klose for this information; see Fabian Klose and Mirjam Thulin, “ Introduction: 
European Concepts and Practices of Humanity in Historical Perspective”, in this volume.
56 Bethencourt, Racisms, 1, 6–8.
57 Rafael Carrasco, Deportados en nombre de Dios: la expulsión de los moriscos (Barce-
lona 2009); Joseph Pérez, Los judios en España (Madrid 2005); Francisco Bethencourt, 
Racisms, 137–151. 
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Iberia after the mid-fourteenth century and into the New World after the early 
twentieth century. The dynamics of mixed-race people in the New World, 
particularly in Mexico and Brazil, created a hierarchy of ‘stained blood’ 
that encompassed a wide variety of possible combinations, as represented 
in the casta paintings of the eighteenth century.58 In the meantime, Portu-
guese and Spanish Oceanic expansion opened up intercontinental relations 
and revealed the extraordinary variety of human beings around the world. 
Prejudices concerning African slaves were projected onto Native Americans 
and Asian peoples, labelled as “local Blacks”. However, detailed human 
geography emerged through travel accounts, reports and chronicles, showing 
differences concerning the European yardstick.59
Imperial projects took advantage of the new intercontinental maritime 
connections, adopting the Roman and Byzantine tradition of representing 
the Emperor surrounded by people from all around the known world. The 
universal purpose of empire was updated with Charles V, and during his 
reign the entrances to his cities in Italy, Spain and the Low Countries were 
embellished with representations of the different peoples he ruled over. The 
title page of Abraham Ortelius’s atlas published in 1570 used allegorical 
female figures to personify the four known continents,60 and these typified 
the different races of human beings. This extraordinary image synthesised 
a century of oceanic exploration and offered a tentative representation of 
the variety of human beings, now divided by continents in a simplified way. 
The title page expressed a hierarchy of human races that corresponded to the 
new assertion of Europe over the Middle East. The previous central position 
of Jerusalem had been shifted as a result of Oceanic exploration and with 
it the vision of the different peoples of the Earth. The prejudices concern-
ing races projected here – Europe representing regulated power, labour and 
justice, contrasted to Asian sensuality and lightness, African roughness and 
American cannibalism – had an enormous impact all over Europe, and by 
the nineteenth century they had inspired more than 500 paintings, sculptures 
and engravings.61 It was this synthetic and self-serving vision of European 
superiority in the world during the age of expansion that was taken on 
board by the late seventeenth-, eighteenth- and nineteenth-century theory 
of races.
58 Ilona Katzew, Casta Painting: Images of Race in Eighteenth Century Mexico (New Haven, CT 
2004); Pilar Romero de Tejada (ed.), Frutas e castas ilustradas (Madrid 2004). 
59 Bethencourt, Racisms, part II.
60 Abraham Ortelius, Theatrum Orbis Terrarum (Antwerp 1570); see Elizabeth McGrath, 
“Humanism, Allegorical Invention, and the Personification of the Continents”, in Hans 
Vlieghe et al. (ed.), Rubenium. Concept, Design and Execution in Flemish Printing (1550–1700) 
(Turnhout 2000), 43–71.
61 Sabine Poeschel, Studien zur Ikonographie der Erdteile in der Kunst des 16.–18. Jahrhunderts 
(Munich 1985). 
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Man was placed in nature, on top of the mammals and primates, above the 
apes, by Carl Linnaeus in his Systema Naturae, published in 1735.62 Linnaeus 
distinguished four categories, the white European, the red American, the 
dark Asian and the black African, but he added the wild and the monstrous 
men. These categories, interpreted as races, were developed in successive 
editions of the book. The hierarchy of human races was established not only 
by gradations of skin colour and physical features, but also by supposed men-
tal attributes: the playful and careless African, the greedy and authoritarian 
Asian, embodying traditional European stereotypes of feckless Africa and 
Oriental despotism. Political stereotypes completed the picture: the African 
was regulated by caprice, the American by custom, the Asian by opinion, and 
the European by law. The supposed superiority of the European was further 
stressed by physical and mental attributes: he was muscular, inventive, and 
acute.63 In the first edition of the Systema Naturae, the references to wild and 
the monstrous men reveal the tricks used to represent the chain of beings, 
with the wild man close to the apes, while the monstrous man was considered 
to represent some form of degeneration, a crucial eighteenth century topic 
and an enduring one, which was justified by the idea of perfect creation, an 
idea then challenged by the emerging notion of progress.
Buffon, Kant, Camper and Blumenbach helped to complicate this simple 
vision, not only stressing the presence of black people across continents – an 
idea already suggested in the seventeenth century by Alonso de Sandoval and 
François Bernier – but adding new races, particularly for Southeast Asia and 
Oceania, which were now brought into the picture.64 They projected previ-
ous stereotypes, drawing heavily on travel literature, but they also created a 
scientific framework that had a major impact on popular perceptions of races, 
not only in Europe but also in other continents. These authors, curiously, were 
generally in favour of the abolition of the slave trade and slavery, they pro-
moted the dignity of human beings, they supported the idea of perfectibility 
of all human beings; but they never doubted the superiority of the white man. 
Camper had another important impact: as both a sculptor and an anatomist, 
he tried to create the first measurement for the different races based on the 
facial angle, two lines from the forehead to the basis of the nose and from that 
point to the entrance of the ear. He calculated that the African would have 
62 Carl Linnaeus, Systema naturæ (Lugduni Batavorum [Leiden] 1735).
63 Id., Systema naturæ (Vindobonæ [Vienna] 1767–1770), vol. 1, 28–33. 
64 Alonso de Sandoval, Un tratado sobre la esclavitud (1627) (Madrid 1987), book 1; François 
Bernier, “Nouvelle division de la terre, par les différentes espèces ou races d’hommes qui 
l’habitent”, in Journal des Sçavans April 24 (1684), 148–155; Buffon, De l’homme (extracts 
1749–1777) (Paris 2006); Immanuel Kant, Anthropology, History and Education (Cambridge 
2007), 82–97, 143–159; Camper, The Works (London 1794); Johann Friedrich Blumenbach, 
The Anthropological Treatises (London 1865). 
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an angle of 70o, the American 73o, the Asian 75o and the European 80o. The 
problem is that he compared these measures with apes, estimated at 55o, and 
Roman and Greek sculptures, which reached 90o and 100o. Charles White, an 
English naturalist and polygenist immediately recycled these images as proof 
that black people were closer to the apes.65
This measurement (or better, mismeasurement, as Stephen Jay Gould 
characterised it) had enormous consequences as it was first elaborated by 
Blumenbach, who tried to establish new methods of skull analysis, then sim-
plified by Samuel Morton, who focused on the volume of the skull.66 The 
flaws of the method – nobody considered the sex, age, economic and social 
background of these randomly collected skulls – were ironically pointed out 
by Gobineau, himself a notorious racist, but they persisted, and were later 
transferred to the calculation of the intelligence quotient (IQ) of different 
peoples and applied to the immigration quotas of the United States in the 
first half of the twentieth century. The debate concerning the method and 
racial implications of The Bell Curve: Intelligence and Class Structure in 
American Life, published by Richard Herrnstein and Charles Murray in 1994, 
was the most recent outcome of this sequence of failed attempts to define 
race according to levels of intelligence.67
In the meantime, the scientific framework shifted dramatically in the 
mid-nineteenth century. The vision of immutable races advocated by Samuel 
Morton, Robert Knox, Arthur Gobineau, Josiah Nott and Louis Agassiz pro-
moted a new scientific racialism opposed to previous ideas of the benefits 
of mixing and improvement of all humans beings.68 The ideas of natural 
inequality, racial hierarchy and white racial superiority embodied in Aryan 
peoples were thus reinforced. This trend responded to the egalitarian ideas 
of the revolution of 1848 in Europe, the debate concerning free soil in the 
American expansion to the West, and the problematic integration of vast pop-
ulations through the expansion of the British Empire in Asia.69 These ideas 
of perpetual and immutable races enduring from creation were soon made 
obsolete by the notion of natural selection promoted by Darwin, highlighting 
millions of years of adaptation, survival and large-scale extermination of 
65 Charles White, An Account of the Regular Gradation in Man and in Different Animals and 
Vegetables (London 1799).
66 Stephen Jay Gould, The Mismeasure of Men (New York 1996).
67 Richard Herrnstein and Charles Murray, The Bell Curve: Intelligence and Class Structure in 
American Life (New York 1994).
68 Samuel Morton, Crania Americana and Crania Aegyptiaca (1839–1840) (Bristol 2002); 
Robert Knox, The Races of Men: A Fragment (London 1850); Arthur de Gobineau, “Essai sur 
l’inégalité des races humaines (1853–55)”, in Oeuvres (Paris 1983), vol. 1, 133–1174; Josiah 
Nott / George Gliddon (ed.), Types of Mankind (Philadelphia 1857); Louis Agassiz, An Essay on 
Classification (1857) (Cambridge, MA 1962). 
69 Bethencourt, Racisms, 271–289.
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species. However, the idea of the survival of the fittest had an impact on the 
emerging social sciences, being reinterpreted, namely by Benjamin Kidd, as 
indicating the inevitable decline of less competitive races.70 Racial division 
stayed at the core of the European discussion until the mid-twentieth century, 
when the atrocious genocides perpetrated during the Second World War led 
to the condemnation of the theories of races that sustained such infamous 
policies against humankind. Repulsion at the atrocities committed during 
colonial wars and the civic action of African Americans in the United States 
to access full citizenship and human rights contributed to exposing the dou-
ble standards of the West and reinforcing the anti-racist norm all over the 
world.71 While we can say that racist divisions receded dramatically in the 
world over the past 60 years, there are still extensive informal practices of 
discrimination and segregation based on racial prejudices, mainly connected 
to the enormous increase in migration among continents, due to war and bad 
working conditions.
5. Gender
The fourth division of humankind concerns sex, or rather, gender as a social 
and cultural construct.72 The subordination of women to men was imposed in 
virtually all cultures, as well as the regulation of sexual behaviour. In China, 
the five Confucian precepts corresponded to the five virtues of filial love, 
loyalty, marital fidelity, obedience and sincerity.73 Natural hierarchy implied 
the submission of children to their father, women to their husbands, widows 
to their sons, and younger siblings to their older male siblings.74 Within the 
family, the most important relationship was between father and son; women 
counted mainly for reproduction and matrimonial alliances. Moderate and 
benevolent rule was generally praised, and contrasted with common cases of 
public and domestic abuse. Mencius tells the story of Tchou, the last emperor 
of the Yin, who killed two of his ducal ministers and imprisoned the third, 
the future King Wen, who was only released when he made gifts of beautiful 
women, fine horses and rare objects – a telling combination – to the tyrant.75 
70 Benjamin Kidd, Social Evolution (London 1894). 
71 Fabian Klose, Human Rights in the Shadow of Colonial Violence: The Wars of Independence in 
Kenya and Algeria (Philadelphia 2013); Jack E. Davis (ed.), The Civil Rights Movement (Oxford 
2001); Carol Anderson, Eyes off the Prize. The United Nations and the African American Strug­
gle for Human Rights, 1944–1955 (Cambridge 2003).
72 Judith Butler / Elizabeth Weed (ed.), The Question of Gender: Joan W. Scott’s Critical Femi­
nism (Bloomington, IN 2011).
73 Confucius, The Most Venerable Book, 87, 153.
74 Mencius, 42, 65, 148, 181.
75 Ibid., 197.
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The maintenance of unmarried women was guaranteed by their limited 
participation in inheritance, while the rule of patrilineal inheritance, even 
where there was an absence of male descendants, was reinforced in the early 
Ming dynasty. The chaste widow, increasingly recognised in this dynasty, 
could manage an estate in the absence of sons, but she needed to choose the 
closest nephew as the heir. The vast number of concubines and dependents, 
who did not participate in the inheritance system, complicated the problem of 
women’s access to property in China.76
The condition of women in Africa varied significantly from region to 
region. In West Africa, for instance, there were many communities that fol-
lowed matrilineal inheritance laws, but the system made women the point 
of reference without giving them power. In certain circumstances of women 
at the margins of the African lineage system, particularly those who had 
married European men in pre-colonial times, they could enjoy significant 
economic and social power as widows or wives of absent husbands, managing 
their wealth. This pattern could be reproduced from generation to generation, 
has the case of the sinhá (Creole for Portuguese senhora, lady) in coastal 
West Africa well attested.77 Given the extraordinary diversity of these situa-
tions, Catherine Cocquery-Vidrovitch’s strong statement that the condition of 
women in late nineteenth-century Africa hardly differed from that of slaves, 
due to their extreme subordination to men, needs reassessment.78 Neverthe-
less it is worth noting the extraordinary heavy work imposed on women, 
mainly in agricultural and household duties, along with violent rituals of 
initiation intended to prepare them for submission. In the case of Muslim 
population, inheritance was regulated by the Qur’ān and the Shari’a, which 
guarantee the maintenance of women, who would receive half the portion 
inherited by their brothers.79
In Europe, the general recognition of private property prevented the 
re-absorption by the state of property left without direct heirs, but there was 
a significant diversity of systems. In various parts of the continent, dowries 
would compensate wealthy married women for their exclusion from inherited 
property, but the management of property by husbands was a matter of con-
cern: it could end up in court. Unmarried women from wealthy backgrounds 
were excluded from inheriting property – at best they could stay with their 
76 Kathryn Bernhardt, Women and Property in China, 960–1949 (Stanford, CA 1999).
77 Philip Havik, Silences and Soundbytes. The Gendered Dynamic of Trade and Brokerage in the 
Pre­Colonial Guinea Bissau Region (Münster 2004).
78 Catherine Cocquery-Vidrovitch, “Women, Marriage and Slavery in Sub-Saharan Africa in 
the Nineteenth Century”, in Gwyn Campbell et al. (ed.), Women and Slavery (Athens, OH 
2007), 43–61; Catherine Cocquery-Vidrovitch, Les africaines. Histoire des femmes d’Afrique 
subsaharienne du XIXe au XXe siècle (Paris 22013). 
79 Elke Stockreiter, Islamic Law, Gender and Social Change in Post­Abolition Zanzibar 
(Cambridge 2015).
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siblings or enter a convent – but younger brothers also had a difficult life 
under property entails that favoured the elder son.80 The extraordinary access 
to property given to wealthy women in Russia following the reforms of Peter 
the Great underlines the diversity of legal regimes of succession in use across 
Europe, although in regions where properties were small, particularly in 
Northern Spain and Portugal, and in various parts of Italy, in the absence 
of brothers women would regularly inherit.81 Although widows did have 
legal rights to property in various European countries, mainly in the South, 
the vast majority of women were placed in a subordinate position, and this 
situation was only addressed in the twentieth century. In general, it was only 
in the last century that the access of women to property, legal rights including 
inheritance, and the electoral system started to be addressed.
The debate on women’s rights still divides societies in the present day, 
due to the idea that religions with a traditional vision of subordinated women 
should be respected. It is one of the issues concerning human rights that 
lacks a consensus, arousing vigorous debate about double standards and 
implicit hierarchies of people, leading to denunciations of the universalist 
vision of women’s rights. The enormous historical changes that occurred in 
various Muslim societies still need to be acknowledged. They suggest the 
possibility of internal dynamic forces willing to push for further changes, 
including changes to gender divisions. But we should not concentrate only on 
Muslim societies, since the status of women is still far from being addressed 
in a satisfactory way in Western societies, too. In any case, local women’s 
initiatives in the past two centuries in various parts of the world have not yet 
been sufficiently studied.
6. Social Exclusion
The fifth division of humankind concerns extreme social exclusion through 
ranking, discrimination and segregation. In India, the perpetuation of 
professions and occupations within certain groups was reinforced in the 
past through their equation with castes and sub-castes. Castes have been 
linked to Hinduism and are attested to in the old texts, particularly in 
The Laws of Manu, but there is a general recent consensus that the caste 
system is not static; there is an enormous regional diversity and evidence 
80 Merry E. Wiesner, Women and Gender in Early Modern Europe (Cambridge 2000). 
81 Michelle Lamarque Marrese, “Gender and the Legal Order in Imperial Russia, 1689–1917”, in 
Dominic Lieven (ed.), The Cambridge History of Russia, vol. 2: Imperial Russia, 1689–1917 
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of upward mobility among several castes, while conversion to a different 
religion may change social status.82 The segregation of outcastes (or Dalit) 
has been illegal in India since the constitution of 1949, but informal segre-
gation persists.83 Many activists have accepted the arguments of Babasaheb 
Ambedkar, one of the architects of the Constitution and himself an Dalit, 
who late in life became a Buddhist. He claimed that the emancipation of 
the outcastes could only occur with the abolition of the caste system al- 
together.84
This is an extreme case, which can be analysed as internal racism, although 
India has become one of the most successful parliamentary regimes. Social 
exclusion here is not equated with political exclusion. Traditional ranking in 
Japan included outcast Burakumin, linked either to entertainment or to menial 
tasks dealing with dead bodies, carcasses of animals and refuse, although 
their numbers in society were much lighter than in India. Segregation of the 
Burakumin became illegal with the Meiji restoration, but discrimination is 
still visible nowadays.85 However, Japan never had a caste system, being a 
relatively homogeneous society. In China, the Confucian system of exams 
for all levels of administration, reinforced after the Song dynasty, excluded 
the idea of hierarchy based on blood. However, if the idea of nobility based 
on blood and descent declined very early, due to imperial policies, ethnic 
conflict was not absent, particularly conflict involving the people of moun-
tainous peripheries and Muslim Uyghurs in Central Asia.86 Social ranking 
was reinforced through political favour, although lineage and family hier-
archies were shaped at local and regional levels. Status was a main issue, 
which was also the case in Africa, where ranking was linked to specialised 
lineages, access to power and redistribution of resources. In Europe the old 
ranking by orders, in which nobility of blood played such an important role, 
was replaced by the hierarchy of class and status groups, based on economic 
82 The Laws of Manu, 6f. (on the creation of the four varna), 238–243 (on outcasts); The Rig 
Veda. An Anthology (London 1981), 31; see also R. S. Khare (ed.), Caste, Hierarchy and Indivi­ 
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and social assets.87 Social mobility improved in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries, but in the past forty years social renewal has become less attain-
able again. The big social debate has focused on the end of poverty, with real 
progress made all over the world, but recent stagnation shifted the discussion 
to the growing gap between rich and poor. Social inequality is now at the 
forefront of the political and social debate.88 But social divisions are rooted 
at local, regional, national and supra-national levels, representing the most 
difficult challenges since they do not fit into the basic framework of national 
management of individual rights.
7. Conclusion
To conclude, I posit that the divide between slaves and free people was partly 
overcome in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, although countervailed 
by entrenched forced labour in the colonies and the massive return of forced 
labour from the 1930s to the 1950s in Europe, while pockets of slavery 
persist in different parts of the world. The notion of the “barbarian” also 
receded dramatically in the past centuries, due to the explosion of migration 
between continents, followed by more or less successful integration into 
local societies. However, there are still strong prejudices against migrants 
from developing countries and refugees from war zones. Here again we 
see religious and ethnic prejudices at work. Race is unfortunately still all 
too visible in the way humankind is divided, even if racism is no longer 
reinforced by law. There was undeniable legal progress, but economic and 
social conditions of discriminated-against minorities did not dramatically 
improve. Divisions based upon gender became less acute in the past cen-
tury in the western world; legal equality has improved, but it is still far from 
being established in several parts of the world. Economic and social equal 
opportunities remain elusive; the gap between rich and poor has been wid-
ening in the past decades in most part of the world, even if absolute poverty 
has been encouragingly reduced. Ranking is one of the persistent realities 
of human condition; many social dynamics are driven by reproduction of 
hierarchies, conformity and distinction. The battle against social exclusion 
is still far from being won. The notion of human dignity has certainly reg-
istered enormous progress, revealed by the consensus on the need to end 
87 Peter Burke, “The Language of Orders in Early Modern Europe”, in M. L. Bush (ed.), Social 
Orders and Social Classes in Europe Since 1500 (London 1992), 1–12.
88 Thomas Piketty, Capital in the Twenty­First Century (Cambridge, MA 2014); Joseph Stiglitz, 
The Price of Inequality (London 2012).
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poverty, although the means to do it are contentious, as the present debate on 
social inequality and how it hinders economic and social development well 
demonstrates.
I have not had space here to address national divisions, which have been 
relatively in abeyance since the devastation of the two world wars. However, 
these divisions are still in place, transformed into a political tool, particu-
larly against immigration, in Europe. Tribal and ethnic divisions are also at 
work, mainly in the Middle East due to failure of the state. Finally, religious 
divisions, which were considered something of the past, have returned with 
surprising violence through faction fighting and political projects of empire 
based on the manipulation of religious beliefs. This new reality challenges the 
Weberian notion of secularisation projected onto a world-wide scale; but it is 
also the result of systematic repression, supported by the Western powers, 
of secular political alternatives. We are now facing different social rhythms, 
economic layers, and cultural and religious backgrounds in a world that is 
far from homogeneous. The re-configuration of a comprehensive notion of 
humankind, hopefully based on an ever-evolving set of human rights, is still 
a fight for the present and for the future.89
89 See Johannes Paulmann, “Humanity – Humanitarian Reason – Imperial Humanitarianism: 
European Concepts in Practice”, in this volume.
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Universalism and its Discontents
Humanity as a Twentieth-Century Concept
Humanity was one of the most used – and abused – concepts of the last 
century. It possessed a remarkably elastic character, serving variably as a 
rallying slogan, political claim and term of derision. Tempting as it is to 
explore the semantic history of the term as a kind of Begriffsgeschichte, 
I prefer to do something else in this essay, not least because Humanität was 
one of the original entries in the third volume of the classic Geschichtliche 
Grundbegriffe, co-edited by Reinhart Koselleck.1 This entry mostly concen-
trated on the Early Modern period, and argued that the term’s modern roots 
can be traced back to the Enlightenment or Christian missionaries. Whatever 
its exact provenance, Claude Lévi-Strauss was correct to say that the concept 
of an all-inclusive humanity blind to racial or cultural differences “appeared 
very late in the history of mankind and did not spread very widely across the 
globe”.2 That may be for the better, given the way in which the dark spectre and 
cruel practices of inhumanity shadowed the lofty dreams of humanity over 
the last two hundred years. And in light of the last century’s chequered record 
of achievements and horrors, the French philosopher Alain Finkielkraut, in 
his elegant little book In the Name of Humanity: Reflections on the Twentieth 
Century, draws attention to the dialectical nature of twentieth century hu- 
manism itself by posing the question:
Can this new form of humanism explain how individuals espousing the most radical 
will to free humanity from its chains could produce a world of concentration camps 
like the ones produced by those who submitted themselves to the most rigid form of 
determinism?3
1 I would like to thank Robert Moeller, Margaret MacMillan, Steve Smith and Stefan-Ludwig 
Hoffmann for their constructive comments on an earlier draft. Hans Erich Bödeker, “Mensch-
heit, Humanität, Humanismus”, in Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe: Historisches Lexikon zur 
politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland, Bd. 3 (Stuttgart 1982), 1063–1128. 
2 Claude Lévi-Strauss, Structural Anthropology, vol. 2, trans. Monique Layton (Chicago, IL 
1983), 329. 
3 Alain Finkielkraut, In the Name of Humanity: Reflections on the Twentieth Century, trans. John 
O’Neill (French original 1996), 42. 
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This is a huge question, needless to say, and those who have tried to 
answer it have often put forward various histories of humanity dominated 
by villains and heroes, such as Jonathan Glover’s popular book, Human-
ity: A Moral History of the Twentieth Century, with the usual suspects 
assigned their predictable places in a latter-day Divine Comedy. By con-
trast, I am going to try to outline how the term humanity was politicised 
at pivotal moments over the twentieth century. At times it dovetailed with 
cognate terms, like civilisation, humanitarianism and human rights, while 
at other times it signified something different altogether. In what follows I 
will reflect on how the concept was used at various political junctures over 
the twentieth century, with particular emphasis on World War I, 1945 and 
decolonisation.
Let’s start with the Great War, or really just before it. It is well known that 
the concept of humanity had a long history before 1914, and was a subject 
of intense debate in the latter half of the nineteenth century.4 However, it’s 
often forgotten that many of the main proponents of the concept of human-
ity before 1914 were pacifists. Certainly the second half of the nineteenth 
century witnessed widespread concern about the development of various 
anti-Enlightenment philosophies based on difference, violence and the 
defence of sacred communities under threat, be it in the form of imperialism, 
nationalism and/or racism, and the pacifists strove to assert the concept of 
humanity as an ecumenical and peaceful alternative.5 To be sure, pacifists 
came in many different ideological shapes and colours, ranging from those 
who sought to ban war to those who only wished to limit it. A strain of 
Second International socialism (including so-called “evolutionary socialists” 
like Jean Jaurès, Eduard Bernstein and the British Fabians) was linked to the 
pacifist cause and the need to save what Jaurès called “peace and civiliza-
tion”.6 Socialist pacifists were thus wary of revolutionary Marxists, precisely 
because their idea of true humanity was to be born through violence. As 
we know, the pacifist cause was buried by the conspicuous show of bruised 
honour, chauvinism and military mobilisation in the summer and autumn 
of 1914. During the war, the chief imagined community of the belligerents 
was the besieged empire or embattled nation-state, and the need to present 
the cause for war as fundamentally defensive was an obsession of all partici-
pants, and shaped much of the deliberations at Versailles. This meant that the 
4 John Burrow, The Crisis of Reason: European Thought, 1848–1914 (New Haven, CT 2000). 
5 Sandi E. Cooper, Patriotic Patriotism: Waging War on War in Europe 1815–1914 (New York 
1991) and Margaret MacMillan, The War That Ended Peace: How Europe Abandoned Peace 
for the First World War (London 2013), esp. 266–294. 
6 Jay Winter, Dreams of Peace and Freedom: Utopian Moments in the Twentieth Century (New 
Haven, CT 2006), 46. 
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deployment of the concept of humanity was not so common either during the 
war or immediately after, as the pacifist call to lay down arms was trampled 
beneath the full mobilisation of war across Europe.
There were notable exceptions, nonetheless. US President Woodrow 
Wilson, for example, invoked the term during the war to make a case for 
American intervention against Germany. His address to Congress on 2 April 
1917 was called a “New Declaration of Freedom: A Charter of Humanity and 
World Peace”, in which he argued that the “present German warfare against 
commerce is warfare against mankind”, and that “irresponsible Government” 
has “thrown aside all considerations of humanity and right”, and thus must 
be stopped.7 By the end of the war Wilson’s loftier idea of humanity gave 
way to the concept more closely associated with his legacy, namely self-de-
termination. Of course Lenin offered his own version about the meaning of 
self-determination, and the clash between their divergent notions of self-de-
termined liberation framed much of the political sound and fury of the last 
century. Yet neither position put much store in any universal ideal of human-
ity at the time. In the eyes of post-war statesmen, humanity – if expressed 
at all – was closely aligned with specific national or particularist claims. In 
his book The New Europe, Thomas Masaryk, the first president of the newly 
independent Czechoslovak Republic, asserted that “nations are the natural 
organs of humanity. Humanity is not super-national, it is the organi zation of 
individual nations”.8 Japanese delegates at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, 
disappointed by the inability of the peacemakers to introduce a clause of 
racial equality in the Versailles Treaty, cynically concluded “the peoples of 
those great western powers” had ultimately “failed to consecrate to mankind 
to the ideals of humanity and universal brotherhood”.9 
In the aftermath of war a broader conception of humanity largely remained 
a pacifist dream; even if its cause and numbers were insignificant, the paci-
fists’ desire to preserve a notion of humanity linked to peace did find some 
echo in the foundation of the League of Nations. By the early 1920s the 
League was involved in a range of humanitarian causes, including campaigns 
against continued slavery in Africa as well as “white slavery” in Europe, 
and the Italian invasion of Ethiopia in 1935–1936 became a rallying cry for 
humanity at the League to mobilize international support for the anti-imperial 
7 President Wilson’s New Declaration of Freedom: A Charter for Humanity and World Peace 
(London 1917), 1f.
8 Thomas Masaryk, The New Europe (1918), as cited in Gerasimos Augustinos (ed.), The 
National Idea in Eastern Europe: The Politics of Ethnic and Civic Community (Lexington, 
MA 1996), 28. 
9 Kiyoshi Kari Kawakami, Japan and World Peace (New York 1919), 45–62. 
Open-Access-Publikation im Sinne der CC-Lizenz BY-NC-ND 4.0
54 Paul Betts
cause.10 But despite the League’s supposed devotion to international peace, 
it was never able to repair its compromised status as an exclusive European 
club whose main business was really managing inter-imperial rivalry. The 
result was that the League was not taken very seriously as a champion of 
a broader view of humanity, as the frustrations experienced by Iraq, China 
and Samoa over the very meaning of mandate autonomy made clear.11 Carl 
Schmitt’s well-known assertion that anyone who speaks in the name of 
humanity is lying, insofar as this seemingly all-inclusive term only masks 
special political interests, was a common critique of the League.12 That the 
term humanity was often enlisted by member states as well as non-member 
pressure groups to petition the League about various national causes, such as 
Chinese dismay about the transfer of former European concessions to Japan, 
only underlined its new political usage. What is more, the Japanese advocacy 
of a racial equality clause was never intended to be universal, but rather was 
understood an instrument to protect Japanese nationals and seek great power 
recognition from the West, to the point that Japanese discrimination against 
Koreans and Chinese was not seen as hypocritical.13
Where the idea of humanity did surface during the war and its aftermath 
was in the realm of propaganda and law, particularly in connection with the 
new term, “crimes against humanity”. In this new lexicon, humanity was 
redefined as a kind of global body politic coloured by a Romantic conception 
of bodily collective pain and suffering. Over the course of the nineteenth 
century the term “crimes against humanity” was enlisted to condemn slavery 
and colonialism. For example, the African-American journalist George Wash-
ington Williams denounced Leopold II of Belgium’s rule in the Congo Free 
State as “crimes against humanity”.14 In the Great War the Allied propa ganda 
campaign against German atrocities on the Western Front against Belgian 
civilians is well known,15 and the Entente was not shy in broadcasting its 
outrage that the Central Powers had “dishonoured humanity by their acts”.16
10 Amalia Ribi Forclaz, Humanitarian Imperialism: The Politics of Anti-Slavery Activism, 
1880–1940 (Oxford 2015), 46–76. 
11 Susan Pedersen, The Guardians: The League of Nations and the Crisis of Empire (Oxford 
2014), 107–194. 
12 Carl Schmitt, Der Begriff des Politischen (Leipzig 1932), 41–43. 
13 Naoko Shimazu, The Racial Equality Proposal at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference: Japanese 
Motivations and Anglo-American Responses, DPhil Thesis, Oxford University, 1995, esp. on 
pp. 81f. 
14 Fabian Klose, Human Rights in the Shadow of Colonial Violence: The Wars of Independence in 
Kenya and Algeria (Philadelphia 2013), 92. 
15 John Horne and Alan Kramer, German Atrocities, 1914: A History of Denial (New Haven, CT 
2000). 
16 Paul Pic, “Violation Systématique des Lois de la Guerre par les Austro-Allemands: Les Sanc-
tions Nécessaire”, in Revue Générale de Droit International Public 23 (1916), 243–268, quoted 
in Daniel Marc Segesser, “Unlawful Warfare is Uncivilized: The International Debate on the 
Open-Access-Publikation im Sinne der CC-Lizenz BY-NC-ND 4.0
55Universalism and its Discontents
Such anger found further expression in the aftermath of war, especially at 
Versailles. The understanding of war crimes as breaches of civilisation had 
long nineteenth-century roots,17 which culminated in the Carnegie Endow-
ment of International Peace’s famed 1914 report on the recent Balkan Wars. 
The term humanity peppered the Carnegie Report, explicitly referring to 
“the European ideal of humanity”, “outrages to humanity” and “the rights of 
humanity”.18 Yet it was in the Versailles Treaty that the concept of “crimes 
against humanity” was elevated as a norm (admittedly not very clearly) in 
relation to the peace, specifically in relation to punishing perceived war 
crimes against POWs, deportees and refugees both during and after the war. 
And it was the Armenian genocide that intensified the debate and called for 
the codification of “crimes against humanity” as a new actionable dimension 
of international law.19 With it a new sense of humanity was articulated, not of 
pacifist anti-war sentiment, but rather as a campaign to limit and punish what 
were seen at the time as uncivilised forms of war conduct, thereby giving 
birth to a new internationalisation of norms – if not laws – about crime and 
punishment as part of a broader dream of constructing an inter-state regime 
of “new justice”.20
In any case, the term humanity dipped in usage over the 1920s, arguably 
reflecting a pronounced nationalist turn in interwar cultural life and under-
standing, as older dreams of a united humanity (to say nothing of a united 
Europe) suffered badly during and after the war. The pacifist cause fared 
poorly by the mid-1920s, especially among the losers of the war and the losers 
of the peace, such as Germany, Italy, Hungary and Romania, where political 
extremism born of revanchist fantasies developed a power politics in a differ-
ent key, from both the left and right. Those associated with Germany’s former 
colonies in East Africa, for example, argued that the removal of colonies was 
a scandal on the grounds, as one official claimed, that the “German people 
have the right and duty to cooperate […] in the education of undeveloped 
races, the common task of civilized humanity”.21 For their part, communism 
and fascism both espoused new and violent imagined communities based 
Punishment of War Crimes, 1872–1918”, in European Review of History 14 (2007), 215–234, 
on p. 222. 
17 Daniel Marc Segesser, Recht statt Rache oder Rache durch Recht? Die Ahndung von Kriegsver-
brechen in der internationalen wissenschaftlichen Debatte, 1872–1945 (Paderborn 2002). 
18 Report of the International Commission to Inquire Into the Causes and Conduct of the Balkan 
War (Washington, DC 1914), 15, 95, 143, 147, 156, 269, 340. 
19 Daniel Marc Segesser, “Dissolve or Punish? The International Debate Amongst Jurists and 
Publicists on the Consequences of Armenian Genocide for the Ottoman Empire, 1915–1923”, 
in Journal of Genocide Research 10 (2008), 95–110. 
20 Mark Lewis, The Birth of the New Justice: The Internationalization of Crime and Punishment, 
1919–1950 (Oxford 2014). See too Mark Lattimer / Philippe Sands (ed.), Justice for Crimes 
Against Humanity (Oxford 2003). 
21 Pedersen, The Guardians, 32. 
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on class and race, not ones that encompassed all of humanity. And in Africa 
and Asia, dreams of liberation pivoted on national self-determination, not 
humanity, a trend that only intensified after 1945.
That the fledgling Soviet Union made little contribution to the humanity 
debate at first may seem surprising, given the revolution’s global call to work-
ers everywhere. After all, Marx had developed his own concept of Menschen 
as Naturwesen, and his own idea of humanity (borrowed from Feuerbach) 
was a collective concept without any trace of transcendence beyond homo 
sapiens.22 (The Soviet idea of humanism was a clear outgrowth of this for-
mulation.) The Soviet Union’s ideal of humanity was still restricted to a class 
identity that encompassed most, but not all, of the species. Even so, there was 
wide usage of the term during the Russian Revolution and the ensuing civil 
war, as the prospect of radical change brought with it a novel vocabulary 
of universalism.23 But it didn’t last very long. By the time Stalin took over, 
the Soviet lexicon of humanity dropped away, apparently reflecting a new 
concern with overriding national and regional consolidation, what Stalin 
famously called “socialism in one country”. Such views only intensified 
during World War II, as nationalism became the emotional means of binding 
socialist citizens to the state, replacing older Soviet ideals of universalism 
from the early 1920s.24
If the Soviet interwar contribution to the history of humanity as a term was 
rather limited, other transnational players helped recast the term in new ways 
after the Great War – and these were the so-called “new humanitarians”. 
Humanitarianism in its Christian conception has a long history, and was 
heavily politicised in the nineteenth century around issues of anti-slavery 
and pacifism, as we have seen. The role of the International Red Cross was 
fundamental here, and the organisation, based in neutral Switzerland, argu-
ably made its real international reputation during World War I for its care of 
wounded soldiers on all sides, for which it was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize 
in 1917. Even so, charity work was also nationalised in the Great War, and 
the various national chapters of the Red Cross were integrated into the war 
effort by all of the belligerent countries, raising questions about the organi-
sation’s neutrality.25 After 1918 the Red Cross set out to reclaim its non-par-
tisan reputation, and the period witnessed the rise of a new international and 
distinctly secular culture of humanitarianism, as in the case of Britain’s Save 
22 Bödeker, “Menschheit, Humanität, Humanismus”, 1120–1128.
23 Richard Stites, Utopian Vision and Experimental Life in the Russian Revolution (New York 
1989). 
24 Steven Merritt Miner, Stalin’s Holy War: Religion, Nationalism and Alliance Politics, 1941–
1945 (Chapel Hill, NC 2003). 
25 Heather Jones, “International or Transnational? Humanitarian Action in World War I”, in Euro-
pean Review of History – Revue européenne d’histoire 16:5 (Oct. 2009), 697–713. 
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the Children Fund, the American Relief Administration and Quaker Relief. 
What made the Save the Children Fund so unusual was the way that it built its 
humanitarian mission around looking after the children from former enemy 
countries, in this case Austria and Germany. In the 1920s the galvanising 
issue for the international community was the relief of civilian suffering in 
Russia after the famine of 1921 and in the Greco-Turkish wars; these were the 
favourite subjects of Red Cross films made in the interwar years, along with 
the Spanish Civil War in the 1930s. Even the League of Nations opened up 
a film division in the 1920s as “a new instrument of civilization” that would 
deal with what they called “problems of an international character aiming 
at the welfare of humanity”.26 It was in relation to these far-flung conflicts 
that the old romantic conception of a collective humanity under threat was 
revived, nurtured and mediatised, with more than a little residue left over 
from its earlier Christian and imperial iterations. In this sense, humanity 
was redefined by charitable activity abroad in a kind of new “imagination 
of solidarity” across continents. Such philanthropy was also driven forward 
by the churches to bolster their image and to build international relief net-
works in the name of a common humanity. With it, Europe’s eastern fringes 
(especially Turkey and Russia) emerged as a new theatre of humanitarian 
imagination, especially for Great Britain, and, according to some, helped 
justify British moral and global leadership after World War I, not unlike its 
nineteenth-century role in the anti-slave trade movement.27
Fascism provided an interesting twist to the political use of humanity. 
Recent scholarship has shown how Fascist Italy played a high-profile inter-
national role in condemning African slavery in the 1920s, in part as a means 
of diverting attention away from Mussolini’s brutal domestic politics and to 
shore up the country’s international reputation as a caring Catholic nation. 
So much so that Italy’s invasion of Abyssinia in 1935 was justified to the 
international community as a humanitarian emergency intervention to halt 
the slave trade there, whereby slavery became the key metaphor for Ethio-
pia’s supposedly uncivilised state and failed government. As a consequence, 
the classic nineteenth-century fusion of imperialism and humanitarianism 
was revived in the 1930s from a radical right-wing perspective.28 Even the 
Third Reich’s invasion of Austria and Czechoslovakia can be seen in this 
26 “The Cinema as an Instrument of Education”, in International Review of Educational Cine-
matography 1:2 (1929), 123. 
27 Keith David Watenpaugh, “The League of Nations’ Rescue of Armenian Genocide Sur-
vivors and the Making of Modern Humanitarianism, 1920–1927”, in American Historical 
Review  115:5  (2010),  1315–1339  and Michelle Tusan,  “ ‘Crimes Against Humanity’: Human 
Rights, the British Empire and the Origins of the Response to the Armenian Genocide”, in 
American Historical Review 119:1 (2014), 47–77. 
28 Forclaz, Humanitarian Imperialism, esp. ch. 4f.
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light, to the extent that the blend of minority politics, self-determination and 
“humanitarianism” (based on restrictive sense of “racial community”) was 
used as a legitimation of military intervention.29
The Second World War saw a flourishing of the term, but as with the 
Great War, it was mostly in reaction to charges of inhumanity from enemy 
combatants. Nazi Germany was routinely held up as the embodiment of inhu-
manity for its racism, anti-Semitism and political violence – punctuated by 
the drip-feed revelations about the horrors of the Holocaust itself – and even-
tually became the global benchmark for radical evil, the end of civilisation 
and barbarism everywhere. On an ideological level the Allies had elevated 
the “rights of man” (cf. H. G. Wells) and human rights as the highest moral 
cause of the war.30 The 1941 Atlantic Charter and the 1942 Declaration of 
United Nations (signed by 26 countries) to create a “great union of humanity” 
based on “faith in life, liberty, independence and religious freedom, and in 
the preservation of human rights and justice in their own lands as well as 
in other lands” were key milestones here, to the extent that human rights 
was pressed into an ideological response to totalitarianism.31 Not that the 
language of humanity was the exclusive monopoly of the Allies; after all, 
Italian and German fascists had their own idea of civilisation and men acing 
inhumanity, even if the term humanity itself noticeably dropped from the 
Italian and German political vocabulary under Mussolini and Hitler. In 
Germany, the preferred terms were of course Volksgemeinschaft, Kultur and 
Abendland, and what reference there was to humanity was often expressed 
in derisive terms like Humanitätsduselei, in this case meaning the pernicious 
rhetoric of the Allies.32 But these words did not matter much in the war, nor 
did they for humanitarianism. The infamous inactivity of the Red Cross in 
Nazi Germany is a good illustration of how humanitarianism often buckled 
under the pressure of national power politics.33
The ceasefire of 1945 gave rise to a renaissance of the term humanity. The 
sea of refugees and displaced persons was commonly described as “home-
less humanity”, as the unprotected refugee became the emblem of the era, 
raising basic food and shelter for war victims in Europe and Asia as urgent 
humanitarian issues.34 One administrator in the British Zone of Germany 
29 Jost Düffler, “Humanitarian Intervention as Legitimation of Violence – The German Case, 
1937–1939”, in Fabian Klose (ed.), The Emergence of Humanitarian Intervention: Ideas and 
Practices From the Nineteenth Century to the Present (Cambridge 2016), 208–228.
30 H. G. Wells, The Rights of Man, or What We Are Fighting For (London 1940). 
31 Klose, Human Rights, 15. 
32 Christian Helfer, “Humanitätsduselei – zur Geschichte eines Schlagworts”, in Zeitschrift für 
Religions- und Geistesgeschichte 16:2 (1964), 179–182. 
33 Birgit Morgenbrod, Das deutsche Rote Kreuz unter der NS-Diktatur (Paderborn 2008).
34 Ben Shephard, The Long Road Home: The Aftermath of the Second World War (London 
2011), 177, 257. 
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commented: “I grew to think that what we were dealing with was Germanity 
and humanity, the former being the bad to be corrected and the latter the 
good to be fostered.”35 Perhaps the most famous moment of the rebooting 
of humanity was the huge assembly of peoples gathered from around the 
world in San Francisco in the spring of 1945, under the auspices of the United 
Nations Conference on International Organization. The conference, which 
gave birth to the UN, kicked off what was easily the most ambitious exper-
iment in twentieth century internationalism. Not for nothing was the San 
Francisco conference called “the most important human gathering since the 
Last Supper”.36 South African Prime Minister Jan Smuts set the tone: “For the 
human race the hour has struck. Mankind has arrived at the crisis of its fate, 
the fate of its future as a civilized world”, for whom the new Charter must 
be based on a “faith in justice and the resolve to vindicate the fundamental 
rights of man”.37 Hundreds of delegates from 51 countries assembled in the 
city’s opera house, flanked by representatives from some 250 inter national 
organisations. The press scrum was without precedent – the combined inter-
national radio and newspaper contingent churned out some two million pages 
of news coverage each day over the course of three months. There was also 
great popular interest in the conference, as delegates were flooded with tens 
of thousands of letters from well wishers from around the globe.38 A new 
world order seemed to be within reach, to be built on a new sense of humanity 
and a range of social, economic, political, and human rights in various guises. 
The soaring opening phrase of the UN Charter preamble – “We the People of 
the United Nations” – was taken as a sign of the world’s new democratic and 
collective spirit. After a war fought against the evils of racism, hopes were 
raised about building an international society based on international justice, 
racial equality and the end of colonialism.
Closely linked to ideals of humanity after 1945 was another term that was 
used more than any other in 1945 to signal the hopeful rebirth not only of 
Europe, but also of a world in tatters – and that was civilisation. At first 
this may seem a little strange; after all, the term carried with it the bag-
gage of eighteenth century elitism and nineteenth-century imperialism, and 
European or Western civilisation was repeatedly pronounced dead by the 
end of World War II, be it in Auschwitz or Hiroshima. However, the term 
framed much public discourse (especially across the West) after 1945 as a 
part of a new lexicon to defend either what had been lost, or that which was 
under threat from post-war developments. In particular, the twinned terms of 
35 Quoted in Francis Graham-Dixon, The Allied Occupation of Germany: The Refugee Crisis, 
Denazification and the Path to Reconstruction (London 2013), 37. 
36 Glenda Sluga, Internationalism in the Age of Nationalism (Philadelphia 2013), 88. 
37 Cited in Mark Mazower, No Enchanted Palace (Princeton, NJ 2009), 28f. 
38 Herbert Vere Evatt, The United Nations (Oxford 1948), 14–20.
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civilisation and humanity were used to frame three of the key international 
events in the second half of 1945, the first two being the Nuremberg and 
Tokyo trials.39 In both cases the Allied judges were not shy in describing these 
war crimes as an unprecedented breach of civilisation that demanded new 
universalist concepts of justice, most controversially “crimes against human-
ity”. The third instance also took place in Japan – Hiroshima and Nagasaki. 
Like the war crimes trials, Nagasaki and Hiroshima spurred impassioned 
international discussion of the role and restoration of humanity as a new 
post-war mission.40 Civilisation was repeatedly invoked defensively in the 
face of atomic power’s destructive capacities, and drove home for many peo-
ple across the globe a new universal sense of the fragility of both humanity 
and the planet.
Much of the lofty United Nations idealism around the term humanity did 
not last long, as the imperial powers were keen to maintain power and control. 
As after the Great War, the transfer of the so-called “trust territories” – that is, 
the colonies that had belonged to the defeated Axis powers – to the victorious 
imperial powers scandalised non-European participants. Moreover, the more 
expansive rights talk during the war – seen in the ILO’s 1944 Philadelphia 
Declaration that made human rights synonymous with social and economic 
justice – succumbed to a more constrained liberal idea of social rights that 
privileged the rights of the market and the language of security over peace.41 
Neither racial nor feminist issues were treated seriously either. As W.E.B. Du 
Bois bitterly remarked, the new UN effectively “disenfranchised 750 million 
persons living in colonies because the international organization could not 
interfere with domestic matters”.42 The charter’s call to “reaffirm” the “dig-
nity of the human person” and “the equal rights of men and women” was 
viewed as too weak and vague to make much of a difference.43 The failure 
39 Lawrence Douglas, The Memory of Judgment: Making Law and History in the Trials of the 
Holocaust (New Haven, CT 2001), 38–64. Joseph B. Keenan, Chief Prosecutor for the Interna-
tional Military Tribunal for the Far East, opened the Tokyo War Crimes Trials on 4 June 1946 
by saying “this is no ordinary trial, for here we are waging part of the determined battle of 
civilization to preserve the entire world from destruction”. Quoted in Ushimura Kei, Beyond 
the “Judgement of Civilization”: The Japanese Intellectual Legacy of the Japanese War Crimes 
Trials, 1946–1949, trans. Steven J. Ericson (Tokyo 2003), 3.
40 John Lewis Gaddis (ed.), Cold War Statesmen Confront the Bomb: Nuclear Diplomacy Since 
1945 (New York 1999) and John Preston Baratta, The Politics of World Federation: United 
Nations, UN Reform, Atomic Control (Westport, CT 2004). 
41 Patricia Clavin, Securing the World Economy (Oxford 2013), 343f. 
42 Sluga, 96, and Paul Gordon Lauren, “First Principles of Racial Equality: History and the Pol-
itics and Diplomacy of Human Rights Provisions in the United Nations Charter”, in Human 
Rights Quarterly 5:1 (1983), 1–26. 
43 Johannes Morsink, “Women’s Rights in the Universal Declaration”, in Human Rights Quar-
terly  13:2  (1991),  229–256  and  Allida  Black,  “Are Women  ‘Human?’  The  UN  Struggle  to 
Recognize Women’s Rights as Human Rights”, in Akira Iriye / Petra Goedde et al. (ed.), The 
Human Rights Revolution: An International History (Oxford 2012), 133–157.
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of human rights to bring about any real breakthrough in the 1940s has been 
written about extensively, and by 1948 nationalism and the nation-state argu-
ably emerged as the new international norm and foundation of a post-war 
world order. A universal human rights regime never challenged national sov-
ereignty or the supremacy of the nation-state. In this sense the 1941 Atlantic 
Charter was much more influential than the Universal Declaration; indeed, 
the founding of India, Pakistan and Israel as new states set the terms for 
revolutionary nationalism around the world, even if human rights were used 
to help write these new national constitutions.44
What is striking that the left was not very involved in this new romantic 
vocabulary of human rights in the 1940s. While European Social Demo-
crats across the continent invoked ideals of humanity and human rights as 
a mobilizing term in the interwar years, they did so less frequently after 
1945, especially regarding human rights.45 By contrast the rhetoric of the 
nation was more much common. In part this had to do with the way that 
the western European left suffered from the effects of anti-communist con-
tainment policy.46 French, Italian and Belgian Communist Parties were all 
expelled from their national governments by 1947, and Stalin launched the 
Cominform that year to bring the various national communist parties to heel. 
The cumulative effect was the virtual collapse of the democratic agendas of 
wartime resistance coalitions and the once guiding idea of “national roads 
to socialism” in both West and East Europe.47 The left’s relative disengage-
ment with human rights talk in the early Cold War may also be because they 
sensed that what really triumphed in 1945 was the national welfare consen-
sus, not universal human rights, and nationally-based welfarist protection 
became the main form of collective politics across the Cold War divide.48 In 
this way, the wartime Beveridge Report became a blueprint for a post-war 
order almost everywhere. The de-internationalisation of the left was also 
the result of its wartime success; having effectively organised the resistance 
movements meant that the left looked to fashion itself as the guardian of 
the nation both during the war and after, which committed them to strictly 
national causes after 1945. Social Democrats in West Germany, for example, 
44 Samuel Moyn, “The Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 in the History of Cosmo-
politanism”, in Critical Inquiry 40:4 (2014), 365–384 and Zachary Elkins / Tom Ginsburg et al., 
“Getting to Rights: Treaty Ratification, Constitutional Convergences and Human Rights Prac-
tice”, in Harvard International Law Journal 54 (2013), 61–95. 
45 Alexander J. Schwitanski, Die Freiheit des Volksstaats: Die Entwicklung der Grund- und Men-
schenrechte und die deutsche Sozialdemokratie bis zum Ende der Weimarer Republik (Essen 
2008). 
46 Ian Buruma, Year Zero: A History of 1945 (London 2013), 272. 
47 Geoff Eley, Forging Democracy: A History of the Left in Europe, 1850–2000 (Oxford 
2002), 299–328. 
48 Moyn, “Universal Declaration”, 365–384.
Open-Access-Publikation im Sinne der CC-Lizenz BY-NC-ND 4.0
62 Paul Betts
opposed the liberal United Europe movement, as did French communists, 
and the same scepticism was directed toward the European Coal and Steel 
Community. In its engagement with patriotic resistance during the war, the 
left became ever more distant from revolution and revolutionary violence; on 
the contrary, and with justification, communist groups portrayed themselves 
instead as the victims of violence.49 Where the left still used the term – recall 
that the newspaper for the French Communist Party was and remains L’Hu-
manité – it was more the recycled language from the world of Jean Jaurés and 
his generation.
In this atmosphere, the concepts of humanity and human rights were 
reworked from more conservative quarters. The terms became integrated 
into Christian Democratic projects, often with a pronounced anti-communist 
dimension, and the Catholic Church in the 1950s (along with Protestants and 
Jews) certainly gave its blessing to this new arrangement.50 Human rights 
were also bent toward special European interests. After decolonisation, for 
example, human rights language was enlisted by former imperial powers 
to protect its white minorities (and their property) still living in Africa and 
elsewhere, underlining how the old inter-war link between minority rights 
and human rights had returned, albeit in a very different guise.51 Humanity, 
generally seen as a concept denoting an inclusive set of common traits and 
values, was even invoked to defend – not challenge – racial difference. For 
instance, the Edinburgh-based international journal Mankind Quarterly, 
founded in 1961, was overtly an anti-liberal attempt to justify white racial 
supremacy and apartheid with the aid of “scientific racism”.52 What is sur-
prising in this case is not the intellectual defence of apartheid, which is well 
known, but that the journal deployed the language of mankind as part of its 
rhetorical arsenal. The broader point is that humanity remained a slippery 
term, and could be aligned to various causes, be they liberal or Christian, 
fascist, communist or racist.
But while the United Nations may have failed in its project to remake 
the international community, other UN agencies worked to pick up the slack 
49 Martin Conway and Robert Gerwarth, “Revolution and Counter-Revolution”, in Political Vio-
lence in Twentieth Century Europe (Cambridge 2011), 162.
50 J. Rossi, American Catholics and the Formation of the United Nations (Lanham, MD 1993); 
J. Nurser, For All Peoples and All Nations: The Ecumenical Church and Human Rights (Wash-
ington, DC 2005); and James Loeffler, “The Particularist Pursuit of American Universalism: 
The American Jewish Committee’s 1944 ‘Declaration of Human Rights’ ”, in Journal of Con-
temporary History 50:2 (2014), 274–295. More generally, Dianne Kirby (ed.), Religion and the 
Cold War (Basingstoke 2013). 
51 Talmot C. Imlay, “International Socialism and Decolonization During the 1950s: Competing 
Rights and the Postcolonial Order”, in American Historical Review 118:4 (2013), 1105–1132.
52 Saul Dubow, “Racial Irredentism, Ethnogenesis, and White Supremacy in High-Apartheid 
South Africa”, in Kronos (2016), 236–264.
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for the mission of humanity. This is where UNESCO made its mark. It was 
the sole international agency dedicated to upholding an ideal of a singular 
secular humanity that transcended Cold War divisions. Its effort to orga nise 
initiatives in international education, cultural preservation, and heritage 
management around the world reflected its broader universalist vision of a 
one-world humanity in the making. Not that this universalism was uncontro-
versial – the admission of West Germany, Japan and Spain as full members in 
UNESCO in the early 1950s on the grounds that a true international commu-
nity must be predicated on a take-all-comers inclusiveness of even the most 
demonised states in the world was a bold position. Given that international 
law as a carrier and expression of humanity bumped up against Cold War 
limits after 1945, with no binding power or enforceability,53 UNESCO spear-
headed high-profile “soft power” initiatives in the fields of education, science 
and culture to bring about international cooperation and peace in areas where 
law and politics could not. This could be seen in its third world development 
schemes and in its commissioned six-volume History of Mankind project, 
which worked to rewrite world history alternatively as a story of peace, 
exchange and progress, instead of the conventional narrative framework of 
war and conflict.54 In UNESCO’s eyes, science could serve as the new lexicon 
of universal humanity and intercultural understanding, what it significantly 
called “scientific humanism”.55 UNESCO did take the international lead in 
debunking racism as specious form of science, proclaiming in a highly-pub-
licised 1950 report that race was more “social myth” than “biological fact”.56 
What is more, UNESCO worked to create this sensibility through the 
media, and in particular through photography. The classic reference for 
this is the 1955 “Family of Man” photography show, conceived by Edward 
Steichen in collaboration with the Museum of Modern Art in New York. 
The exhibition aimed to show what Steichen called “the essential one-ness of 
mankind throughout the world”,57 portraying peoples from across the world 
in a kind of intimate family album of post-fascist humanity. This revived link 
of photography and pacifism recalled French businessman Alfred Kahn’s 
dream to photograph the whole world in a new Archives de la Planète for 
53 Mark Mazower, “The Strange Triumph of Human Rights”, in Historical Journal 47 (2004), 
396. 
54 Paul Betts, “Humanity’s New Heritage: UNESCO and the Rewriting of World History”, in 
Past & Present 228 (2015), 249–285. 
55 Glenda Sluga, “Unesco and the (One) World of Julian Huxley”, in Journal of World History 21:3 
(2010), 393–418. 
56 Elazar Barkan, The Retreat of Scientific Racism (Cambridge 1992), 341–343, and Michelle 
Brattain, “Race, Racism and Antiracism: UNESCO and the Politics of Presenting Science to 
the Postwar Public”, in American Historical Review 121 (2007), 1386–1413.
57 Museum of Modern Art, The Family of Man (New York 1955), 4. 
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the sake of peace,58 but this time the cause was represented by images of 
suffering humanity (and children in particular) used by UNESCO, UNICEF 
and the Red Cross to mobilise humanitarian aid around the world. It is no 
accident that this kind of photography became closely aligned to the human 
rights cause as dual registers of universalism.59 So just as romantic novels in 
the early nineteenth century helped engender a new sensibility of humanity 
towards suffering distant strangers,60 these photographs performed a similar 
role in helping spur a new phase of global engagement after 1945.
But despite UNESCO’s best efforts to champion a secular ideal of 
humanity beyond Cold War antagonism and the ideologies of difference, 
the term became quickly embroiled in Cold War politics. Initially the USSR 
maintained its older cynicism toward the term humanity, shaped by Marx’s 
suspicion of the bourgeois concept of humanity as simply class-based spe-
cial interests dressed up in universalist language. The Soviet reaction to the 
1955 Family of Man photography exhibition was instructive here, as Soviet 
critics took issue with the guiding ideology of a human family marked by 
progress and sameness across continents as perniciously obfuscating class 
conflict, war and international struggle.61 For the Soviets the preferred term 
was humanism, and in particular socialist humanism to distinguish it from its 
bourgeois counterpart. Humanism was intended as a distinctly this-worldly 
term that denoted the victory of reason and science over religion and obscu-
rantism, and socialist humanism was retooled as a term of self-definition for 
the Soviet Union and its satellite states after 1945. Yet the term humanity did 
surface internally in the USSR after Stalin’s death, especially in the 1960s. 
It re-emerged in the sphere of space exploration and evolutionary biology, to 
the extent that it was used to describe a more comprehensive anthropologi-
cal designation of earth dwellers. The concept of humanity was thus more 
linked to science than politics, and if it was associated with politics, then it 
was generally associated with causes of peace and anti-imperialism. After 
the signing of the Helsinki Accords, which not only guaranteed borders 
and travel rights, but also allowed for academic exchanges across the Iron 
Curtain, science, human rights and a shared sense of humanity based on sci-
entific internationalism that transcended Cold War division (the international 
scandal resulting from the imprisonment of Soviet physicist Andrei Sakharov 
58 Winter, Dreams of Peace and Freedom, 12, 26.
59 Tom Allbeson, “Photographic Diplomacy in the Postwar World: UNESCO and the Concep-
tion of Photography as a Universal Language, 1946–1956”, in Modern Intellectual History 
(2015), 1–33; Sarah E. James, Common Ground: German Photographic Cultures Across the 
Iron Curtain (New Haven, CT 2013), 47–102; and Heide Fehrenbach and Davide Rodogno, 
Humanitarian Photography: A History (New York 2015). 
60 Lynn Hunt, Inventing Human Rights: A History (London 2007). 
61 Eric J. Sandeen, Picturing an Exhibition: The Family of Man and 1950s America (Albuquerque, 
NM 1995), 125–154.
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was a key test case) eventually emerged as a dissident discourse in the 1980s 
in the USSR.62
However, the Soviet Union’s growing interest in humanity was also forged 
as a Cold War weapon to attack the West. This was evident in the USSR’s 
involvement with the Geneva Conventions. At the key 1949 conference in 
Geneva the USSR and its allies pushed hardest for all four Geneva Conven-
tions to be applied to all wars and all civilians as a means of embarrassing 
the West,63 and in so doing effectively positioned itself as the guardian of 
the Convention’s spirit of universalism.64 A major Cold War flare-up over 
the Geneva Conventions concerned the question of atomic weapons, as the 
USSR drafted a resolution calling for a full outlawing on atomic bombs on 
humanitarian grounds, clearly aimed at the Americans and British.65 The 
Soviet claim to speak in the name of peace and humanity effectively put 
the United States and its allies on the back foot as the Soviet Union lobbied 
for more extensive protection of civilians in war zones.66 This paralleled the 
USSR’s political use of human rights to criticise the West for its inability to 
live up to its proclaimed ideals, be it in terms of racial equality or self-de-
termination for third world liberation.67 For them and for many leaders of 
the developing world, human rights were tantamount to anti-imperialism and 
national self-determination, which helped the USSR join forces with what we 
now call the Global South.
This brings me to decolonisation itself, as humanity was politicised in the 
so-called third world to advance new claims. A good example is the Alge-
rian war of independence, and the way in which the Algerian FLN (Front 
de Libération Nationale) advanced its case in the name of humanity. In its 
first letters to the UN in 1955 and 1956, the FLN couched its struggle in the 
language of the French denial of Algerian human rights and its right to self- 
determination, citing mass arrests, the outlawing of national political parties, 
62 Paul Rubinson, “ ‘For Our Soviet Colleagues’: Scientific Internationalism, Human Rights and 
the Cold War”, in Iriye / Goedde et al. (ed.), The Human Rights Revolution, 245–264.
63 The USSR maintained its long-standing belief in the complementarity (not contradiction) 
of humanity and military necessity under socialism, arguing that the military necessity of a 
socialist state “serves the higher interest of humanity”. Jiri Toman, “The Socialist Countries 
and the Laws of Armed Conflict”, in Modern Wars: The Humanitarian Challenge (London 
1986), 158–176. 
64 Peter Hast Vigor, The Soviet View of War, Peace and Neutrality (London 1975), 174f. 
65 Geoffrey Best, War and Law Since 1945 (Oxford 1994), 111–113. 
66 Helen M. Kinsella, Image Before the Weapon: A Critical History of the Distinction Between 
Combatant and Civilian (Ithaca, NY 2011), 119f. 
67 Jennifer Amos, “Embracing and Contesting: The Soviet Union and the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights, 1948–1958”, in Stefan-Ludwig Hoffmann (ed.), Human Rights in the Twen-
tieth Century (Cambridge 147–165) and Mary Dudziak, Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the 
Image of American Democracy (Princeton, NJ 2000), 203–248.
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as well as the banning of newspapers and arbitrary seizure of homes.68 The 
Algerian Executive Committee instructed commanders and officers in the 
field strictly to observe the Geneva Conventions, and made sure that the 
Algerian Red Crescent helped implement humanitarian law and retained the 
support of the Red Cross.69 Both sides had already turned to the media to 
publicise their causes, often complete with graphic photographs of atrocities 
reminiscent of the media war of sensationalised killings during the Spanish 
civil war.70 Having set up a media office in New York, the FLN conducted 
a shrewd media campaign to use the Geneva Conventions to their political 
advantage, and was winning in the court of international public opinion. 
As such the FLN was effective in gathering support from other third world 
countries at the UN, and cited the UN Charter, human rights and the right of 
self-determination as justifications for its cause.71
Elsewhere, leading Third World intellectuals and leaders were suspicious 
of the term humanity as warmed-over imperial ideology from a bygone age. 
Such figures as Frantz Fanon and Aimé Césaire voiced their disdain of such 
lofty European universalism, even in its more liberal UNESCO-style key. 
Even so, it pays to recall that humanity and universal civilisation as concepts 
were taken seriously by a range of leading non-European thinkers around 
the world. At first this may seem strange, given the 1990s discussions of 
so-called Asian values as a staunch defence of cultural relativism in the face 
of a proclaimed human rights universalism. But this was not the sentiment 
in 1945. Take for example Peng-Chun Chang, Kuomintang Chinese ambas-
sador to the UN and one of the key framers of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights. For him the trick was to find a way of reconciling human 
rights, humanity and civilisation, and he noted that these terms were often 
at cross purposes. Chang was quick to point out that Britain, France, Bel-
gium and Holland all pressed for a so-called “colonial clause” in the UN 
Charter to exclude colonies from the application of human rights covenants. 
European champions of human rights, such as René Cassin, made no bones 
about Asian and African peoples not being ready for self-rule and human 
rights recognition; Churchill said much the same about the need to limit the 
global application of the principle of self-determination enshrined in the 1941 
68 Arnold Fraleigh, “The Algerian Revolution as a Case Study in International Law”, in Richard 
Falk (ed.), The International Law of Civil War (Baltimore 1971), 226.
69 Klose, Human Rights, 126f., and Roland Burke, Decolonization and the Evolution of Interna-
tional Human Rights (Philadelphia 2010), esp. 35–91.
70 One French-produced English language pamphlet in the late 1950s, significantly called “Doc-
uments on the Crimes and Outrages Commited [sic] by the Terrorists in Algeria”, claimed that 
the so-called “Army of Liberation” had perpetrated an “uninterrupted succession of crimes 
against humanity, against civilization, against progress”. Documents on the Crimes and Out-
rages Commited (sic) by the Terrorists in Algeria (Algiers 1956[?]), 6. 
71 Mohamed Alwan, Algeria Before the United Nations (New York 1959). 
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Atlantic Charter. The underlying assumption was that civilisation began with 
sovereignty, and colonies thus had to wait.
Chang made common cause with Léopold Sédar Senghor, poet and later 
President of Senegal, as he, Chang and others felt that a universal concept of 
humanity was worth salvaging and defending. Not coincidentally, Senghor 
was closely associated with UNESCO. Notably, this idea of universal civ-
ilisation – even based on a Western model – found some resonance among 
Asian intellectuals in the Ottoman and Japanese Empires in the late nine-
teenth century,72 though these views were increasingly muted after World 
War I, as the stress fell upon the primacy of distinct civilisations.73 Yet the 
idea was revived in new ways after 1945. What he and Chang both recog-
nised was that civilisation, traditionally understood, implied an evolutionary 
framework, whereas humanity and human rights did not – thus the claim 
to be part of a universal humanity was an effort to do away with this old 
imperial logic of progress in order to suggest that all peoples were now on an 
equal footing.74 For them, the vision of universalism (which combined human 
rights and civilisation) was thus a dream of anti-imperialism. The point is 
that in the era between 1945 and decolonisation, the dream of humanity and 
universal civilisation was not confined to Europe or to the imperial powers, 
and the term remained a relevant concept of political thinking throughout the 
era of decolonisation, even if its one-time singularity now gave birth to new 
calls to define and defend more pluralistic and regionalised ideas of African 
and Asian civilisations for a post-imperial age.
This brings me to the conclusion. The career of the concept of humanity 
over the course of the twentieth century was inextricably tied to its oppo-
site – namely, inhumanity – and for this reason the problem of humanity was 
closely connected to the larger problem of how and to what extent ideology 
justifies violence. This issue was the subject of intense debate in the 1940s 
in Europe, as noted in Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s 1947 book, Humanism and 
Terror. The book was written in response to Arthur Koestler’s Darkness at 
Noon published the year before, a book that posed the problem of liberty 
72 Cemil Aydin, “Beyond Civilization: Pan-Islamism, Pan-Asianism and the Revolt Against 
the West” and Dominic Sachsenmaier, “Searching for Alternatives to Western Modernity: 
Cross-Cultural Approaches in the Aftermath of the Great War”, in Journal of Modern Euro-
pean History 4 (2006), 204–223, 241–260 respectively. See too Rochona Majumdar, “From 
Civilizational Heroism to an Ethic of Universal Humanity: Bengali Discussions of Civility”, 
in Margit Pernau / Helge Jordheim et al. (ed.), Civilizing Emotions: Concepts in Nineteenth 
Century Asia and Europe (Oxford 2015), 207–230.
73 Michael Ades, “Contested Hegemony: The Great War and the Afro-Asian Assault on the Civi-
lizing Mission Ideology”, in Journal of World History 15 (2004). 
74 Lydia Liu, “Shadows of Universalism: The Untold Story of Human Rights Around 1948”, in 
Critical Inquiry 40:4 (Summer 2014), 385–414. See also Jan Eckel, Die Ambivalenz des Guten: 
Menschenrechte in der internationalen Politik seit den 1940ern (Göttingen 2014), 260–342. 
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in a dramatic and controversial fashion. For the protagonist Rubashov, 
history went from being a “locus of revolutionary fraternity” to the “sheer 
force of fact”.75 For Merleau-Ponty, Koestler’s book chronicled the great 
betrayal of the century, one had become a hallmark of modern political 
ideology of all stripes. What bothered Merleau-Ponty most – and again, he 
was writing in 1947 – is how the belief in humanism, in a desire to ful-
fil itself, was “transformed into its opposite, namely, into violence”.76 It 
is the inurement to violence in the name of ideology that for him was the 
most frightening aspect of the age of social engineering.77 Even worse for 
Merleau-Ponty is that the sins of Western humanism were simply carried 
over under communism, and arguably by many other regimes too. Again, 
in his words:
In its own eyes Western humanism appears as the love of humanity, but for the rest 
of men it is only the custom and institution of a group of men, their password and 
occasionally their battle cry. If the reply is that their forces are defending freedom 
and civilization, this implies a renunciation of absolute morality and entitles the Com-
munists to say that their forces are defending an economic system which will put an 
end to man’s exploitation of man. It is from the conservative West that communism 
received the notion of history and learned to relativize moral judgment. It has not 
forgotten the lesson and has sought, at least in a given historical milieu, those forces 
which on balance have a chance to making humanity a reality […]. But then the dif-
ferences between them [i.e. capitalist civilisations] and the Soviet enterprise is not the 
difference between heaven and hell or between good and evil; it is only a matter of the 
different uses of violence.78
Such views mirrored a related discussion in Europe about the relationship 
between dignity and History, in which History and progress were seen as the 
very vehicles that crushed individual dignity in the name of violent collective 
social orders of the left and right. As Hannah Arendt pithily put it: “It is 
against dignity to believe in human progress.”79
Thinking about the link between ideology and violence is not irrelevant to 
our present moment. The post-Cold War militarisation of human rights and 
75 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Humanism and Terror: An Essay on the Communist Problem, trans. 
John O’Neill (Boston 1969), 16. 
76 Id., Humanism and Terror, 13. 
77 As he put it: “In reality the most serious threat to civilization is not to kill a man because of his 
ideas (this has often been done in wartime), but to do so without recognizing it or saying so, 
and to hide revolutionary justice behind the mask of the penal code. For, by hiding violence one 
grows accustomed to it and makes an institution of it.” Ibid., 34. 
78 Ibid., 176f. 
79 Hannah Arendt, Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy (Chicago, IL 1982), 77, cited in 
Finkiel kraut, In the Name of Humanity, 59. 
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the advent of the “Responsibility to Protect” doctrine in Bosnia, Somalia and 
Rwanda brought a new union of humanity and war that has fatally hollowed 
out the pacifist dimension of the term. NATO’s proclamation that Kosovo 
was a “humanitarian war” was both a return to and rejection of the nine-
teenth-century past.80 What is less remarked upon is that this new military 
assertion of the West went hand in hand with the revived assertion that the 
supremacy of sovereignty by Russia and China and others as a defence against 
the imposition of distinctively Western values disguised as benign universal-
ism. The international blowback to such military interventions has led some 
observers to characterise the post-Cold War period as neo-Westphalian, or 
what some have coyly called “East-phalian” in its Asian-inflected defence 
of national sovereignty above all. In this rendition, humanity can only be 
expressed regionally, if at all. Tony Judt inadvertently reflects this logic in 
arguing that “the recovered memory of Europe’s dead Jews has become the 
very definition and guarantee of the continent’s restored humanity”,81 as for-
malised with the Stockholm Declaration in 1998.82
The post-Cold War apotheosis of humanitarianism as a form of engage-
ment and mode of being has taken place at a time when the old-style uni-
versalist precept of humanity no longer commands much adherence or faith, 
having lost its political currency and intellectual respectability.83 It is perhaps 
worth noting here that Finkielkraut’s original book title in French is very dif-
ferent from its English translation. Whereas the English title is In the Name 
of Humanity, the French original is Humanité Perdue, implying in part that 
humanitarianism begins where the dream of humanity leaves off. This may 
be the result of our understandable suspicion toward ideologies of redemp-
tion of any kind, burnt as we have been by the false liberation theologies of 
the twentieth century. Yet the opposite extreme may be equally troubling, 
signifying what Finkielkraut calls a latter-day “treason of the intellectuals”, 
in that intellectuals have become ashamed “of aspiring to what is general and 
transcendent in all men”.84 The language of humanity, once a rallying cry, 
has become a kind of empty phrase and even a source of embarrassment, 
an unwanted leftover from the age of social reconstruction. Or at least so 
80 Michael Barnett, Empire of Humanity: A History of Humanitarianism (Ithaca, NY 2011), 186. 
81 Tony Judt, Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945 (London 2005), 804. 
82 Stephen Hopgood, The Endtimes of Human Rights (Ithaca, NY 2013), 53f. 
83 As Finkielkraut provocatively put it: “Recently misled by the myth of human progress, it [the 
‘humanitarian generation’] now falls back on the indisputable truth about suffering humanity, 
thus avoiding all bad surprises. No longer susceptible to the grand scheme of history, it is only 
interested in the misfortune of the species.” Finkielkraut, In the Name of Humanity, 91. For 
context, see Johannes Paulmann, “Conjunctures in the History of International Humanitarian 
Aid During the Twentieth Century”, in Humanity 4 (2013), 215–238.
84 Julien Benda, The Treason of the Intellectuals, trans. R. Aldington (New York 1969), 79, cited 
in Finkielkraut, In the Name of Humanity, 43. 
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it appears in the West, for new formulations of humanity are being forged 
across the world, often for violent purposes. Al Qaeda terrorists in the wake 
of 9/11, for example, devised a notion of humanity as a diasporic faith-based 
community defined by its extremist self-perception as “global victim”.85 The 
prosecution of war is also changing. With the advent of drone warfare, we are 
facing the very real possibility of future military interventions being made 
in the name of humanity by non-humans.86 Be this as it may, one could argue 
that we are much less internationalist than our grandparents’ generation 
70 years ago, and for this reason it is worth thinking about the legacy of 
humanity as the failure of universalism in our own time.87 The fears of 1945 
may have faded, but so too have the dreams.88 The ongoing refugee crisis 
has dramatised this point, as humanitarianism – and arguably more so than 
a shared sense of humanity – is what drives action and charity. In this under-
standing, humanitarianism, and not human rights, may be the real last utopia.
85 Faisal Devji, “The Terrorist as Humanitarian”, in Social Analysis 53:1 (2009), 173–192. 
86 Mark Mazower, Governing the World: A History of an Idea, 1815 to the present (London 
2013), 402, 404.
87 Stefan-Ludwig Hoffmann, “Human Rights and History”, in Past & Present, forthcoming and 
Eckel, Die Ambivalenz des Guten, 825–842. 
88 Buruma, Year Zero, 10. 
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Mihai-D. Grigore
Humanism and its Humanitas
The Transition From the Humanitas Christiana to 
Humanitas Politica in the Political Writings of Erasmus
What is a human being? What is human nature? […] 
Making and keeping human life human. 1
In the thicket of the many understandings of humanity and human nature in 
the modern and post-modern eras, there is a common denominator: human-
ity is not negotiable and contingent, but an ontological fact of every human 
being. “Negotiable” and “contingent” are only the adjectives and epithets that 
accompany humanity in the speech of humans on their own humanity. Such 
appropriations deconstruct humanity in “multiple humanities” – to para-
phrase Shmuel Eisenstadt –, identifying a “proletarian”, “bourgeois”, “Chris-
tian”, “political” humanity and so forth.2 As Noam Chomsky has argued,
a vision of a future social order [must] be based on a concept of human nature. If, 
in fact, man is an indefinitely malleable, completely plastic being, with no innate 
structures of mind and no intrinsic needs of a cultural or social character, then he 
is a fit subject for the “shaping of behaviour” by the State authority, the corporate 
manager, the technocrat, or the central committee. Those with some confidence in 
the human species will hope that this is not so and will try to determine the intrin-
sic human characteristics that provide the framework for intellectual development, 
the growth of moral consciousness, cultural achievement, and participation in a free 
community.3
1 John Macquarrie, In Search of Humanity. A Theological and Philosophical Approach (London 
1982), 1.
2 On “proletarian” and “bourgeois” humanity see James Miller, The Passion of Michel Foucault 
(Cambridge, MA 1993), 202.
3 From Noam Chomsky’s Language and Freedom, quoted in Robin Headlam Wells, “Humanism 
and Human Nature in the Renaissance”, in Brian Boyd / Joseph Carroll et al. (ed.), Evolution, 
Literature & Film. A Reader (New York 2010), 231–245, on p. 231.
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This ethical and implicitly political ideal of human individuality as pos-
sessing an intrinsic value and being independent of all forms – hidden or 
not – of determination and contingency, which in fact lead to oppression 
and injustice, is not new at all. It can already be found in the early modern 
period, albeit in a preliminary form, at the intersection of moral theology, 
natural sciences and the secular individualisation of man; the modern 
consequence of this is the transformation of the human being into a spe-
cific kind of selfhood as political person, with its own will, desires and 
rationality.
This essay is motivated, in part at least, by Jörn Rüsen’s apt observation on 
Christian dogma’s ambivalence towards humanity:
On the one hand, it contributed to the idea of human dignity through its understand-
ing of man as an image of God, its belief that God became man in Christ, and its 
transcendence of the ethnic and social barriers of human life by emphasizing the 
immediacy and equality of human subjectivity in its relationship to God. On the other 
hand, it emphasized the rankness of human nature in its dogma of Original Sin and 
put all human approaches to a humane life under the command of the institutionalized 
dogmatic regulations of the Church.4
In anticipation of the following considerations, I should point out that both 
terms in the title of this essay, Christiana humanitas and humanitas politica, 
do not occur in early modern sources. They are my own analytical categories, 
with which I aim to capture the early modern transition to an understanding 
of humanity as a quality of human presence in the world.
I argue that there is a turn in the early modern period from a humanitas 
(humaneness, humanity, Menschlichkeit) understood in relation to an external 
transcendent factor, i.e. a creator God (as an active and determinative agency 
of humanity) to a new semantic paradigm, which comprehends humanity as 
the internal, intrinsic and inherent state of every human being, as the locus 
of human nature. I will thus try in this essay to describe this specific early 
modern turn from a purely theological to an immanent understanding of the 
humanity of human beings. For this purpose, “human nature” is understood 
as human needs, desires and actions in the world. For the first paradigm, 
I will use the analytic concept of humanitas Christiana, while the second will 
be described as humanitas politica.
4 Jörn Rüsen, “Homo Humanistus? Towards a Universal History of Humanism”, in id. / Mihai I. 
Spariosu (ed.), Exploring Humanity – Intercultural Perspectives on Humanism (Göttingen 
2012), 29–44, on p. 34.
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At the heart of the following analysis are the political writings Institu-
tio Principis Christiani (“Education of a Christian Prince” from 1516) and 
Querela Pacis (“The Complaint of Peace” from 1517)5 by probably the most 
important humanist author, “the prince of the humanists”, Desiderius Eras-
mus of Rotterdam6 These two works have been quietly ignored by modern 
scholars, despite their importance for the ethical system of Erasmus. For 
instance, only few extensive studies exist on the fundamental Institutio Prin-
cipis Christiani: the chapter on Erasmus in Eric Voegelin’s History of Politi-
cal Ideas from 1948,7 the introduction to the Institutio by Otto Herding,8 and 
recently the chapter on Erasmus in my own monograph on the discourses 
surrounding the concept of Princeps Christianus in Early Modern political 
theory.9 The following notes are also an attempt to correct certain simplistic 
interpretations, which see the Institutio and Querela merely as statements 
against the Augustinian theory of bellum iustum.10 Such interpretations 
totally ignore that Erasmus’ peace discourse represents only an application, 
a concretisation of the holistic notions of “humanity” and “human nature”, 
which for Erasmus represent the basis of human existence and co-existence.
Erasmus is most appropriate subject for the following case study, not only 
because of his reputation in the intellectual and political landscape of. Europe 
in the sixteenth century and later,11 but also because he was a “humanist” – a 
central concept when dealing with humanitas –, and because we can identify 
5 I have used the following editions and translations of the texts: Erasmus Roterodamus, 
“Institvtio Principis Christiani”, in Opera Omnia Desiderii Erasmi Roterodami IV. 1, ed. by 
Otto Herding (Amsterdam 1974), 95–219; id., “Querela Pacis”, in Opera Omnia Desiderii 
Erasmi Roterodami IV. 2, ed. by Otto Herding (Amsterdam 1977), 1–100; Erasmus von 
Rotterdam, Ausgewählte Schriften 5, ed. by Werner Welzig (Darmstadt 1968); Desiderius 
Erasmus, The Education of a Christian Prince (1516), transl. by Lester K. Born (New York 
1963); Erasmus of Rotterdam, The Complaint of Peace. Translated From Querela Pacis 
(A.D. 1521), transl. by Thomas Paynell (London 1917) (the latter with numerous translation 
errors).
6 Gary Remer, Humanism and the Rethoric of Toleration (Philadelphia 1996), 45; Rüsen, 
Humanity, 34.
7 Eric Voegelin, Collected Works, vol. 22 (Columbia, MO 1998), 88–109; German version: Eric 
Voegelin, Die Ordnung der Vernunft, Occasional Papers XXIX, ed. by Peter J. Opitz (Munich 
22006).
8 Otto Herding, “Institutio Principis Christiani. Einleitung”, in Opera Omnia Desiderii Erasmi 
Roterodami IV.1. (Amsterdam 1974), 95–130.
9 Mihai-D. Grigore, Neagoe Basarab – Princeps Christianus. Christianitas-Semantik im Ver-
gleich mit Erasmus, Luther und Machiavelli (1513–1523) (Frankfurt/M. 2015), 193–231.
10 Christine Christ-von Wedel, Erasmus of Rotterdam. Advocate of a New Christianity (Toronto 
2013), 225–235.
11 On the popularity of Erasmus see Cornelis Augustijn, Erasmus. His Life, Works, and Influence 
(Toronto 1991); Christoph Galle, Hodie nullus – cras maximus. Berühmtwerden und Berühmt-
sein im frühen 16. Jahrhundert am Beispiel des Erasmus von Rotterdam (Münster 2013). For 
the biography of Erasmus see Léon E. Halkin, Erasmus von Rotterdam. Eine Bio graphie 
(Zurich 1989); Erika Rummel, Erasmus (New York 2004). 
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in the aforementioned works the simultaneous presence of both paradigms: 
humanitas Christiana and humanitas politica. Erasmus was one of the first 
promoters of political humanity in contradistinction to Christian humanity. 
This makes it all the more disappointing that important recent anthologies 
on “Humanism”, “humankind”, or “humanity” should fail to devote at least a 
chapter to one of the most important thinkers on humanity.12
Stating that Erasmus was a humanist raises several problems. Therefore, I 
will begin by briefly discussing the humanist phenomenon in Early Modern 
Europe. After that, I will approach his political writings in order to show 
what made him a humanist, and to describe his understanding of humanitas. 
I will finish with some brief, final considerations.
1. Humanism and Humanists
What we today call “humanism” is, like every other major historical phenom-
enon, a difficult concept to define.
There is in fact no essential thing that we could call humanism – in the 
sense of a definite philosophical, practical and terminological system. At the 
same time, the concept itself is of late occurrence. It was first used by the 
theologian Friedrich Immanuel Niethammer in his educational manifesto 
Der Streit des Philanthropinismus und des Humanismus in der Theorie des 
Erziehungsunterrichts unsrer Zeit.13 The noun “humanism” also appeared 
for the first time in English in the nineteenth century, influenced by German 
usage.14 Yet the appropriate approach to humanism would be use the plural 
form “humanisms”, meaning a multitude of forms and intellectual or cul-
tural interests, scientific and scholarly patterns etc. that could be designated 
as humanist.15
12 Jörn Rüsen (ed.), Approaching Humankind. Towards an Intercultural Humanism (Göttingen 
2013); Andrea Radasanu (ed.), In Search of Humanity. Essays in Honor of Clifford Orwin (Lon-
don 2015).
13 Friedrich Immanuel Niethammer, Der Streit des Philanthropismus und Humanismus in der 
Theorie des Erziehungsunterrichtes unserer Zeit (Jena 1808). See also Paul O. Kristeller, 
Humanismus und Renaissance I. Die antiken und mittelalterlichen Quellen (Munich 1974), 16; 
Eckhard Keßler, Der Humanismus und die Entstehung der modernen Wissenschaft (Pforzheim 
1998), 2. On the educational programe of so-called nineteenth-century “classical humanism” 
see Bas van Bommel, Classical Humanism and the Challenge of Modernity. Debates on Clas-
sical Education in Nineteenth Century Germany (Berlin 2015). 
14 Andrew Copson, “What is Humanism?”, in id. / A. C. Grayling (ed.), The Wiley Blackwell 
Handbook of Humanism (London 2015), 1.
15  Herfried Münkler, “Die politischen Ideen des Humanismus”, in id. / Iring Fetscher (ed.), Pipers 
Handbuch der politischen Ideen, vol. 5 (Munich 1993), 553–613, on pp. 553–556; August Buck, 
“Der italienische Humanismus”, in Notker Hammerstein / August Buck (ed.), Handbuch der 
deutschen Bildungsgeschichte 1 (Munich 1996), 1–56, on p. 1.
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However, the use of the singular is surely legitimate in view of the method 
applied by the “humanists” in their work with the sources of classical and late 
antiquity as well as early Christianity.16 They developed a critical-philological 
approach in order to gain from their texts the information they thought they 
needed to revive morality and to renew the moral system.17 The scholarly 
preoccupation of the humanists had as its practical goal an improved human 
coexistence that would deliver happiness either on a Christian-theological 
or a philosophical-ethical basis.18 In this sense, as a common moral program 
grounded on education (educatio) and knowledge of the past (eruditio), and 
because this program brought together different intellectual circles all over 
Europe,19 we can speak of ‘humanism’ in the singular.
Concerning this point, let us consider the definition of “Humanism” given 
by The Willey Blackwell Handbook of Humanism:
Humanism is a democratic and ethical life stance, which affirms that human beings 
have the right and responsibility to give meaning and shape to their own lives. It stands 
for the building of a more human society through an ethic based on human and other 
natural values in the spirit of reason and free inquiry through human capabilities. It is 
not theistic, and it does not accept supernatural views of reality.20
To speak of one humanism as a non-religious, not theistic position is a limited 
approach at best.21 Such a definition may seem philosophically quite appeal-
ing, but it is false when humanism in considered from a historical perspec-
tive. We cannot speak of an international, synchronically and diachronically 
all-embracing humanism. Furthermore, the European Byzantine, late medi-
eval and early modern European humanisms were certainly profoundly reli-
gious.22 The possibly most influential humanist, Erasmus of Rotterdam, to 
whom the Handbook does not refer at any point, is the best example of deeply 
religious humanist views, as I will further try to show.
16 Augustijn, Influence, 17.
17 Erika Rummel, “Scholasticism and Biblical Humanism in Early Modern Europe”, in id. (ed.), 
Biblical Humanism and Scolasticism in the Age of Erasmus (Leiden 2008), 1–14, on pp. 1f.
18 Robert Evans, “European Humanism: East and West”, in Mihai I. Spariosu / Jörn Rüsen (ed.), 
Exploring Humanity – Intercultural Perspectives on Humanism (Göttingen 2012), 145–151, on 
pp. 145f.
19 See for instance Constance M. Furey, Erasmus, Contarini, and the Religious Republic of 
Letters (Cambridge 2006), 166.
20 Copson, Humanism, 6.
21 Ibid., 4.
22 Keith Robbins (ed.), Religion and Humanism. Papers Read at the Eighteenth Summer Meeting 
and the Nineteenth Winter Meeting of the Ecclesial History Society (Oxford 1981). 
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“Humanism” is etymologically linked with the term humaniora used by 
Cicero to define what later in the European Renaissance was known as artes 
liberales or – to use the terms of humanist sources – as studia humanita-
tis.23 The term “humanist”, humanista, in fifteenth century Italy designated 
mainly a teacher or preceptor, but it could also refer generally to anyone who 
had enjoyed an education following the high standards of Greek or Roman 
antiquity.24 Nevertheless, not only scholarship and education were the goals 
of the humanist programme of studia humanitatis. As already mentioned, the 
main goal was an ethical and hence a political one. It is no coincidence that 
Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics and his Politics assumed a central place in the 
teaching canon of the humanist circles in the late Middle Ages and the early 
modern period. In his recent survey of global ethics, Kenan Malik claims that, 
the humanists “established a new model of intellectual excellence that empha-
sized literature, philology, oratory, poetry, ethics, and politics”, but also that 
they “were enthused less by Aristotle’s dry treatises than by Plato’s stylish 
dialogues”.25 This is to misstate the facts. Aristotle’s works on poetics, ethics, 
and politics must in fact be considered a prime source of inspiration – more 
important than Plato’s works – for the humanist program and in consequence 
were taught extensively.26 According to the Florentine scholar and statesman 
Coluccio Salutati, the humanitas of the humanist program meant both scholar-
ship and education, but also goodness as a political idea of human coexistence, 
interaction and interdependence: “Because not only the virtue usually called 
goodness is contained in this concept of humanitas, but also experience and 
scholarship.”27
Erasmus of Rotterdam enjoyed an education not only in the humanities, but 
also in spiritual and theological subjects, as well as gaining political experience 
as counsellor to the Bishop of Cambrai and to the Dauphin Charles (the future 
Emperor Charles V). In 1487, Erasmus entered the monastic community of 
the Augustine Canons in the Dutch town of Steyn, near Gouda. There he 
came into contact with “humanist concerns” (humanistische Inte ressen):28 
23 Studia humanitatis consisted, since the fifteenth century, of grammar, rhetoric, history, poetry 
and morals (Kristeller, Humanismus, 17f.). See also Robert Black, “Cicero in the Curriculum of 
Italian Renaissance Grammar Schools”, in Ciceroniana 9 (1996), 105–120; Susan Meld Shell, 
“ ‘More [Than] Human’. Kant on Liberal Education and the Public Use of Reason”, in Andrea 
Radasanu (ed.), In Search for Humanity. Essays in Honor of Clifford Orwin (Lanham, MD 
2015), 449–464, on p. 452.
24 Münkler, Humanismus, 554.
25 Kenan Malik, The Quest for a Moral Compass. A Global History of Ethics (London 2014), 164. 
26 Grigore, Princeps Christianus, 200f.
27 Eckhard Apud Kessler, Das Problem des frühen Humanismus. Seine philosophische Bedeu-
tung bei Coluccio Salutati (Munich 1968), 44. 
28 On Humanism in the Low Countries see the new anthology of Jozef Ijsewijn’s older studies, 
Humanism in the Low Countries, selected and ed. by Gilbert Tournoy (Leuven 2015).
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the friars enjoyed the intellectual life of the litterae, practiced poetry and 
rhetoric, and cultivated the art of correspondence (ars epistolandi). In this 
exciting intellectual atmosphere, Erasmus wrote an important humanist 
work, De contemptu mundi (before 1493), in which he displays his humanist 
erudition as well as his theological and moral views on human existence.29 In 
Erasmus’s understanding of humanism, scholarship and good education are 
forms of Christian edification. In this view, those practices are humanist that 
form or empower social and rational human nature and help it to evolve – 
in Aristotelian sense – towards virtue, whereby “virtue” is understood as a 
quality of human performance and policy.30
2. Humanitas and Political Concordia
In the preface of the Institutio Principis Christiani, dedicated to Emperor 
Charles V, Erasmus wrote that he considered himself a theologus,31 a 
theologian. Modern scholars invariably refer to him as a humanist. Both 
designations are of course legitimate, since they are not mutually exclusive. 
Regarding Erasmus, one can present two arguments to that effect:
On the one hand, Erasmus develops his whole program with the theological 
goal of human redemption. He argues that only through an education based 
on classical philosophers and the Church Fathers, one can educate a perfect, 
cultivated humanity, restored to its pre-lapsarian condition, as intended by 
the incarnation of Christ himself.32 As Jacob Vance has argued,
[…] Erasmus steeped himself in the study and translation of numerous Church Fathers, 
and he had a particular interest in patristic exegesis on Saint Paul. We know that by 
that time, he had read pseudo-Dionysius, Origen, Cyprien, Ambrose, and Jerome in 
Italy. Together with humanists such as the earlier Lorenzo Valla (1406–1457) and 
29 Remer, Humanism, 43f; Grigore, Princeps Christianus, 201f.
30 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Translation, Introduction, and Commentary by Sarah 
Broadie / Christopher Rowe (Oxford 2002), book I, ch. 13 and book II, ch. 2; Aristotle, 
Politics, transl. by Carnes Lord (Chicago, IL 22013), book I. See Berndt Hamm, “Augusti-
nus-Begeisterung und Augustinismus in der Reformation”, in Kenneth Hagen (ed.), Augustine, 
the Harvest and Theology (1300–1650) (Leiden 1990), 127–135, on pp. 158f., 195; Ekkehard 
Mühlenberg, “Das Argument: ‘Die Wahrheit erweist sich in Übereinstimmung mit den Vätern’. 
Entstehung und Schlagkraft”, in Leif Grane et al. (ed.), Auctoritas Patrum II. Neue Beiträge zur 
Rezeption der Kirchenväter im 15. und 16. Jahrhundert (Mainz 1998), 153–169, on pp. 166–169. 
31 “[E]go theologus inclytum et integerrimum principem [instituit]”, Erasmus Roterodamus, 
Institvtio, 134.
32 Fritz Caspari, “Erasmus on the Social Functions of Christian Humanism”, in Journal of the 
History of Ideas 8:1 (1947), 78–106; Grigore, Princeps Christianus, 213–227.
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Jacques Lefevre D’Etaples (c. 1450–1536), Erasmus worked to rehabilitate Saint 
Paul as an Apostle of central importance during the fifteenth and early sixteenth 
centuries.33
The theological message in the writings of Erasmus is clear. In his De con-
temptu mundi, Erasmus has no problem replacing the Christian felicitas 
(“happiness”) with the pagan, Epicurean term voluptas (“pleasure”) and 
making it a vehicle for Christian morals, associating for instance the monastic 
ascetical environment with a paradisus voluptati (“paradise of pleasures”) 
and with a hortus deliciarum (“garden of delights”).34 Erudition (eruditio) 
was for Erasmus meaningless without its fulfilment in piety (pietas). When 
praising the privileges of education, Erasmus recurs to the well-known hom-
ily of Basil the Great Ad adolescentes and shows how important letters are 
for an authentic Christian life.35 Such an approach dissociates Erasmus from 
basic humanism, making him a so-called “biblical humanist”.36
On the other hand, we encounter a whole trend of humanist approaches 
(not only in Erasmus’ writings), which in dealing with the bonae litterae 
or politiores litterae (good letters, cultivated letters) of classical philosophy 
aim in fact at the Christian pietas. The bonae litterae are seen as the prelude 
of the sacrae litterae (sacred writings, Holy Scriptures), in the same way as 
erudition is seen to precede piety and heavenly happiness.37 The human ideal 
of Erasmus is the homo duplex, i.e. the “two-fold man”, erudite and pious.38 
However, Erasmus himself considers that in this way the heavenly Kingdom 
of God depends directly on functional human associations on Earth, capable 
of offering a viable infrastructure for education: and this means, of course, 
political, spiritual, literary or even economical education. Uncultivated, 
33 Jacob Vance, Secrets. Humanism, Mysticism, and Evangelism in Erasmus of Rotterdam, 
Bishop Guillaume Briçonnet, and Marguerite de Navarre (Leiden 2014), 21. On the humanist 
preoccupation with the Church Fathers see Charles S. Stinger, Humanism and the Church 
Fathers. Ambrogio Traversari (1386–1439) and Christian Antiquity in the Italian Renaissance 
(Albany, NY 1977).
34 R. Bultot, “Érasme, Épicure et le De contemptu mundi”, in Joseph Coppens (ed.), Scrinium 
Erasmianum II (Leiden 1947), 205–238, on p. 237; Paul Mestwerdt, Die Anfänge des Erasmus. 
Humanismus und devotio moderna (Leipzig 1917), 234f.
35 August Buck, Humanismus. Seine europäische Entwicklung in Dokumenten und Darstellun-
gen (Freiburg 1987), 39.
36 Cornelis Augustijn, “Erasmus”, in Theologische Realenzyklopädie 10 (1993), 1–18, on pp. 2–4. 
On the whole situation of biblical humanism in sixteenth century Europe see Timothy J. Wen-
gert, Philip Melanchthon’s Exegetical Dispute With Erasmus of Rotterdam (Oxford 1998); 
Erika Rummel (ed.), Biblical Humanism and Scolasticism in the Age of Erasmus (Leiden 2008).
37 Robert W. Scribner, “The Social Thought of Erasmus”, in Journal of Religious History 6 
(1970), 3–26, on p. 7. Augustijn, Influence, 25, 75.
38 Constant Matheeussen, “Religio und Litterae im Menschenideal des Erasmus”, in Joseph Cop-
pens (ed.), Scrinium Erasmianum I (Leiden 1969), 143–163, 353, 363.
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illiterate and vulgar people, vulgus as Erasmus calls them, cannot make good 
inhabitants of patria celesta (heavenly Fatherland).
Only citizens of an earthly, well-organized political body, a populus – seen 
as partner of the ruler in the social contract – can do that.39 This distinc-
tion between vulgus and populus is one of the most characteristic features 
of the political humanity intended by Erasmus. The populus represents the 
ground, the foundation of the political body and the place where lordship 
(principatus) can evolve and develop into a good, proper, Christian lordship 
(principatus Christianus), avoiding degeneration into abusive tyranny. The 
populus – understood as the community of free decision-makers within the 
state – is the most important political factor in establishing a corpus rei pub-
licae.40 However, the people have to be educated in order to do this. Education 
provides both citizens (subjects) and political elites, so it is indispensable for 
any polity. In his argument, Erasmus repeatedly refers to Aristotle:
In his Politics, Aristotle distinguishes between a prince and a tyrant on the basis that 
the one is concerned with the state and the other pursues his own ends. No matter 
what the prince is deliberating, he always keeps this one thing in mind: “Is this to the 
advantage of all my subjects”? A tyrant only considers whether a thing will contribute 
to his cause. A prince is vitally concerned with the needs of his subjects […]. On the 
other hand, if a tyrant ever chances to do something good for his subjects, he turns it to 
his own personal gain. Those who look out for their people only in so far as it redounds 
to their personal advantage hold their subjects in the same status as the uneducated 
common man (vulgus hominum) does his horse or ass. For these men take care of their 
animals, but all the care they give them is judged from the advantage to themselves, 
not to the animals. But anyone who despoils the people with his rapacity, or wracks 
them with his cruelty, or subjects them to all sorts of perils to satisfy his ambition, 
considers free citizens even cheaper than the uneducated common folk (vulgus) value 
their draft animals or the fencing master his gladiators.41
39 Grigore, Princeps Christianus, 216f.
40 Herding, Institutio, 126.
41 “Id vt compendio dicam, hac nota principem a tyranno distinguit in politicis Aristoteles, 
quod his suis studet commodis, ille reipublicae. Princeps quacunque de re deliberans illud 
semper in animo spectat, num expediat vniuersis ciuibus. Tyrannus illud consyderat, an sibi 
conducat. Princeps etiam suum agens negocium tamen potissimum suorum spectat vtilitatem. 
Contra tyrannus si quando benemeretur de ciuibus, tamen hoc ipsum ad priuatam suam refert 
vtilitatem. Qui suos eatenus curant, quatenus expedit propriis commoditatibus, ii non alio loco 
ciues suos habent quam vulgus hominum equos et asinos. Nam hos quoque curant illi, sed 
omnem curationem suis, non illorum vsibus metiuntur. Caeterum qui rapacitate deglubunt 
populum aut crudelitate laniant aut ob ambitionem suam periculis omnibus obiiciunt, ii peiore 
loco ciues habent liberos quam vulgus empta iumenta aut lanistae sua mancipia.” Erasmus 
Roterodamus, Institvtio, 154; compare with translation Desiderius Erasmus, Education, 161f.
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Therefore, the main characteristic of the populus as a body of political sub-
jects or citizens is, according to Erasmus, the fact that the populus is the 
partner of the good ruler in a well-functioning political organism. Rulers 
who neglect the virtues of generosity, considerate benevolence and good 
will toward their subjects, dehumanise them and abuse them in an unworthy, 
in-humane manner, in the same way that vulgar people (vulgus hominum) 
abuse and misuse their animals. Erasmus thus argues that humanity is a 
performative, conscious act on the part of humans for the benefit of other 
humans, in an all-embracing dimension of shared humanity.
On the other hand, in his writings Erasmus makes negative references 
to the vulgus,42 in order to contrast it to the positively connoted populus, 
with all its aspects related to political life. Education is thus the criterion of 
distinction between the two Erasmian categories. When Erasmus speaks of 
vulgus or plebs, he does not necessarily mean social categories such as com-
mon people, poor, peasants, artisans or vagrants. He means all those – elites 
included –, who act without education and virtue, like an animali mob, ani-
mated by instinctive desires (voluptates plebejae)43 and poisoned by dubious, 
questionable views (venena vulgarium opinionum).44
Erasmus considers it is important to decouple that which makes up a 
human being, its humanity – humanitas –, from its transcendent and external 
points of reference. Humanity is to him something that everybody potentially 
or virtually possesses. Christian humanity is what educated, pious Christians 
possess:
Education exerts an extremely powerful influence, as Plato says, so that a man who 
has been trained in the right (homo recte instructus) develops into a sort of divine 
creature, while on the other hand, a person who has received a perverted training 
degenerates into a monstrous sort of savage beast,45
Erasmus states in Institutio Principis Christiani. Finally, it is education that 
leads to the rise of humanity: by birth, every human being possesses human-
ity in nuce, potentially, but this humanity has to be educated and cultivated 
in order to develop to its full extent. This association of humanity with bio-
logical existence given by natural birth as a member of the human species 
transforms Erasmian humanity into an immanent category.
42 Voegelin, Ordnung der Vernunft, 20.
43 Erasmus Roterodamus, Institvtio, 144.
44 Ibid., 140.
45 “Tantam vim habet educatio, vt Plato scripserit hominem recte institutum in diuinum quoddam 
animal euadere; contra perperam educatum in immanissimam quandam degenerare beluam.” 
Ibid., 188.
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The main argument found in both Institutio Principis Christiani and 
Querela Pacis is that no political association, indeed no human coexistence, 
can succeed in the absence of concord or harmony (concordia) between 
humans, taken as individuals of the same species. People have to be edu-
cated in order to be able to comprehend their common humanity, leading to 
equality, good will and social solidarity. According to Erasmus, as well as to 
Aristotle, there is no functional political body without peace and harmony. 
There is also no international community without universal peace, a thought 
that would later be developed by Immanuel Kant in his pamphlet Zum ewigen 
Frieden (“Perpetual Peace”).46
Erasmus attempts not only to show how important concord is for all forms 
of human forms, but also that concord is deeply rooted in human nature. 
Therefore, he draws on observations made in the study of nature.
Animals destitute of reason live with their own kind in a state of social amity. Ele-
phants herd together; sheep and swine feed in flocks; cranes and crows take their flight 
in troops; storks, masters of dutifulness, have their public meetings; dolphins defend 
each other by mutual assistance; and everybody knows that both ants and bees have 
respectively established by general agreement a little friendly community.47
The same argument occurs in the Institutio, where Erasmus stated that
dragons, panthers, lions, and all the other beasts that are condemned on the charge 
of savageness do not rage one against the other, but beasts of like characteristics (suo 
generis) are safe together. But the tyrant, who is a human among his conspecific 
humans (homo in homines), turns his bestial cruelty against his fellow humans and 
fellow citizens.48
46 Immanuel Kant, Zum ewigen Frieden. Ein philosophischer Entwurf. Texte zur Rezeption 
1796–1900, ed. by Manfred Buhr / Steffen Dietzsch (Leipzig 1984); English translation Imma-
nuel Kant, Perpetual Peace. A Philosophic Essay, transl. by W. Hastie, https://librivox.org/
perpetual-peace-by-immanuel-kant/. See about Erasmus’s part in the Kantian thought on peace 
Volker Gerhardt, Immanuel Kants Entwurf “Zum ewigen Frieden”. Eine Theorie der Politik 
(Darmstadt 1995), 24.
47 “Animantia rationis expertia in suo quaeque genere ciuiliter concorditerque degunt. Armenta-
tim viuunt elephanti, gregatim pascuntur sues et oues, turmatim volant grues et graculi, habent 
sua comitia ciconiae, pietatis etiam magistrae, mutuis officiis sese tuentur deplhini. Nota est 
formicarum et apum inter ipsas concors politia”, Erasmus Roterodamus, Querela, 62; compare 
with transl. Desiderius Erasmus, Complaint, 4.
48 “Dracones pardi leones caeteraque immanitatis damnata crimine animantia a suo genere tem-
perant et tuta est inter feras similitudo morum. At tyrannus homo in homines, ciuis in ciues 
potissimum feritatem suam exercet”, Erasmus Roterodamus, Institvtio, 157; compare transl. 
Desiderius Erasmus, Education, 166.
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Erasmus continues with observations regarding human beings:
[…] Yet to man, whom, of all created beings, concord would most become, and who 
stands most in need of it, neither nature, so powerful and irresistible in every thing 
else, can reconcile; neither human compacts unite; neither the great advantages which 
would evidently arise from unanimity combine, nor the actual feeling and experience 
of the dreadful evils of discord cordially endear. To all men the human form is the 
same, the sound made by the organs of utterance similar; and while other species 
of animals differ from each other chiefly in the shape of their bodies, to men alone 
is given a reasoning power, which is indeed common to all men, yet in a manner so 
exclusive, that it is not at the same time common to any other living creature. To this 
distinguished being is also given the power of speech, the most conciliating instrument 
of social connection and cordial love. Throughout the whole race of men are sown 
by nature the seeds of virtue, and of knowledge. From nature, man receives a mild 
and gentle disposition, so prone to reciprocal benevolence that he delights to be loved 
for the pleasure of being loved, without any view to interest; and feels a satisfaction 
in doing good, without a wish or prospect of remuneration. This disposition to do 
disinterested good is natural to man […]. Hence even the common people, in the ordi-
nary language of daily conversation, denominate whatever is connected with mutual 
good will (benevolentia), humane (humanum); so that the word humanity (humanitas) 
no longer describes man’s nature, merely in a physical sense; but signifies humane 
manners, or a conduct, worthy the nature of man.49
In consequence, human nature is dignified by the conduct of every human 
individual and not by external instances like God and Church. Nature, Eras-
mus states in the Querela, offers everything that is needed to create concord: 
“Thus it appears, in the various ways nature has taught man her first great 
lesson of love and union.”50 Only later in the Querela Pacis do arguments 
occur pertaining to Christian theology, which grounds human communities 
49 “Solos homines, quos omnium maxime decebat unanimitas quibusque cum primis opus est 
ea, neque natura tam aliis in rebus potens et efficax conciliat, nec institutio coniungit, nec tot 
ex consensu profecturae commoditates conglutinant, nec tantorum deninque malorum sensus 
et experientia in mutuum amorem redigit. Figura communis omnium, vox eadem; et cum 
caetera animantium genera corporum formis potissimum inter se different, vni homini indita 
vis rationis, quae ita sit illis inter ipsos communis, vt cum nullo sit reliquorum animantium 
communis, vni huic animanti sermo datus, praecipuus necessitudinum conciliator. Insita sunt 
communiter disciplinarum ac virtutum semina, ingenium mite placidumque et ad mutuam 
beneuolentiam propensum, vt per se iuuer amari et iucundum sit de aliis benemereri […]. Hinc 
est videlicet, quod vulgus quicquid ad mutuam beneuolentiam pertinet humanum appellat (vt 
humanitatis vocabulum non iam naturam nobis declaret, sed mores hominis natura dignos”, 
Erasmus Roterodamus, Querela, 63f; compare to transl. Desiderius Erasmus, Complaint, 5f. 
50 “Tot argumentis natura docuit pacem concordiamque”, Erasmus Roterodamus, Querela, 64. 
This is not new, it is only an argument, Erasmus already formulated in his other work on the 
peace’s benefits, Dulce bellum inexpertis from 1515, Peter G. Bietenholz, Encounters With a 
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on the sacrifice of Christ and on Eucharistic community, not on the bio logical/
natural order. It is striking for an author who considers himself a theologus 
that reasons based on the observation of nature prevail in the order of argu-
mentation over those that are purely theological. Of course, the natural order 
is to any theologian in the sixteenth century – and thus to Erasmus – an 
image of the divine creative power of God: but Erasmus’s line of argument, 
which begins with issues from the observation of nature and only later links 
them with the theological discourse, is still quite unusual and deserves 
mention.
It is no coincidence that, in the first of the above quotations, Erasmus cites 
bees as an example of animals forming associations; in the second quotation, 
he insists that only men have the gift of rationality and speech or language, in 
order to separate them from animals and insects. This is Aristotle’s argument 
in his Politics. As Aristotle affirmed, even though bees were able to build 
communities, this fact did not necessarily made them into state-building 
political beings (zoa politika). As Aristotle made clear, this was because 
the medium of politics was speech, and this was given only to men by 
their nature:
And why man is a political animal in a greater measure than any bee or any gregarious 
animal is clear. For nature, as we declare, does nothing without purpose; and man 
alone of the animals possesses speech. The mere voice, it is true, can indicate pain 
and pleasure, and therefore is possessed by the other animals as well (for their nature 
has been developed so far as to have sensations of what is painful and pleasant and to 
indicate those sensations to one another), but speech is designed to indicate the advan-
tageous and the harmful, and therefore also the right and the wrong; for it is the special 
property of man in distinction from the other animals that he alone has perception of 
good and bad and right and wrong and the other moral qualities, and it is partnership 
in these things that makes a household and a city-state.51
In this way, Aristotle laid out an educational desideratum that culminated 
in the construction of the perfect political organism. Education is required 
because speech – as a medium of political virtue and ethics, as well as a 
communicational interface of human coexistence52 – is a complex instrument 
in which someone has to be instructed in order to display maximal efficiency. 
Radical Erasmus. Erasmus’ Work as a Source of Radical Thought in Early Modern Europe 
(Toronto 2009), 73f., 77f.
51 Aristotle, Politics, http://data.perseus.org/citations/urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0086.tlg035.perseus-
eng1:1.1253a.
52 Mihai-D. Grigore, “Die ethische Handlungsgemeinschaft als Voraussetzung der Hermeneutik. 
Zur Dialektik des Handelns und Verstehens”, in Christoph Ernst et al. (ed.), Kulturhermeneu-
tik. Interdisziplinäre Beiträge zum Umgang mit kultureller Differenz (Munich 2008), 455–472.
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Many beings are able to articulate sounds to reveal instinctive desires, but 
only political subjects, citizens, are capable of communication through 
speech. Speech distinguishes men as citizens, state-building beings, from 
barbarians and slaves, who are not capable of establishing a political body. 
Barbarians do not have education, so they do not have a (political) language.53 
Speech/language is for Aristotle a dimension of human reflection, discern-
ment, learning, sharing and action.
Erasmus takes up the educational program laid out by Aristotle and adapts 
it in his own political and pedagogical thought. He no longer speaks of bar-
barians and slaves. In contrast to Aristotle, Erasmus works with a more inclu-
sive definition of humanity, according to which all humans are able to learn 
to communicate and associate themselves in political organisms. Therefore, 
their human potential profits from their capacity to be educated. Erasmus’s 
main distinction is not that between citizens and barbarians or slaves, as it 
was for Aristotle, but that between educated and uneducated people. On the 
other hand, for Erasmus, speech constitutes the main argument in favour of 
the divinity and privilege of the human being: the human being is the crown of 
the entire creation because it shares with God, the Creator, the skill of speech, 
of communication, of logos. Therefore, the nature of all humans – because all 
humans are capable of speech – is divine. In this way, Erasmus never forsakes 
his theological concerns in his anthropology, but he does make a decisive 
step towards strengthening the idea of human nature per se as a quality of all 
humans independent of their religious beliefs or social status.
The natural potential in human ontology, speech as the levelling medium 
of socio-political balance, and the quality of mutual good will are for Eras-
mus not only intensified by education, but also embodied in the laws of the 
state. This is why Erasmus expressly links the natural disposition of good 
will in conspecific beings to the practice of law. Both good will and law are 
signs and vehicles of humanitas. Erasmus writes in this sense in Institutio 
Principis Christianis about the “humanity of law” (humanitas legum).54 The 
law and its humanity, as a sign of human policy and politics, attenuates the 
unnatural quality of the state, because state and political hierarchy between 
humans are actually results of inequality and are against the natural law ( jus 
naturale). Natural law made all men free, equal and solidary with each other. 
Authority, servitude, power and lordship are typical human phenomena, and 
that is why they count as the law of nations ( jus gentium): “Nature created 
all men equal, and slavery was superimposed on nature, which even the laws 
53 Mihai-D. Grigore, “Der Mensch zwischen Gott und Staat. Überlegungen zu politischen Formen 
im Christentum”, in Studii Teologice 6:1 (2010), new series, 105–175, on pp. 110f.
54 Erasmus Roterodamus, Institvtio, 199. See also Otto Schottenloher, “Zur humanitas legum bei 
Erasmus”, in Festschrift für Hermann Heimpel zum 70. Geburtstag am 19. September 1971, 
vol. I (Göttingen 1971), 667–683, on p. 671.
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of pagans recognized”,55 affirms Erasmus in the first book of Institutio Prin-
cipis Christiani with regard to the Roman jurists Ulpianus and Florentinus.56 
In this case, all humans can do is to organize themselves according to their 
humanity, i.e. good will, solidarity, human laws and of course moral Chris-
tian conduct. In this context, it would be interesting to ask what impact such 
ideal and theoretical considerations had on the real political life of Europe in 
Erasmus’s times.
Let us take the case of the Institutio Principis Christiani, because it is older 
and more fundamental than Querela, which in many regards only repeated 
and deepened ideas of the first. According to a letter that he himself wrote, 
Erasmus began work on the Institutio in 1515 and finished it in March 1516.57 
The book was published that same year by Froben in Basel and was an 
instant bestseller.58 In the same year, the book was reprinted without license 
in Leuven by Dirk Martens, which angered Erasmus extremely (“libellum 
de Principe, quemfurtim excudit interim cum ego abesse in Anglia”).59 
Further editions followed: the third was published by Badius Ascensius in 
Paris (1517), and Froben in Basel published a fourth revised edition in 1518. 
Altogether 33 Latin editions of the Institutio are known, accompanied by 
21 translations into different European languages.60 The first Froben edition 
was dedicated by Erasmus – in his quality of preceptor, consiliarius, of the 
55 “Cum natura genuerit omneis homines liberos et praeter naturam inducta sit seruitus, quod 
ethnicorum etiam leges fetentur […]”, Erasmus Roterodamus, Institvtio, 165; transl. Desiderius 
Erasmus, Education, 177.
56 Grigore, Der Mensch, 112f. Ulpianus was the first to systemize the theory of natural law and the 
law of nations, stating that natural law was specific and common to all beings and postulated 
by nature itself, while the law of nations was a human product and characteristic exclusively 
for human beings: “Ius naturale est, quod natura omnia animalia docuit: nam jus istud non 
humani generis proprium, sed omnium animalium […]. Ius gentium est, quo gentes humanae 
utuntur. Quod a naturali recedere facere intellegere licet, quia illud omnibus animalibus, hoc 
solis hominibus inter se commune sit” (Corpus iuris civilis, vol. I: Institutiones / Digesta, ed. by 
Theodor Mommsen / Paul Krueger [Hildesheim 251993], ch. 1, 29). Natural law consisted of the 
laws of nature, for instance freedom and equality. The law of nations consisted on the contrary 
of lack of freedom, inequality, and servitude. Lordship and political power were, according 
to the Roman jurist Florentinus, against nature and its laws: “Servitus est constitutio iuris 
gentium, qua quis dominio alieno contra natura subicitur” (Corpus Iuris Civilis I, ch. 4, 35). 
On Roman Law in Renaissance humanism see Quirinus Breen, “Renaissance Humanism and 
the Roman Law”, in Quirinus Breen, Christianity and Humanism. Studies in the History of 
Ideas, collected and published in his honor by Paul Oskar Kristeller et al. (Grand Rapids, MI 
1968), 183–199.
57 Ludwig Enthoven, “Über die Institutio Principis Christiani des Erasmus. Ein Beitrag zur 
Theorie des Fürstenerziehung”, in Neue Jahrbücher für klassisches Altertum, Geschichte und 
Literatur und für Pädagogik 24 (1909), 312–329, on. p. 312; Herding, Einleitung, 107.
58 Augustijn, Influence, 40; Augustijn, Erasmus, 2.
59 Opus Epistolarum Desiderii Erasmi Roterodami, 12 vols, ed. by Preserved Smith Allen 
(Oxford 1906–1958), Letter 332 to Pieter Gillis from 7 May 1515.
60 Herding, Institutio, 101–104, 114f.
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young prince – to the future Charles V.61 The resonance of the Institutio at 
the European Courts was quite impressive. It was used for the education of 
the young princes, the future rulers of their countries: Charles V, Ferdinand I, 
Henry VIII and Edward VI read it.62 Of course, that so many rulers read the 
book does not necessarily imply that they also put its ideas into practice.
There were also many critics of the work. The French humanist Guillaume 
Budé (Budaeus) described the Institutio as a thin, insubstantial book, full 
of superfluous speculations (“tenuis loqui, nimirum anxias ac nimirum 
subtiles argutias”).63 Other critics accused Erasmus of pacifism, because of 
his emphasis on concord and solidarity in the policy of states. The theolo-
gians at the University of Paris warned the European political class not to 
be “infested” by Erasmian pacifism, which was endangering the political 
and social order (“enervat omnem politiam”). The Parisians considered 
Erasmus’s ideas on peace an abstruse heresy. This virulent critique moved 
Erasmus to publish in 1531 an apology of the Institutio, in which he softened 
many of his controversial and contested assertions.64 We can see from both 
criticism and popularity, that the Institutio Principis Christiani garnered a 
wide interest in the European political and intellectual circles of the sixteenth 
century and thereafter.
3. Conclusion
What I have been trying to point out is that, in the two most important polit-
ical works of Erasmus, we can witness a transition from the classical Chris-
tian political anthropology, focused on humanity as a Christian category, to 
a mundane (a precursory world-centred form of secularism) anthropology 
focusing on humanity as a sort of biological given.65
Erasmus remains a theologian and considers mere humanity as only a 
preliminary, undeveloped form of Christian humanity. He gives priority 
to the latter, regarding it as an improved, educated and cultivated form of 
the former. In other words, all people possess humanity, but not all of them 
possess Christian humanity. This performative aspect – i.e. somebody has to 
perform something in order to gain a reward – in the deconstruction of the 
61 Münkler, Humanismus, 592.
62 Herding, Institutio, 103; Ludwig Schrader, “Der Herrscher nach Erasmus von Rotterdam”, in 
Hans Hecker (ed.), Der Herrscher. Leitbild und Abbild in Mittelalter und Renaissance (Düssel-
dorf 1990), 179–201, on pp. 184f.
63 Apud Herding, Instiutio, 99. For Erasmus’ controversial relation to Budaeus see David O. 
McNeil, Guillaume Budé and Humanism in the Reign of Francis I (Geneva 1975), 61–76.
64 Herding, Institutio, 108–110.
65 Voegelin, Ordnung der Vernunft, 11–17.
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human being – i.e. the humanity of men is dependent on their (moral) per-
formance – is typical of the pre-modern political theory centred on Christian 
theology. According to this pattern, humanity is related to external factors 
like God, who creates humans and humanity, like Christ, who intervenes 
to redeem humankind, or like the Church, with its intercessory power to 
administer good and evil on Earth in the name of God.
In Erasmus’ political writings, we can discern a turn from an externally 
determined humanity toward an internally given one. In both the Institu-
tio and Querela, for instance, the Church does not play any important part. 
Moreover, the arguments from the observation of nature take precedence 
over those of theological speculation. Two interdependent kinds of humanitas 
are in evidence here. On one hand, there is humanitas politica, based on the 
similarity, solidarity and common interest of all humans in order to create an 
earthly basis of coexistence, communication and harmony. The realisation 
of political humanity on earth is the first step toward Christian humanity 
(Christiana humanitas). Postulating a political concept of humanity is the 
modern momentum in Erasmus’s anthropology. He inverts the priorities and 
relates the superior idea of Christian humanity to the basic and indispens-
able general humanity of all people. According to him, Christ addressed 
this general political humanity, which makes people capable of association, 
organisation and political life, in order to improve it, but not to replace it. 
Erasmus is discreetly alluding to the fact that all human association forms 
are capable of creating order and of giving a functional infrastructure for 
people to organize their earthly life using their natural disposition to sol-
idarity, communication and rules. Christian humanity is indispensable 
for redemption, which needs a Christian state on Earth in order to pre-
pare the future inhabitants of God’s Kingdom in Heaven. Nevertheless, a 
political humanity is needed in order to ensure the survival of the human 
race. Of course, Erasmus is still a partisan of the lofty goal of citizenship 
in the heavenly Kingdom of God – he is and remains a Christian theolo-
gian – but, in his political writings, he opens the door for a broader under-
standing of the essence of human beings, and this is their naturally given 
humanity.
Erasmus’s and in fact the entire whole humanist programme’s main con-
tributions to the conceptual development of humanitas may not be that inno-
vative, but had a major impact on the history of humanity. Taking over many 
arguments from Aristotle, reinforcing, extending, and concretising them, 
Erasmus links them to an educational and political agenda. Moreover, in this 
way he shows that humanity is only less a perfectus (something closed, com-
pleted, done, self-contained) than a perficiendum (something still to achieve, 
to complete, to bring to an end). Humanity is itself a process of becoming 
aware, edification, and education of natural potential.
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By stating that humanity is a form of humaneness centred on mutual 
benevolence, solidarity, and good will – in a single word “concord” (concor-
dia) – Erasmus only opens an intrinsically indissoluble link: “No humanism 
without humanity, no ‘education’ without ‘compassion’, without humanitar-
ian practice.”66 
66 Hubert Cancik, “Europe – Antiquity – Humanism”, in Jörg Rüsen (ed.), Approaching Human-
kind. Towards an Intercultural Humanism (Göttingen 2013), 95–118, on p. 116. See also Sem 
Dresden, Humanismus und Renaissance (Munich 1968), 237. 
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Mariano Delgado
“All People have Reason and Free Will”
The Controversy Over the Nature of the 
Indians in the Sixteenth Century
Today it is common to speak of the “family of mankind” and the “unity of 
mankind”. This universalism, however, was not always as self-evident and, 
over the course of history, had to be fought for long and hard. Then again, the 
Christian contribution to the genealogy of human rights is, as Hans Joas has 
pointed out, disputed and at best an indirect one.1 This certainly is true when 
the secular-humanist sacredness of the individual shows a certain conver-
gence – only understood late by the different churches – with the Christian 
view of humanity. In the case of the “family of mankind” and the “unity 
of mankind” we can thus speak of a dual genealogy, but also of a decisive 
contribution made by Christianity.
1. The Dual Genealogy
On the one hand, there is the line of thought informed by Humanism and the 
Enlightenment. This can be traced back to the Stoic Cicero, who regarded 
mankind as a single family to which all men belonged. On the basis that 
they all shared in the capacity for reason, its individual members enjoyed 
“a dignity equal and common to all men”. Distinctions made with regard 
to dignity, “as resulting from the different wealth, achievements, talents, or 
decisions made by individuals”,2 could never repeal the first, fundamental 
and shared form of dignity. Unfortunately, there had been incidents, caused 
by particular historical circumstances, in which the dialectic of universal-
ism and particularism contained in this notion had turned into intolerance 
and violence.
The reception of this line of thought, combined with the conviction that 
mankind could be subjected to a cultural education, led, during the Enlighten-
ment, to a celebration of the family of mankind. A famous example is Friedrich 
1 Cf. Hans Joas, Die Sakralität der Person. Eine Genealogie der Menschrechte (Frankfurt/M. 
2011), 15–21, 204f.
2 Wilfried Härle, “Menschenwürde”, in Michael Anderheiden / Wolfgang U. Eckart (ed.), Hand-
buch Sterben und Menschenwürde (Berlin 2012; 3 vols), vol. 1, 237–257, on p. 239.
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Schiller’s Ode to Joy of 1805 (“Every man becomes a brother, / Where thy 
gentle wing abides. […] Brothers – o’er the stars unfurl’d / Must reside a lov-
ing father.”).3 In spite of this exuberant pathos of brotherhood, it did not take 
long for the opposite to show itself. Indeed, Voltaire’s famous slogan “écrasez 
l’infâme” (“let us crush the infamous”) soon evolved from a metaphor for 
the intellectual debate to a call for the cruel persecution of reactionaries. 
Likewise, the sinister liaison between the striving for an enlightened human 
existence and (German) nationalism led, already from the beginning of the 
nineteenth century onwards, to the familiar catastrophes in European his-
tory, catastrophes in which the family of states consisted of warring nations 
and, as far as brotherhood was concerned, behaved rather like Cain and Abel. 
It is for this reason, as Helmut J. Schneider has pointed out, that authors 
like Heinrich von Kleist depicted the family of mankind as a hypocritical 
illusion or impossibility in their plays. Others still, like the scholar Marc 
Shell, have spoken of the political danger contained the idea of a family of 
mankind contained, concealing the unacknowledged particularism of blood 
relationships and leading to an emphasis on the differences between (nation) 
families.4
On the other hand, there is the Christian line of thought, the ideas and 
narratives about human dignity and the unity of mankind carried into the 
world by missionaries. In terms of its dogmatic belief in monogenism and 
its view that all humans are made in the “image of God” (Genesis 1:26–27; 
9:6), Christianity follows Judaism. By regarding Jesus as “the image of an 
invisible God” (Colossians 1:15) and the poor and suffering as his “repre-
sentatives on earth” (Matthew 25:40.45), Christianity also set out its own 
course.
The Church Fathers addressed the Christian vision of the unity of nations 
in connection with the debate about monogenism, which, of course, also had 
certain social-ethical implications as to how different peoples lived together 
in the Roman Empire.5 But the real test for the Christian narrative came 
during the Age of Discovery, when Europeans encountered new and very 
different peoples, an encounter that soon turned into a hermeneutic problem: 
Did these peoples also descend from Adam? – For the prophetic missionaries 
there was no question about it. It therefore is not surprising that the central 
3 Friedrich von Schiller, Werke und Briefe in zwölf Bänden, ed. by Otto Dann et al. (Frankfurt/M. 
1992), vol. 1: Gedichte, ed. by Georg Kurscheidt, 248. Translation after William F. Wertz, 
http://www.schillerinstitute.org/transl/schiller_poem/ode_to_joy.pdf. 
4 Cf. Helmut J. Schneider, Genealogie und Menschheitsfamilie. Dramaturgie der Humanität von 
Lessing bis Büchner (Berlin 2011); Marc Shell, The End of Kinship – “Measure for Measure”, 
Incest, and the Ideal of Universal Siblinghood (Stanford, CA 1988).
5 Joseph Ratzinger, Die Einheit der Nationen. Eine Vision der Kirchenväter (Salzburg 1971).
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questions of the famous sermon of Antón de Montesino on the fourth Sun-
day of Advent 1511 – which will be returned to below – read: “Are they not 
human beings? Have they no rational souls? Are you not obligated to love 
them as you love yourselves?”
It took a real effort to find an answer. Paracelsus disregarded the dogmatic 
belief in monogenism and in 1520 wondered whether “the inhabitants of the 
West Indies could be descendents of Adam and Eve, as Adam’s sons most 
certainly did not travel to any remote islands”.6 Upon reflection he reached 
the rather bold conclusion that they must have “descended from another 
Adam”.7 Others, like the Jesuit José de Acosta, openly admitted at the end 
of the sixteenth century: “The reason why we are forced to say that the Indi-
ans originate from Europe or Asia is because we cannot contradict the Holy 
Scripture, which clearly states that all men descend from Adam.”8
Still others, like Bartolomé de Las Casas, passionately defended the 
unity of mankind in a debate with the humanist Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda in 
Valladolid in 1550–1551.9 In merging the two genealogies, Las Casas and his 
fellow campaigners pointed to Cicero as well as to the Bible:
All people in the world are humans and there exists only one definition for all humans 
and every single individual, namely that they are all rational; made in God’s image, 
they all have reason and free will. […] All the lineage of humanity is one and all human 
beings as regards their creation and natural existence are alike.10
But Las Casas did not leave it at the defence of the unity of the family of 
mankind; rather he also called, in a direct response to Eurocentric arrogance, 
for a more self-critical approach and greater openness towards the truth, 
sacredness, beauty and good harboured in the different indigenous cultures 
6 Hugh Honour, “Wissenschaft und Exotismus. Die europäischen Künstler und die außer-
europäische Welt”, in Karl-Heinz Kohl (ed.), Mythen der Neuen Welt. Zur Entdeckungs-
geschichte Lateinamerikas (Berlin 1982), 22–48, on p. 30. 
7 Ibid. 
8 José de Acosta, “Historia natural y moral de las Indias”, in José Alcina Franch (ed.), Crónicas 
de América (Madrid 1987), vol. 34, 111.
9 Editions and abbreviations used: Ángel Losada (ed.), Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda, Demócrates 
segundo – o De las justas causas de la guerra contra los Indios (Madrid 1984) [abbreviated 
DS]; id. (ed.), Apología de Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda contra Fray Bartolomé de Las Casas y 
de Fray Bartolomé de Las Casas contra Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda (Madrid 1975); id. (ed.), 
Epistolario de Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda (Madrid 1966); id. (ed.), Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda a 
través de su „epistolario“ y nuevos documentos (Madrid 1949); id. (ed.), Tratados políticos 
de Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda (Exhortación a la guerra contra los turcos. Del reino y deberes 
del rey. Demócrates primero o Diálogo sobre la compatibilidad entre la milicia y la religión 
cristiana) (Madrid 1963); Paulino Castañeda Delgado (ed.), Bartolomé de Las Casas – Obras 
completas (Madrid 1988–1998, 14 vols) [hereafter abbreviated as OC].
10 Las Casas, OC VII, 536f.
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and religions. In a way his thinking foreshadowed the search for a “global 
universalism”, a search Immanuel Wallerstein considers one of the key chal-
lenges of today.11
Similarly, there occurred during the Age of Discovery – such as when 
Las Casas saw “flagellated Christs” in the maltreated native population – a 
breakthrough as to what the agreed reading of Matthew 25:40.45 was to be.12 
This interpretation was to become, as Sherman W. Gray has demonstrated, 
ever more prominent over time. From the nineteenth century on it was shared 
by the majority of exegetes, even if a particular restriction – to the followers 
of Jesus as the addressees of the parable of the Last Judgement – still received 
the support of some influential believers. Today – not least because of lib-
eration theology, the merciful activities of the Church and the decisions of 
the Council – we are used to taking this encompassing reading for granted.13
Nonetheless, Christianity, which contributed so importantly to the defence 
of the unity of mankind, failed. Because of its exclusive reasoning it fell 
prey to the temptation of intolerance, “the construction of a hopeless, inner-
worldly absoluteness that questions the other for now and forever”.14 In line 
with Ernst Benz, who incidentally considers church history itself as “the 
strongest argument against Christianity’s exclusive claim to absoluteness”, 
this can be expressed even more bluntly: “Neither Islam nor Buddhism nor 
Hinduism has killed nearly as many people because of their faith than the 
Christian churches.”15 Indeed, Christianity has long lost its innocence.
2. The Debate About the Indigenous Americans: 
Slaves by Nature?
Las Casas and Sepúlveda have already been mentioned. The following sec-
tion considers whether the indigenous Americans were “natural slaves” as 
defined by Aristotle. The Scottish philosopher and theologian John Major, 
who taught at the Sorbonne in Paris, discussed the moral and legal questions 
11 Immanuel Wallerstein, Die Barbarei der anderen. Europäischer Universalismus (Berlin 
2007), 39.
12 Las Casas, OC V, 2366.
13 Cf. Sherman W. Gray, The Least of My Brothers: Matthew 25:31–46. A History of Interpreta-
tion (Atlanta 1987); Gustavo Gutiérrez, Nachfolge Jesu und Option für die Armen. Beiträge zu 
einer Theologie der Befreiung im Zeitalter der Globalisierung (Fribourg 2009), 43–59.
14 Joseph Ratzinger, “Das Problem der Absolutheit des christlichen Heilsweges”, in Joseph 
Ratzinger, Das neue Volk Gottes. Entwürfe zur Ekklesiologie (Düsseldorf 1969), 363–375, on 
p. 372.
15 Ernst Benz, “Ideen zu einer Theologie der Religionsgeschichte”, in Akademie der Wissen-
schaften und der Literatur (ed.), Abhandlungen der geistes- und sozialwissenschaftlichen 
Klasse (Wiesbaden 1961), vol. 5, 63f.
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arising from the Spanish discovery of America in his commentary on II Sen-
tentiarum dist. 44, q. 3 as first printed in 1509. It was meant to close with 
Aristotle’s Politics, more precisely the widely held view that the Spaniards 
could rule over the indigenous Americans like “the Greek over the barbari-
ans”: that the so-called Indians were “slaves by nature” and that “it was the 
right of the first person who conquered them to rule them”.16 This was the 
“scientific consensus” at the time.
The situation changed in September 1510 when the first Dominicans 
arrived in Santo Domingo, the capital of today’s Dominican Republic. At the 
end of 1511, Antón de Montesino asked – as already mentioned before – a 
number of decisive questions in his famous sermon on the last Sunday of 
Advent:
Tell me, with what right, with what justice do you hold these Indians in such cruel and 
horrible servitude? On whose authority have you waged such detestable wars on these 
people, who lived calm and peacefully in their lands, in which you have consumed 
such infinitudes of them, wreaking upon them this death and unheard-of havoc? […] 
Are they not human beings? Have they no rational souls? Are you not obliged to love 
them as you love yourselves?17
Now the decisive questions had been asked, moreover, from a peculiar Chris-
tian perspective: Montesino had not only questioned the “right” with which 
the indigenous Americans were held in such cruel and horrible servitude, 
but had also indicated, to further evangelisation, that they were “children of 
God” and, thus, men “like us”. The ensuing controversy about the nature of 
the indigenous Americans reached its pinnacle in the aforementioned debate 
between Las Casas and Sepúlveda in Valladolid in 1550–1551.
16 John Major, In secundum librum sententiarum (Paris 1519), f. clxxxvijr: “Etiam aliud est: 
Populus ille bestialiter vivit; citra ultraque equatorum et sub polis vivunt homines ferini, 
ut Ptholomaeus in Quadripartito dicit. Et iam hoc experientia compertum est […]”. (“These 
peoples live like beasts and there are wild people on both sides of the equator and below the 
poles, as as Ptolemy states in his ‘Tetrabiblos’. This is proven today by way of experience. As 
they are slaves by nature, whoever conquers them first has the right to rule them. And as the 
philosopher states in chapters 3 and 4 of book I of ‘Politics’, it is clear that some people are 
slaves and others are masters by nature; indeed, in the case of some people, it is determined 
that others will benefit. And it is in fact just that one is a slave and the other a master, that one 
gives and the other obeys orders, as the ability to give order is natural to the master. It is for this 
reason that the philosopher states in the aforementioned book that the Greek should rule over 
the barbarians, as barbarians and slaves are essentially the same by nature.”) Cited after Las 
Casas in OC IX, 622; cf. Anthony Pagden, La caída del hombre natural: el indio americano y 
los orígenes de la etnología comparativa (Madrid 1988), 66.
17 Las Casas, OC V, 1761f.
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The “Aristotelian argument” was Sepúlveda’s most important contribution 
to the debate. According to this argument, those whose natural constitution 
was such that they should be subservient, and “who rejected rule without 
there existing any other way”, could be subjected to “the use of force”. To the 
objection that the argument was rather astonishing “and far removed from 
general opinion”, Sepúlveda responded:
Astonishing perhaps, but only to those who welcomed the philosophy from a certain 
distance. I am all the more surprised that a man as educated as you are considers a 
certain teaching – well-known amongst philosophers and closely corresponding to 
natural law – to constitute a new dogma.18
Sepúlveda referred to the third, fifth and eighth chapter in Book I of 
Aristotle’s Politics, in particular. Following Aristotle, he first of all distin-
guished between the legal and philosophical notion of the term “slavery”. 
According to the first, slavery exists due to some accident, resulting in a loss 
of freedom; according to the second, it derives from an innate irrationality 
coupled with inhumane and barbaric customs. The different kinds of power 
and rule – of the father over his son, the husband over his wife, the master 
over slaves, the judge over citizens, the king over his people – rooted in natu-
ral law, derive, as Aristotle set out, from one sole principle and dogma: “The 
perfect always ought to dominate and rule over the imperfect, the excellent 
over its opposite, the noble over vice.”19 Whoever was unwilling to volun-
tarily respect this principle could legally be forced to do so, such as by way 
of a just war, as the philosophers had taught. To lend further support to his 
argument, Sepúlveda paraphrased a passage from Aristotle’s Politics:
It seems that war arises in a certain sense from nature, since a part of it is the art 
of the hunt, which is properly used not only against animals, but also against those 
men who, having been born to obey, reject servitude: such a war is just according to 
nature.20
Based on Book I of Aristotle’s Politics,21 Sepúlveda thus subordinated “all” 
inhabitants of the New World in terms of prudence, acumen and a whole 
range of virtues and human emotions to the Spaniards – just as “children are 
subordinate to adults, women to men, the cruel and inhuman to the gentle, 
and the unrestrained to the restrained and moderate”. In short: All natives 
18 DS, 19 (425–436).
19 DS, 20; cf. Aristotle, Politics I,8: 1256b.
20 DS, 22; Aristotle, Politics I,8: 1256b, http://www.columbia.edu/acis/ets/CCREAD/sepulved.
htm.
21 Cf. Aristotle, Politics I,2f. 5.8: 1252a–1253b, 1254ab, 1256ab. 
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were “poor, weak creatures” (homunculi), barbaric man-eaters like the 
Scythians during Antiquity, who could hardly be regarded as rational beings 
and therefore could, should they not voluntarily subordinate themselves, be 
hunted like animals. Also, they had no cultural achievements to show. The 
fact that they had houses and political regimes of sorts indicated that they 
were neither bears nor monkeys, but not necessarily creatures with a trace 
of reason.
Today many authors are surprised that Sepúlveda had such bad press at 
that time. They believe that he only wanted to apply the principles of Aris-
totelian humanism to the project of Spanish expansion.22 The problem is not, 
however, that Sepúlveda argued in favour of whoever was the better, as such a 
line of argument, from a strictly philosophical point of view, would, in terms 
of meritocracy, also be valid today. The problem is rather that he described 
entire peoples as being “slaves by nature” and constructed on this basis, 
disregarding their cultures, a set of reasons why they should be subjected 
permanently.23 That the natives would ever be able to govern themselves 
“rationally”, i.e. in a manner judged “civilised” by European standards, was 
more than unlikely if one believed Sepúlveda’s writings on the controversia 
de Indis. It is for this reason that he deserved being reproached by Erasmus in 
1532 (when the Dutch scholar responded to the Antapologia which Sepúlveda 
had sent him, a series of arguments challenging Erasmus’s written defence 
against Alberto Pio, Prince of Capri, who had previously equated Erasmus’s 
pacifism with the harm caused by Luther):
I admire the erudition and talent as well as the brilliant style of your work. Nonethe-
less, I was most disappointed to see that you make your fine abilities available to such 
a cause. Indeed, it is regrettable that a talent like yours, for which no-one but Christ 
and his muses can be thanked, allows itself to be misused by such a polemic minority.24
Unlike Sepúlveda, Las Casas knew the New World – the Caribbean and Cen-
tral America – from personal experience. Between 1502 and 1547 he sailed 
five times between Spain and the West Indies, grew fond of the indigenous 
Americans and came to regard them as children of God and close relatives 
of Europeans. It was not least because of this that he called for a change 
22 See, for example, Horst Pietschmann, “Aristotelischer Humanismus und Inhumanität? 
Sepúlveda und die amerikanischen Ureinwohner”, in Wolfgang Reinhard (ed.), Humanismus 
und Neue Welt (Weinheim 1987), 143–166.
23 As is evident from his late work De regno (1571), Sepúlveda maintained his Aristotelian world 
view after the Debate of Valladolid and continued to regards the indigenous Americans as 
“slaves by nature”; cf. Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda, “Del reino y los deberes del rey” in Ángel 
Losada (ed.), Tratados políticos de Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda (Madrid 1963), 29–125, on 
pp. 34–36.
24 Losada (ed.), Epistolario, 32.
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of perspective in the controversia de Indis. He asked himself, for example, 
whether a John Major – or, for that matter, Sepúlveda – would have spoken 
in this manner “if he had been an Indian himself” (si Indus esset).25 It is for 
this reason that Las Casas established a new kind of apologetic literature, 
which was meant to do justice to the values that Europe and Christianity 
represent. Considering that the term “apologia” had been used, since Socrates, 
to describe a person’s self-defence against criticism lacking facts, Las Casas 
wrote two rather remarkable texts – both with the word “apologia” in the 
title – to defend others, their human dignity, freedom and equality as well 
as the value of their cultures and religions: Adversus persecutores et calum-
niatores gentium novi orbis ad oceanum reperti apologia, which he wrote 
during and after the Debate of Valladolid and which remained unpublished 
until the middle of the twentieth century,26 and Apologética historia sumaria, 
which he wrote for the most part after the Debate of Valladolid and which 
was first published in 1909.27
Las Casas was fiercest in his critique of Sepúlveda’s “Aristotelian argu-
ment”. For Las Casas,28 Aristotle’s notion of the barbarian was not as clear-
cut as Sepúlveda had claimed, and he could not accept that the indigenous 
Americans were to be regarded as “slaves by nature”. First, a barbarian was 
any human being, who, contrary to reason and the natural law, had developed 
into the worst kind of possible being, something that could, as we all knew, 
also occur among the “civilised”.29 Second, a barbarian was any human being 
who spoke a foreign tongue, had no system of writing, or simply belonged 
to another culture. Third, barbarians in the narrow Aristotelian definition of 
the word were only such human beings that resemble monsters and live like 
wild animals, free from any kind of political rule; this third kind, however, 
was exceedingly rare among mankind.30 It is the last group that Aristotle 
referred to in Book I of Politics,31 whereas he referred to the second group 
in Books III and V of Politics,32 emphasizing that there also existed real 
kingdoms with natural kings, standing armies and political regimes among 
the barbarians. The indigenous Americans belonged to the second group, 
whereby Europeans were – according to such criteria as foreign language, 
etc. – as much barbarians to them as they were barbarians to us.
25 OC IX, 604.
26 Ibid.
27 OC VI, VII and VIII.
28 Cf. OC IX, 76–125. 
29 Cf. Aristotle, Politics I,2: 1253a.
30 Cf. id., Nicomachian Ethics VII,1: 1145a.
31 Cf. id., Politics I,2: 1252b and I,8: 1256b.
32 Cf. id., Politics III,14: 1285a; III,16: 1287b; III,17: 1287b–1288a and V,11: 1314a; V,10: 
1311a.
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And even if the indigenous Americans were barbarians according to 
the narrow Aristotelian definition, there was no reason, as Sepúlveda had 
claimed, why they should be allowed, in wars of conquest, to be hunted down 
like animals. Indeed, any rule established against the will of the subordinates 
could only be, as Aristotle set out in Book III of Politics, tyrannical, brutal 
and short-lived; and tyrannical rule was, as Aristotle argued in the Nico-
machian Ethics,33 the worst form of government and not to be tolerated.
But Las Casas went further than to classify the indigenous Americans 
among the second group of the barbarians and to criticise colonial warfare. 
In Book VII of Politics and Book VI of the Nicomachian Ethics, Aristotle 
famously described the preconditions required for an ideal state to develop, 
namely the presence of farmers, craftsmen, warriors, a certain number of 
rich men, priests and judges who were distinguished by economic, religious 
and political intelligence.34 In his apologetic writings, Las Casas attempted 
to prove that these preconditions were met by many native polities and were, 
in fact, at times more developed than those known from European antiquity. 
At the same time, it should not be concealed here that Las Casas’ description 
of the indigenous Americans was at times rather idealised, such as when 
he wrote that the inhabitants of some of the Caribbean islands – the Baha-
mas – were so naïve, serene and peaceful that it appeared that “Adam had 
never sinned”.35
In fact, it was only a matter of duty for Las Casas to discuss Aristotle, a 
duty which he took on to rebut Sepúlveda’s main argument with Sepúlveda’s 
own weapons. It was, however, when Las Casas departed from Aristotle 
and subjected the great thinker’s dogmas to the ethic universalism of both 
the Biblical and the Stoic traditions that his true greatness showed: “Fare-
well Aristotle? Because it is from Christ, the eternal truth, that we received 
the commandment: ‘Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself’ (Matthew 
22:40).”36 With such sentences Las Casas indicated that it was, above all, 
the Christian humanism that concerned him – just as it had concerned the 
first Spanish Dominicans when they asked the decisive questions on the last 
Sunday of Advent in 1511. His faith told him that all men were made in God’s 
image and that they were, in principle, all capable of living a civilised life 
according to the faith. It is against this background and on the basis of Cicero 
that Las Casas could conclude his critique of the “Aristotelian argument” 
with the following words, resembling a declaration of universal human dig-
nity: “All the lineage of humanity is one and all human beings with regard 
33 Cf. id., Nicomachian Ethics VIII,12: 1160b.
34 Cf. id., Politics VII,8: 1328b; Nicomachian Ethics VI: 1138b–1145a.
35 OC VIII, 1319.
36 OC IX, 100f.
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their creation and natural existence are alike.”37 After all, all people have, 
in principle, reason and free will. Such an understanding of mankind is the 
precondition for the establishment of a more cooperative and just world order, 
as generally aspired to today.
3. Las Casas and the African Slaves
Ever since the Enlightenment philosopher Corneille de Pauw wrote in his 
Recherches philosophiques sur les Américains, ou Mémoires intéressants 
pour servir à l’histoire de l’espèce humaine (2 vols, Berlin 1768–1769) that 
the slave trade to America “had first been envisioned and conceptualised 
by a cleric named Las Casas”,38 it has been claimed time and again that the 
Christian humanist Las Casas simultaneously defended the freedom of the 
indigenous American and the enslavement of the black African, an argument 
that would have been deeply fraught with contradiction, of course. Henri 
Grégoire, the famous constitutionalist Bishop of Blois, defended Las Casas 
in a memorable Apologie in the French Academy on 12 May 1800.39 In this 
discourse he firmly denied that Las Casas had been the initiator of the slave 
trade. Indeed, the Historia de las Indias, in which Las Casas accused himself 
of having been the first to recommend “that licences should be issued to take 
Negro slaves to these countries”,40 was – due to a law issued by Philipp II in 
1558 strictly regulating all printed matter – only published later and Grégoire 
took the view that the parts recounted by Antonio Herrera in his Historia de 
los hechos de los castellanos […] of 1601 amounted to nothing but defama-
tion. The apologetic line adopted by Grégoire was subsequently reasserted 
by some other Lascasists: Servando Teresa de Mier in 1806, Gregorio de 
Funes in 1819, and Juan Antonio Llorente in 1822. In the nineteenth century, 
there were also other authors who knew of Las Casas’ self-accusation, yet 
emphasised that there had already been black slaves in the Antilles before 
37 OC VII, 537; cf. Marcus Tullius Cicero, De legibus – Über die Rechtlichkeit [transl., commen-
tary and epilogue by Karl Büchner] (Stuttgart 1989), 19f., 30–32. The English translation after 
John Marenbon (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Medieval Philosophy (Oxford 2012), 656.
38 Isacio Pérez Fernández, Bartolomé de las Casas ¿contra los negros? Revisión de una leyenda 
(Madrid 1991), 36.
39 Cf. “Apologie de Bartolomé de Las Casas, évêque de Chiapas” as delivered by Citizen 
Grégoire at the Institut National on 22 Floréal 08 / 12 May 1800 in Albert Soboul (ed.), Les 
Œuvres de l’abbé Grégoire (Paris 1977; 14 vols), vol. VI; Rita Hermon-Belot (ed.), Écrits sur 
les Noirs (Paris 2009; 2 vols), vol. 1 (1789–1808); Guy Bedouelle, “Las Casas et la traite des 
Noirs: une apologie bien intentionnée de l’abbé Grégoire (1802)”, in Mémoire dominicaine 16 
(2002), 153–180.
40 OC V, 2191.
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Las Casas made his recommendation, and moreover that others would have 
done exactly the same. Lascasists and anti-Lascasists have exchanged the 
same arguments ever since.
New documents and arguments were contributed above all by Isacio Pérez 
Fernández.41 He also challenged the views held by many scholars since the 
eighteenth century: namely, that Las Casas was the first to recommend bring-
ing black slaves to the Antilles; that he came up with and drafted the plan for 
the slave trade; that he endorsed the enslavement of black Africans; and, last 
but not least, that he had a selective understanding as far as human rights 
and human dignity are concerned.42 So what has historical research revealed 
to be true? It showed that there were already black slaves in the Antilles 
before Las Casas wrote his memoranda in 1516–1518; that Las Casas sug-
gested the following in his memorandum of 1516, written in response to pleas 
received from mendicants and settlers of the island Española and addressed 
to Cardinal Francisco Jiménez de Cisneros and Adriaan Florensz, the Bishop 
of Tortosa, the co-regents of Spain at the time: “As to the communities in 
question, H. E. is advised to keep twenty Negroes or other slaves instead of 
Indians for the mines, providing them with accommodation and food as nec-
essary;43 that the Hieronymite Fathers made similar suggestions in 1517 and 
1518 (see also the case of the colonial judge Alonso de Zuazo); that Las Casas 
renewed his suggestion in 1518; that all these suggestions only reflected 
the interests of the Spanish settlers, wishing to cease the exploitation of the 
indigenous Americans; that it was the general understanding in Europe at the 
time that the black Africans had been enslaved in just wars on the African 
west coast and that slavery was therefore legitimate; that the great scholas-
tic Adriaan Florensz, later Pope Adrian VI, with whom Las Casas resided 
at the Spanish court of Charles V, did not voice any doubts; that the court 
made several attempts in 1518 to obtain licences to trade in slaves; that Las 
Casas answered, upon being asked how many slaves would be needed, that he 
did not know;44 that the Atlantic slave trade began in 1518, after Laurent de 
Gorevod, the Governor of Bressa, had sold his licence to abduct 4,000 slaves 
to the Antilles to the brothers Centurione (Melchior, Gaspar, Martin, Esteban 
and Luis), Genoese bankers in Seville; that the slave trade then took on its 
own dynamic, driven by the laws of supply and demand.
41 Cf. footnote 38 as well as Isacio Pérez Fernández, Fray Bartolomé de las Casas: de defen-
sor de los indios a defensor de los negros. Su intervención en los orígenes de la deportación 
de esclavos negros a América y su denuncia de la previa esclavización en África (Madrid 
1995); Philippe-Ignace André-Vincent, “Las Casas face à la traite des Noirs”, in Autour de Las 
Casas. Actes du colloque du Ve Cente naire 1484–1984 [Toulouse, 25–28 October 1984] (Paris 
1987), 235–241; Luz María Martínez Montiel, Negros en América (Madrid 1992).
42 Cf. Pérez Fernández, Bartolomé de las Casas ¿contra los negros?, 59–61.
43 Las Casas, OC XIII, 28.
44 Cf. Las Casas, OC V, 2191.
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For what there is no historical proof, however, is a direct involvement of 
Las Casas in the slave trade. At the same time, it appears that he contacted 
the Crown on several occasions to obtain black slaves, for himself, for settlers 
in the Antilles, and for the family of Columbus. The last time this happened 
was in 1543, when he travelled as Bishop of Chiapas to Mexico. To contact 
the Crown for the services of black slaves was not uncommon for bishops at 
the time, at least not until 1547, when Las Casas started to change his mind.
In 1547, a black slave by the name of Pedro Carmona returned together 
with Las Casas from Cuba to Lisbon. While Carmona had been freed by 
his late master, the master’s heirs did not agree with and recognise this 
decision. Protected by Bishop Las Casas, he thus travelled to Spain to assert 
his freedom in court. That he travelled under the protection of Las Casas 
we know from the account Carmona delivered in court. Once in Spain, Las 
Casas accompanied Carmona to court and posted bail for him, right up until 
his freedom was restored. It can be assumed that Las Casas, who by nature 
had a “compassionate heart”,45 listened to Carmona’s life story on the long 
journey across the Atlantic. Recognizing that the Portuguese wars against 
black Africans in Guinea were no less unjust than the Spanish wars against 
indigenous Americans in the New World, it seems to have occured to him that 
the enslavement of black men, women and children was no less horrendous.
Las Casas also used his stay in Lisbon to buy some of the chronicles com-
piled by Portuguese explorers about their journeys along the west coast of 
Africa. But it was only after the Debate of Valladolid in 1550–1551, which 
marked a turning point in his thought, that Las Casas was to find time to 
study the chronicles in detail. Convinced that the Portuguese wars in Africa 
were also deeply unjust, he wrote, from 1555 onwards, some additional 
chapters to his Historia de las Indias, which constituted something like a 
“Brief Report about the Destruction of West Africa” by the Portuguese.46 His 
studies of Portuguese expansion led him, in 1560, to the succint judgement 
“that the horrible servitude of the Negro is as unjust as that of the Indian”.47 
Thus, with regard to the black slave, he came to recognise and regret his 
earlier misjudgement – indeed, to such an extent, that he was no longer cer-
tain whether “his past ignorance and general goodwill could be pardoned by 
God’s judgement”.48
45 Cf. Las Casas, OC V, 2081.
46 Cf. Isacio Pérez Fernández, Brevísima relación de la destrucción de Africa. Preludio de la 
destrucción de las Indias (Salamanca 1989).
47 Las Casas, OC V, 2324.
48 Ibid.
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This self-incrimination should, however, rather be understood in theolog-
ical and moral terms: He subjectively felt “guilty” for having indirectly con-
tributed to the slave trade, even though his contribution was never decisive 
and even though he acted out of ignorance and on the basis of good will. He 
had a scrupulous conscience and tended to overemphasise his “sin”. As far 
as the slave trade is concerned, his conscience remained troubled right until 
his death.
4. The Impact of Las Casas
Overall it can be said that Las Casas’ anthropological main thesis, that all 
men and women as children of God can be civilised and thus can believe, 
prevailed; in contrast, the thesis that indigenous Americans were by defi-
nition non-barbarians turned out not to be persuasive. Indeed, around 1570 
the Franciscan friar and great ethnographer of Aztec culture Bernardino 
de Sahagún clearly emphasised that indigenous Americans “are our broth-
ers, who like us are descended from Adam; they are our kin, whom we are 
obliged to love as we love ourselves”.49 He did not allow himself to be drawn 
into the debate whether the Aztecs had been “wild” or “civilised” before 
their encounter with Christ, but certainly believed in an evolutionary notion 
of history and maintained that the Aztecs, now converted, were no longer 
barbarians:
Whatever the old days may have been like, we can see now that they are skilled in 
and practise all kinds of craftsmanship. They are also talented when it comes to 
the mastery of philosophy and theology, as can be seen from those who have been 
instructed in these matters.
And he added: “They thus are no less suited for Christianity, if only they 
received adequate instruction.”50
Still, the Jesuit Acosta, who advocated a “differentiated” anthropological 
approach around 1600, was to have a much greater influence on the creation 
of the colonial system. Informed by both ethical and practical concerns, 
“one Indian [was] not the same as another” for Acosta, and “to express it 
with some humour, there exist[ed] barbarians who [were] far ahead of oth-
ers”.51 More precisely, he spoke of three types of barbarians, as the recently 
49 Bernardino de Sahagún, “Historia general de las cosas de Nueva España”, in Juan Carlos 
Temprano (ed.), Crónicas de América (Madrid 1990), vol. 55a, 5f.
50 Ibid.
51 José de Acosta, De procuranda indorum salute (Madrid 1984–1987), vol. 23, 60.
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discovered atheists were all called: The first type included the Chinese, the 
Japanese and most of the peoples of East India, whom he considered to be as 
civilised as Europeans, as they had “clear forms of government, state laws, 
fortified cities, highly respected officials, a blossoming, well-organised 
trade and – what is perhaps most important – a recognised use of written 
languages”.52 The second type included the indigenous peoples who had 
given rise to the high cultures of Mexico and Peru. While they did not have 
any written languages, they nonetheless had well-ordered political regimes 
and maintained magnificent cults of God, all with priests and temples. The 
third type was associated with nomads, such as the Guaraní and most of the 
other indigenous peoples, who lived without laws and kings, without con-
tracts and administrations, and who also knew no organised cults of God. 
These were the “slaves by nature”, whom, according to Aristotle, it was 
permissible to hunt and tame like animals. While all three types of barbar-
ians had the capacity to learn and, even more importantly, the “capacity to 
believe”, the catechetical method needed to be applied differently and needed 
to include, especially with the third type, a certain degree of paternalistic 
compulsion.
It appears that Acosta53 wanted to leave all conflicts behind, disputes that 
had long clouded the light of truth with thick fog. To this end he rejected 
Sepúlveda’s notion of religious and political expansion and insisted that the 
lack of civilisation among certain peoples was not so much due to their birth 
as to their education and customs.54 While he maintained that Spaniards and 
indigenous Americans together made up the people of the Spanish Empire 
(“All have the same king and are subject to the same laws.”55), he added the 
qualification, following Aristotle, that those with only manual skills should 
allow themselves to be led and those with intellectual abilities should lead the 
manually skilled and, above all, intellectually talented. According to Acosta, 
the relationship between Spaniards and indigenous Americans thus was to 
be as follows: the first were to treat the second, if necessary, with force, but 
never inhumanely; furthermore, the two were meant to help each other, as the 
state could only function if some lent their eyes for it to be able to see, and 
others their feet for it to be able to walk.
Las Casas was in favour of an idealist normative approach. Acosta, on 
the other hand, pursued a realist strategy and described what was politi-
cally feasible in the shadow of colonial ambitions. His theory, as adopted 
and implemented by the Jesuits, arguably constituted the most appropriate 
52 Ibid., 62.
53 Cf. ibid., 272. 
54 Cf. ibid., 148–156.
55 Cf. ibid., 516.
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approach – “a plan possible for the Europeans; a plan advantageous for the 
Indians” – to the political realities of the Americas after the Spanish conquest 
of the Inca Empire in 1572.56
5. Outlook
Las Casas demonstrated two things: firstly, that non-Europeans were not 
uncivilised, but had different cultures and values from which Europeans 
could learn, and secondly, that European culture had a Christian-Stoic core, 
which remained to be fully universalised. In other words, Las Casas would 
not be a supporter of the moral and legal relativism still apparent today.57 
Rather, he would support those calling for a self-critical, “enlightened 
Eurocentrism” or truly “universal universalism”,58 in other words a greater 
willingness to admit mistakes, acknowledge the values of other cultures and 
help build, together with all persons concerned, a better world order. To this 
end today’s Europeans require more thoughtfulness and modesty, but also the 
necessary self-confidence.
Translation: Uta Protz
56 Alain Milhou, “Die Neue Welt als geistiges und moralisches Problem (1492–1609)”, in Horst 
Pietschmann et al. (ed.), Handbuch zur Geschichte Lateinamerikas, vol. 1: Mittel, Südamerika 
und die Karibik bis 1760 (Stuttgart 1994), 274–296, on p. 289.
57 As to the notion of a “universal universalism”, see Wallerstein, Barbarei, 17.
58 Ibid., 9.
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Judith Becker
Conceptions of Humanity in Nineteenth-Century 
German Protestant Missions
What do missions have to do with humanitarianism? In some circles, the 
mission movement was and is interpreted as being mainly humanitarian, 
both in looking back to its beginnings and with regard to the present when 
mission has become mostly social work and mission institutions work along-
side other NGOs in areas of crisis.1 However, as the substantiating arguments 
in favour of missions have changed considerably over the years, so have the 
definitions of “humanity” or “humanitarian”. When reading the publications 
in the Basel periodical Der evangelische Heidenbote (“The evangelical 
heathen-messenger”) with regard to India in the first 25 years of the Basel 
India mission (1834–1859), it is striking that the terms “humanity”, “human-
itarianism” or some derivative are not used once. How, then, did German 
missions in the nineteenth century understand humanity and in what respects 
was the concept of humanity a foundational and substantiating element in 
these missions?
After a short introduction to the major nineteenth-century mission theolo-
gian Gustav Warneck, this study will focus on the Basel Mission, the largest 
and most important of the German-speaking mission societies in the early 
nineteenth century. The study will draw on their periodical Der evange lische 
Heidenbote and on manuscript sources, mainly applications by future mis-
sionaries in which they elaborated on their motives, as well as letters and 
reports from missionaries, mostly from South India.
The first section on Warneck will illustrate the broad theological outlines 
of the missions’ religious argumentation. Of course, Warneck cannot stand 
for all missions, not even for all German-speaking missions. But his was an 
important voice, heard by all and reacted to by all. Furthermore, his atti-
tudes were shared by most mission societies and also by the Basel Mission. 
1 These approaches are discussed in most newer overviews over mission history, see e.g. Dana 
L. Robert, Christian Mission. How Christianity Became a World Religion (Blackwell Brief 
Histories of Religion Series, Chichester 2009); Jeffrey Cox, The British Missionary Enter-
prise Since 1700 (New York 2008); id., “Master Narratives of Imperial Missions”, in Jamie S. 
Scott / Gareth Griffiths (ed.), Mixed Messages: Materiality, Textuality, Missions (New York 
2005), 3–18. An overview over contemporary approaches to conceptions of humanitarianism 
offers e.g. Lynn Festa, “Humanity Without Feathers”, in Humanity 1:1 (2010), 3–27. See also 
Michael Barnett / Janice Gross Stein (ed.), Sacred Aid. Faith and Humanitarianism (Oxford 
2012). 
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In the later sections, foundational aspects of humanity in the viewpoint of 
the Basel Mission are discussed. They can be grouped according to three 
features: humanity as humaneness (“Menschlichkeit”), as unity and equality, 
and as relief from (spiritual and physical) poverty. Finally, I will draw some 
conclusions as to the importance of humanity for German missions in the 
nineteenth century.
1. Gustav Warneck’s History of 
Protestant Missions and Humanity
In 1882, the doyen of (German) mission studies, Gustav Warneck, published 
the first edition of his voluminous Outline of the History of Protestant 
Missions.2 In his introductory chapter, after some general remarks on Chris-
tianity and missions, he gave an overview over the history of Protestant 
missions from the Reformation. To him, the nineteenth century was the real 
century of missions and he explained why this had become possible: besides 
geographical explorations and technical inventions, ideas and attitudes in the 
West had changed. Following the American and French Revolutions, political 
freedom came to the fore, as did “a certain philanthropy and humanity”3 
that found its main expression in the abolition movement.4 While distancing 
himself from “political party fervour and doctrinal enthusiasm”,5 Warneck 
claimed that this ideological development helped to rouse interest in the well-
being of “black” people and thus strengthened the mission movement.
2 Gustav Warneck, Abriß einer Geschichte der protestantischen Missionen von der Reforma-
tion bis auf die Gegenwart. Ein Beitrag zur neueren Kirchengeschichte (Leipzig 1882). On 
Warneck and his time see Dieter Becker / Andreas Feldtkeller (ed.), Es begann in Halle …: 
Missionswissenschaft von Gustav Warneck bis heute (Erlangen 1997).
3 Ibid., 42: “eine gewisse Philanthropie und Humanität”.
4 On this question see Seymour Drescher, “Trends in der Historiographie des Abolitionismus”, 
in Geschichte und Gesellschaft 16 (1990), 187–211; Herbert S. Klein, “Neuere Interpretationen 
des atlantischen Sklavenhandels”, in ibid., 141–160; Howard Temperley, “The Ideology of 
Antislavery”, in David Eltis / James Walvin (ed.), The Abolition of the Atlantic Slave Trade. 
Origins and Effects in Europe, Africa, and the Americas (Madison, WI 1981), 21–35; Derek R. 
Peterson (ed.), Abolitionism and Imperialism in Britain, Africa, and the Atlantic (Athens, GA 
2010), 129–149; John Stauffer, “Abolition and Antislavery”, in Robert L. Paquette / Mark M. 
Smith (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Slavery in the Americas (Oxford 2010), 556–577. For an 
overview over the most important sources cf. e.g. John Oldfield (ed.), The British Transatlantic 
Slave Trade, vol. 3: The Abolitionist Struggle: Opponents of the Slave Trade (London 2003). Cf. 
also Stanley L. Engerman, “Some Implications of the Abolition of the Slave Trade”, in David 
Eltis / James Walvin (ed.), The Abolition of the Atlantic Slave Trade. Origins and Effects in 
Europe, Africa, and the Americas (Madison 1981), 3–18; Seymour Drescher, Abolition. A His-
tory of Slavery and Antislavery (Cambridge 2009); id., Econocide. British Slavery in the Era of 
Abolition (Chapel Hill, NC 2010).
5 Warneck, Abriß (1882), 42: “politischer Parteieifer und doktrinäre Schwärmerei”.
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This, as he repeatedly stated, was not the purpose of the liberal movements 
and revolutions, which were instead used by God to be put in the service of 
missions.6 Warneck underlined that God was the author of everything that 
happened in the world and that he used worldly events or human endeavours 
in ways that humans did not expect. The omnipotence of God and his active 
intervention in the world were among Warneck’s main beliefs.
In the ninth edition, dated 1910, shortly before his death, Warneck was 
more outspoken about the relation between ideas of humanity and human 
rights on the one hand and mission on the other: again, he underlined the 
difference between revolutions and political and liberal ideas of humanity on 
the one hand and the Christian religion on the other, and then explained how 
these ideas had opened the way for Christian missions.7 He was of the opin-
ion that these ideas and practices, together with Rousseau’s ideal of nature, 
had led to a new esteem for “non-Christian and non-civilised humankind” 
and that this had made it easier for Christians to put into practice the right of 
all people to hear the Gospel.8
The last aspect was his main point: Christianity was a universalistic 
religion and taught universal salvation.9 Warneck taught the unity of all 
humankind as created in God’s image and that all humankind was of the 
same blood.10 This means that it shared descent from Adam and Eve and was 
meant to be saved by the love and blood of Jesus Christ. Warneck claimed 
6 Cf. e.g. Gustav Warneck, Abriß einer Geschichte der protestantischen Missionen von der 
Reformation bis auf die Gegenwart. Mit einem Anhang über die katholischen Missionen 
(Berlin 91910), 208: “[…] die menschlicherseits keineswegs in der Absicht geschehen sind 
und noch geschehen, dem Christentum zu seiner Ausbreitung Türen zu öffnen, die aber die 
weltregierende Hand Gottes heute geradeso in den Dienst der Mission stellt, wie in der apos-
tolischen Zeit die jüdische Diaspora, […]”. Cf. also ibid., 259: “es ist nicht Missionsaufgabe, die 
Türen der Welt aufzuschließen, sondern dahin zu gehen, wo sie bereits aufgeschlossen sind. 
Unter dem vorsehungsvollen Leiten Gottes öffnet der Wissenstrieb und der Erwerbssinn durch 
Entdecker, Kaufleute und Kolonialpolitiker die Türen der Welt und diese Türöffnung ist der 
Missionsbeitrag, den die Welt meist unwissentlich und selbst unwillentlich leistet.”
7 Warneck belonged to the conservative wing of Protestant theologians and to the 
Pietist / awakening movement. Members of other groups within Protestantism would have 
argued in a very different way. Also, for Warneck like for the awakening movement, destruc-
tion of order was seen as endangering life, world and religion. Therefore, they opposed all kinds 
of revolution.
8 Warneck, Abriß (1910), 81: “So revolutionär auch jene Ideen auftraten, und so wenig die 
Forderung allgemeiner Menschenrechte religiös begründet wurde, so leisteten sie der 
Missionsbewegung dennoch dadurch Wegbereiterdienste, daß sie in Verbindung mit den 
Rousseauschen Naturidealen einen Umschwung in der Schätzung auch der nichtchristlichen 
und nichtzivilisierten Menschheit herbeiführten, und daß sie den christlichen Kreisen die Gel-
tendmachung des Rechts aller Menschen auch auf das Evangelium wesentlich erleichterten.”
9 Ibid., 1.
10 On the reference to the same blood cf. also: Felicity Jensz, “Reporting From the Religious 
Contact Zone: Missionaries and Anthropologists in Nineteenth-Century Australia”, in Judith 
Becker (ed.), European Missions in Contact Zones. Transformation Through Interaction in a 
(Post-) Colonial World (Göttingen 2015), 125–141.
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that God had had, from the beginning, the plan to save all humankind and 
that he had made this plan more and more visible until the time of the present 
Christian missions. The idea of a universal mission made Christianity a world 
religion, according to Warneck.11 The doctrine of justification, the centre of 
the Protestant faith,12 taught “a universal want for salvation, a universal grace 
of salvation and a universal condition of salvation”. It followed, to Warneck, 
that there also needed to be a universal offer of salvation and thus mission to 
the whole world.13
That is how he defined humanity or humankind.14 All humankind shared 
an origin and a goal – and had the same problems to solve, the same faults, 
the same sins and the same, the only path to salvation. In his religious per-
spective, all humankind was one.
Opinions such as those of Gustav Warneck were very common in the 
nineteenth-century mission movement. They were not seen as contradicting 
the ethnological differentiation between races, the religious differentiation 
between cultures as influenced by religions, or the evolutionary differentia-
tion between stages of development in particular countries and cultures. But 
all these differences, however important in daily life, were traversed by the 
religious conviction of a fundamental unity.
The relief that mission could bring was mainly interpreted as spiritual 
relief from the danger of eternal death. Still, the progress of the book makes 
clear that Warneck also believed in relief from physical distress. With regard 
to David Livingston, he underlined that his explorations all “ultimately 
served humane ends: the abolition of the slave trade, the opening of roads for 
legal trade, the introduction of a healthy culture and principally the spread of 
Christianity”.15
Warneck also believed in the civilisational benefits mission could bring 
and in different stages of development attained by peoples in Africa, Asia, 
Europe and America. This development, he believed, was intimately linked 
with their religiosity. Warneck, like most parts of the nineteenth-century 
11 Warneck, Abriß (1910), 2.
12 Eberhard Jüngel, Das Evangelium von der Rechtfertigung des Gottlosen als Zentrum des 
christlichen Glaubens. Eine theologische Studie in ökumenischer Absicht (Tübingen 1999).
13 Warneck, Abriß (1910), 3: “So haben wir in der Lehre von der Rechtfertigung durch den 
Glauben ein universales Heilsbedürfnis, eine universale Heilsgnade und eine universale 
Heilsbedingung. Mit logischer wie mit dogmatischer und ethischer Notwendigkeit folgt 
daraus eine universale Heilsanbietung, d.h. die Sendungsveranstaltung durch die ganze Welt 
(Röm. 10, 4–17).”
14 Warneck himself spoke of “Menschheit”. When talking about liberal and political ideas of 
humanity he used the Latin term “Humanität”. I translate “Menschheit” with “humankind” in 
order to maintain the distinction.
15 Warneck, Abriß (1910), 319: “Alle seine Entdeckungen haben als letztes Ziel humane Zwecke: 
Beseitigung des Sklavenhandels, Straßenöffnung für gesetzlichen Handelsverkehr, Einführung 
gesunder Kultur und hauptsächlich Ausbreitung des Christentums.”
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mission movement, interpreted all cultures as permeated by religion and 
since, to them, Christianity was the only religion that could open the path 
to God and eternal life; only the Christian religion could bring forward real 
progress and development.16 Furthermore, even when converted to Christian-
ity, people had to grow in faith and in “Christian” standing before becoming 
“adult” Christians. Warneck, like others, and interpreting St. Paul, compared 
the development of Christians to children growing up.17 In the actual interpre-
tation of when new converts were to be considered “adult”, he differed from 
others like the British Church Missionary Society, which elected the African 
Samuel Crowther as bishop in the mid-nineteenth century.18 However, he did 
not doubt that in the end, in the eschaton, all people would be the same.
Criticising the development in North America, where black slaves had 
been liberated but were not accepted as equal members of society, Warneck 
wrote that the church had become their social centre and that they put their 
efforts and sacrifices into churches and schools in order to build up their 
own, independent communities. They wanted to have churches with black 
ministers that were entirely independent of white staff. Implicitly, Warneck 
praised their religious endeavours whilst calling white Americans to account 
for their neighbours’ sense of independence, which he saw as contradict-
ing the idea of a united Church.19 It was also in the sense of the unity not 
only of the Church but also of all humankind that Warneck interpreted the 
success of Protestant missions in India, mainly among the lower castes. In 
a worldly perspective, he saw that members of lower castes were attracted 
by the prospect of improving their social standing through conversion. He 
emphasised that Christianity did “everything in order to elevate them”.20 In 
a religious perspective, he compared this development to the first centuries 
of Christianity, when the Christian faith had been adopted mostly by lower 
class people, too, and saw in this a proof of the right way of evangelising in 
accordance with the plan of God.
Civilisation was, according to Warneck, no prerequisite of Christian mis-
sions. If mission relied on a preexisting civilisation, if mission even tried to 
16 The doctrine of development in successive stages was very popular at the time. However, the 
evangelicals also taught that progress was not linear but always interrupted by setbacks, declines 
of belief, “falling asleep” (thus the awakening) or even turning away from God. Warneck illus-
trates this in his overview over the history of Protestant missions from the Reformation to his 
present. On the development by stages cf. also Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Vorlesungen 
über die Philosophie der Geschichte (Frankfurt/M. 1970).
17 Cf. 1 Cor. 3: 1–4.
18 Warneck, Abriß (1910), 271. On the CMS see Kevin Ward / Brian Stanley (ed.), The Church 
Mission Society and World Christianity, 1799–1999. Studies in the History of Christian 
Missions (Grand Rapids, MI 2000); Eugene Stock, The History of the Church Missionary 
Society. Its Environment, its Men and its Work, 3 vols (London 1899, vol. IV: London 1916).
19 Warneck, Abriß (1910), 234.
20 Ibid., 365.
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civilise before evangelising, it was doomed to failure. Warneck saw the proof 
of this theory in the Church Missionary Society’s attempt to evangelise in 
New Zealand from 1814.21 Mission might well follow civilisation by others 
and it would certainly be followed by some kind of civilisation but (European) 
civilisation was not necessary for the success of missions. However, in order 
to further the growth of Christians in faith, Warneck found an enhancement 
of the moral, spiritual and social life of the whole society to be necessary.22 
Still, he declared “the commingling of Christianisation and Europeanisation 
or Americanisation” to be one of the main dangers that threatened mission-
ary success.23
Warneck interpreted humankind as united by origin, object and goal, by 
creation and the eschaton, by sin and the need for salvation. In this sense, 
humanity became a substantiating element in his mission theory: all people 
had to be missionised or at least acquainted with the Gospel because they 
all needed it. It was the duty of those who were already converted to God 
to spread the “good news”, for the sake of the others and to further of the 
Kingdom of God.
2. Humanity as Humaneness
Who is a human being? And how should he or she be treated?24 In India, 
the Basel missionaries found these to be relevant questions.25 They did not 
always agree with the Indians about the definition of who was to be consid-
ered a human being and what place this person took in society or in relation 
to animals. The definition of humanity itself was contested. Furthermore, 
21 Ibid., 503f. On civilisation and humanitarianism in British missions see e.g. Richard Price, 
Making Empire. Colonial Encounters and the Creation of Imperial Rule in Nineteenth-Century 
Africa (Cambridge 2008), on the differences between the earlier missions described in this 
study and later nineteenth-century missions see Robert Eric Frykenberg, Christianity in India. 
From Beginnings to the Present (Oxford 2008), 339, on double-bound approach to culture and 
civilisation of evangelical and pietistic missions see Jeffrey Cox, “The Missionary Movement”, 
in Denis G. Paz (ed.), English Religious Traditions. Retrospect and Prospect (Westport, CT 
1995), 197–220. On colonialism see e.g. Harald Fischer-Tiné / Michael Mann (ed.), Colonialism 
as Civilizing Mission. Cultural Ideology in British India (London 2004); Catherine Hall, Civi-
lising Subjects. Metropole and Colony in the English Imagination, 1830–1867 (Oxford 2002).
22 Warneck, Abriß (1910), 510.
23 Ibid., 511.
24 Cf. e.g. Joanna Bourke, What It Means to Be Human: Historical Reflections From the 1800s to 
the Present (Berkeley, CA 2013).
25 On the Basel Mission see Wilhelm Schlatter, Geschichte der Basler Mission 1815–1915. Mit 
besonderer Berücksichtigung der ungedruckten Quellen, 3 vols (Basel 1916); Paul Jenkins, 
Kurze Geschichte der Basler Mission (Basel 1989); on the Basel Mission in India see Judith 
Becker, Conversio im Wandel. Basler Missionare zwischen Europa und Südindien und die 
Ausbildung einer Kontaktreligiosität, 1834–1860 (Göttingen 2015).
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the Basel missionaries discussed, on a more sophisticated level, how humans 
were to behave and what made “competent” or “good” humans.26 In this de- 
bate, they did not distinguish between male and female humans.
The first opposition was that between humans and animals. When 
Herrmann Mögling, one of the most influential Basel Indian missionaries, 
first arrived in Mumbai27 in 1836 and accompanied his Scottish colleagues 
Wilson and Mitchell on occasion of their visit to an animal hospital, he was 
shocked to see that animals were treated better than some humans. Taking 
into consideration the Hindu doctrine of reincarnation, he could understand 
that animals were regarded as equal to humans, but that animals should 
receive better treatment than humans was beyond his comprehension. The 
argument that humans could ask for help whereas animals could not did not 
convince him; he thought that humans who did ask for help were often not 
heard.28 The contrast between the treatment of animals and of certain groups 
of humans, certain castes, again and again disgusted the missionaries. They 
had not the slightest sympathy for the esteem in which Hindus held certain 
animals – not when taking their treatment of humans into account. A fun-
damental difference between the Indian and the European definition of life 
appeared. It was based on different religious systems, the Hindu doctrine of 
incarnation on the one hand and the Christian belief in a linear history that 
would result in eternal life or damnation on the other. These differing beliefs 
had informed Indian (not only Hindu) as well as European (mostly Christian) 
attitudes towards life and towards the definition of humanity. While in Hin-
duism the boundaries between human and animal were fluent, in European 
Christianity they were regarded as stable.
But the definition of humanity was debated not only in relation to animals 
like cows or monkeys. It was also contested with regard to humans them-
selves. And here, though Indian notions concerning certain castes or groups 
of people were sometimes adopted, the Basel missionaries’ definitions and 
attributions as to who was considered human and who could be perceived 
as “animal” differed considerably from those of their Indian counterparts. 
And within the Basel community, different approaches can be found between 
the missionaries in India and the publishing and commentating editors of 
26 Cf. e.g. Heidenbote 1837, 96. Cf. BMA, C-1,2 Mangalore 1836, no. 12, H. Mögling, 15.9.1836 
for an more extensive description and the names and affiliations of the colleagues who wel-
comed the newcomers. Heidenbote 1846, 55.
27 As far as they are still recognisable, I use the official modern names of places in India. Only in 
cases when names have changed entirely and the towns are too small to be widely known have I 
retained the contemporary names. This decision was facilitated by the fact that the names were 
current in the nineteenth century, too, and their spelling differed considerably from one letter 
to the other, or even between reports in the Heidenbote. However, I am aware that the naming 
of many places is contested nowadays, too.
28 Quoted in Heidenbote 1837, 31.
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their letters, the mission inspector and later the editor of the Heidenbote. 
Generally speaking, the people living in Europe were more ready to adopt 
Indian descriptions of certain groups as “savage” or “animal-like” than the 
missionaries in India.
In his annual report for 1844, inspector Wilhelm Hoffmann reported on 
the newly begun mission among the Nayadis “who up to now had led a sav-
age and wretched life in the woods and on the streets […]. They rambled 
around nearly naked like wild animals”.29 The main reason for this ascription 
as “savage” and the comparison with animals lay in the people’s lack of 
sedentary ways, its clothing and dietary habits.30 Sedentariness, to the Basel 
missionaries, was a main indicator of Christian development and faith.31 Nev-
ertheless, it was the mission inspector in Basel, not the missionaries in India, 
who wrote in this pejorative way about the people. The Christians’ goal was, 
according to the inspector, to “educate these unfortunate people humanely”.32 
Their goal was to form them as humans as opposed to their present life like 
“animals”. To this end, education and schooling in Christianity were consid-
ered necessary, as was a fixed residence. The stabilitas loci was one of the 
few persistent motifs when the Basel Mission discussed Christianisation in 
relation to civilisation or humanisation.
Two years later, Hoffmann distanced himself from the Hindu perception 
of the Nayadis as animals. Though he had adopted the ascription in the years 
before, he now declared that their “progress in learning, in work and in Chris-
tian moral or civilisation” proved “that they were not tigers or hyenas as the 
Hindus think”.33 (“Hindu” in this context meant principally “Brahmin”.34) 
The interesting point is that Hoffmann opposed “animal” not to “human” but 
29 Heidenbote 1844, 62. Cf. also Heidenbote 1845, 13.
30 Cf. also the remarks in the annual report of 1845: Heidenbote 1845, 85. In Heidenbote 1844, 
44. Johann Michael Fritz reported on the joy of the Nayadis when he had given them clothing 
so that they could, as he quoted the Nayadis, dress in a proper Indian way and thus appear as 
humans: “Ich hätte Ihnen und manchen vaterländischen Freunden es wünschen mögen, die 
Freude wahrnehmen zu können, die sich im Gesicht und Geberden dieser armen Leute kund 
that, als ich Abends jeglichem von ihnen ein Stück Zeug gab, mit dem sie sich nach indischer 
Weise ordentlich bekleiden konnten und wodurch sie, wie sie sich ausdrücken, nun in Stand 
gesetzt sind, als Menschen erscheinen zu können.”
31 Cf. Judith Becker, “ ‘Gehet hin in alle Welt …’. Sendungsbewusstsein in der evangelischen 
Missionsbewegung der ersten Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts”, in Evangelische Theologie 72 
(2012), 134–154.
32 Heidenbote 1844, 62. Another stated goal was to “save” them from Muslim missions.
33 Heidenbote 1846, 74.
34 The Basel Missionaries followed the general European trend to identify Brahmin and Sanskrit 
traditions with “Hinduism”. As an introduction see Gavin D. Flood, An Introduction to Hindu-
ism (Cambridge 1996); Axel Michaels, Der Hinduismus. Geschichte und Gegenwart (Munich 
²2012). On the entanglement between Hindu and Christian approaches see Hugh Pyper, “The 
Battle of the Books: The Bible Versus the Vedas”, in C. L. Crouch / Jonathan Stöckl (ed.), In the 
Name of God. The Bible in the Colonial Discourse of Empire (Leiden 2014), 169–187.
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to “Christian”. It was their progress in education, civilisation and Christian-
ity that proved the Nayadis’ humanity.35
The definition of “Christian” as “human” was also behind the description 
of Brahmins as animal-like. In 1839, the charismatic Samuel Hebich was 
referred to as suffering from “very hard work with the grand Brahmins”. He 
wrote: “If our dear ones at home could see the fight with these wild animals 
for one hour only they would recognise, I am sure, that more favourable inter-
cession for us and our work is needed.”36 What turned Brahmins into animals 
in Hebich’s view was their persistent opposition to Christianity, a resistance 
not only on their own part but also, in the missionaries’ perception, engaged 
in keeping others from converting.37 – On the other hand, Brahmins could 
also refer to the Europeans as belonging to the “race of monkeys” and thus 
assert their own superiority.38 Both sides referred to their religious-political 
opponents as “animals”, an ascription which was used in both directions and 
functioned, of course, on a very different level from the discussion about the 
humanity of lower castes.
After visiting the animal hospital in 1836, Mögling saw some Hindu holy 
men, accompanied by his colleagues Johannes Layer and Heinrich Frey. 
He found the holy men to be disgusting and “hardly resembling humans”. 
Another holy man was, he thought, even more abhorrent. The man showed 
the dead fingers of a hand in which he held a green flower. According to 
Mögling, he boasted of his indifference towards his body.39 The Christian 
message, however, was considered as relevant to the body as to the soul. 
This degree of asceticism was too much even for the ascetically inclined 
Mögling.40 In his view, the holy man no longer behaved like a human being 
and voluntarily neglected his body, a gift from God. A different definition of 
asceticism as well as of humanity informed the missionaries’ and the Hindu 
perception of these saints. Not only was the “right” connection of body and 
soul contested, but also the definition of body and of physical pleasure or, in 
this case, suffering.
Yet the missionaries’ assessment of the Indians was not unidirectional. 
The same missionary could voice very different opinions. In 1846, the 
35 Their regular prayers and their request for “Christian” names had already been quoted in the 
first reference to this new mission in 1844, thus elevating them above animals.
36 Heidenbote 1839, 89.
37 In a similar vein, Christian Müller reported on a Hindu festival where drunken Hindu guests 
became like “wild animals”. Heidenbote 1846, 27f. Here, too, an opposition to values, practices 
and religion informed the attribution as “animals”.
38 Heidenbote 1841, 68f.
39 Heidenbote 1837, 31.
40 Mögling’s attitude towards ascetics can be seen in his attempt to live like one of his Indian 
converts or audience and those were mainly from lower castes. His motif, however, was not 
ascetics but imitation of St. Paul; cf. 1 Cor. 9:20.
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Heidenbote quoted several pages from Heinrich Albrecht’s diary from 1844, 
when Albrecht had been in India for two years. He complained about “the 
Hindu” and enumerated “his” negative character traits, concluding with a 
reference to the ancient proverb about the Cretans: “They are always liars, 
evil beasts, slow bellies.”41 A few pages later, the same Albrecht praised “the 
Hindus” for being better than “our white people at home” and thus closer 
to the Kingdom of God.42 Depending on the context, the attitude towards 
and estimation of the Indians could change considerably, particularly if the 
Indians were Hindus. Muslims were generally seen more negatively, less 
susceptible for evangelisation, but on the other hand they usually were not 
compared to animals, either. Catholic Indians, if they did not prove open to 
conversion, were seen even more negatively, but most certainly as humans.43
The assessment of the Indians depended on their attitude towards the mis-
sionaries and on their practices towards the evangelising men and women. It 
was, therefore, a religious assessment. On the same page as the last quotation, 
Albrecht explained the goal of his mission: “to speak a word of truth, whereby 
vicious people shall become good people”. He explained to his audience that 
all men were bad, without any exception, and that only faith could make them 
good and keep them from living in sin.44 In this perception, conversion and 
faith were what made men human.
This opinion underlay the missionaries’ notion that they could actually see 
who was a Christian and who was not. They repeatedly reported on external 
features in which they thought they saw the degree of “Christianness”. This 
mostly referred to the faith, but sometimes also to posture or deportment. Of 
course, actions, keeping to “Christian” values and practices, were perceived 
as a more or less objective indicator, but features and posture also came 
up fairly often.45 An open face, a “free” look indicated the Indian’s inner 
beliefs, or so thought the missionaries. An additional feature was joy spread 
over the face.46 When they could not see the “likeness of a disciple”, they 
became suspicious of the person.47 As in other respects, external features 
41 Heidenbote 1846, 49. Cf. Titus 1:12.
42 Ibid., 55.
43 On Syrian Christians in India see Paul Verghese (ed.), Die syrischen Kirchen in Indien (Stuttgart 
1974); George Oommen, “Strength of Tradition and Weakness of Communication – Central 
Kerala Dalit Conversion”, in Geoffrey A. Oddie (ed.), Religious Conversion Movements in 
South Asia. Continuities and Change, 1800–1990 (Richmond 1996), 79–95. Cf. also Matthias 
Frenz, “The Illusion of Conversion. Ṡiva Meets Mary at Vēḷāṅkaṇṇi in Southern India”, in 
Richard Fox Young / Jonathan A. Seitz (ed.), Asia in the Making of Christianity. Conversion, 
Agency, and Indigeneity, 1600s to the Present (Leiden 2013), 373–401.
44 Heidenbote 1846, 55.
45 Cf. e.g. Heidenbote 1841, 67; 1843, 65f.; 1852, 65, 68. Most of these general remarks were 
written by the editor of the Heidenbote in Europe. 
46 Heidenbote 1836, 81.
47 Ibid., 81.
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became indicators of inner processes and of faith itself. This contradicted 
the awakened missionaries’ concept of conversion as personal metanoia but 
became increasingly important in India, where they had to evaluate a per-
son’s standing in faith, both in view of their reports to Europe and in view 
of the question of baptism.48 With regard to the appearance of a person, his 
or her features decided whether they were to be considered human, because 
humanity was directly linked to faith and thus the individual’s relationship 
to God.
This also became visible when the missionaries wrote about new converts 
and Indian (and European) congregations. Reporting back to the mission com-
mittee and their supporters in Europe, they had to count the converts and the 
members of congregations and Christian communities.49 They did not count 
“persons” or “people”, they counted “souls”. What was important about their 
mission was bringing souls to God. This means that what defined people was 
not their being humans – walking on their feet, having a ratio, having speech 
etc. – but their having souls and turning them to God. Although the body was 
not to be neglected, the soul was the main feature of being human.
3. Humanity as Unity and Equality
Like Warneck, the missionaries were convinced that, fundamentally, all 
people were equal. This meant first and foremost that all people were equally 
sinners.50 They were all descended from Adam and Eve, created in God’s 
image, but had been included in the fall of humankind.51 Therefore, they were 
all sinners. As difficult as it was to convey this doctrine to the Hindu and 
Muslim Indians who had a very different concept of sin, the missionaries 
held it to be fundamental to the Christian faith and did not deviate from it. 
It enabled them to accept the Indians as equal and to receive them into an 
imagined community of sinners, to build a unity of humankind in which 
Europeans, Asians and Africans were alike.52
48 Cf. Becker, Conversio im Wandel. 
49 Cf. e.g. Heidenbote 1836, 83, 86.
50 Heidenbote 1842, 86; 1844, 39.
51 In 1844, Mögling explained by use of reproduction and lineage the unity of humankind: “Der 
Beweis für die Einheit der Menschen, daß aus der Verbindung irgend welcher Menschenracen 
Kinder geboren werden, daß aber eine Rabe und ein Papagei etc. keine Junge hecken können, 
verschaffte einen vollständigen Sieg.” (Heidenbote 1844, 48).
52 Of course, the missionaries would not have denied the hierarchies that existed in the colonial 
situation, nor would they have wished to overturn them entirely. But they added another aspect 
to the picture and, from a religious and eschatological perspective, they accepted the Indians 
as equal. On mission and colonial situations see Becker (ed.), European Missions in Contact 
Zones. One of the fundamental postcolonial approaches to missions is Jean Comaroff / John 
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In the missionaries’ view, all humankind was not only alike in sin but 
also in the need for redemption. They were convinced that all religions, too, 
searched for redemption.53 In their missionary disputes with Indians, the 
missionaries often referred to themselves in order to illustrate the need for 
redemption – and its possibility. They explicitly placed themselves on the 
same level as the Indians.54 The goal in this case was to convince the Indi-
ans of the truth of their evangelisation. The comparison was to convince the 
Indians by putting Christian teaching into practice before their eyes. At the 
same time, it underlined the equality of all humankind, an important point 
particularly for members of lower castes.
Comparisons and references to equality were drawn not only with regard 
to Indians but also in view of the European audience, which the missionaries 
addressed directly from time to time. In these cases, the references served a 
different goal: They were to plead for understanding for and acceptance of 
the difficulties Indians had in embracing “Christian” values and adopting 
“Christian” (i.e. European) practices. Examples of sins that could be found 
everywhere, including among the missionaries, were haughtiness and con-
ceitedness, as Hermann Gundert explained in 1846.55 All other deviations 
that were highly reproachful to the Basel community were referred to, as well.
However, the missionaries were convinced that all the Indians, too, even 
the most disadvantaged ones, were of “God’s house”,56 which is to say that 
there were elements in them that referred back to the creation of all and that 
“God’s law was written into their hearts” – the old theory of natural theol-
ogy57 –, which enabled them to hear the message and eventually return to 
God. They were, in short, part of creation and part of the redeemed people. 
This, too, entailed the perception of all humankind as equal.
L. Comaroff, Of Revelation and Revolution. Christianity, Colonialism, and Consciousness in 
South Africa (Chicago, IL 1991).
53 Heidenbote 1841, 30.
54 Heidenbote 1846, 44: “daher auch ich gekommen sey, sie zu laden, und sie bitte, diese Gnade 
anzunehmen, daß sie dem Zorn entrinnen möchten. Sey ich doch Sünder wie sie, Fleisch von 
ihrem Fleisch, Blut von ihrem Blut: aber gläubig worden und darum beschenkt mit Sünden-
vergebung und heiligem Geist, so daß ich dürfe nun als Zeuge von diesem Allem dienen.” 
This approach was adopted by the Indian catechists, cf. Heidenbote 1849, 41. On missions 
and colonialism in India see e.g. Jeffrey Cox, Imperial Fault Lines. Christianity and Colonial 
Power in India, 1818–1940 (Stanford, CA 2002); see also Chad M. Bauman, Christian Identity 
and Dalit Religion in Hindu India, 1868–1947 (Grand Rapids, MI 2008); and Becker, Conversio 
im Wandel. 
55 Heidenbote 1846, 31.
56 Heidenbote 1838, 8.
57 See as an introduction Walter Sparn, “Natürliche Theologie”, in TRE 24 (Berlin 1994), 85–98.
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Most importantly, Christ had died and risen for all humankind, including 
those who were still “heathens”. He was “the saviour not only of the Franks 
and the English but the saviour of the world”.58 Because his death had, in the 
Christian faith, been for all, all people were or would be equal and united in 
him.59 This Christian teaching became fundamental to the missionaries who 
lived among people of other faiths, cultures and traditions. They believed that 
eventually all would be one.
The notion of the equality of humankind was strengthened by the con-
viction of the unity and equality of all Christians. It was illustrated in India 
by the unity of “black and white” Christians in one church, particularly in 
Kannur where Samuel Hebich worked among Indian and European Chris-
tians alike and where he insisted on the unity of both congregations, on com-
munal services and feasts and where people from very different backgrounds 
assembled regularly.60
Once an Indian had converted, he or she was to be accepted into the com-
munity of Christians and (officially) regarded as equal. This, of course, was 
a statement of faith. In reality, Indians were not always treated as equal. Yet, 
the factual inequality could head into two directions.
Firstly, in accordance with the theory of stages of development, Indian 
converts were often regarded as junior to European Christians.61 They were 
treated with what the missionaries thought was love and respect, but they 
were also often treated like children. The Indian convert Hermann Anandrao 
Kaundinya, a Brahmin, had been educated in Basel as missionary and worked 
as a regular missionary in India from 1851.62 Officially, he worked on equal 
terms with his European colleagues, but not all of them accepted him as 
equal and he repeatedly complained about his treatment. At the same time, 
he was best friend and confidant to Hermann Mögling, who did not make any 
distinction between Kaundinya and his European colleagues. Meanwhile, the 
missionary who opposed Kaundinya most, Samuel Kullen, had been educated 
alongside and sent out with Kaundinya. It later turned out that Kullen was 
a paedophile and that Kaundinya had tried to warn the Basel committee of 
him. This personal antagonism may also have influenced Kullen’s treatment 
of the Brahmin convert missionary colleague.
58 Heidenbote 1846, 56.
59 Heidenbote 1838, 30.
60 Cf. e.g. Heidenbote 1843, 69.
61 See e.g. for an approach influential at the time Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Vorlesungen 
über die Philosophie der Geschichte. 
62 On Kaundinya see Katrin Binder, “Herrmann Anandrao Kaundinya”, in Albrecht Frenz / 
Stefan Frenz (ed.), Zukunft im Gedenken. Future in Remembrance (Norderstedt 2007), 
419–424; Mrinalini Sebastian, “Mission Without History? Some Ideas for Decolonizing Mis-
sion”, in International Review of Mission 93 (2004), 75–96.
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Secondly, Indians were quite often depicted as model Christians and used 
to illustrate to the European audience what a Christian life should be.63 In this 
case, the Indians were held up as superior to the Europeans. Both attitudes 
can be found in the mission periodicals as well as the manuscript sources, 
sometimes on the same page. The reason for this was the conviction of the 
fundamental unity and equality in the Christian faith.
When they tried to convey this conviction to the Indians, it acquired what 
was, to the Europeans, a new sense: as opposition to caste divisions. At the 
same time, this opposition was used to illustrate the Christian belief in the 
unity and equality of all humankind in contrast to the perceived Indian tra-
dition.64 The missionaries promoted the idea that it was opposition to the 
caste system that underscored the superiority of the Protestant faith over 
Indian traditions. When confronted with the South Indian caste system, the 
missionaries insisted that castes were made by humans (or the devil acting 
through them), and that God opposed castes.65 They repeatedly declared that 
there was only one caste, the caste of humans. When one of his pupils, on 
being asked by a Hindu in 1841, stated that they were of the Christian caste, 
Georg Friedrich Sutter interrupted the conversation by stating that “they are 
of the human caste”.66 He then added that, therefore, he himself belonged to 
the same caste. The unity of humankind in one caste was not to be divided by 
races or cultures, at least not in theory.
People who wanted to convert had to leave their caste, or better: had to 
transgress caste boundaries, eat and drink and pray together.67 There was no 
way back for those converts, because their former caste members would not 
accept them back once they had eaten with members of other castes. This 
made conversion appealing to members of lower castes and daunting to those 
of higher castes.68 For the missionaries, this approach had not only the advan-
63 See Judith Becker, “ ‘Dear Reader, Remember This’: Mission Reports as Paradigms for Revival 
in Europe. The Barmer Missionsblatt and Basel Evangelischer Heidenbote in the Nineteenth 
Century”, in Christian Soboth , Pia Schmid with Veronika Albrecht-Birkner, Hartmut Leh-
mann, Thomas Müller-Bahlke and Udo Sträter (ed.), “Schrift soll leserlich seyn.” Der Pietis-
mus und die Medien. Beiträge zum IV. Internationalen Kongress für Pietismusforschung 2013, 
2 vols (Hallesche Forschungen 44/1 + 2), Halle 2016, vol. I, 149–162.
64 The Hindu conception of castes had been adopted by Islam, Syrian and Catholic Christianity 
in India, see e.g. David Mosse, The Saint in the Banyan Tree. Christianity and Caste Society in 
India (Berkeley, CA 2012).
65 Heidenbote 1844, 70; 1845, 53.
66 Heidenbote 1841, 26. Cf. also Heidenbote 1846, 51.
67 Only in rare cases and against their conviction the missionaries allowed caste divisions, cf. 
Heidenbote 1844, 38. 
68 See e.g. Rowena Robinson / Sathianathan Clarke (ed.), Religious Conversion in India. Modes, 
Motivations, and Meanings (Oxford 2003); Bauman, Christian Identity and Dalit Religion; 
Walter Fernandes, Caste and Conversion Movements in India. Religion and Human Rights 
(New Delhi 1981).
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tage of illustrating Christian unity in daily life but also of denigrating other 
Indian religions. It was mainly a religious, not a political statement, but since 
religion and politics could not be separated in India at the time, it had social 
and political consequences in an attempted breakup of the caste system.
Still, the conviction of the unity of all humankind was not only applied 
within India, but also in addressing the European audience: The missionaries 
in their reports repeatedly referred to the “beauty” of Indian people.69 Since 
people who were considered internally bad were also depicted as bad-look-
ing, the references to the beauty of the Indians illustrated their inner beauty, 
their (possible) faith and their humaneness.
And even if the Indians were not yet obviously equal in faith they could 
soon become so. Herrmann Mögling, in a mission sermon to an English 
audience in 1838, reprimanded those who looked down on Indians “as a 
lower species of humankind”. “Whoever does this throws away the gemstone 
whose brilliance is still hidden beneath the rougher crust”. Mögling counted 
on the future to demonstrate the value of the Indians. He also thought that 
friendship with Indian converts was possible and that it “would one day be 
more delightful than anything”.70 This was a sermon preached in his first 
years in India. When looking back twenty years later, Mögling claimed that 
he had not thought real friendship with Indians possible but that he had expe-
rienced it with Kaundinya and others and had seen that communion was not 
dependent on tradition or on race but only on faith.71
That he could imagine such a community at the beginning of his work in 
India and that his colleagues voiced similar opinions on unity and equality 
was based on the conviction that all people would be one at the end of days.72 
Even if the unity was not lived at the time and might never be fulfilled on 
earth, all Pietistic missionaries were convinced that in the eschaton, they 
would experience full unity. This would also be shown in communal meals.73 
When stressing this aspect, the missionaries adapted their eschatological 
conviction to what concerned Indians in light of their culture.
69 Heidenbote 1839, 45.
70 Heidenbote 1838, 29.
71 BMA, C-1.26 Kurg 1860, no. 38, H. Mögling, 21.7.1860.
72 Heidenbote 1844, 39.
73 Heidenbote 1841, 83.
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4. Humanity as Poor Relief: 
Humanitarianism
“I know that love of the saviour and love of the heathens are the first virtues 
of a missionary”,74 wrote Basel inspector Joseph Josenhans in 1852. To love 
one’s neighbours was an important concept that motivated young men and 
women to become missionaries. It played a major part in the future mission-
aries’ applications to the Basel institution. They founded it in the love of God 
and in the double commandment of love.75 It is present in many applications 
from 1820 to 1860.76 The future missionaries explained that they loved the 
“poor heathens” whom they saw as their neighbours.77
In this way, albeit maybe involuntarily or even unconsciously, they intro-
duced a hierarchy between themselves and their “neighbours”. This hierarchy 
was, in the first place, spiritually defined and pertained to Indians as well as 
Europeans.78 When a collegial missionary was found to have acted in a devi-
ant manner like Christian Greiner, who was found to have had an long-stand-
ing extramarital affair in Mangalore in 1856, they interpreted this as proof 
of his not having really been converted, not really believing in God and not 
living in tight connection with God. The colleague and brother became the 
“poor Greiner”. Correspondingly, when an Indian converted and became a 
missionary colleague like Kaundinya, he was not only no longer a heathen 
but was also no longer considered “poor”; he became the “dear brother”, the 
“dear Kaundinya”. “Poor” and “dear” were mainly spiritual attributes. The 
“neighbour” was, from a religious perspective, everyone.
Many candidates defined love as compassion, and this compassion was, 
again, mainly spiritually informed. It was also based on their own experience 
of conversion and of being a sinner and needing justification and grace. They 
thought that every sinner who did not know the only way to salvation, con-
version to “real” faith, needed compassion – and mission. The missionaries 
74 Heidenbote 1852, 70.
75 Matth. 22:36–40 parr.
76 Cf. BMA, BV. The applications were been analysed in in ten-year intervals, supplemented by 
the applications of those who were later sent to India.
77 Cf. e.g. BMA, BV 139 (Christian Leonhard Greiner), Lebens-Geschichte [1830], 2v; BV 252 
(Christian Jakob Bomwetsch), [Lebenslauf, 1840], 4; BV 590 (Johannes Weiblen), [Lebenslauf], 
23.11.1859, 1.
78 As a matter of course, the missionaries also believed in the concept of European superiority 
over other peoples and cultures. This theory became more widespread and more pronounced 
during the nineteenth century, and most members of the missionary movement adopted it in 
one way or the other. Still, except for single exceptions, they never adopted it entirely. The 
evaluation of people from a spiritual perspective continued to exist. Cf. e.g. Jeffrey Cox, The 
British Missionary Enterprise Since 1700 (New York 2008), 114–144.
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later compared themselves to those to whom they were sent and thus created 
a feeling of unity and equality.79
The mission candidates expressed compassion for those who had not yet 
heard about God’s saving grace and who therefore, in their view, still lived 
in “darkness”, under the power of the devil.80 What they intended to do, was 
“saving souls”81 as their own souls had been saved by their conversion. To 
the glory of God, they wanted to share with others the gifts that God had 
bestowed upon them. And they wanted, at the same time, to further the 
imminent Kingdom of God. They were convinced that the eschaton was soon 
to come.82
Of course, all these ideas of the candidates were very idealistic and far 
removed from any reality because all they had to help them imagine what life 
in a foreign country was like and how the “heathens” lived was their Pietistic 
education and, as the century progressed, a growing number of missionary 
publications. Once they arrived in the missionary contact zones their atti-
tudes changed considerably. The “poor heathens” became real people and 
their problems, too, became real. As a result, the definition of “poor” was 
modified. To be sure, the spiritual definition persisted, but it was comple-
mented by a secular definition. People in Asia and even more so in Africa 
were “poor” not only on a spiritual level but also socially and economically. 
This pertained to slaves and former slaves among whom the Basel mission-
aries worked in West Africa and it was also true for the lower castes in India, 
Basel’s most important Indian converts.
At the same time, the idea of the power of the devil, not only over the souls 
of people but also within cultures, was substantiated, too. The missionaries 
became convinced that they experienced the devil at work, particularly in 
cultures that were – as they saw it – permeated by religion and that were 
79 Heidenbote 1853, 103.
80 Cf. e.g. BMA, BV 138 (Joh. Christoph Friedr. Schmidt), letter to C. G. Blumhardt, 13.1.1828, 2r. 
The difference between darkness and light was also a favoured topic in mission conversations, 
Heidenbote 1841, 26.
81 Cf. e.g. BMA, BV 611 (Friedrich Wilhelm Schnepf), Kurzer Ueberblick über meine Jugend-
jahre [1860], 7. Heidenbote 1835, 29. The love of neighbours, too, was fundamentally meant as 
a love of their souls. Heidenbote 1841, 80.
82 On this, cf. e.g. the debate published in Ernst Staehelin, Die Christentumsgesellschaft in der 
Zeit von der Erweckung bis zur Gegenwart. Texte aus Briefen, Protokollen und Publikationen 
(Basel 1974), 209–325. This is only one example of the expectation of the imminent return of 
Christ. Cf. on the mission’s historical conception and consciousness also Judith Becker, “Die 
Christianisierung fremder Völker – ein Zeichen für die nahende Endzeit?”, in id. / Bettina Braun 
(ed.), Die Begegnung mit Fremden und das Geschichtsbewusstsein (Göttingen 2012), 183–204; 
Judith Becker, “Zukunftserwartungen und Missionsimpetus bei Missionsgesellschaften in der 
ersten Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts”, in Wolfgang Breul / Jan Carsten Schnurr (ed.), Geschichts-
bewusstsein und Zukunftserwartung in Pietismus und Erweckungsbewegung (Göttingen 
2013), 244–270.
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highly developed like Hinduism.83 It was the duty of a Christian to fight 
against this and rescue people from the power of the devil.
In one of his first reports from India, Johann Christoph Lehner deplored 
how “deeply sunken” the people were, a condition that was also considered to 
be a kind of poverty. This was, of course, a religious judgement. But Lehner 
filled the statement with references to spiritual as well as secular matters: On 
a spiritual level, he found “blindness”, “idolatry” and “sin” everywhere, also 
“poverty” that could be interpreted in a religious as well as a secular way. He 
explained this with the “imperiousness” of the priesthood, yet another sign 
of “sunkenness”, although it went along with high social standing and mostly 
also with wealth. Lehner contrasted the condition of the lower people with 
India’s natural wealth and beauty and with the possibilities they offered.84 
The extreme discrepancies between possibilities and the practice and life 
they perceived in India induced the missionaries to broaden their concep-
tion of poverty, compassion and their duties towards their neighbours and to 
include secular relief as an important aspect of their mission.
Although conversion and the “saving” of souls remained at the centre of 
the mission programme – and particularly of the reports about it –, poor relief 
had been, from the beginning, an important part of the work of the mission-
aries.85 It became even more pronounced because they thought they could 
set themselves apart from the Hindus who, as the missionaries perceived it, 
did not necessarily help their neighbours if they were poor and from lower 
castes.86 Poor relief as a traditional pastoral duty of Christians was elevated 
in India to an indicator of “true” faith, increasingly perceived as a means of 
not only helping the poor but also of converting. This was the case not only in 
India, but also in Europe. In Europe, too, poverty was defined spiritually as 
well as socially, and social poverty was often seen as an external expression 
83 Heidenbote 1847, 65.
84 Heidenbote 1835, 27f: “Aber um so schauerlicher wirkte der schneidende Kontrast auf unser 
Gemüth, denn der Anblick eines tief versunkenen Menschengeschlechtes um uns her auf 
unsere Seele machte. Fülle und Armuth, Hoheit und schmutzige Verwerflichkeit stellen sich 
im stärksten Gegensatze hier dem Blicke des Fremdlings dar, und während das Auge mit 
Wohlgefallen auf der Pracht und dem reichen Überflusse der Natur ruht, wird das Herz tief 
verwundet über der unsäglichen Versunkenheit, Blindheit und Armuth eines Volkes, das in den 
Fesseln eines rohen Aberglaubens und einer herrschsüchtigen Priesterschaft liegt, und unter 
dem Fluch der Sünde zu schmachten scheint. An allen Straßenecken wird man eine Schaar 
dieser unglücklichen gewahr, welche auf dem Boden umher liegen wie Schafe, die keinen 
Hirten haben […]”. This can be contrasted with Lehner’s own report of his journey to India in 
which he stated that he wanted “to be useful to our poor heathen brethren.” Ibid.
85 The impact of poor relief in missions in India is illustrated e.g. by Bauman, Christian Identity. 
For an overview over poor relief and social welfare in nineteenth century Protestantism. See 
below, note 88.
86 Heidenbote 1835, 20.
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of inner poverty with regard to faith.87 Generally speaking, the missionaries 
acted in India as their Pietistic compatriots did in Europe, on the basis of the 
same convictions and with the same goal.
The Basel missionaries were not willing to support paupers on a perma-
nent basis, but they were willing to offer one-time help (particularly if they 
thought they had found new candidates for conversion) or to provide a living 
by offering new means of employment.
Furthermore, work was meant to educate people towards the Christian 
faith. It was used as a test of the sincerity of candidates for conversion. If they 
were not willing to work, they were not considered to be sincerely interested 
in becoming Christians.88 The Basel missionaries were not out to distribute 
alms. They could not afford to do so, but alms did not fit into their world-
view either. As their main motif was “saving souls” by leading people to 
conversion, they did not want to raise people only socially or economically. 
Here, the body came into the play again. It was, the missionaries thought, 
made by God in order to work and to maintain the soul. And if they had to 
choose between body and soul, they would, of course, take the soul and leave 
the body. Also, the body had an important impact on the soul: work was 
interpreted as a means against superstition.89 As social and economic poverty 
was interpreted as an expression of inner poverty, so was physical work as 
a means of relief from spiritual poverty – as long as it was accompanied by 
evangelisation, of course.
Another secular motive for providing work and caring for the poor was 
produced by the missionaries themselves: When Indians converted to Chris-
tianity they had to leave their castes, in the perspective of the missionaries as 
well as in that of their fellow caste members who turned them out when they 
broke caste boundaries. Because castes were usually linked to specific pro-
fessions, converts lost their profession and thus their income.90 Providing for 
them was fundamental to the mission and they often deplored that they had 
not more means to support converts. This, however, was a kind of poverty 
that was partly created by the mission. Still, to them, the quest for the right 
kind of work also had a religious aspect: Many of their first converts were 
from among the Billava, the “toddy drawer” (makers of palm wine) caste. 
As alcohol was seen as potentially dangerous, the missionaries searched for 
87 And it was often the same people who supported poor relief and Bible distribution in Europe and 
the missions. See e.g. Stähelin, Christentumsgesellschaft, 182f., 186f., 227; Martin Friedrich, 
Kirche im gesellschaftlichen Umbruch. Das 19. Jahrhundert (Göttingen 2006); Traugott 
Jähnichen / Norbert Friedrich, “Geschichte der sozialen Ideen im deutschen Protestantismus”, 
in Walter Euchner et al. (ed.), Geschichte der sozialen Ideen in Deutschland. Sozialismus, 
katholische Soziallehre, protestantische Sozialethik. Ein Handbuch (Essen 2000), 867–1103.
88 Heidenbote 1843, 56.
89 Heidenbote 1845, 14.
90 Heidenbote 1853, 16.
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new forms of employment, whether the toddy drawers were allowed by their 
compatriots to pursue their profession or not. Christian Greiner called regu-
lar work a “means of education”, meaning education to the Christian faith.91
Schools could also be seen as a part of poor relief, in a secular as well 
as a spiritual way, because their main objective was to evangelise by use of 
catechism and Bible lessons and by teaching how to read and write with the 
help of religious texts.92 They could thus be considered as contributing to 
spiritual and secular poor relief, by teaching about salvation and by educa-
tion that would allow people to get office jobs, for instance in the colonial 
administration.
In 1838, Herrmann Mögling called the poor house “a very important 
appendix to missions”.93 Gathering poor people became a mission strategy. 
They were assembled, dependent on the missionaries, were perceived as 
mostly grateful and thus as easy candidates for conversion – although the 
Basel missionaries continued to ask for “real”, inner conversions and under 
these conditions, they could not always be sure of the motives. However, they 
also began to argue that conversion to Christianity and leaving Hinduism 
could be a first step that was to be followed by the second step of inner 
conversion, a concept that differed considerably from the stance maintained 
in Europe.
Even though addressing themselves to poor people had a concrete sec-
ular motive – it was these people who were most willing to listen to the 
missionaries – it was also interpreted in a religious way: In 1837, Christian 
Leonhard Greiner declared that preaching to the poor was a main duty.94 
This perception was based on the biblical account, according to which Jesus 
not only was often depicted as a teacher of the poor but also was quoted 
as having answered the questions of the disciples of John the Baptist if he 
was the messiah: “Go your way, and tell John what things ye have seen and 
heard; how that the blind see, the lame walk, the lepers are cleansed, the deaf 
hear, the dead are raised, to the poor the gospel is preached.”95 Greiner thus 
depicted himself as follower of Jesus when he preached to the poor.
The missionaries’ notion of slavery, too, was important in this context. 
In India, Layer found the people “in the devil’s bonds of slavery”, internally 
91 Heidenbote 1841, 61.
92 The Basel India mission had been founded in order to build a school and an institution that 
would educate future catechists. On his first mission journey, which mainly aimed to get to 
know other missions and missionaries from European partner societies, Samuel Hebich visited 
his first school in India, Heidenbote 1835, 29.
93 Heidenbote 1838, 94: “ein sehr wichtiges Anhängsel einer Mission”. Later, the Basel Mission 
ran its own poor house in Tellicherry, Heidenbote 1851, 40.
94 Heidenbote 1837, 3.
95 Luke 7:22.
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as well as externally.96 That is to say that the Basel missionaries interpreted 
the lives of Hindus or Muslims as lives of inner slavery. Belief in what 
the awakened missionaries considered invented or man-made gods, living 
in a religious system of higher and lower gods (for the lower castes, this 
meant mainly lower gods) in which voluntary “possession” as they called 
it, or an “altered state of consciousness”,97 as it might more appropriately be 
called, seemed to them to be slavery of a special kind. This was based on the 
Lutheran Pietistic conviction that a person could only either be turned to God 
or to the devil.
The perception of double slavery was applied also to Indian culture and 
particularly to the caste system. Being born into a particular caste precluded 
social mobility. What is more, living within caste boundaries that were abso-
lute and in lower castes that were interpreted as polluting higher ones was, to 
the European missionaries, a kind of slavery, too. In both cases, with regard 
to “possession” and with regard to “caste”, slavery was an interpretation, an 
attribution of the European missionaries to Indian life and it was based on 
their religious convictions. It affected their actions in India and their attitudes 
towards Indians considerably. Liberation from this kind of slavery was per-
ceived as an eminent goal.
Poor relief thus was not an aim in itself, it was only meant to accompany 
the efforts towards evangelisation. It was used as a means to attract people, 
it was seen as a necessary by-product of or a support for conversion. It was 
also seen as a “Christian” duty and central to the Pietistic system of values. 
Therefore, although it was far from insignificant, it was not primary purpose 
of the mission.
5. Conclusion: 
Understandings of “Humanity” and Their Foundational Role 
in German Protestant Missions
Humanity was a foundational and substantiating element in the nine-
teenth-century German Protestant missions in several respects: The Pietists 
thought it their duty to missionise because of the unity of humankind, they 
thought it their duty to help others because of the unity of body and soul, 
96 Heidenbote 1841, 71. On the conception of slavery in the Basel Indian mission and the develop-
ment of a contact religiosity cf. Judith Becker, “Liberated by Christ: Evangelical Missionaries 
and Slavery in Nineteenth Century South India”, in id. (ed.), European Missions in Contact 
Zones, 65–85.
97 Masataka Suzuki, “Bhūta and Daiva. Changing Cosmology of Rituals and Narratives in 
Karnataka”, in Senri Ethnological Studies 71 (2008), 51–85, on p. 54.
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and in both respects to fulfil the duty of loving their neighbours, which was 
considered the foremost commandment to Christians.
Once in the mission countries, they came upon further questions that 
made them voice their anthropological and theological beliefs with regard to 
other religious and cultural concepts and to ponder on and deepen their ideas 
of humanity in the sense of humaneness. In the contact zone, they slightly 
modified their anthropological views of people and entered into a discussion 
about who was human and about the boundaries between humans and ani-
mals and the right treatment of both. This as well as encounters with Hindu 
holy men made them discuss the relationship between body and soul and the 
duties towards both. And while they considered the soul much more impor-
tant than the body, they maintained that care for the body was important, too. 
Ultimately, what made humans human was their Christian faith. Remarkably, 
the opposite of “animal” was “Christian”.
In the Indian context, humanity in the sense of humanitarianism consisted 
mainly of poor relief. But here, too, the definition of “poor” related to the 
body as well as the soul. The Pietistic missionaries always wanted to help the 
whole person, body and soul. Poor relief without a spiritual dimension was 
not what they had in mind. Indeed, it was only in the mission countries that 
they fully realised the social and economic dimensions of poverty – even if 
most of them had come from lower strata themselves.
Poor relief was closely tied to mission and conversion. On the one hand, it 
was a mission strategy: Caring for the poor brought them into contact with 
the mission. Furthermore, members of lower castes were more amenable to 
mission than Brahmins and other upper-caste Indians. One of the main rea-
sons for this attitude lay again in the missionaries’ conception of humanity: 
in their emphasis on the unity of humankind. This emphasis made Chris- 
tianity attractive to people from lower castes, whilst deterring those of higher 
castes.
Poor relief, however, only seldom consisted in giving alms (at least in the 
self-perception and -representation of the mission). It consisted in offering 
work, employment and other means of self-support to the (future) converts. 
The body, given by God, was to be used and it was be employed as a means 
of conversion itself. The Basel missionaries were convinced that work would 
help people on their way to inner conversion. Implicitly, this may have had 
civilising implications, equating Christianity with (European) civilisation. 
Gustav Warneck discussed this openly – and dismissed a supposedly indis-
soluble link between civilisation and Christianisation.
The conception of humanity that ultimately undergirded the German 
Protestant missions was the believed unity of humankind. Although in prac-
tice they introduced new hierarchies and superiorities and their opposition 
to caste distinctions may not have been only religiously founded but also 
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a mission strategy, the fundamental belief that all humans were equal and 
united before God was one of the strongest motives to begin missions at 
all. It was predicated on the basic doctrines of creation, the fall, redemp-
tion and the eschatological perspective of unity in an (imminent) Kingdom 
of God.
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From Emancipation to Transcendence?
Dignity, Catholicism, and the Changing Imageries of 
Humanity in Post-War Europe
The idea of “human dignity” is easily one of the central values in post-war 
political thought and discourse. Faith “in the dignity and worth of the human 
person” features prominently in almost all global and regional human rights 
documents – from the Charter of the United Nations of 1945 and the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 (UDHR) to the United Nations Human 
Rights Covenants of 1966, and from the American Convention on Human 
Rights of 1969 to the Helsinki Final Act of 1975.1 Dignity also features 
prominently in many contemporary constitutions – from the post-war West 
German and Italian to the South African or Polish constitutions of 1996 and 
1997 respectively. Even military interventions are undertaken in the name of 
human dignity. Because of NATO’s intervention in the war in Kosovo, US 
President Bill Clinton said in 1999, “the twentieth century is ending […] with 
a hopeful affirmation of human dignity and human rights for the twenty-first 
century”.2 State sovereignty, the International Commission on Sovereignty 
and State Intervention wrote in 2001, entailed not only rights, but also a 
state’s responsibility to protect “the dignity and basic rights of all the people 
within the state”, and if it failed to provide this protection, “responsibility to 
protect” fell to the international community.3 Both supporters and opponents 
1 The quotation is from the preamble to the UN Charter. See Charter of the United Nations, San 
Francisco 1945, https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/ctc/uncharter.pdf; UN General Assem-
bly, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10 December 1948, 217 A (III), http://www.ohchr.
org/EN/UDHR/Documents/UDHR_Translations/eng.pdf; Organization of American States 
(OAS), American Convention on Human Rights, “Pact of San Jose”, Costa Rica, 22 Novem-
ber 1969, http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b36510.html; Conference on Security and Co- 
operation in Europe (CSCE), Final Act of Helsinki, 1 August 1975, http://www.refworld.org/
docid/3dde4f9b4.html. Art. 3 of the Geneva Convention also prohibits “[o]utrages upon per-
sonal dignity”. See International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Geneva Convention 
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Fourth Geneva Convention), 
12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 287, http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b36d2.html.
2 Bill Clinton, Address on the Kosovo Agreement, 10 June 1999, http://millercenter.org/presi 
dent/speeches/speech-3933.
3 The Responsibility to Protect: Report of International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty, December 2001, quotation on p. 8, http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20
Report. For the history of humanitarian intervention see Michael Geyer, “Humanitarianism 
and Human Rights. A Troubled Rapport”, in Fabian Klose (ed.), The Emergence of Humanitar-
ian Intervention (Cambridge 2016), 31–55.
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of contemporary issues and policies ranging from abortion laws to stem cell 
research and from assisted suicide to same-sex marriage frequently invoke 
the idea of a universal human dignity in their arguments.4
But what is human dignity? While Germany’s constitution defines the 
protection of human dignity as the state’s foremost responsibility, the coun-
try’s constitutional court has yet to come up with a binding definition of 
this notion. Is human dignity a transcendent kernel of every human being 
and as such the inalienable source of human rights? Or is the protection of 
one’s dignity itself a human right?5 Historians are not qualified to answer this 
kind of legal and philosophical question. Yet by delineating the conceptual 
history of human dignity, they have brought a number of striking aspects 
about it to light.
While its pedigree reaches back to antiquity, dignity’s connection to 
universal human rights is of relatively recent origin. It was not until the 
1940s that the two concepts were increasingly seen as connected. Moreover, 
Samuel Moyn has shown in his recent book Christian Human Rights that not 
only had dignity not featured prominently in human rights discourses until 
the mid-twentieth century, some of the concept’s most prominent supporters 
at the time came from authoritarian, clerical, at times even fascist circles, 
with political Catholics – including Popes Pius XI and Pius XII – chief 
among them.6
4 For two examples referring to “dignity” at least thirty times see Obergefell vs. Hodges, 576 
U. S., Supreme Court of the United States, 2015, http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/14 
pdf/14-556_3204.pdf; Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Dignitatis personae [Instruc-
tion on Certain Bioethical Questions], 2008, http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congrega 
tions/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_20081208_dignitas-personae_en.html.
5 Rosemarie Will, “Bedeutung der Menschenwürde in der Rechtssprechung”, in Aus Politik und 
Zeitgeschichte 61:35–36 (2011), 8–14. For the debate in Germany see Stephan Kirste, “Die 
Würde des Menschen im Recht”, published in two parts in Archiv für Rechts- und Sozial-
philosophie 95:3 (2009), 420–427 and 96:1 (2010), 109–114. For a collection of essays dis-
cussing dignity from various perspectives see Christopher McCrudden (ed.), Understanding 
Human Dignity (Oxford 2013). See also Charles R. Beitz, “Human Dignity in the Theory of 
Human Rights: Nothing But a Phrase?”, in Philosophy & Public Affairs 41:3 (2013), 259–290; 
Christopher McCrudden, “Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights”, in 
European Journal of International Law 19:4 (2008), 655–724; for two philosophical accounts 
see Michael Rosen, Dignity: Its History and Meaning (Cambridge, MA 2012); Jeremy Waldron, 
Dignity, Rank, and Rights (Oxford 2012).
6 See Samuel Moyn, Christian Human Rights (Philadelphia 2015). On the history of post-war 
Catholicism see Giuliana Chamedes, The Vatican and the Making of the Atlantic Order, 
1920–1960 (Ph.D. thesis, Columbia University, 2013); James Chappel, Slaying the Leviathan: 
Catholicism and the Rebirth of European Conservatism, 1920–1950 (Ph.D. thesis, Columbia 
University, 2012); John Connelly, From Enemy to Brother: The revolution in Catholic Teaching 
on the Jews, 1933–1965 (Cambridge, MA 2012); see also Udi Greenberg, The Weimar Cen-
tury: German Émigrés and the Ideological Foundations of the Cold War (Princeton, NJ 2014), 
120–168; Jan-Werner Müller, Contesting Democracy: Political Ideas in Twentieth-Century 
Europe (New Haven, CT 2011), 132–143.
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The concept of human dignity, thus, is not inherent in the notion of human 
rights; its introduction into human rights discourses, rather, gave rise to a 
specific, mid-twentieth century vernacular language of human rights.7 Ana-
lysing this vernacular leads us to the central topic of this book, for under-
lying these vernaculars are competing understandings of humanity, as the 
Lebanese philosopher Charles Malik, a member of the “inner core” of the 
drafting committee of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, noted in 
the language of his time:
[…] the very phrase, “human rights” obviously refers to man, and by “rights” you 
can only mean that which belongs to the essence of man; namely, that which is not 
accidental, that which does not come and go with the passage of time and with the rise 
and fall of fads and styles and systems. It must be something belonging to man as such. 
We are, therefore, raising the fundamental question, what is man? And our differences 
will reflect faithfully the differences in our conceptions of man, namely, of ourselves.8
Against this background, this article pursues two aims: first, it discusses how 
dignity featured in post-war Catholic discourses and which understandings 
of humanity emerged from them. Second, the article asks how significant 
these Catholic notions were for the wider post-war currency of human dig-
nity. In pursuing these aims, this article confirms core findings of Moyn’s 
Christian Human Rights as well as of an emergent historiography of post-
war European Catholicism: by invoking human dignity, the Catholic Church 
adapted human rights to an essentially conservative discourse.9 Both Thomas 
Aquinas and Immanuel Kant, Michael Rosen has shown, defined “human 
dignity” as the intrinsic value of human beings.10 Kant, however, believed 
that dignity derives from human autonomy – the ability of human beings to 
independently understand the demands of the moral law and to act accord-
ingly. According to this view, therefore, the ability for autonomous moral 
action sharply distinguished humanity from the rest of the natural world and 
imagined it as consisting of members of equal worth and status. In Thomist 
philosophy, on the other hand, a person’s or object’s dignity derived from its 
7 The term “human rights vernacular” has been adopted from Mark Philip Bradley, “American 
Vernaculars: The United States and the Global Human Rights Imagination”, in Diplomatic 
History 38:1 (2014), 1–21.
8 “The More Important Speeches and Interventions of Dr. Charles Malik, Representative of 
Lebanon and Rapporteur of the Commission, Taken from the Verbatim Records, Human Rights 
Commission, First Session, 27 Jan. to 10 Feb. 1947”, Lake Success, N.Y., Library of Congress, 
Manuscript Division, Charles Habib Malik Papers, Box 76, Folder 9 (hereafter: LoC, Malik 
Papers).
9 Moyn, Christian Human Rights; Chamedes, “Vatican”; Chappel, “Leviathan”; Connelly, 
Enemy to Brother.
10 For the following see Rosen, Dignity, 1–61.
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proper place within the divine order of creation. Humanity, in other words, 
was not imagined as distinct from the natural world, but as part of the natural 
world, and both this natural world and humanity were imagined as hierarchi-
cally structured. Protecting a person’s dignity meant to allow her to assume 
her place within this hierarchical order.
At the same time, though, this article also seeks to chart a path beyond 
the interpretations of the recent historiography of human rights, dignity, and 
Catholicism. Two points are crucial in this respect: First, by broadening the 
focus beyond World War II and its aftermath, I seek to problematise seem-
ingly homogeneous notions like “Catholics” and “Catholicism”. Much as the 
Catholic Church is a hierarchically organised and centrally controlled organi-
sation, its doctrines were nevertheless invoked and applied in a wide variety 
of different historical and geographical situations and were thus subject to 
contestations and reinterpretations. Catholic understandings of dignity and 
humanity thus changed considerably over the course of the post-war period. 
Second, I agree with the editors of this volume in understanding “humanity” 
as a constantly evolving, ambiguous, and contested notion, especially when 
it was normatively charged with a notion like “dignity” and thus became 
a source of social authority and political legitimacy. Acknowledging this 
contestedness of humanity, I hope to show that neither were Catholic views 
of dignity quite as dominant after 1945, nor did they disappear completely in 
the later decades of the twentieth century, as recent interpretations suggest.
1. Dignity and Catholicism in Post-War International History
In the twentieth century, “human dignity” has become one of the core ideas 
of Catholic social thought and the cornerstone of the Church’s reconciliation 
with democracy and human rights. Having begun with Pius XII’s Christmas 
addresses of 1942 and 1944, this process took on full force in the 1960s. In 
1963, Pius’ successor John XXIII promulgated the encyclical Pacem in terris. 
Arguing that only respect for human rights provided a stable basis for world 
peace, the Pope discussed a broad array of civil, political and economic rights 
as protecting or flowing from human dignity, a term he used 31 times, with 
religious freedom as the right “which most truly safeguards the dignity of the 
human person”.11 Dignity was also a central term in two texts of the Second 
Vatican Council. The Council’s “Constitution on the Church in the Modern 
World”, Gaudium et spes, promulgated in 1965, featured an entire chapter 
11 John XXIII, Pacem in terris [Encyclical on Establishing Peace in Truth, Justice, Charity, and 
Liberty], 11 April 1963, sec. 14, http://w2.vatican.va/content/john-xxiii/en/encyclicals/docu 
ments/hf_ j-xxiii_enc_11041963_pacem.html.
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devoted to “The Dignity of the Human Person”, which argued that there was 
“a growing awareness of the exalted dignity proper to the human person, 
since he stands above all things, and his rights and duties are universal and 
inviolable.” From this, the constitution deduced an entire catalogue of rights 
and social goods to which human beings were entitled.12 The “Declaration on 
Religious Freedom”, Dignitatis humanae, promulgated simultaneously with 
Gaudium et spes, similarly noted how a “sense of the dignity of the human 
person has been impressing itself more and more deeply on the consciousness 
of contemporary man […]. This Vatican Council takes careful note of these 
desires in the minds of men”, the declaration went on. “It proposes to declare 
them to be greatly in accord with truth and justice.”13 John Paul II, finally, 
who is presumed to have had a major impact on drafting Gaudium et spes, 
made human dignity a leitmotif of his pontificate.14
If human dignity moved to the centre of Catholic thought and doctrine, 
Catholic thinkers and ideas played an important part in the emergence of 
dignity as a central concept of human rights discourses. The obvious per-
son to mention in this context is the French philosopher Jacques Maritain, 
whose Catholic interpretation of human rights proved highly influential both 
for Church doctrine and the post-war emergence of Christian democracy in 
Europe and Latin America.15 Maritain is also often mentioned as someone 
who had a large influence on the writing of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights.16 Yet he appears to have been only the best-known exponent 
12 Second Vatican Council, Gaudium et Spes [Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern 
World], 7 December 1965, sec. 26, http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_
council/documents/vat-ii_const_19651207_gaudium-et-spes_en.html.
13 Second Vatican Council, Dignitatis humanae [Declaration on Religious Freedom], 7 Decem-
ber 1965, sec. 1, http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/
vat-ii_decl_19651207_dignitatis-humanae_en.html.
14 John Paul II, Redemptor hominis, 4 March 1979, http://w2.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/
encyclicals/documents/hf_ jp-ii_enc_04031979_redemptor-hominis.html. A scholarly biogra-
phy of John Paul II remains to be written. For his views on human rights and dignity and 
presumed role in the Second Vatican Council see Avery Dulles, “John Paul II and the Mystery 
of the Human Person”, in id., Church and Society: The Laurence J. McGinley Lectures, 
1988–2007 (New York 2008), 414–428; George Weigel, Witness to Hope: The Biography of 
Pope John Paul II (New York 1999), 163–169.
15 Much like John Paul II, Maritain is still lacking a historical biography. On him see esp., 
Chappel, “Leviathan”, 40–65, 145–199, 335–396; Samuel Moyn, “Personalism, Community, 
and the Origins of Human Rights”, in Stefan-Ludwig Hoffmann (ed.), Human Rights in the 
Twentieth Century (Cambridge 2011), 85–106; see also Rajesh Heynickx / Jan de Maeyer, The 
Maritain Factor: Taking Religion Into Interwar Modernism (Leuven, Belgium 2010); Jude P. 
Dougherty, Jacques Maritain: An Intellectual Profile (Washington, DC 2003); Tobias Licht / 
Benedikt Ritzler, Jacques Maritain: Philosophie und Politik aus katholischem Glauben (Karls-
ruhe 2002); James V. Schall, Jacques Maritain: The Philosopher in Society (Lanham, MD 
1998).
16 For this view see for instance Andrew Woodcock, “Jacques Maritain, Natural Law and the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights”, in Journal of the History of International Law 8 
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of a broader revival of Thomist philosophy that went beyond Catholic think-
ers and politicians.17 Another representative of this trend was Charles Malik, 
the aforementioned Lebanese philosopher, Greek Orthodox Christian, and 
author of the Declaration’s preamble, which refers to “the inherent dignity 
[…] of all members of the human family” in the same prominent position it 
has in the preamble to the UN Charter. Malik also insisted on using the con-
cept of the “human person”, rather than the individual, in the declaration, a 
point he shared with Maritain’s personalist philosophy. The work of the draft-
ing committee also appears to have taken a number of drafts from Catholic 
groups and scholars into account. Malik went on to serve as rapporteur and 
later chairman of the UN Commission on Human Rights.18
National constitutions were another field where Catholic ideas and authors 
played a role in turning dignity into the basis for human rights. One of the 
first national constitutions to feature human dignity was the Irish constitution 
of 1937, a text heavily consulted with local Catholic bishops and even sent 
to the Vatican for approval.19 In West Germany, the Catholic legal scholar 
Günter Dürig argued that the Basic Law’s understanding of humanity was 
derived from the Christian view of the human person. Dürig would go on to 
write a very influential interpretation of the first article of the West German 
Basic Law, one of the most prominent usages of human dignity in European 
constitutional texts.20
(2006), 245–266; Edward M. Andries, “On the German Constitution s̓ Fiftieth Anniversary: 
Jacques Maritain and the 1949 Basic Law (Grundgesetz)”, in Emory International Law 
Review 13:1 (1999), 1–76.
17 Frieder Günther, Denken vom Staat her: Die bundesdeutsche Staatsrechtslehre zwischen Dezi-
sion und Integration 1949–1970 (Munich 2004), 192f.; Moyn, Christian Human Rights, 65–100; 
Michael D. Torre (ed.), Freedom in the Modern World: Jacques Maritain, Yves R. Simon, Mor-
timer J. Adler (Notre Dame, IN 1989).
18 On the writing of the UDHR and Malik’s role in it see Mary Ann Glendon, A World Made New: 
Eleanor Roosevelt and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (New York 2001); Johannes 
Morsink, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Origins and Intent (Philadelphia 1999); 
Antoine Prost / J. M. Winter, René Cassin and Human Rights: From the Great War to the Uni-
versal Declaration (Cambridge 2013), 237–248; see also John Nurser, For All Peoples and All 
Nations: The Ecumenical Church and Human Rights (Washington, DC 2005).
19 Moyn, Christian Human Rights, 25–64.
20 Günter Dürig, “Die Menschenauffassung des Grundgesetzes”, in Juristische Rundschau 7 
(1952), 259–263; Günter Dürig, “Der Grundrechtssatz von der Menschenwürde: Entwurf 
eines praktikablen Wertsystems der Grundrechte aus Art. 1 Abs. l in Verbindung mit Art. 19 
Abs. II des Grundgesetzes”, in Archiv des öffentlichen Rechts 81:2 (1956), 117–157. On Dürig 
see Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, “Die Würde des Menschen war unantastbar”, in Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung, 3 September 2003; Hans-Ulrich Büchting, “Günter Dürig”, in Juristen im 
Porträt: Verlag und Autoren in 4 Jahrzehnten (Munich 1988); Walter Schmitt Glaeser, “Günter 
Dürig (1920–1996)”, in Peter Häberle et al. (ed.), Staatsrechtslehrer des 20. Jahrhunderts: 
Deutschland – Österreich – Schweiz (Berlin 2015), 933–950.
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Catholics, finally, also assumed a central role in the emergent global hu- 
man rights movement – from Peter Benenson, the founder of Amnesty 
Inter national, to Jaime Castillo, the founder of the foremost human rights 
committee in the resistance to the dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet in Chile, 
from Soviet bloc dissidents like the Pole Tadeusz Mazowiecki and the Czech 
Vaclav Benda to the leaders of the People Power Revolution in the Philip-
pines and the role of Catholic Priests for Justice in the South Korean events 
of June 1987.21
What are the implications of this broad Catholic role for the rise of “human 
dignity” as one of the crucial notions of contemporary human rights dis-
courses? The most obvious aspect in this context is that, in adopting human 
rights language, the Catholic Church undertook one of the more spectacu-
lar doctrinal reversals in recent religious history. Until the Second Vatican 
Council, it was official Church teaching that the idea of universal rights – 
especially a right to religious freedom – contradicted the Catholic faith, a 
tradition going back to the Church’s reaction to the French Revolution. The 
concept of “human dignity”, however, had featured in Catholic doctrine long 
before the twentieth century. Already in the fifth century, Pope Leo I had 
called upon Christians to acknowledge their dignity.22 In the late nineteenth 
century, Pope Leo XIII wrote in his famous encyclical “On Capital and 
Labor”, Rerum novarum, that workers must not be “degraded […] with condi-
tions repugnant to their dignity as human beings”.23 Yet neither of these Popes 
saw dignity as the foundation of universal rights. Leo I’s call for Christians 
to acknowledge their dignity went along with the warning not to fall back 
into their “previous worthlessness by evil conduct”, while Leo XIII called 
upon employers to “respect in every man his dignity as a person ennobled by 
21 On Benenson, see Tom Buchanan, “ ʻThe Truth Will Set You Free:̓ The Making of Amnesty 
International”, in Journal of Contemporary History 37:4 (2002), 575–597; Stephen Hopgood, 
Keepers of the Flame: Understanding Amnesty International (Ithaca, NY 2006). On Castillo 
and Catholics in Latin America see Jan Eckel, Die Ambivalenz des Guten: Menschenrechte in 
der internationalen Politik seit den 1940ern (Göttingen 2014), 583–710; Patrick William Kelly, 
Sovereignty and Salvation: Transnational Human Rights Activism in the Americas in the Long 
1970s (Ph.D thesis, University of Chicago, IL 2015). On Polish Catholic intellectuals see Piotr 
H. Kosicki, “L̓ avènement des intellectuels catholiques: Le mensuel Więź et les conséquences 
polonaises du personanalisme mounierien”, in Vingtième Siècle 102 (2009), 31–47; Stefania 
Szlek Miller, “Catholic Personalism and Pluralist Democracy in Poland”, in Canadian Slavonic 
Papers / Revue Canadienne des Slavistes 25:3 (1983), 425–439. On Korea see Paul Y. Chang, 
Protest Dialectics: State Repression and South Korea’s Democracy Movement, 1970–1979 
(Stanford, CA 2015). See also Daniel Philpott, “The Catholic Wave”, in Journal of Democ-
racy 15:2 (2004), 32–46.
22 Quoted in Romanus Cessario, The Godly Image: Christ & Salvation in Catholic Thought From 
St. Anselm to Aquinas (Petersham, MA 1990), 124.
23 Leo XIII, Rerum novarum [Encyclical On Capital and Labor], 15 May 1891, sec. 36, http://
w2.vatican.va/content/leo-xiii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_l-xiii_enc_15051891_rerum- 
novarum.html.
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Christian character”.24 Dignity, it appears, was bound to the washing away 
of original sin through baptism, and humans could thus forfeit their dignity 
through sinful behaviour.
Well into the twentieth century, in fact, popes rejected such central human 
rights as freedom of the press or freedom of religion, demanded that Cathol-
icism be the state religion, and, while accepting that other religions could be 
tolerated, justified legal restrictions on the practice of non-Catholic denomi-
nations.25 Underlying these doctrines was the idea that restricting such rights 
protected Catholics from spiritual harm – the forfeiting of their dignity by 
accepting “erroneous” religious or even secular views. While a democratic 
Catholic politician like the later West German chancellor Konrad Adenauer 
thus had to struggle with his Church’s disapproval of democracy, the Church 
aligned itself with such notoriously repressive regimes as Franco’s Spain, 
a country whose quasi-constitution, the “Charter of the Spanish People”, 
adopted on 16 July 1945, notably defined “respect for the dignity, integrity, 
and liberty of the human person” to be one of its guiding principles.26
2. Dignity and Social Order
Unless we adopt a Whiggish view of history according to which Catholicism 
was simply pulled along by the inexorable rise of human rights, we have 
to understand the emergence of Catholic discourses on human rights and 
dignity as fundamental reconfigurations of Catholic doctrines and/or their 
underlying imaginaries of humanity and we have to explore the interaction 
between Catholic discourses on dignity and the broader evolution of human 
rights ideas in the post-war period. This section is devoted to analysing how 
the concept of dignity was incorporated into Catholic thought, whereas the 
following section assesses its impact on secular human rights discourses.
Numerous examples suggest that, using the concept of dignity, the Church 
and lay Catholics adapted as much as adopted human rights language. For all 
that Pius XII, in his Christmas address of 1942, insisted that any domestic 
order must be based on the “dignity of the human person”, he still seems 
to have understood that term very much in the fourth-century sense of 
Leo I. Current events, the pontiff argued, had shown that “social life […] 
is never nearer to losing its noblest prerogatives than when it thinks it can 
24 Cessario, Image, 124.
25 Philpott, “The Catholic Wave”, 33f.
26 Art. 1 of the “Charter of the Spanish People”, 16 July 1945, in Amos Jenkins Peaslee (ed.), 
Constitutions of nations, 3 vols (The Hague 21956), vol. III, 282–285.
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deny or forget with impunity the external source of its own dignity: God.” 
Giving “men” back their dignity, thus, meant for Pius XII to oppose their 
“dearth of solid principles and strong convictions, their surfeit of instinctive 
sensible excitement and their fickleness.” Unsurprisingly, the “fundamen-
tal personal rights” which he listed as the basis for a just social order were 
overwhelmingly rights to live a life according to Catholic views, such as 
the “right to […] religious formation and education” and to “worship God 
in private and public” as well as the “the right to marry and to achieve the 
aim of married life” and “the right to free choice of state of life, and hence, 
too, of the priesthood or religious life.” Even “the right to work” appeared 
within the context of an imaginary of humanity as divinely ordered for it was 
to be guaranteed “as the indispensable means towards the maintenance of 
family life”.27
Similar views could be found in “A Declaration of Human Rights”, a 
text which the US National Catholic Welfare Conference, the forerunner of 
today’s national conference of bishops, drafted in 1947 and submitted to the 
UN Commission on Human Rights. In many ways, to be sure, the text went 
significantly further than Pius’ Christmas address. It acknowledged a “right 
to freedom of expression of information and of communication”, freedom of 
association and assembly, and the right to form trade unions. Yet the pream-
bles which introduced the entire text and each of its sections established an 
unequivocal interpretive framework for the draft’s articles. The preamble to 
the declaration’s first part, “The Rights of the Human Person”, read: “The 
dignity of man, created in the image of God, obligates him in accordance 
with law imposed by God. Consequently, he is endowed as an individual 
and as a member of society with rights which are inalienable.” The source of 
dignity, in other words, was divine and placed humans in a social and natural 
order governed by divine law. Rights were merely a means to an end. “God, 
the Creator of the human race”, the general preamble reads, “has charged 
man with obligations arising from his personal dignity, from his immortal 
destiny, and from his relationships as a social being.” And it was for the 
“fulfilment of these obligations” that “man is endowed with certain natu-
ral, inalienable rights.” Part II of the declaration focused on the rights of the 
family which was described as “the natural and fundamental group unit of 
society” and as “endowed by the Creator with inalienable rights antecedent to 
27 All quotations are from Pius XII, The Internal Order of States and People: Christmas Message 
of 1942, https://www.ewtn.com/library/PAPALDOC/P12CH42.HTM. For the original Italian 
text see Con sempre nuova freschezza [Radio message for Christmas], 24 December 1942, 
https://w2.vatican.va/content/pius-xii/en/speeches/1942.index.html. For a contemporaneous 
German translation see “Die Weihnachtsbotschaft des Papstes vom 24. Dezember 1942”, in 
Die Friedens-Warte 43:1 (1943), 47–57.
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all positive law.” One of the rights enumerated in this section was the “right 
to the protection of maternity” and to educate one’s children.28
The Church’s two central human rights texts of the 1960s, Pacem in terris 
and Dignitatis humanae, went even further beyond the Christmas address 
of 1942 than the US bishops’ charter. Most importantly, Dignitatis humanae 
declared a general right to religious freedom–not just a right to be Catholic – 
which had “its foundation in the very dignity of the human person as this 
dignity is known through the revealed word of God and by reason itself”.29 
The declaration’s grounding of dignity and rights not only in revelation but 
also in anthropology and philosophy are probably the clearest departure from 
Pius XII and indeed the entire tradition for which he stood. This more secular 
line of argument was driven by authors who saw Dignitatis Humanae as 
more of a legal document in line with the UDHR, as Agnes de Dreuzy notes, 
a tendency begun with Pacem in terris, where John XXIII had called the 
UDHR a “step in the right direction”.30
In a sense, then, Vatican II meant a step in the direction of Rosen’s Kantian 
understanding of dignity as resulting out of human autonomy.31 Even these 
more clearly philosophical endorsements of human rights, however, could be 
used in various ways. Unsurprisingly, bishops living under atheist dictator-
ships were among the first to understand the potential of a Catholic human 
rights doctrine. Polish bishops – especially Karol Wojtyła, the later pope – 
seem to have played an important role in drafting the council’s relevant 
documents. In the 1960s, amidst a fierce conflict with Poland’s Communist 
authorities over religious education in school, the bishops devoted several 
pastoral letters to Pacem in terris, emphasising the encyclical’s support for 
individual rights and democracy. “Standing behind us”, the bishops reassured 
the faithful in 1963, “is not only the Gospel of Salvation but also the ‘Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights’ whose fifteenth anniversary the world 
will celebrate in December”.32 The very fact that the Church argued from the 
idea of individual rights, rather than its own rights as an institution, and that 
it thus accepted the idea of such rights marked nothing short of a revolution 
28 “A Declaration of Human Rights”, drafted by a committee appointed by the National Catholic 
Welfare Conference, 1947, LoC, Malik Papers, Box 76, Folder 7.
29 Dignitatis humanae, sec. 2.
30 Pacem in terris, sec. 143. Agnes de Dreuzy, “ ‘Dignitatis Humanae’ as an Encounter Between 
Two  ‘Towering Theologians’:  John Courtney Murray,  S. J.,  and Yves Congar, O.P”,  in U. S. 
Catholic Historian 24:1 (2006), 33–44, on p. 39; Bernhard Sutor, “Katholische Kirche und 
Menschenrechte: Kontinuität oder Diskontinuität in der kirchlichen Soziallehre?”, in Forum 
für osteuropäische Ideen- und Zeitgeschichte 12:1 (2008), 141–158.
31 Rosen, Dignity, 19–30.
32 “Biskupi polscy do braci kapłanów”, 28 August 1963,  in Listy pasterskie episkopatu Polski 
1945–1974 (Paris 1975) (hereafter: Listy), 296–313, on pp. 310f.; see also “Orędzie o prawie do 
nauczania religii”, 28 August 1963, in Listy, 317–320, on pp. 317f.
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in Catholic social thought.33 The Polish bishops’ focus on individual rights, 
however, went along with the insistence that Polish society was overwhelm-
ingly Catholic and that the main institution of Polish Catholics – the Church – 
therefore should be respected; in a sense, then, invoking an individual right 
to religious freedom was another way of demanding a special place for the 
Church in Polish society.34
The pontificate of John Paul II, finally, marked a certain departure from 
the anthropological approach of the 1960s. Wojtyła had helped turn the term 
“inherent dignity of the human person” into a staple of Catholic discourse in 
Poland and, through his participation the Second Vatican Council, may have 
helped place it at the centre of the Church’s social teaching. His first encyc-
lical Redemptor hominis – the programmatic statement of his papacy – was 
steeped in personalist ideas. It featured a section on human rights, describing 
them as the foundation of a just and peaceful world and lauding the U.N.’s 
attempts to guard over their implementation. The pope’s take on dignity and 
human rights, though, was more than a little ambivalent when it came to 
non-Christians. Focused on Christ as the “redeemer of man”, his first encyc-
lical developed an expressly Christian anthropology, thus departing from 
John XXIII’s Pacem in terris, which had interpreted human rights in the 
natural law tradition. Redemptor hominis, moreover, saw “man” united to the 
nation “by organic links as with a larger family”.35 John Paul II’s vision of 
the Polish nation – as his visit to Poland of 1979 made abundantly clear – was 
unabashedly Christian. To be sure, he had a more open vision of Polish his-
tory than his fellow Polish bishops, supporting ecumenism and interreligious 
dialogue and calling Catholics to tolerance and respect towards non-Catholic 
Poles. However, his sermons were part of a discourse which claimed that it 
was Christian values that inclined the Poles to welcome members of other 
faiths. Non-Catholics were thus integrated into a still firmly Catholic nar-
rative in which Polish tolerance – in itself a rather problematic claim – was 
another proof of Christ’s presence in the Polish nation.36
The ambiguities of the Polish pontiff’s message are encapsulated in a 
sermon he gave at the former German extermination camp Auschwitz- 
Birkenau – a place whose over one million victims were almost exclusively 
Jewish, an aspect John Paul II did not emphasise. He never discussed or even 
mentioned Polish anti-Semitism in his addresses, sketching instead a mar-
tyriological understanding of Polish history. Yet he did single out the Jewish 
victims of Auschwitz as a special group “intended for total extermination”. 
33 Sutor, “Katholische Kirche und Menschenrechte”. 
34 “Orędzie o prawie do nauczania religii”, 28 August 1963, in Listy, 317–320, on p. 318.
35 Redemptor hominis, sec. 17.
36 For this discourse, see esp. Brian Porter-Szűcs, Faith and Fatherland: Catholicism, Modernity, 
and Poland (New York 2011), 347–359.
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He also invoked the common descent of Christians and Jews from Abra-
ham – a core idea of the Church’s newfound rejection of anti-Semitism and 
the centrepiece of the Pope’s own efforts to foster Catholic-Jewish dialogue. 
More importantly, John Paul II interpreted Auschwitz in a way that resonated 
strongly with the values of the human rights movement. The extermination 
camp was the “Golgotha of the modern world”, he said, a place posing the 
question whether it was “enough to impose on [man] an ideology in which 
human rights are subjected to the demands of the system, completely sub-
jected to them, so as in practice not to exist at all”? Invoking two Catholic 
victims of Auschwitz – Maximillian Kolbe, a Franciscan monk who had 
sacrificed himself to save another inmate, and Edith Stein, a German-Jewish 
intellectual and convert to Catholicism37 – he said that “Where the dignity 
of man was so horribly trampled on, victory was won through faith and 
love.” For this message to bear fruit in Europe – the Pope concluded his ser-
mon – “the Declaration of Human Rights must have all its just consequences 
drawn from it”.38
How influential were these views outside of the Church? How important 
were Catholic ideas in shaping the idea of human dignity? Core ideas of the 
Catholic discourse on human rights and dignity undoubtedly played a role 
in central events in the history of human rights. In Charles Malik’s afore-
mentioned speech at one of the earlier meetings of the UNCHR, he made an 
argument echoing in many ways Pius XII’s concern about humans’ “dearth 
of solid principles and strong convictions, their surfeit of instinctive sensible 
excitement and their fickleness” and anticipating the argument of the Polish 
bishops in 1963.39 Somewhat surprisingly, given World War II and events in 
Eastern Europe, Malik claimed that the main threat to human freedom did 
not emanate from “kings and dictators” but from the “tyranny of the masses” 
which would inevitably lead to the tyranny of an all-powerful state claiming 
the complete loyalty of its citizens. Yet, Malik went on, “man” was not only 
obliged to be loyal to the state, but also to “his family, to his religion, to his 
profession; he has his loyalty to science and the truth.” To Malik, therefore, 
protecting human rights meant defending the rights of these “intermediate 
37 Both Kolbe and Stein are very controversial figures in the history of Catholic-Jewish relations. 
In Stein’s case it is primarily because she was a convert, whereas Kolbe established a veritable 
Catholic publishing empire in inter-war Poland and used the new medium of the radio. Ded-
icated to the fight with Freemasonry, these media would often feature overtly anti-Semitic 
statements. See Porter-Szűcs, Faith, 307–309, 367–369; Ronald Modras, “The Interwar Polish 
Catholic Press on the Jewish Question”, in Annals of the American Academy of Political and 
Social Sciences 548 (1996), 169–190, on pp. 181f.
38 John Paul II, “Homily During Holy Mass at the Brzezinka Concentration Camp”, 7 June 1979, 
https://w2.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/homilies/1979/documents/hf_ jp-ii_hom_ 
19790607_polonia-brzezinka.html.
39 Pius XII, Order.
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institutions” against the all-encompassing claims of the modern state.40 
Notably, Article 16.3 defining the family as the “natural and fundamental 
group unit of society” seems to go back to an initiative by Malik, who had 
unsuccessfully proposed to add to this that the “family is endowed by the 
Creator with inalienable rights antecedent to all positive law”.41
Similar ideas can be found in the writings of the German legal scholar 
Günter Dürig, the aforementioned author of an influential interpretation of 
article 1 of the West German Basic Law. The understanding of humanity 
prevalent in the Basic Law, Dürig argued in 1952, was consciously or uncon-
sciously derived from the Christian understanding of the human person, an 
understanding he saw as superior to that of the Enlightenment, in which 
humans had started to see themselves as absolute and thus either to understand 
themselves as Übermenschen or “fearfully take refuge in the collective.” 
The understanding of dignity in the Basic Law, by contrast, saw humans 
in the Christian sense as “persons” who had inalienable human rights but 
who became fully human only in serving the community and its values. The 
concept of the person, in other words, protected individuals from the state, 
but subordinated them to society, to Malik’s “intermediate institutions”.42
Running through all of these statements, whether ecclesiastical or from 
laypeople, seems to be an idea that James Chappel has interpreted as central 
to the development of twentieth-century Catholic thought. At the centre of 
Catholicism’s social imaginary was the vision “of an overlapping set of hier-
archies legitimized in the last instance by natural law, its organising principle, 
and God, its supreme leader.” What many Catholics came to realise, Chappel 
shows, is that their previous reliance on the state as the guarantor and enforcer 
of this vision was increasingly outdated in the age of mass society. Through 
democracy and with human community shattered into masses of atomised 
individuals, many Catholics came to believe, the state threatened the “natu-
ral” communities and hierarchies making up society. The task, therefore, was 
to shelter these communities from the state. The rights of human persons, in 
other words, were not meant to emancipate them, but to protect the “natural” 
social institutions, family and Church most of all, that were at the basis of 
their dignity and personhood.43
40 “More Important Speeches”, 13f., LoC, Malik Papers, Box 76, Folder 9.
41 Morsink, Universal, 254f.
42 Dürig, “Menschenauffassung”, 260f.
43 James Chappel, “The Catholic Origins of Totalitarianism Theory”, in Modern Intellectual 
History 8:3 (2011), 561–590, on p. 565; Chappel, “Leviathan”.
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3. Dignity After 1945: 
A History of Religious Conservatism?
How important were these views for human rights discourses more broadly? 
Is the post-war history of dignity thus a history of Catholic and authoritarian 
history? There are two important caveats in this respect. First, it is crucial not 
to take Catholicism’s self-image as a monolithic and hierarchical structure 
with the pope on top at face value. The main actors and authors of Catho-
lic discourses on dignity and human rights had spent the previous decades 
banned from teaching Catholic theology for their views or, as converts and 
laypeople, were outsiders in a Church in which the difference between clergy 
and laity was concomitant to the difference between baptised and non-bap-
tised.44 The latter observation is particularly true for the person who is now-
adays somewhat too easily seen as the main exponent of post-war Catholic 
thought – Jacques Maritain. As a layperson and convert from Protestantism, 
an independent-minded philosopher married to a Jew, many bishops were 
highly suspicious of Maritain. Some tried to have his ideas condemned as 
contrary to Catholic faith as late as the Second Vatican Council.45
Even before the changes of the 1960s, moreover, Catholicism was home to 
a wide variety of progressive groups and initiatives campaigning for peace 
and social justice and many Catholic human rights activists came from these 
movements. Chief among them was the lay organisation Pax Christi out of 
which two foundational figures of Amnesty International, Peter Benenson 
and Seán MacBride, would emerge.46 Others came to combine Catholic ideas 
with Marxism to create “liberation theology”.47 Catholic participation in the 
Chilean or Brazilian human rights movements seems to have evolved out of 
similar strands.48
What is more, given how seamlessly the concept of human dignity has 
been transformed from an idea placing humans in a hierarchical society 
guaranteed by a Catholic monarch into an idea protecting individual against 
the state by means of “intermediate institutions”, it is easy to overlook 
44 On this point see esp. Connelly, Enemy.
45 Yves Congar, My Journal of the Council (Collegeville, MN 2012), 37, entry from 23 January 
1961.
46 Moyn, Christian Human Rights, 22.
47 Chris Dols / Benjamin Ziemann, “Progressive Participation and Transnational Activism in the 
Catholic Church After Vatican II: The Dutch and West German Examples”, in Journal of Con-
temporary History 50:3 (2015), 465–485; E. Gerard and Gerd-Rainer Horn, Left Catholicism 
1943–1955: Catholics and Society in Western Europe at the Point of Liberation (Leuven 2001); 
Gerd-Rainer Horn, “Progressive and Conservative Religious Ideologies: The Tumultuous Dec-
ade of the 1960s”, in Politics, Religion & Ideology 12:4 (2011), 475f.; Gerd-Rainer Horn, The 
Spirit of Vatican II: Western European Progressive Catholicism in the Long Sixties (Oxford 
2015).
48 Kelly, “Sovereignty”.
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how revolutionary many of the texts of Vatican II really were.49 Many of 
these texts, Dignitatis humanae most of all, were drafted in highly conten-
tious and controversial processes, given how far they departed from ideas 
espoused only years before. One of the council’s most influential theologi-
ans, Yves Congar, was disappointed when he realised that the faithful would 
not be given any explanation for how fundamentally Dignitatis Humanae 
changed Catholic doctrine on religious freedom and individual autonomy.50 
However much the Church adapted human rights and dignity to a con-
servative imaginary of humanity, and although John Paul II developed an 
unabashedly Christian anthropology as the basis for individual rights, the 
post-war period nevertheless fundamentally transformed Catholic thought 
and doctrine.
The second caveat is that, as influential as Catholic ideas and thinkers 
seem to have been in post-war politics, just how big their impact was remains 
to be determined, and there is good reason to believe it is currently somewhat 
overestimated. Again, Maritain is an important example. He is widely seen 
as having had a major impact on the writing of the UDHR to the extent that 
he is sometimes even described as one of the text’s authors.51 In fact, though, 
it is very difficult to find evidence for this presumed influence. He and the 
UNCHR’s René Cassin were  in  contact with  one  another,  but mostly  this 
seems to have concerned questions of the university in exile, whose dean 
Maritain was during World War II.52 Neither the Jacques Maritain Papers at 
the University of Notre Dame nor those of Charles Malik at the Library of 
Congress contain any evidence that the two philosopher exchanged views, or 
even only personally knew each other.53 Maritain’s only discernible impact 
on the commission’s work was that he presided over a UNESCO-appointed 
committee of philosophers who were to discuss the fundaments of human 
rights. Yet rather than steering the committee towards Catholic ideas, 
Maritain’s contribution seems to have been to argue that the members’ dif-
ferent views on the foundations of human rights did not keep them from 
working towards their practical realisation. The members of the committee 
agreed on human rights, Maritain quipped in the introduction, but only on 
49 Sutor, “Katholische Kirche und Menschenrechte”.
50 Dreuzy, “Dignitatis”, 39f.
51 Woodcock, “Maritain”.
52 See, for instance, Letter from Jacques Maritain to René Cassin, dated 30 June 1942, University 
of Notre Dame, Jacques Maritain Center, Jacques Maritain Papers, Box 17, Folder 1. See also 
Prost and Winter, René Cassin, 163.
53 Maritain’s name does not even feature in Malik’s extensive correspondence archived in the 
Library of Congress. See Charles Habib Malik Papers: A Finding Aid to the Collection in the 
Library of Congress, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Washington, DC, 2010, http://
rs5.loc.gov/service/mss/eadxmlmss/eadpdfmss/2011/ms011018.pdf.
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the condition that no one asked them why.54 What role the findings of the 
committee played for the work of the commission is difficult to assess. What 
seems rather clear, though, is that to many of the commission’s members, 
Malik’s philosophical lectures were something of a nuisance. As important as 
he was for drafting the Declaration’s preamble, moreover, authors of different 
philosophical views such as René Cassin, Eleanor Roosevelt, John Humphrey 
and P. C. Chang shaped the entire text.55
When it comes to the Federal Republic it is true that, due to the division 
of Germany, Catholics made up about half the West German population and 
they may have had a disproportionate influence due to the dominant role 
of Christian Democracy. But while Dürig’s Christian interpretation of the 
Basic Law may thus have resonated strongly with many of his compatriots, 
his main contribution to German legal thought – the so-called Objektfor-
mel – was not to provide a substantial definition of dignity but to describe it 
negatively. Human dignity was violated, Dürig argued, whenever a human 
being was degraded to being a mere object or means for something else. The 
West German constitutional court, moreover, did not apply this definition 
consistently, and Dürig himself was always denied his greatest ambition – to 
become a judge on the constitutional court himself.56 Contrary to his views, 
moreover, it seems that the reference to dignity in the Basic Law was not 
religious. Shaped primarily by secular members of the parliamentary coun-
cil, especially Theodor Heuss and Carlo Schmid, dignity was understood as 
humans’ “internal liberty”, which individual rights protected from intrusion 
by the state, as the legal historian Christoph Goos has shown.57
If post-war human rights discourses were never as clearly shaped by 
Catholic ideas as it may seem, it is worth asking whether Catholic ideas 
became as completely irrelevant in later decades as the decay of European 
Catholicism would suggest. Catholics, as noted above, played a central role 
in many processes of the 1970s human rights revolution, and whether these 
groups brought religious ideas into human rights discourses, where they 
survived in a secular form, could be a fascinating idea for future research.58
54 Jacques Maritain, “Introduction”, in UNESCO, Human Rights: Comments and Interpretations, 
UNESCO/PHS/3(rev.), Paris, 25 July 1948, I–IX, on p. I.
55 See, for instance, Glendon, World, 39f. For the various sources on which the commission drew 
see also the Memorandum by the UN Secretariat “Textual Comparison of the Proposed Drafts 
of an International Bill of Rights Proposed by Private Individuals”, not dated, LoC, Malik 
Papers, Box 76, Folder 7.
56 Will, “Bedeutung”; Gunther Rojahn, Elfes – Mehr als ein Urteil: Aufladung und Entladung 
eines Politikums (Diss., Freie Universität Berlin, 2009).
57 Christoph Goos, Innere Freiheit: Eine Rekonstruktion des grundgesetzlichen Würdebegriffs 
(Göttingen 2011).
58 For a fascinating view of Amnesty International as a secular church see Hopgood, Keepers.
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4. Conclusion
The idea that all human beings have an inherent dignity, an intrinsic value 
derived from their autonomy and equality, is central to contemporary notions 
of humanity. Yet, as I hope this sketch has shown, the emergence of this 
notion evolved along crooked paths and was propelled by surprising and 
highly contingent developments. As such, it reflects the larger conceptual 
history of “humanity” as a notion that constantly evolves, is redefined, and – 
being a source of moral authority and political legitimacy – is also frequently 
contested.
The contemporary history of Catholicism as one of the main discourses to 
combine dignity and individual rights reflects this aspect of dignity, rights, 
and humanity as evolving and contested notions in two ways. First, it shows 
how that a category which we now associate with the Enlightenment belief in 
the rationality of human beings emerged, among others, thanks to a discourse 
revolving out of a deep seated scepticism about humanity In Encyclicals and 
the writings of Catholic philosophers, a life in dignity meant that individuals 
assumed their proper place within a hierarchy of “intermediate institutions”, 
whereas human rights were meant to protect these institutions and allow 
individuals to fulfil their obligations towards them and to God. As Malik’s 
warning against the “tyranny of the masses” showed, then, the belief in 
human rights and dignity could just as well evolve out of a fear of destructive 
tendencies inherent in humanity as out of a belief in the rationality and moral 
autonomy of human beings.
But even as we reconstruct this discourse on human dignity and acknowl-
edge its influence it would go too far to argue that the conceptual history of 
human dignity is a history of how authoritarian ideas were secretly snuck 
into contemporary human rights discourses. The second way in which the 
history of Catholicism reflects how contested and fluent notions of dignity 
and humanity remained concerns Catholicism itself. Highly controversial 
and driven by a diverse group of actors, many of whom were former outsid-
ers and dissidents, the emergence of Catholic discourses on dignity evolved 
along paths that were just as crooked as those of secular developments. Most 
importantly, Catholic support for the right to religious freedom directly con-
tradicted Church teaching before the 1960s. As much as the Church adapted 
human rights discourses to its imaginaries of humanity, therefore, it also 
transformed itself fundamentally in the process, thus opening up a space on 
which diverse groups could take central Catholic notions such as justice into 
new directions. To what extent the work of these groups left religious sedi-
ments in contemporary discourses on dignity and human rights is an exciting 
question for future research on the history of both dignity and humanity.
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Thomas Weller
Humanitarianism Before Humanitarianism?
Spanish Discourses on Slavery From the 
Sixteenth to the Nineteenth Century
1. Antislavery and the Humanitarian Big Bang Theory
The abolitionist movement initiated by Anglo-American Quakers and 
Evangelicals in the closing decades of the eighteenth century is gener-
ally considered the first humanitarian movement in history. According to 
Michael Barnett, the unprecedented public concern over the suffering of 
distant others and – even more startling – the European enslavement of black 
Africans, was an “historic breaching of established categories of humanity”.1 
Based on a “revolution in moral sentiments” and the “emergence of a culture 
of compassion”, for the first time in history humanitarian concerns led to 
a mass movement that finally forced the British government to abolish the 
slave trade. Thus, antislavery constitutes a core element of what Barnett calls 
the “humanitarian big bang”.2
No one who has ever researched the history of humanitarianism would 
seriously deny the pivotal role of Anglo-American abolitionism.3 As 
Abigail Green has pointed out in a recent article, however, “it is striking 
how much work deals in practice either with Britain and the United States 
or with Protestant Christianity, without reflecting seriously this bias”. As 
a consequence, Green pleads for a consideration of “different humanitarian 
traditions” that “evolved in different national, religious and imperial cul-
tures”.4 This chapter aims to investigate one of these traditions. One might 
1 Michael Barnett, Empire of Humanity. A History of Humanitarianism (Ithaca, NY 2011), 57. – 
I would like to thank my colleagues at the IEG and the participants of the conference “Human-
ity – A History of European Concepts in Practice” for their fruitful comments on my paper. 
Special thanks go to Austin Glatthorn whose careful reading helped to improve this chapter 
considerably not only with regard to language and style.
2 Ibid., 49–56. For the importance of empathy and emotions in the formation of humanitarian 
ideas see also Lynn Hunt, Inventing Human Rights. A History (New York 2007), 35–69.
3 For a general overview see Seymour Drescher, Abolition. A History of Slavery and Antislavery 
(Cambridge 2009); Christopher Leslie Brown, Moral Capital. Foundations of British Aboli-
tionism (Chapel Hill, NC 2006); John R. Oldfield, Popular Politics and British Anti-Slavery. 
The Mobilisation of Public Opinion Against the Slave Trade, 1787–1807 (London 1998); David 
Turley, The Culture of English Antislavery, 1780–1860 (London 1991).
4 Abigail Green, “Humanitarianism in Nineteenth-century Context. Religious, Gendered, 
National”, in The Historical Journal 57 (2014), 1157–1175, on p. 1169.
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wonder whether the phrase “humanitarianism before humanitarianism” is 
appropriate to describe the phenomenon that will be discussed in the pages 
to follow (thus explaining the question mark in the title). Nevertheless, before 
the so-called “humanitarian big bang”, Europe’s moral universe was any-
thing but empty. Within Spain’s colonial empire, theologians, jurists and 
missionaries questioned the legitimacy of enslaving Africans as early as 
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Some of these authors even went 
beyond the early nineteenth-century abolitionists’ cry to end the slave trade. 
This chapter analyses the arguments and narratives of these early Spanish 
antislavery writings as well as their conceptual framework, paying special 
attention to the changing semantics of humanity.
2. How to Translate Wilberforce Into Spanish?
Interestingly enough, none other than William Wilberforce, one of the lead-
ing figures of British abolitionism, was perfectly aware – or at least had an 
idea – of this earlier antislavery tradition. In 1810, Wilberforce wrote to the 
British Foreign Minister, Lord Richard Wellesley, to ask for his assistance in 
launching an abolitionist campaign in Spain. To this end, Wilberforce wanted 
one of his texts to be translated into Spanish. For this task, he had in mind 
a Spanish exile who had recently arrived in London and was in close con-
tact with the British Foreign Office and the African Institution.5 José María 
Blanco y Crespo, or Joseph Blanco White as he called himself upon his arrival 
in England, was descended from an Irish merchant family in Seville and thus 
moved with certain facility between the English and Spanish languages. He 
was also an ordained Catholic priest, although he converted to Anglicanism 
5 Christopher Schmidt-Nowara, “Wilberforce Spanished. Joseph Blanco White and Spanish 
Antislavery, 1808–1814”, in id. / Josep M. Fradera (ed.), Slavery and Antislavery in Spain’s 
Atlantic Empire (New York 2013), 158–175. See also id., “Bartolomé de las Casas and the 
Slave Trade to Cuba circa 1820”, in Matthew Brown / Gabriel Paquette (ed.), Connections After 
Colonialism. Europe and Latin America in the 1820s (Tuscaloosa, AL 2013), 236–249; Manuel 
Moreno Alonso, La forja del liberalismo en España. Los amigos españoles de Lord Holland, 
1793–1840 (Madrid 1997). On Blanco White and antislavery see also André Pons, “Blanco 
White, abolicionista (1)”, in Cuadernos hispanoamericanos 559 (January 1997), 63–70; 
“Blanco White, abolicionista (2)”, in Cuadernos hispanoamericanos 560 (February 1997), 
29–38; “Blanco White, abolicionista (3)”, in Cuadernos hispanoamericanos 565–566 (July–
August 1997), 143–158; Emily Berquist, “Early Antislavery Sentiment in the Spanish Atlan-
tic World, 1765–1817”, in Slavery and Abolition 31:2 (2010), 181–205; Joselyn M. Almeida, 
Reimagining the Transatlantic, 1780–1890 (Burlington, VT 2011), ch. 3; id., “Joseph (José) 
Blanco White’s Bosquexo del comercio en esclavos. British Abolition, Translation, and the 
Cosmopolitan Imagination”, in Bulletin for Spanish and Portuguese Historical Studies 37:2 
(2012), http://digitalcommons.asphs.net/bsphs/vol37/iss2/3.
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in 1812 and later embraced Unitarianism.6 Thus, to Wilberforce, Blanco 
White seemed an ideal translator of his texts not only for linguistic reasons. 
He hoped that the Spanish theologian might add some ideas borrowed from 
Spanish authors of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries that would be 
likely to convince Spanish clergymen of the abolitionist cause:
It has occurred to me as worthy of Consideration whether, as Bartholomew (the Early 
Conveyor if not the first Spanish originator of the Sla[ve] Trade) de la[s] Casas, pleaded 
however the Cause of the Blacks, there might not be found in his Writings or those of 
some other of the Spanish divines passages likely to have weight with the Ecclesiastics 
of the Country. Y[ou]r Lordship knows, whether Mr. White is likely to be at all versed 
in Spanish Literature, especially in ecclesiastical.7
We do not know how familiar Blanco White really was with Spanish 
“ecclesiastical literature”. His writings do not contain explicit references 
to any sixteenth- or seventeenth-century authors. Some passages, however, 
reveal a certain familiarity with Lascasian thought. One of the closest friends 
of Blanco White in London was the Mexican Dominican friar Servando 
Teresa de Mier, a great admirer of Las Casas.8 It is very likely that Mier, 
who edited Las Casas’ Brevísima Relación de la Destrucción de las Indias in 
1812, acquainted Blanco White with the Dominican’s oeuvre.9
At first glance, though, Blanco Whites’s abolitionist pamphlet, entitled 
Bosquexo del comercio en Esclavos (1814), owes much more to contempo-
rary English antislavery writings than to Spanish sources. In the opening 
pages, one can find the famous illustrations of the overloaded slave ship 
Brookes, first published in Plymouth in 1788 and reissued one year later 
in London by Thomas Clarkson on behalf of the Society for Effecting the 
Abolition of the Slave Trade.10 Large parts of Blanco White’s Bosquexo are 
in fact a direct translation of William Wilberforce’s Letter on the Abolition 
of the Slave Trade (1807).11 Another important source for Blanco White was 
6 Only two years after his conversion, Blanco White became an Anglican minister. In 1835 he 
left the Church of England and declared himself Unitarian. For Blanco’s biography see Martin 
Murphy, Blanco White. Self-Banished Spaniard (London 1989); Francisco Durán López, José 
María Blanco White o la conciencia errante (Sevilla 2005).
7 Wilberforce to Lord Wellesley, August 1, 1810, The National Archives, FO 72/104, fol. 1v; see 
also Schmidt-Nowara, “Wilberforce Spanished”, 160.
8 Begoña Pulido Herráez, “Fray Bartolomé de las Casas en la obra y el pensamiento de Fray 
Servando Teresa de Mier”, in Historia Mexicana 2 (2011), 429–475.
9 Pons, “Blanco White, abolicionista (3)”, 148. 
10 Plan and Sections of a Slave Ship, London 1789; for the history of this print see Marcus Rediker, 
The Slave Ship. A Human History (New York 2007), 308–342.
11 William Wilberforce, A Letter on the Abolition of the Slave Trade; Addressed to the Freehold-
ers and Other Inhabitants of Yorkshire (London 1807).
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Mungo Park’s bestseller Travels in the interior districts of Africa, which 
first appeared in 1799.12 At the request of the African Institution, Blanco 
White had translated and published fragments of both texts between 1811 
and 1813 in the liberal periodical El Español.13 Notwithstanding, Blanco 
White’s Bosquexo was more than just a compilation of his former transla-
tions of Wilberforce and Park. In view of the obvious differences between 
the British and Spanish public, it became necessary to alter the original texts 
“very considerably – indeed almost to compose a new work”.14 Thus, large 
parts of the text constitute a polemical response to a proslavery pamphlet that 
the influential Cuban planter Francisco Arango y Parreño had presented to 
the Spanish constitutional assembly of Cádiz in 1811.15
Regardless of the necessary adaptations of Blanco White’s sources, it is 
not surprising that his text is impregnated with the “humanitarian narrative”, 
characteristic of contemporary abolitionist writings.16 The author’s starting 
point is the supposed equality of all human beings, including the inhabitants 
of other continents and remote parts of the world. According to Blanco White, 
their “natural affections and sensations were absolutely equal” to those of 
Europeans.17 From this basic assumption Blanco White, like other abolition-
ists, appeals directly to the readers’ sensibility, empathy and compassion for 
the oppressed Africans:
If there is something inside of them equal to our sentiments, if they do not belong to 
another species, if they feel and think like Europeans, they offer a picture of pain and 
misery that scares our imagination. Yet, can there be the slightest doubt? If we hear 
the howl of a suffering animal, we cannot avoid feeling some sort of sympathy and 
pain, some kind of powerful motion that tells us that there is an analogy between the 
12 Mungo Park, Travels in the Interior Districts of Africa (1799), ed. by Kate. F. Marsters (Durham, 
NC 2000). On the influence of Park’s and other African explorers’ writings on the antislavery 
movement see Deirdre Coleman, Romantic Colonization and British Anti-Slavery (Cambridge 
2005), 20–22.
13 Pons, “Blanco White, abolicionista (1)”, 65f.
14 Report of the Committee of the African Institution 8 (1814), 21, quoted in Schmidt-Nowara, 
“Wilberforce Spanished”, 172.
15 Francisco Arango y Parreño, “Representación de la ciudad de la Habana a las Cortes el 20 de 
julio de 1811, con motivo de las proposiciones hechas por D. Guridi Alcocer y D. Agustín de 
Argüelles, sobre el tráfico y la esclavitud de los negros”, in Hortensia Pichardo Viñals (ed.), 
Documentos para la historia de Cuba (Habana 1973), vol. 1, 240–270. See Schmidt-Nowara, 
“Wilberforce Spanished”, 164–169; Pons, “Blanco White, abolicionista (1)”, 67–69.
16 Thomas Laqueur, “Bodies, Details, and the Humanitarian Narrative”, in Lynn Hunt (ed.), The 
New Cultural History (Berkeley, CA 1989), 176–204.
17 “Los afectos y sensaciones características de la naturaleza son absolutamente iguales en unos 
y otros [sc. africanos y europeos]”, Blanco White, Bosquexo, 29.
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creature’s pain and ours. And when we see the tears of these black slaves, victims of 
European greed, how can it be that any further argument is necessary to prove that 
their affliction is as bitter as ours.18
Like many other abolitionist writers – as Lynn Festa has observed – Blanco 
White slips “almost indiscernibly between the two primary senses the word 
[humanity] possessed during the period: humanity as shared species category 
and humanity as sympathy or benevolence”.19
These men, women, and children to whom we are linked by an undeniable kinship of 
humanity, are victims of a cruelty that would move us if we heard that it was commit-
ted toward beasts. The history [of this cruelty] cannot be read without tears, but these 
tears are demanded by humanity.20
The two principal meanings of the Spanish word humanidad can be found 
as early as in Sebastián de Covarrubias’ Tesoro de la lengua castellana, 
the first Spanish dictionary, published in 1611 (the first printed dictionary 
of a European language). Covarrubias defines “humanity” (humanidad) as 
“human nature” (la mesma naturaleza humana) and “kindness and polite-
ness” (benignidad y cortesia).21 This indicates that the semantics of humanity 
employed by Blanco White are not as new as it may seem at first glance. 
In two passages of his text, however, Blanco White uses the term in an 
eye-catchingly modern way, condemning the slave trade as a “crime against 
humanity” (delito contra la humanidad).22 It is remarkable that Blanco White 
should use this concept, albeit in a moral rather than a legal sense, bearing 
18 “[…] Si hay algo en ellos semejante a lo que nosotros sentimos: si no pertencen a otra especie, 
si sienten y piensan como los Europeos; presentan un cuadro de dolor y miseria de que la 
imaginación se atemoriza. Pero ¿es possible que quepa la duda más pequeña en esto? – Al 
escuchar los ahullidos de un animal que sufre, no podemos dexar de sentir cierto dolor de sym-
patia, cierto movimiento poderoso que nos dice que hay analogia entre su dolor y el nuestro; 
y al ver correr las lágrimas de esos esclavos, de esas víctimas de la codicia Europea, ha de ser 
preciso recurrir a argumentos para probar que la aflicción que se las hace verter es tan amarga 
como la nuestra!” Ibid., 22f.
19 Lynn Festa, “Humanity Without Feathers”, in Humanity 1:1 (2010), 3–27, on p. 7.
20 “[…] esos hombres, mugeres, y niños con quienes un innegable parentezco de humanidad 
nos enlaza; son víctimas de una crueldad que las [sic] estremeceria si la oyeran referir como 
executada en bestias. La historia […] no se podra leer sin lágrimas. Pero la humanidad las 
exige”, Blanco White, Bosquexo, 48 [italics mine – TW].
21 Sebastián de Covarrubias Orozco, Tesoro de la lengua castellana o española (Madrid 1611), 
fol. 482v.
22 “¿Se puede continuar este tráfico, sin quebrantar las leyes de la moral y sin cometer un grave 
delito contra la humanidad?”, Blanco White, Bosquexo, 72. “[…] para que las Cortes tengan 
compasion de la Havana y le concedan el privilegio de colmar la medida de sus delitos contra 
la humanidad.” Ibid., 94.
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in mind that this very term would become a key concept of international law 
more than a century later.23
3. The Spanish Tradition of Antislavery
The arguments put forward by Blanco White against the Atlantic slave trade 
were not completely new. His principal assertion, that Africans did not dif-
fer in “rationality and humanity” (racionalidad y humanidad)24 from other 
humans, clearly recalls the famous sixteenth-century debate between Las 
Casas and Ginés de Sepúlveda over the “humanity” of the native Americans.25 
It is true that the advocate of the indios once had proposed the introduction of 
African slaves to the West Indies instead of turning to native manpower. Yet, 
Las Casas was by no means the architect of the Atlantic slave trade and, what 
is more, in his later writings, he regretted bitterly his former proposal and 
ultimately rejected the enslavement of native Africans for the same reasons 
he had advanced in favour of the indios.26
Las Casas was not the only Spanish-speaking author who criticised the 
African slave trade. Other sixteenth-century theologians and jurists, such 
as the Dominican Tomás de Mercado, the Mexican professor of civil law 
Bartolomé Frías de Albornoz, and the Jesuit Luis de Molina also questioned 
the European right to enslave Africans and considered participation in the 
slave trade a sin.27 Tomás de Mercado’s Suma de tratos y contratos (1571) 
23 See the contribution by Kerstin von Lingen, “Fulfilling the Martens Clause: Debating ‘Crimes 
Against Humanity’, 1899–1945”, in this volume. In spite of the extensive research dedicated to 
this topic, most authors do not seem overly concerned with the historical roots of the concept. 
See Daniel Marc Segesser, “Die historischen Wurzeln des Begriffs ‘Verbrechen gegen die 
Menschlichkeit’ ”, in Jahrbuch für juristische Zeitgeschichte 8 (2006 / 2007), 75–101.
24 “Los negros no ceden en racionalidad y humanidad a los demás hombres”, Blanco White, 
Bosquexo, 25.
25 See the chapter by Mariano Delgado, “ ‘All People have Reason and Free Will’: The Contro-
versy Over the Nature of the Indians in the Sixteenth Century”, in this volume.
26 Lawrence Clayton, “Bartolomé de las Casas and the African Slave Trade”, in History Compass 7 
(2009), 1526–1541; Isacio Pérez Fernández, Fray Bartolomé de las Casas, O. P. De defensor 
de los indios a defensor de los negros. Su intervención en los orígenes de la deportación de 
esclavos negros a América y su denuncia de la previa esclavización en África (Salamanca 
1995); Jürgen von Stackelberg, “ ‘Primero el c1erigo Casas …’ Zur Legende vom ‘Apostel der 
Indios’ als Initiator des Negersklavenhandels”, in Iberoromania 13 (1981), 30–46.
27 Liliana Obregón, “Spanish Colonial Critiques of African Enslavement”, in Beyond Law 8 
(2001), 41–66; José Andrés-Gallego / Jesús María García Añoveros, La iglesia y la esclavitud 
de los negros (Pamplona 2002); Jesús María García Añoveros, El pensamiento y los argumen-
tos sobre la esclavitud en Europa en el siglo XVI y su aplicación a los indios americanos y 
a los negros africanos (Madrid 2000); Javier Laviña, “La iglesia ante la esclavitud, jesuitas 
y dominicos”, in Gabriela Dalla Corte et al. (ed.), Homogeneidad, diferencia y exclusión en 
América. X Encuentro-Debate América Latina ayer y hoy (Barcelona 2006), 355–364; Miguel 
Anxo Pena González, “Aportación antiesclavista en tierrras de Indias, a fines del siglo XVII”, 
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was one of the most popular merchant guide books (artes mercatoria) written 
in Spanish. One of the book’s chapters was explicitly dedicated to the slave 
trade in Cape Verde. Casting doubt on the moral legitimacy of purchasing 
Africans, the Dominican concluded that the only way merchants could avoid 
sinning was to abstain from participating in the slave trade.28 In his book 
Arte de los contractos (1573), Bartolomé Frías de Albornóz – who was a 
secular jurist and not a cleric as it is sometimes stated29 – propounded a 
similar argument. Albornoz went one step further even than his predeces-
sor in questioning some of the principal justifications for slavery that were 
generally accepted by most contemporary authors, including Mercado whose 
work Albornoz had read.30 In the first volume of De iustitia et iure (1593), 
the renowned Jesuit jurist and theologian Luis de Molina also dealt with the 
problem of African slavery.31 In contrast to Albornoz, Molina reaffirmed 
that slavery was generally legitimate, provided that Africans were enslaved 
always with just cause. Over a period of several years during which he taught 
at a number of Portuguese universities, however, Molina had obtained first-
hand information about the trade. Therefore, he knew only too well that the 
vast majority of Africans that Portuguese traders purchased on the West 
African coast had been unjustly enslaved. Accordingly, the Jesuit shared the 
opinion of other authors who stated that Christians were entitled neither to 
buy nor to resell these Africans as slaves. Anyone who did so committed a 
sin so grave that he was liable to be condemned for eternity. Surprisingly, 
though, Molina made one significant exception to this general rule: since 
most American slaveholders were not able to determine the origin of their 
in Ildefonso Murillo (ed.), El pensamiento hispánico en América. Siglos XVI–XX (Salamanca 
2007), 489–530.
28 Tomás de Mercado, Suma de tratos y contratos, ed. by Nicolás Sánchez-Albornoz (Madrid 
1977), lib. 2, cap. XXI, 230–239. See Obregón, “Spanish colonial Critiques”, 49–52; 
Andrés-Gallego / García Añoveros, La iglesia, 35f.
29 See for example Obregón, “Spanish Colonial Critiques”, 52, who refers to him as a “Spanish 
Dominican priest”. Albornoz was originally from Talavera de la Reina, studied law in Osuna 
and later became the first professor of civil law at the University of Mexico. See García 
Añoveros, “Bartolomé Frías de Albornoz”, 531–570; Bernardo Alonso Rodríguez, “El Doctor 
Bartolomé Frías de Albornoz, primer catedrático de Instuta en la Universidad de México”, in 
Justo García Sánchez et al. (ed.), Estudios jurídicos in memoriam del profesor Alfredo Calonge, 
vol. 1 (Mexico City 2002), 43–59.
30 Bartolomé Frías de Albornoz, Arte de los contratos (Valencia 1573), lib. III, tit. IV, f. 130v–131r. 
See Obregón, 52f.; Andrés-Gallego / García Añoveros, Iglesia, 37–39; Jesús María García 
Añoveros, “Bartolomé Frías de Albornoz”, 547–562.
31 Pedro de Molina, De Iustitia et Iure, 6 vols (Mainz 1659), vol. 1, tract. ii, disp. 32–36; see 
Andrés-Gallego / García Añoveros, Iglesia, 46–53; Jesús María García Añoveros, “Luis de 
Molina y la esclavitud de los negros africanos en el siglo XVI. Principios doctrinales y conclu-
siones”, in Revista de Indias 60:219 (2000), 307–329; Matthias Kauffmann, “Slavery Between 
Law, Morality, and Economy”, in id. / Alexander Aichele (ed.), A Companion to Luis de Molina 
(Leiden 2014), 183–225. 
Open-Access-Publikation im Sinne der CC-Lizenz BY-NC-ND 4.0
158 Thomas Weller
slaves or the circumstances under which they had been taken into captivity, 
they owned them in “good faith”. Thus, they were free from guilt and could 
continue using slave labor without repentance.32
None of the aforementioned authors questioned the institution of slavery 
as such. The whole debate was over the question of whether native Africans 
were enslaved with “just cause” according to Canon Law and the Thomist 
tradition. To almost all sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Spanish authors, 
this was undoubtedly the case when non-Christians were captured in a 
“just war” or when they were condemned to slavery by a political authority 
for committing a crime. Notwithstanding, even those authors who either 
affirmed the legitimacy of the African slave trade on this basis or accepted 
slavery as a means of evangelisation, like the seventeenth-century Jesuit mis-
sionary Alonso de Sandoval, repeatedly denounced the inhuman treatment of 
African slaves by their Christian masters.33
Since slavery was generally accepted as a centuries-old institution legiti-
mised by undoubted authorities, only very few contemporary writers dared 
to raise their voice against the powerful apparatus that kept slavery in the 
Atlantic running for centuries. A rather extraordinary case was that of the 
two Capuchin friars Francisco José de Jaca from Aragón and Epifanio de 
Moirans (Epiphane de Moirans) from the small village of Moirans en Mon-
tagne in the Franche Comté (a part of Burgundy that belonged to the Spanish 
Monarchy until 1678). Both had travelled as missionaries to the Caribbean 
in the late 1670s. Jaca had exercised his ministry since 1678 in the district 
of Cartagena de Indias (today Colombia) and came to Havana in 1681. There 
he met his fellow Capuchin friar Epifanio de Moirans who had spent several 
years in Cayenne, the isle of Martinique and the province of Cumaná (in what 
is now Venezuela).34
Both men had independently come to the conclusion that the enslave-
ment of Africans was unjust and sinful. From their pulpits, they began to 
preach against slavery and demand that slave owners free their slaves and 
compensate them economically for their work. They also refused to hear 
slave masters’ confessions and absolve them of their sins, a strategy that Las 
32 De Molina, De Iustitia, vol. 1, tract. ii, disp. 36, no. 1f.
33 Alonso de Sandoval, Naturaleza, policía sagrada i profana, costumbres i ritos, disciplina i 
catechismo evangélico de todods los etíopes (Sevilla 1627), lib. 2, cap. 2–4, fol. 132v–143v; 
see Obregón, “Spanish Colonial Critiques”, 55f.; Andrés-Gallego / García Añoveros, 
Iglesia, 55–61, 161–166.
34 José Tomás López García, Dos defensores de los esclavos negros en el siglo XVII (Caracas 
1982); Miguel Anxo Pena, Francisco José de Jaca. La primera propuesta abolicionista de 
la esclavitud en el pensamiento hispano (Salamanca 2003); Christoph Krauss, Epifanio de 
Moirans OFM Cap. und sein Kampf gegen die Sklaverei. Ein Frühaufklärer auf Kuba (Saar-
brücken 2009); Louis Sala-Molins, Esclavage réparation. Les lumières des capucins et les 
lueurs des pharisiens (Paris 2014).
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Casas had recommended and practised against Spanish encomenderos more 
than a century earlier.35 Not surprisingly, the two Capuchins’ struggle for the 
emancipation of slaves incited great controversy in Cuba’s colonial society. 
The two friars were denounced to the authorities, put under arrest, and sent 
back to Spain in 1682. Meanwhile, each of them had started to write down 
their arguments against slavery. The result was two extremely remarkable 
texts, which constitute the most radical criticism of slavery before the rise of 
modern abolitionism.36
The texts are very different in language, structure and style. Moirans’ 
treatise, Servi liberi seu naturalis mancipiorum libertatis iusta defensio, 
is well-organised and much more eloquent than Jaca’s Resolución sobre la 
libertad de los negros, which was written in the vernacular. Nevertheless, 
both authors’ arguments were similar and they arrived at the same con-
clusions. By referring to earlier authors like Domingo de Soto, Tomás de 
Mercado, Luis de Molina, Diego Avendaño and others, Jaca and Moirans 
tried to demonstrate that all men were free by nature and that the enslave-
ment of Africans was against natural law, divine law, and the law of nations 
(ius gentium). They refuted one by one arguments previously voiced in favour 
of slavery in the New World. Finally, they requested the immediate liberation 
and economic compensation of all enslaved Africans (which they based on 
St. Thomas’ doctrine of restitution) as the only means of redeeming, at least 
partly, the terrible sins committed by those who participated directly or indi-
rectly in the trade.
35 Helen R. Parish / Harold E. Weidman, Las Casas en Mexico. Historia y obras desconocidas 
(Mexico City 1992), 57–62, 71f.; Lino Gómez Cañedo, “Aspectos característicos de la acción 
Franciscana en América”, in Archivo Ibero-Americano 48:189–192 (1988), 441–472; Jesús 
Antonio de la Torre Rangel, “Confesionarios. Uso del derecho canónico a favor de los Indios”, 
in Memoria del X congreso del Instituto Internacional de Historia del Derecho Indiano, vol. 2 
(Mexico City 1995), 1657–1674. On this practice in other parts oft he Spanish empire see 
Guillermo Lohmann Villena, “La restitución por conquistadores y encomenderos. Un aspecto 
de la incidencia lascasiana en el Perú”, in Anuario de Estudios Americanos 23 (1966); Pedro 
Borges, “Posturas de los misioneros ante la duda indiana”, in Corpus Hispanorum de Pace 25 
(1984), 597–630; Ángel Losada, “Diego de Avendaño S.I. moralista y jurista, defensor de la 
dignidad humana de indios y negros en América”, in Missionalia Hispanica 39:115 (1982), 1–18.
36 Epifanio de Moirans, Siervos libres. Una propuesta antiesclavista a finales del siglo XVII. 
Edición crítica por Miguel Anxo Pena González (Madrid 2007); id., A Just Defense of the 
Natural Freedom of Slaves. All Slaves should be free. A critical edition and translation of 
Servi liberi seu naturalis mancipiorum libertatis iusta defensio, ed. and trans. by Edward R. 
Sunshine (Lewiston, NY 2007); Francisco José de Jaca, Resolución sobre la esclavitud de 
los negros y sus originarios en estado paganos y después ya cristianos. La primera condena 
de la esclavitud en el pensamiento hispano. Edición crítica por Miguel Anxo Pena González 
(Madrid 2002); a first edition by López García, Dos defensores, 69–176. 
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One may wonder why these two authors came to such a radical conclusion, 
considering that they were mainly reiterating and reaffirming the arguments 
of previous texts. As in Las Casas’ case, their personal experience as mis-
sionaries played a definitive and decisive role. It is noteworthy that both 
authors started by preaching and taking action against the practice of slavery 
and only then began to write down their arguments. Although both of them 
employed the traditional form of the learned treatise, they used their own 
experiences as eyewitnesses to support their argument. Moirans stressed this 
right from the start:
I have seen heard, tested, and confirmed by experience the wrongs done to slaves and 
the practice of injustices, oppressions, cruelties, inhumanities, and impieties of such 
a great number and enormity that barbarians or Scythians – not to mention Chris-
tians or religious – would be stunned to know or hear a part of what I have seen with 
my own eyes, heard with my own ears, and touched with my own hands in the West 
Indies.37
Jaca appealed to his readers’ practical sense of humanity in the same manner. 
No further arguments were necessary to condemn slavery, “if one looked 
with clear and Christian eyes at the baby boys and baby girls, [as] I have 
seen, being brought to America […] like dogs, cats and sheep condemned 
to the scaffold of slavery without any more guilt than original sin”.38 The 
unfortunate fate of slave children provided the most telling example for Jaca’s 
principal assertion that all Africans were unjustly enslaved.39 By evoking the 
image of innocent babies condemned to the martyrdom of slavery, however, 
Jaca also aimed to arouse readers’ empathy and compassion.40 What rendered 
this strategy even more effective was the metaphorical comparison of human 
offspring with animals. This was more than just a rhetorical device, since the 
animalisation of African slaves, in word and deed, was right at the heart of 
37 “Visis, auditis, probatis, experientia compertis factis erga manicipia iniuriis, iniustiis, oppres-
sionibus, crudelitatibus, inhumanitatibus exercitis et impietatibus tot ac tantis ut stuperet 
barbarus aut Scytha ne dicam Christianus vel religiosus si sciret vel audiret ex parte quae vidi 
oculis meis, auribus meis audivi, et contractavi manibus in Indiis occidentalibus”, Moirans, A 
Just Defense, 6f.
38 “[…] si con ojos claros y cristianos se miran los niños y niñas de pecho que yo he visto, los 
cuales traídos a estas tierras […] como perros, gatos y ovejas quedan condenados al degolladero 
de la esclavitud, sin más culpa que la del pecado original”, Jaca, Resolución, 15.
39 Albornoz argues in the same fashion with the example of enslaved women and children who 
were without any guilt (“que diremos de los niños y mugeres que no pudieron tener culpa”), 
Albornoz, Arte de los contratos, lib. III, tit. IV, f. 130v.
40 See the chapter by Katharina Stornig, “Between Christian Solidarity and Human Solidarity: 
Humanity and the Mobilisation of Aid for Distant Children in Catholic Europe in the Long 
Nineteenth Century”, in this volume.
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Atlantic slavery.41 Moirans also pointed repeatedly to that fact, stating, for 
instance, that the “treatment of horses and mules” was not “as bad as that of 
Christian slaves by Catholics of the Indies”.42
According to Moirans, female slaves too were treated no better than cattle, 
since they “live like mares, multiply like dogs, and produce profit for the 
master like cows”.43 By denouncing the animal-like living conditions of 
slave women, Moirans questioned the asymmetric gender and race relations 
of colonial society. According to the Capuchin friar, female slaves were 
literally degraded to the status of baby-making machines.44 At the same 
time, however, the text maintained the typical male European stereotype of 
African women, which considered them sexually promiscuous and highly 
procreative.45 According to the author, he once “beheld large number of 
Blacks and mulattoes – pregnant slaves – who sometimes had two children 
in the lap and one in the womb, without a husband”.46 The slave master’s wife 
considered this unavoidable, since she could not “be around my female slaves 
all the time to prevent fornication”.47 According to Moirans, slave owners did 
not only tolerate and promote illicit sexual relations among their slaves, but 
they also sexually abused their female slaves; even married men and clerics 
did so:
It is horrible what remains unwritten concerning the masters in relation to female 
slaves, whom they use for sin, for adultery, and for defilement. Not only do bachelors 
beget their own offspring as male and female slaves, but even married men sire slaves, 
even clerics, even religious, because everybody uses female slaves at will for evil.48
41 Karl Jacoby, “Slaves by Nature? Domestic Animals and Human Slaves”, in Slavery & 
Abolition 15:1 (1994), 89 –97; David Brion Davis, “At the Heart of Slavery”, in id., In the 
Image of God. Religion, Moral Values, and Our Heritage of Slavery (New Haven, CT 2001), 
123–136; id., The Problem of Slavery in the Age of Emancipation (New York 2014), 3–44.
42 “[…] nec enim equis aut mulis talia inferuntur qualia Christanis mancipiis a Catholicis 
Indiarum”, Moirans, A Just Defense, 50f.
43 “[…] et ancillae […] vivunt ut equae, multiplicant ut canes et fructificant domino veluti boves.” 
Ibid., 40–43.
44 In fact, the rate of illegitimate births was much higher among slave women than among other 
members of colonial society. Contrary to the widespread image, however, the fertility of female 
slaves was relatively low, Susan Migden Socolow, The Women of Colonial Latin America 
(Cambridge 2000), 137; Jennifer L. Morgan, Laboring Women. Reproduction and Gender in 
New World Slavery (Philadelphia 2004), 107–143.
45 Barbara Bush, “ ‘Sable venus’, ‘she devil’ or ‘drudge’? British slavery and the ‘fabulous fiction’ 
of black women’s identities, c. 1650–1838”, in Women’s History 9 (2000), 761–789; id., Slave 
Women in Caribbean Society, 1650–1838 (London 1990), 11–22; Henrice Altink, Representa-
tions of Slave Women in Discourses on Slavery and Abolition, 1780–1838 (London 2007).
46 “[…] ingrediendo domum aspiciens multitudinem Nigrorum, mulatorum, ancillas gravidas, fil-
ios in sinu habentes quandoque duos, et unum in ventre sine viro”, Moirans, A Just Defense, 42f.
47 “Non sum ego (ait domina) semper cum ancillis meis, ut impediam fornicationem.” Ibid.
48 “Horribilia sunt quae remanent in calamo quantum ad dominos erga ancillas quibus abutuntur 
in peccatum, in adulterium, in stuprum, filios suos habentes in servos et ancillas non solum 
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This fact horrified Moirans so much that his “pen shudders and refuses to 
provide ink for those topics” that he would have preferred to “pass over in 
silence”.49 The incriminated practices were not, however, peculiar to colonial 
slavery, but were also very common in the Spanish metropolis.50
Whereas Moirans deliberately abstained from explicit descriptions of sex-
ual violence perpetrated against enslaved women, he described in great detail 
how masters physically punished their slaves for the slightest offence:
Blacks suffer horrendous torments and continual martyrdom […] for the least thing 
[…] they get scourged with inhuman whips until blood flows, bones show, and flesh 
disintegrates […], because with single strokes bones are laid bare. Others burn the side 
of the slaves’ bodies with red-hot plates or a hot knife in sensitive parts; some cut off 
flesh and testicles with a razor.51
By pointing to these atrocities, Moirans turned the slave owners’ argument 
that Africans were like beasts that do not deserve better treatment against the 
slave owners themselves. Since they acted in such an inhumane way towards 
their fellow men, they were even worse than beasts. Indeed, their greed had 
deprived them of all human features:
But I say that those who in word and deed consider Blacks to be animals and beasts 
are more irrational than those very wild beasts and Blacks. Indeed, I say that those 
very people are insane and mad with greed. Not only are they deprived of the light of 
charity and justice but also reason. They are without conscience, morality and rational 
nature, worse than beasts and cattle, more foolish than beasts of burden that have 
no understanding.52
soluti, sed coniugati, sed clerici, sed religiosi, quia omnes ancillis utuntur ad libitum in malum.” 
Ibid., 44f.
49 “Horret calamus atramentum nolens reddere ad istae quae tacentur.” Ibid.
50 William D. Phillips, Slavery in Medieval and Early Modern Iberia (Philadelphia 2014), 85–90; 
Aurelia Martín Casares, La esclavitud en la Granada del siglo XVI (Granada 2000), 359–373; 
Allessandro Stella, “Des esclaves pour la liberté sexuelle de leurs maîtres (Europe occidentale, 
XVIe–XVIIIe siècles)”, in Clio. Histoire, Femmes, Societé 5 (1997), http://clio.revues.org/419.
51 “Horrenda sustinent tormenta Nigri et continua martyria […] pro minima re […] flagellis 
caeduntur inhumanis usque ad effusionem sanguinis, ossium denudationem, et carnium 
consumptionem […], quia singulis percussionibus denudantur ossa; alii laminis ardenti-
bus comburunt latera eorum aut cultro candenti in partibus sensibilibus; nonnulli novacula 
abscindunt carnes et testiculos”, Moirans, A Just Defense, 48–50.
52 “Sed dico irrationabiliores esse ipsis feris bestiis, et Nigris, qui Nigros dictis et factis reputant 
pecudes, bestias; imo dico ipso esse amentes et furiosi cupiditate; non solum lumine charitatis 
et iustitiae privati, sed et rationis, sine conscientia, sine sinderesi, sine natura rationali, bestiis 
et pecudibus deteriores iumentis insipientiores quibus non est intellectus.” Ibid., 126f.
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Thus, Moirans and Jaca opposed the common strategy of dehumanizing and 
animalizing Africans, in theory and in practice, by holding up a mirror to the 
inhumanities and bestialities committed by slaveholders in the New World. 
For Moirans and Jaca “humanity”, in the sense of kindness and benevolence, 
and its opposite “inhumanity”, in the sense of cruelty, barbarity or bestiality, 
were closely connected to the word’s primary meaning (i.e. belonging or not 
belonging to humankind).
Neither of the two authors, however, use the term humanitas or huma-
nidad as a collective noun, meaning the universal body of mankind. The 
underlying notion of humankind was still a gradual and hierarchical one 
embedded in the history of salvation. Both authors made a clear distinction 
between human beings in general and (Catholic) Christians in particular. 
According to Moirans, the enslavement of Africans was unjust for two rea-
sons (i.e. ratione hominis et ratione Christiani). Firstly as human beings, 
Africans had a natural right to personal freedom. Secondly, as Christians 
they also possessed a divine right. Within the same logic, however, Moirans 
accepts and reaffirms the Christian right to enslave Muslims: “Christians 
may own as slaves those who are sinners against the Church and enemies of 
the Church’s children, such as the Turks, the Moors, and all of the Muslim 
enemies of the Church.”53 This is not surprising, given the historical context 
of his writings. At this time, Christian Europeans were at constant war with 
“Moors” and “Turks” and prisoners of war were enslaved on both sides of the 
Christian-Muslim front in the Mediterranean and South-Eastern Europe.54
This shows very clearly that Moirans and Jaca did not condemn the insti-
tution of slavery as such, although their critique of the Atlantic slave trade 
was the most radical to be expressed before the rise of modern abolitionism. 
Nevertheless, like all previous authors, the two Capuchin friars did not deny 
the general possibility that a person could be enslaved with just cause. Yet they 
did state that this was definitely not the case with regard to enslaved Africans 
who were sold and brought to America without just cause. Thus, everybody 
who participated directly or indirectly in the Atlantic slave trade was sinning 
gravely and therefore obliged to contribute to the immediate emancipation 
and economic compensation of all enslaved Africans. This demand was 
53 “Christiani possunt habere in servos qui contra Ecclesiam peccant, et hostes sunt filiorum 
Ecclesiae sicuti Turcae et Mauri, omnesque Mahumetani hostes Ecclesiae.” Ibid., 134f.
54 Robert C. Davis, Christian Slaves, Muslim Masters. White Slavery in the Mediterranean, 
the Barbary Coast, and Italy, 1500–1800 (Basingstoke 2003); Phillips, Slavery, 32–53; 
Gillian Weiss, Captives and Corsairs. France and Slavery in the Early Modern Mediterranean 
(Stanford, CA 2011); Géza Dávid / Pál Fodor (ed.), Ransom Slavery Along the Ottoman Borders 
(Early Fifteenth-Early Eighteenth Centuries) (Leiden 2007); Stefan Hanss / Juliane Schiel (ed.), 
Mediterranean Slavery Revisited (500–1800) – Neue Perspektiven auf mediterrane Sklaverei 
(500–1800) (Zurich 2014).
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not only aimed at individual slave owners, but also at political authorities 
who were expected to put an end to Atlantic slavery. Of course, this was 
an unattainable, utopian goal at this time. Most of Jaca’s and Moirans’ con-
temporaries could neither follow their argument nor understand the cause of 
their outrage. As we have already seen, the two Capuchins’ stance provoked 
fierce opposition among the ruling colonial elite. The political authorities in 
Spain had legitimised and fostered the Atlantic slave trade for almost two 
centuries and thus were unlikely to embrace Jaca’s and Moirans’ cause. What 
was more, the closing decades of the seventeenth century were a period of 
economic decline. The so-called asiento de negros became an ever more 
important source of income for the chronically indebted Spanish Crown.55 
Nevertheless, the questions raised by Jaca and Moirans reached the highest 
institutions of the Spanish Monarchy, including the monarch himself, and 
also the Roman Curia.
While in America as well as on his way back to Spain, Jaca had addressed 
several letters to the Spanish king and the Council of the Indies. In these 
letters he complained about his imprisonment and urged the political author-
ities to take action against colonial slavery.56 When Jaca and Moirans arrived 
in Spain they reiterated their demands. Thanks to the intervention of the 
papal nuncio Marcello Durazzo and the royal confessor Tomás Carbonell, 
bishop of Sigüenza, their case finally reached the monarch. After referring 
the matter to the State Council, Charles II ordered the Council of the Indies to 
think of measures to “suspend and emend the disorders that have been justly 
denounced, as reason, conscience, and humanity demand”.57 In October 1683 
he issued a royal decree urging the royal officials in America “to take special 
care of the good treatment of slaves”.58 Those slaveholders who “exceeded 
in cruelty” should be punished and forced to sell their slaves.59 However, 
55 Hugh Thomas, The Slave Trade. The History of the Atlantic Slave Trade, 1440–1870 (London 
2006), 210–219; Reyes Fernández Durán, La corona española y el tráfico de negros. Del 
monopolio al libre comercio (Madrid 2011); Enriqueta Vila Vilar, Hispanoamérica y el com-
ercio de esclavos: los asientos portugueses (Sevilla 1977); Marisa Vega Franco, El tráfico de 
esclavos con América. Asientos de Grillo y Lomelín, 1663–1674 (Sevilla 1984). 
56 Jaca, Resolución, Appéndice, no. 3, 6f., 81, 85–87. For Jaca’s and Moirans’ struggle with Span-
ish authorities see Jaca, Resolución, “Estudio preliminar”, XLIX–LVI; Moirans, Siervos libres, 
“Estudio preliminar”, XV–XVIII; Pena González, Primera propuesta, 169–178.
57 “[…] se encargue con ponderación al [consejo] de Indias procure dar tal providencia al reparo 
de tan justos desórdenes, que se suspenden y enmienden como lo pide la razón, la humanidad 
y la conciencia”, Oficio del Consejo de Estado a Carlos II, Madrid, 27 March 1683, in Jaca, 
Resolución, Appéndice, no. 79, 272–274, on p. 274. Oficio del Consejo de Indias a Carlos II 
(Madrid, 8 April 1683), ibid., no. 80, 275–277.
58 “[…] pongan muy particular cuidado en el buen tratamiento de los esclavos, velando mucho 
en ellos”, Real Cédula de Carlos II a las Audiencias y Gobernadores de las Indias (Madrid, 
12 October 1683), ibid., no. 117, 313f.
59 “[…] siempre que se averiguase exceso de sevicia en los amos, se les obliga a venderlos [sc. los 
esclavos] y demás amas se les castigue, si el caso lo pidiese.” Ibid.
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it seems that the royal order had little effect on the practice of slavery in 
Spanish America, since it had to be reissued again in 1710.60
Jaca’s and Moirans’ principal demand remained unmet. In 1685, Charles II 
requested another report from the Council of the Indies. This time the 
monarch wanted to know whether the enslavement of Africans was legal 
according to the opinion of learned theologians and jurists, if slavery was 
beneficial for the American colonies, and what consequences would follow 
from its suspension. The councillors’ answer could not have been more clear-
cut: after reaffirming the principal arguments voiced in favour of slavery, the 
councillors presented the case of Moirans and Jaca as a cautionary example 
of the turmoil that would necessarily follow from any restriction of colonial 
slavery.61 Consequently, the Spanish government did not take any further 
steps in this direction.
In the meantime, the case of the two Capuchins’ had also reached the 
Roman Curia, who was well informed of the Spanish authorities’ proceed-
ings against Jaca and Moirans since their return to Spain in 1682.62 After 
the suspension of their trial in Madrid, Jaca and Moirans went to Rome, 
where other missionaries such as Girolamo Merolla supported their strug-
gle against Atlantic slavery.63 Another advocate for the emancipation of the 
enslaved Africans was Lourenço da Silva, a lay brother of Afro-Brazilian 
descent, who came to Rome in 1682 to denounce the atrocities of the slave 
trade to the Papacy.64 In March 1685, shortly after Jaca’s and Moirans’ arrival 
in Rome, the General Procurator of the Capuchins presented a list of eleven 
propositions concerning slavery to the Congregation de Propaganda Fide.65 
This list, heavily influenced by Jaca’s and Moirans’ arguments, was passed 
on to the Holy Office, which finally confirmed all of the propositions one 
60 Real Cédula de Felipe V a los Gobernadores y Justicias de Indias (Madrid, 19 April 1710), 
ibid., no. 162, 371f.
61 Oficio del Consejo de Indias (Madrid, 21 August 1685), ibid., no. 147, 349–354.
62 For the following see Jaca, Resolución, “Estudio preliminar”, LVI–LX; Moirans, Siervos 
libres, “Estudio preliminar”, XVIII–XXXI; Pena González, Primera propuesta, 179f., 377–
382; Andrés-Gallego / García Añoveros, Iglesia, 84–92; Teobaldo Filesi, “Tratta atlantica 
africana e atteggiamento della chiesa”, in Il cristianesimo nel mondo atlantico nel secolo 
XVII. Atteggiamenti dei cristiani nei confronti dei popoli e delle culture indigeni (Vatican City 
1997), 243–281, on pp. 258–263.
63 Merolla, also a Capuchin was active in the Congo. See Richard Gray, “Fra Girolamo Merolla 
da Sorrento, the Congregation of Propaganda Fide and the Atlantic Slave Trade”, in La conos-
cenza dell’Asia e dell’Africa in Italia nei secoli xviii e xix (Naples 1984), vol. 2, 803–811; Pena 
González, Primera propuesta, 353–367.
64 Richard Gray, “The Papacy and the Atlantic Slave Trade. Lourenço da Silva, the Capuchins, 
and the Decisions of the Holy Office”, in Past & Present 115 (1987), 52–68; Pena González, 
Primera propuesta, 377f.
65 “Carta de Giovanni Battista da Sabbio, procurador general de los Capuchinos a Alderano 
Cibo, secretario de Propaganda Fide, Rome, 12 March 1685”, in Jaca, Resolución, Appéndice, 
no. 128, 322–324.
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year later.66 According to the eleven articles confirmed by the Holy Office, it 
was neither legal for Christians to enslave Africans by force or deceit nor to 
purchase or sell those unjustly enslaved. The buyers were obliged to ascertain 
the origin of their slaves and to make sure that they had been enslaved by just 
title. If this was not the case, they had to set them free immediately and also 
were expected to compensate them for their sufferings. Slaveholders were not 
permitted to cause bodily harm to or kill their slaves “by private authority” 
(ex privata auctoritate). They were also not allowed to baptize them without 
first giving them religious instruction.67 This decree was sent to the bishops 
of Angola, Cádiz, Valencia, Seville and Málaga, as well as to the Apostolic 
Nuncios in Spain and Portugal to proclaim and enact in the dioceses on both 
sides of the Atlantic.68 The repeated protests of Capuchin missionaries in 
Africa that continued into the eighteenth century indicate that the results 
were rather poor. In the American colonies too, the decree had hardly any 
effect and the Spanish and Portuguese authorities did their utmost to quell 
the rise of any future antislavery sentiment or practice. Consequently, Jaca 
and Moirans were never allowed to return to America and their writings were 
kept under lock and key in Spanish archives. Indeed, they were forgotten for 
almost 300 years.
4. Humanitarianism Before Humanitarianism?
As the examples of Jaca and Moirans have shown, the discourse and practice 
of antislavery are much older than those of modern abolitionism. At first 
glance there were significant differences between their struggle and those 
of late eighteenth- and early-nineteenth-century abolitionists. Early mod-
ern Spanish authors writing against slavery conformed to the casuistry of 
scholastic tradition. Thus, they did not question the institution of slavery as 
such, but rather discussed the legitimacy of the enslavement of Africans. The 
works of Jaca and Moirans are no exception. Much like their later follow-
ers, these Capuchin friars made use of a “humanitarian narrative”. Basing 
their arguments on their own first-hand experience, they bluntly described 
the atrocities of New World slavery and appealed to their readers’ empathy 
and compassion for the oppressed Africans. By doing so, they employed a 
66 “Decreto del Santo Oficio sobre varias dudas remitidas por los Capuchinos, Rome, 20 March 
1686”, in Jaca, Resolución, no. 158, 230, 365–368; Collectanea Sanctae Congregationis de 
Propaganda Fide seu decreta instructiones rescripta pro apostolicus missionibus 1:230 
(1907), 76f.; Pena González, Primera propuesta, 379–381; Sala-Moulins, Esclavage, 23–26.
67 Ibid.
68 Ibid., 381.
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semantics of “humanity” versus “inhumanity”, one that was very similar to 
that of nineteenth-century abolitionist writings. Moirans’ and Jaca’s concept 
of humankind, however, was marked by the religious struggles of their time. 
The divisions between (Catholic) Christians and enemies of the Church were 
a decisive factor in their position towards slavery. As a matter of course, Jaca 
and Moirans shared the common opinion that Muslims who were captured by 
Christians in war could be justly enslaved.
Bearing this in mind, it seems even more surprising that the demands of 
this “two-man-abolitionist-movement” avant la lettre were far more radical 
than those of any early nineteenth-century abolitionist. Whereas, British and 
American abolitionists initially only championed the abolition of the slave 
trade, Jaca and Moirans also demanded the immediate liberation and com-
pensation of all enslaved Africans. Not surprisingly, their campaign against 
New World slavery did not succeed. This was partly due to the influence 
of powerful institutions and pressure groups within the Spanish monarchy, 
who successfully managed to silence the fundamental moral questions raised 
by Moirans and Jaca. No less important was the lack of a public sphere in 
the Spanish-speaking world of the seventeenth century. Had there been one, 
it might have embraced and pushed forward the antislavery campaign, as 
was the case one hundred years later. Jaca and Moirans were not, however, 
lone voices in the wilderness. In Africa and South America, there were 
other missionaries who voiced opinions in opposition to slavery. In Rome, 
they could count on the support of their religious superiors. Nevertheless, 
the idea of putting an end to New World slavery was something completely 
inconceivable to the vast majority of their contemporaries.
Thus, in some regards, sixteenth and seventeenth century Spanish authors 
can be considered the forerunners of modern humanitarianism, despite dif-
ferences between their writings and those of nineteenth-century abolition-
ists. In his recent study on the Origins of Global Humanitarianism, Peter 
Stamatov has pointed to the structural similarities between early modern 
Spanish criticism of slavery and modern Anglo-American abolitionism.69 
According to Stamatov, both campaigns were paradigms of “long distance 
advocacy” that “emerged from the struggles of religious actors in the course 
of European imperial expansion overseas”.70 However – and this is also very 
telling – there seems to be no direct continuity between the older Spanish 
antislavery discourse and Anglo-American abolitionism. Even in Spain, 
where modern abolitionism made its voice heard at a relatively late moment 
69 Peter Stamatov, The Origins of Global Humanitarianism. Religion, Empires, and Advocacy 
(New York 2013).
70 Ibid., 1.
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in history, antislavery activists rarely referred to the older Spanish antislavery 
tradition, but instead to the Anglo-American model of antislavery.71 Thus, 
although parallels over time and space may not be accidental, the history of 
humanitarianism and human rights cannot be written as a linear progression 
stretching from Las Casas via Wilberforce to the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights. Historians of humanitarianism should, however, take into 
account the diverse and multi-layered origins of humanitarian ideas and prac-
tices that arose in cultural contexts other than the Anglo-Atlantic Protestant 
world and that can be traced back to long before the so-called “humanitarian 
big bang”.
71 For nineteenth century Spanish antislavery see the pathbreaking study by Christopher Schmidt-
Nowara, Empire and Antislavery. Spain, Cuba, and Puerto Rico 1833–1874 (Pittsburgh, PA 
1999); Belén Pozuelo Mascaraque, “Sociedad española y abolicionismo en la segunda mitad del 
siglo XIX”, in Cuadernos de Historia Contemporánea 10 (1988), 71–92; id., “Los abolicioni-
stas españoles”, in Estudios Históricos. Homenaje a los Profesores José María Jover Zamora 
y Vicente Palacio Atard, 2 vols (Madrid 1990), vol. 1, 101–121. I touch on the question of 
the continuity and discontinuity between early modern and late nineteenth century Spanish 
antislavery in an unpublished conference paper: Thomas Weller, “The Long Road to Abolition. 
Spanish Discourses on Slavery in the Nineteenth Century”, paper read at the international 
conference “Religion in the Age of Imperial Humanitarianism, 1850–1950”, Mainz, 5–7 Sep-
tember 2012. 
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Fabian Klose
“A War of Justice and Humanity”
Abolition and Establishing Humanity as an International Norm1
My Lords; if we were to define humanity, what should we say it was? 
What are its attributes; what is its character? ‘A sympathy of feeling for 
the distress of others – a desire to accomplish good ends by good means.’ 
Let any man examine these qualities, and tell you, if he can, how the Slave 
Trade agrees with either of them; and if he cannot, I think we can have no 
difficulty in saying, that the Slave Trade is contrary to humanity.2
Lord Grenville (British Prime Minister), 1806
1. Introduction
On 27 August 1816 a British fleet under the command of Lord Exmouth, 
supported by six Dutch warships, began to bombard the harbour and city of 
Algiers.3 The devastating bombardment lasted for several hours and destroyed 
almost the entire pirate fleet as well as a large part of the city’s fortifications. 
After his impressive victory Lord Exmouth liberated 1.624 European slaves4 
and forced Omar Bashaw, the dey of Algiers, to sign a treaty conceding the 
1 I would like to thank the participants of the conference “Humanity – A History of European 
Concepts in Practice” held from 8–10 October 2015 at the Leibniz Institute of European History 
for their important comments and remarks. Additionally, I would like to thank Martin Aust, 
Johannes Paulmann, Jorge Luengo Sánchez, Gregor Feindt, Joe Kroll and Benan Şarlayan for 
their perceptive comments on the draft of this chapter.
2 Quote from Lord Grenville’s Speech in the House of Lords on 24 June 1806, in Great Britain, 
Parliament (ed.), Substance of the Debates on a Resolution for Abolishing the Slave Trade, 
Which was Moved in the House of Commons on the 10th June, 1806, and in the House of Lords, 
on the 24th June, 1806 (London 1806), 90.
3 On the exact course of the attack, see Cyril Northcote Parkinson, Edward Pellew (London 
1934), 457–464; Roger Perkins / Kenneth John Douglas-Morris, Gunfire in Barbary: Admiral 
Exmouth’s Battle With the Corsairs of Algiers in 1816 – the Story of the Suppression of White 
Slavery (Homewell 1982), 107–132.
4 Among the liberated slaves were only eighteen English people, while the vast majority of those 
freed from slavery came from the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, Spain, and Sardinia. For an 
exact listing, see Perkins / Douglas-Morris, Gunfire in Barbary, 147.
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unqualified end of the enslavement of Christians.5 The military strike thus 
fulfilled all British expectations and unleashed a storm of enthusiasm. Upon 
their return, Lord Exmouth and his officers were showered with honours. 
The prince regent awarded the admiral the title of viscount for his services, 
and the kings of the Two Sicilies, the Netherlands, Sardinia, and Spain each 
demonstrated their gratitude to the war hero by knighting him.6 During a 
debate in Parliament on the official tribute to the admiral, Lord Castlereagh, 
the foreign secretary, depicted the military strike against Algiers even as a 
“war of justice and humanity”, in which the British nation had intervened 
selflessly in defence of all European countries against the North African 
pirates and their practice of enslaving Europeans.7 Similar glorifying voices 
were raised in public by contemporary publications such as “The Triumph 
of Justice; or British Valour Displayed in the Cause of Humanity”.8 By its 
naval action against the leading Barbary State, the United Kingdom tried 
to buttress its credibility with regard to its new foreign policy paradigm of 
universal abolition in the wake of the Congress of Vienna.9 London sent the 
unequivocal signal that it would not hesitate to deploy massive force in order 
to enforce the ban of the slave trade and stop gross violations of humanity. 
Thus Great Britain set the significant precedent for a new practice in inter-
national politics which emerged in the course of the nineteenth century and 
grew directly out of the campaign against the slave trade – the practice of 
humanitarian intervention.10
5 “Treaty of Peace Between Great Britain and Algiers”, 28 August 1816, in British Foreign 
and State Papers (BFSP) 3 (1815–1816) (London 1838), 516; “General Memorandum From 
Exmouth”, 30 August 1816, ibid., 519; “Delaration of the Dey of Algiers Relative to the Aboli-
tion of Christian Slavery”, 28 August 1816, ibid., 517.
6 On the numerous honors, see Parkinson, Pellew, 469f.; Perkins / Douglas-Morris, Gunfire in 
Barbary, 155, 165–171.
7 “Speech of Castlereagh Before the House of Commons”, 3 February 1817, in T. C. Hansard 
(ed.), The Parliamentary Debates From the Year 1803 to the Present Time, vol. XXXV (1817) 
(London 1817), 177–179.
8 J. Gleave (ed.), The Triumph of Justice; or British Valour Displayed in the Cause of Humanity. 
Being an Interesting Narrative of the Recent Expedition to Algiers (Manchester 1816).
9 See esp. Oded Löwenheim, “ ‘Do Ourselves Credit and Render a Lasting Service to Mankind’: 
British Moral Prestige, Humanitarian Intervention, and the Barbary Pirates”, in International 
Studies Quarterly 47 (2003), 23–48.
10 On the history of humanitarian intervention, see Gary Bass, Freedom’s Battle: The Origins of 
Humanitarian Intervention (New York 2008); Brendan Simms / David J. B. Trim (ed.), Human-
itarian Intervention. A History (Cambridge, MA 2011); Davide Rodogno, Against Massacre: 
Humanitarian Interventions in the Ottoman Empire, 1815–1914 (Princeton, NJ 2012). While 
these studies mainly focuses on the interventions in the Ottoman Empire, I argue that the 
concept of humanitarian intervention grew directly out of the campaign against the slave trade, 
cf. Fabian Klose (ed.), The Emergence of Humanitarian Intervention. Ideas and Practice From 
the Nineteenth Century to the Present (Cambridge 2016).
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By focusing on the case study of the abolition of slave trade, this chapter 
surveys the long-term implications of a theoretical debate over the concept 
of humanity for an interventionist practice in international politics. In a first 
step this essay focuses on the campaign of British abolitionists around 1800, 
when they successfully mobilised public opinion in favour of their cause and 
initiated decisive parliamentary debates on the issue of banning the slave 
trade. Here it is absolutely crucial to take into account that the abolitionists 
formulated their political demands not in a language of rights but rather in 
terms of common humanity.11 In doing so, they gave a prominent place to 
the moral argument that the slave trade was contrary to all principles of 
humanity and succeeded in obtaining legal recognition for this notion with 
the Abolition Act of 1807. In a second step, this chapter looks at the impact 
of this new legal norm on practices in international politics. In order to effi-
ciently enforce its new foreign policy paradigm of abolition in the wake of the 
Congress of Vienna, Great Britain initiated an international treaty network, 
which after decades of diplomatic negotiations included almost all states 
in Europe and the Americas. This treaty regime was based on the emerg-
ing international consensus that human trafficking constituted a “crime 
against humanity”.
While some studies argue that humanity emerges as a concept exclusively 
in the context of global war and modern genocide in the twentieth century, 
and derives its status as an international legal norm only from the Nuremberg 
trials in 1946,12 this essay adopts a very different position. It argues that 
abolition and the related practice of enforcing it already brought about a 
significant development of the idea of humanity in the course of the long 
nineteenth century. During this period, it developed from a moral category 
to an accepted norm in international politics and finally in international law. 
Furthermore, the perception of defending common humanity by force was 
thus established as a new practice with all its ambivalent consequences.
11 For this reason most studies explicitly relate the campaign against the slave trade in the course 
of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries to the history of humanitarianism instead of the 
history of human rights. See Samuel Moyn, “Die neue Historiographie der Menschenrechte”, 
in Geschichte und Gesellschaft 38 (2012), 545–572, on pp. 559–561. For two exceptions, see 
Jenny Martinez, The Slave Trade and the Origins of International Human Rights Law (Oxford 
2012); Robin Blackburn, The American Crucible. Slavery, Emancipation, and Human Rights 
(London 2011).
12 For instance, in his book “The Idea of Humanity in a Global Era” Bruce Mazlish prominently 
argues “that out of an epochal crime – global war and modern genocide – has emerged the idea 
of crimes against humanity. And out of crimes against humanity has emerged the concept of 
Humanity”. Furthermore he emphasises that the “transformation of the notion of humanity into 
the concept of Humanity takes place in the context of humankind entering upon a time of total 
war” and derives its legal status only from the Nuremberg trials. See Bruce Mazlish, The Idea 
of Humanity in a Global Era (New York 2009), 15, 35f.
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2. “The Slave Trade is Contrary to Humanity” –
From a Moral Argument to a Legal Norm
In the last few years a burgeoning body of historical research on the history 
of humanitarianism has shown that a true “humanitarian revolution”13 took 
place at the end of the eighteenth century, in the sense that people started to 
feel empathy for their fellow human beings not only within their own country, 
but across borders and even on distant continents. Individuals were mobilised 
by a sentimental and moral “humanitarian narrative” that motivated them to 
care for strangers.14 In this context, British abolitionism is absolutely pivotal 
and regarded as the driving force for the crystallisation of humanitarian 
sentiments. In an intensive campaign spanning several decades, abolition-
ists significantly mobilised public opinion and caused a tremendous outcry 
against the transatlantic slave trade, which had been regarded as lawful and 
even a desirable branch of commerce for nearly 400 years.
From the end of the fifteenth to the middle of the nineteenth century, 
Europeans shipped over eleven million Africans to the Americas to supply 
the constant demand for slave labour on colonial plantations. In the process, 
captives underwent a significant process of dehumanisation, meaning that 
slave hunters, dealers and owners transformed them from individual humans 
into mere commodities. Instead of regarding them as beings with human 
dignity forming an undeniable part of humankind, they degraded them to 
ordinary goods in the Atlantic trading system and treated them accordingly.15 
The hunt for slaves on the African continent alone costed countless lives even 
before the slave ships set sail for their voyages. Additionally, it is estimated 
that another 1.5 million people died due to the appalling and inhumane living 
conditions on board of the slave vessels during the so-called middle passage, 
the infamous crossing of the Atlantic.16 Thus, the transatlantic slave trade 
13 Here I refer to the term “humanitarian revolution” in the sense of the revolutionary emergence 
of humanitarian sensibility and activities rather than as a decline in violence, as it is interpreted 
by Steven Pinker, The Better Angels of Our Nature: The Decline of Violence in History and Its 
Causes (London 2011), 129–188.
14 Thomas Laqueur, “Bodies, Details, and the Humanitarian Narrative”, in Lynn Hunt (ed.), The 
New Cultural History (Berkeley, CA 1989), 176–204; Samuel Moyn, “Empathy in History: 
Empathizing With Humanity”, in History and Theory 45 (2006), 397–415; Lynn Hunt, Invent-
ing Human Rights: A History (New York 2007); Richard D. Brown / Richard Wilson (ed.), 
Humanitarianism and Suffering. The Mobilization of Empathy (Cambridge 2009); Lynn Festa, 
“Humanity Without Feathers”, in Humanity 1:1 (2010), 3–27; Kenan Malik, The Quest for a 
Moral Compass. A Global History of Ethics (London 2014), 189–217.
15 For this process of turning African captives into Atlantic commodities, see esp. Stephanie 
Smallwood, Saltwater Slavery. A Middle Passage From Africa to American Diaspora (Cam-
bridge 2007), 33–64.
16 David Eltis, “The Volume and Structure of the Transatlantic Slave Trade: A Reassessment”, 
in The William and Mary Quarterly 58 (2001), 17–46; Herbert S. Klein, “The Atlantic Slave 
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can be described, in the trenchant words of the prominent African-American 
civil rights leader and historian W. E. B. Du Bois, as “the most magnificent 
drama in the last thousand years of human history”.17
The slave trade reached its high point in the 1780s, when over 80.000 
Africans were transported each year to the Americas. In this period the 
United Kingdom was the undisputed leader in this flourishing economic sys-
tem.18 However, it was also in Great Britain that, during the heyday of human 
trafficking, a small group of activists began to organise civil resistance to the 
well-established slave trade economy. On 22 May 1787, various abolitionists 
met in London to form the Committee for Effecting the Abolition of the Slave 
Trade.19 Instead of tackling the overall problem of slavery they explicitly 
decided to concentrate on the abolition of the slave trade. The main reason 
for this strategic decision lay in the fact that they deliberately wanted to avoid 
any involvement in complicated legal disputes over the property rights of the 
powerful West Indian plantation aristocracy to their slaves and the contested 
legality of efforts by the Westminster government to interfere in the legisla-
tion of the colonies.20 In contrast, the regulation of any trade issue clearly fell 
under the jurisdiction of London. Hence a ban on human trafficking could 
be implemented by governmental means, as the leading abolitionist Thomas 
Clarkson remarked: “By asking the government, again, to do this and this 
only, they were asking what it could really enforce. It could station its ships 
of war, and command its custom-houses, so as to carry any act of this kind 
into effect.”21 Already in the founding phase of their organisation, the aboli-
tionists had a clear vision of how to achieve their humanitarian aims through 
a governmental policy of intervention. The long-term goal was the complete 
abolition of slavery.
Trade. Recent Research and Findings”, in Horst Pietschmann (ed.), Atlantic History: History of 
the Atlantic System, 1580–1830 (Göttingen 2002), 301–320. For an impressive online database 
concerning the transatlantic slave trade, http://www.slavevoyages.org/tast/index.faces.
17 W. E. B. Du Bois, Black Reconstruction in America: An Essay Toward a History of the Part 
Which Black Folk Played in the Attempt to Reconstruct Democracy in America, 1860–1880 
(New York 1966), 727.
18 Klein, Atlantic Slave Trade, 198.
19 Thomas Clarkson, The History of the Rise, Progress, and Accomplishment of the Abolition 
of the African Slave-Trade by the British Parliament, vol. I (London 1808), 255–258; Frank 
Joseph Klingberg, The Anti-Slavery Movement in England: A Study in English Humanitarian-
ism (New Haven, CT 1926), 73; Peter Stamatov, Global Humanitarianism. Religion, Empires, 
and Advocacy (New York 2013), 155–174. There has been an intensive debate among historians 
concerning the background of British abolition. For an overview, see for example Thomas 
Bender (ed.), The Antislavery Debate: Capitalism and Abolitionism as a Problem in Historical 
Interpretation (Berkeley, CA 1992).
20 Clarkson, History, 286f.
21 Ibid., 287.
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Thus the principal aim of the new founded society, in which according 
to their own notion men of different religious denominations united “with 
true Christian harmony, in the cause of humanity and justice”,22 was to draw 
decisively parliamentary and public attention to the inhuman practice of the 
slave trade:
If this trade should become, as there is reason to hope it will, a subject of Parliamentary 
investigation early in this session, it is to be wished that the general sense of the Nation 
(which without doubt is in favour of liberty, justice, and humanity) may be expressed 
by Petitions to Parliament, and by applications to their Representatives, in order to 
procure their assistance. In the distribution of the Tracts, it is therefore recommended 
that this purpose may be kept in view.23
As a consequence the abolitionists started a then unprecedented humanitar-
ian campaign, lasting several decades. By distributing pamphlets, organising 
public rallies and initiating petitions on a large scale, they successfully mobi-
lised public opinion to put significant pressure on parliament and government 
in order to take concrete action against human trafficking.24
However, at this point it is of crucial importance to note that in their 
campaign the abolitionists were articulating their political demands not in 
the language of rights but in terms of humanity. They could passionately 
fight against the transatlantic slave trade and ask for state intervention, but 
at the same time endorse the paternalistic concept of a mission to civilise 
the Africans without granting them equal rights. For instance, William 
Wilberforce, the leading voice of the abolitionist movement in Parliament, 
was recorded as expressing this view significantly in a debate on the 
abolition of the slave trade in the House of Commons in April 1791 with 
these words:
22 Id., A Summary View of the Slave Trade and of the Probable Consequences of its Abolition 
(London 1787), iii. For the religious motivation of many abolitionists, see Roger T. Anstey, 
The Atlantic Slave Trade and British Abolition, 1760–1810 (London 1975), 157–235; David 
Brion Davis, The Problem of Slavery in the Age of Emancipation (New York 2014), 291–390; 
Christopher Leslie Brown, Moral Capital: Foundations of British Abolitionism (Chapel Hill, 
NC 2006), 333–450; Boyd Hilton, The Age of Atonement. The Influence of Evangelicalism 
on Social and Economic Thought, 1795–1865 (Oxford 1988), 209–211; Christopher Leslie 
Brown, “Christianity and the Campaign Against Slavery and the Slave Trade”, in Stewart 
J. Brown / Timothy Tackett (ed.), Cambridge History of Christianity, vol. 7: Enlightenment, 
Reawakening and Revolution 1660–1815 (Cambridge 2006), 517–535.
23 Clarkson, Summary View, iii.
24 On this successful mobilisation, see James Walvin, “The Public Campaign in England Against 
Slavery, 1787–1834”, in David Eltis / James Walvin (ed.), The Abolition of the Atlantic Slave 
Trade: Origins and Effects in Europe, Africa, and the Americas (Madison, WI 1981), 67f.; 
Seymour Drescher, “Whose Abolition? Popular Pressure and the Ending of the British Slave 
Trade”, in Past & Present 143 (1994), 160–162.
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The Negroes, he [Wilberforce] said, were creatures like ourselves: they had the 
same feelings, and even stronger affections than our own; but their minds were 
uninformed, and their moral characters were altogether debased. Men, in this state, 
were almost incapacitated for the reception of civil rights. In order to become fit 
for the enjoyment of these, they must, in some measures, be restored to that level 
from which they had been so unjustly and cruelly degraded. To give them power of 
appealing to the laws, would be to awaken in them a sense of the dignity of their 
nature. The first return of life after a swoon, was commonly a convulsion, danger-
ous, at once, to the party himself, and to all around him. Such, in the case of the 
Slaves, Mr. Wilberforce feared, might be the consequence of a sudden communication 
of civil rights.25
Instead of rights it was the moral category of a common humanity26 that was 
absolutely essential to the abolitionist argument and thus became the move-
ment’s undisputed leitmotif. Their paramount goal was to raise awareness 
in public and parliamentary debates that African slaves were not ordinary 
commodities but human beings with feelings who formed an undeniable, 
integral part of humankind.27 The abolitionist task was to revoke the pro-
cess of dehumanisation and degradation of the captives to mere goods in 
the Atlantic trade system by stressing their true human nature. For instance, 
Wilberforce precisely underlined the importance of this notion in the afore-
mentioned parliamentary debate of April 1791: “Already we have gained one 
victory: we have obtained, for these poor creatures, The recognition of their 
human nature, which, for a while, was most shamefully denied.”28 The iconic 
image created by Josiah Wedgwood of the enslaved African kneeling with 
manacled hands outstretched, posing the rhetorical question “Am I not a man 
25 Quote by Wilberforce during the debate in the House of Commons on 18 and 19 April 1791, in 
Great Britain, Parliament, House of Commons (ed.), The Debate on a Motion for the Abolition 
of the Slave-Trade, in the House of Commons on Monday and Tuesday, April 18th and 19th 1791 
(London 1791), 37.
26 The term “humanity” was defined in a contemporary English dictionary as “1. The nature of a 
man. […] 2. Human kind; the collective body of mankind. […] 3. Benevolence; tenderness. […] 
4. Philology; grammatical studies […]”. See “Humanity”, in Samuel Johnson, A Dictionary of 
the English Language: in Which the Words are Deduced From Their Originals, and Illustrated 
in Their Different Significations by Examples Form the Best Writers, vol. 1 (London 1755). 
27 See here esp. Lynn Festa, “Humanity Without Feathers”. Concerning this idea the abolitionist 
referred to the older tradition of the Quakers and their campaign against the slave trade. See 
for instance Anthony Benezet, Observations on the Inslaving, Importing and Purchasing of 
Negroes (Germantown, PA 1760); id., The Case of Our Fellow-Creatures, The Oppressed 
Africans, Respectfully Recommended to the Serious Consideration of the Legislature of Great 
Britain, By the People Called Quakers (London 1784).
28 Quote by Wilberforce, in Great Britain Parliament, The Debate on a Motion for the Abolition 
of the Slave-Trade, 42.
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and a brother?”, which swiftly became the official emblem of the movement, 
represented this notion most vividly.29 The abolitionists sought to appeal 
to the humanitarian sensibility of their fellow citizens to evoke sympathy 
for the fate of African slaves and to demand action on behalf of suffering 
fellow human beings. Accordingly many petitions demanding immediate 
abolition were addressed to parliament in the name of “Justice, Liberty, and 
Humanity”.30 However, it was exactly this emerging notion of humanity 
which, in turn, provoked firm resistance in the anti-abolitionist camp and 
led to critiques such as that articulated by Lord Abingdon in a parliamentary 
debate in April 1793: “It is, say the petitioners, the ground of humanity; but 
humanity, as I have shown, is no ground for petitioning: humanity is a private 
feeling, and not a public principle to act upon: it is a case of conscience, and 
not a constitutional right.”31
Despite the persistent opposition of the powerful lobby of West Indian 
planters, the abolitionist cause finally prevailed and gained official recog-
nition in parliament. In June 1806 Wilberforce and his fellow campaigners 
managed to pass successfully a resolution in both houses of parliament, which 
denounced the slave trade as “contrary to the principles of justice, humanity, 
and sound policy”.32 Especially in the House of Lords, which usually tended 
to favour the anti-abolitionist camp, Wilberforce’s motion could rely on the 
support of the prime minister, Lord Grenville. He decisively influenced the 
29 Clarkson, History, 450; Mary Guyatt, “The Wedgwood Slave Medallion. Values in Eigh - 
teenth-century Design”, in Journal of Design History 13:2 (2000), 93–105; Hugh Honour, The 
Image of the Black in Western Art, vol. 4: From the American Revolution to World War I: Slaves 
and Liberators (Cambridge, MA 1989), 62–64; Joanna Bourke, What It Means to Be Human: 
Historical Reflections From the 1800s to the Present (Berkeley, CA 2011), 120.
30 For the content of these petitions, see exemplary e.g. R. Hamilton, An Address Intended to 
Have Been Delivered at a Meeting of the Inhabitants of Ipswich for the Purpose of Considering 
the Propriety of Petitioning Parliament for an Abolition of the Slave Trade, 17th February 
1792 (Ipswich 1792); Thomas Clarkson, A Short Address Originally Written to the People of 
Scotland on the Subject of the Slave Trade With a Summary View of the Evidence Delivered 
Before a Committee of the House of Commons on the Part of the Petitioners for its Abolition 
(Shrewsbury 1792). See also Seymour Drescher, “People and Parliament: The Rhetoric of the 
British Slave Trade”, in The Journal of Interdisciplinary History 20:4 (1990), 561–580, on 
pp. 566f.; John R. Oldfield, Popular Politics and British Anti-Slavery. The Mobilization of 
Public Opinion Against the Slave Trade 1787–1807 (Manchester 1995), 115–119.
31 Speech of Lord Abingdon on 11 April 1793, in William Cobbett (ed.), The Parliamentary His-
tory of England From the Earliest Period to the Year 1803, Parliamentary Debates, vol. 30: 
13th December 1792 to 10th March 1794 (London 1817), 657f. 
32 For the debate in the House of Commons on 10 June 1806, see Great Britain, Parliament, Sub-
stance of the Debates on a Resolution for Abolishing the Slave Trade, 1–85. For the debate in 
the House of Lords on 24 June 1806, see ibid., 87–154. For the debate in parliament, see also 
Oldfield, Transatlantic Abolitionism, 186–188; Joel Quirk, The Anti-Slavery Project: From 
the Slave Trade to Human Trafficking (Philadelphia 2011), 48f.; Boyd Hilton, “1807 and All 
That. Why Britain Outlawed her Slave Trade”, in Derek R. Peterson (ed.), Abolitionism and 
Imperialism in Britain, Africa, and the Atlantic (Athens, GA 2010), 63–83.
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debate and clearly took a stand by stigmatising the slave trade as a gross 
violation of common-sense humanity:
My Lords; if we were to define humanity, what should we say it was? What are its 
attributes; what is its character? “A sympathy of feeling for the distress of others – a 
desire to accomplish good ends by good means.” Let any man examine these qualities, 
and tell you, if he can, how the Slave Trade agrees with either of them; and if he 
cannot, I think we can have no difficulty in saying, that the Slave Trade is contrary to 
humanity.33
The resolution’s core statement that the slave trade was “contrary to human-
ity”, once again emphasised by Lord Grenville’s statement, became a legal 
norm just nine months later. On 25 March 1807 Parliament passed the “Act 
of the British Parliament for the Abolition of the Slave Trade”.34 Under this 
act, every British citizen was forbidden to engage, directly or indirectly, in 
any aspect of the slave trade under threat of a heavy fine of 100 pounds35 
per slave. The singular importance of this decision lay, above all, in the fact 
that the struggle against the transatlantic slave trade, which the abolitionists 
had up to that point conducted exclusively at the levels of civil society and 
politics, now became, by law, a matter of the United Kingdom. The British 
government had committed itself to deploy means of state against the traffic 
in human beings. Accordingly, the act had practical implications, stipulating 
the seizure of slave ships:
And be it further enacted, that all Ships and Vessels, Slaves or Natives of Africa, 
carried, conveyed, or dealt with as Slaves, and all other goods and effects that shall or 
may become forfeited for any offence committed against this Act, shall and may be 
seized by any Officer of His Majesty’s Customs or Excise, or by the Commanders or 
Officers of any of His Majesty’s Ships or Vessels of War.36
In this way the Abolition Act laid the legal foundation for the military deploy-
ment of the Royal Navy off the coast of West Africa to enforce the ban on the 
transatlantic slave trade. For this purpose, the Admiralty sent two warships 
to African waters in 1808, the year immediately following the passage of the 
33 Quote from Lord Grenville’s Speech in the House of Lords on 24 June 1806, in Great Britain, 
Parliament, Substance of the Debates on a Resolution for Abolishing the Slave Trade, 90.
34 “Act of the British Parliament for the Abolition of the Slave Trade”, 25th March 1807, in 
BFSP 5, 559–568. See also Stephen Farrell, “ ‘Contrary to the Principle of Justice, Humanity 
and Sound Policy’: The Slave Trade, Parliamentary Politics and the Abolition Act, 1807”, in 
Stephen Farrell et al., The British Slave Trade: Abolition, Parliament and People (Edinburgh 
2007), 141–171. 
35 In 1787, a British pound had the purchasing power of about US $140 today.
36 “Act of the British Parliament”, BFSP 5, 567.
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act. In view of the task of patrolling a coastline more than 3.000 miles long 
from Cap-Vert in today’s Senegal to Cape Fria in today’s Namibia, this step 
was at first no more than a symbolic act. In 1811, however, the number of 
vessels was increased to that of a small fleet, and Great Britain continued 
to demonstrate its permanent military presence along the infamous Slave 
Coast until the mid-1860s: the first and longest humanitarian intervention 
in history. At the high point of its engagement in the 1840s, the British fleet 
consisted of more than 30 ships.37 Ultimately, Lord Abingdon’s contention 
that humanity was only “a private feeling, and not a public principle to act 
upon […], and not a constitutional right”38 was refuted in practice; instead, 
humanity and its violations became a guiding, legally recognized principle 
for the new British foreign policy paradigm of abolition, which eventually 
initiated and justified the new practice of humanitarian intervention.
3. Enforcing Abolition and Establishing an International Norm
However, this military intervention raised a major problem from the very start, 
namely the insufficiently addressed question of the mandate. What types of 
operations were British officers officially mandated to conduct? In addition 
to British slave ships, were they permitted to stop, search and seize the slave 
ships of other nations? All of these questions touched upon highly sensitive 
rights of national sovereignty and contained enough diplomatic explosives to 
spark serious international complications. During the Napoleonic wars, Great 
Britain legitimised its unilateral operations against the slave ships of other 
nations by citing maritime law in times of war which provided the right to 
stop and seize foreign ships as legitimate prizes.39 With the end of Napoleon’s 
reign and the peace agreement of 1814, the situation altered fundamentally, 
leaving Britain with the need for a new basis in international law for its policy 
of intercepting foreign slave ships in times of peace.
At the Congress of Vienna in 1814/15, the British foreign secretary, Lord 
Castlereagh, attempted to persuade other participating countries to support 
37 On this deployment of the Royal Navy, see Christopher Lloyd, The Navy and the Slave Trade. 
The Suppression of the African Slave Trade in the Nineteenth Century (London 1968); William 
Ernest Frank Ward, The Royal Navy and the Slavers. The Suppression of the Atlantic Slave 
Trade (London 1969); Siân Rees, Sweet Water and Bitter. The Ships that Stopped the Slave 
Trade (London 2009).
38 Speech of Lord Abingdon on 11 April 1793, in Cobbett, Parliamentary History, 657f. 
39 On this, see Jean Allain, “The Nineteenth Century Law of the Sea and the British Abolition of 
the Slave Trade”, in British Yearbook of International Law 78 (2007), 342–388; Holger Lutz 
Kern, “Strategies of Legal Change: Great Britain, International Law, and the Abolition of the 
Transatlantic Slave Trade”, in Journal of the History of International Law 6:2 (2004), 233–258.
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a declaration for the immediate and universal ban of the slave trade by ex- 
plicitly invoking the principles of common morality and humanity.40 At the 
same time, Castlereagh proposed joint measures of direct maritime inter-
vention to stop and confiscate slave ships in international waters.41 The result 
of the controversial and fierce negotiations in Vienna was the “Déclaration 
des 8 Cours, relative à l’Abolition Universelle de la Traite des Nègres”, signed 
on 8 February 1815.42 In the spirit of the Enlightenment and in the name of all 
“civilized states”, the eight members of the commission condemned the slave 
trade as a glaring contradiction to the “principes d’humanité et de la morale 
universelle”.43 The declaration explicitly undertook to end this scourge, 
which had devastated Africa, humiliated Europe, and haunted humankind. 
It concluded with a direct appeal to all “civilized nations” to sustain and 
contribute to the noble cause of abolishing the slave trade with all means 
possible.
The Vienna declaration did not establish a legally binding ban, as the 
British delegation had sought to achieve; it was strictly a declaration of 
intent. However, its significance should not be underestimated. Its inclusion 
in the final act of the congress reveals its special status in international law 
because this international condemnation of human trafficking was approved 
not only by the members of the eight-nation commission but also by all of 
the countries participating in the congress.44 With this broad base of support, 
the declaration transformed a humanitarian idea to a concrete norm in inter-
national law.45 Although the Vienna declaration was not legally binding, it 
40 “Protocole de la 1ère Séance Particulière Entre les Plénipotentiares des 8 Cours, 20th January 
1815”, in BFSP 3, 949–951.
41 “Protocole de la 2de Conférence Particulière Entre les Plénipotentiares des 8 Cours”, in 
BFSP 3, 961f.
42 For a detailed description of these negotiations, see Charles K. Webster, The Foreign Policy 
of Castlereagh 1812–1815. Britain and the Reconstruction of Europe (London 1931), 413–424; 
Jerome Reich, “The Slave Trade at the Congress of Vienna. A Study in English Public Opinion”, 
in Journal of Negro History 53:2 (1968), 129–163, on pp. 137–140. On the question of the slave 
trade at the Congress of Vienna in general, see Helmut Berding, “Die Ächtung des Sklaven-
handels auf dem Wiener Kongress 1814/15”, in Historische Zeitschrift 219:2 (1974), 265–290, 
on pp. 266–289; Ian Clark, International Legitimacy and World Society (Oxford 2007), 37–60; 
Thomas Weller, “ ‘…répugnant aux principes d’humanité’. Die Ächtung des Sklavenhandels in 
der Kongressakte und die Rolle der Kirche”, in Heinz Duchhardt / Johannes Wischmeyer (ed.), 
Der Wiener Kongress – eine kirchenpolitische Zäsur? (Göttingen 2013), 183–213; Brian E. 
Vick, The Congress of Vienna. Power and Politics After Napoleon (Cambridge 2014), 201–212.
43 “Declaration des 8 Cours, relative à l’Abolition Universelle de la Traite des Nègres”, 8 February 
1815, in BFSP 3, 971f.
44 The declaration was included in Article 118 as no. 15 of the final act. See Johann Ludwig 
Klüber (ed.), Schluß-Acte des Wiener Congresses vom 9. Juni 1815 (Erlangen 1818), 111.
45 Berding, “Ächtung des Sklavenhandels”, 267f.; Clark, International Legitimacy, 42, 55–57; 
Robert Rie, Der Wiener Kongress und das Völkerrecht (Bonn 1957), 131; Vick, Congress of 
Vienna, 211.
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may be referred to as one of the first important documents in the history of 
international humanitarian law, one in which the concept of humanity was 
firmly established as a norm.
In their vigorous demands to implement the ban of the slave trade, the 
abolitionists now used the Vienna declaration as a crucial point of reference. 
For instance, in a pamphlet published in 1816 the British lawyer James 
Stephen consistently referred to the internationally agreed principle that the 
slave trade was repugnant to humanity in order to attack the fierce Spanish 
resistance to universal abolition.46 Furthermore, Stephen, who had given his 
brother-in-law William Wilberforce the decisive juristic impulse for the 1807 
Abolition Act, derived from the declaration of the Congress of Vienna an 
internationally binding legal obligation on all “civilized nations” to enforce 
the ban. He addressed the question which measures the countries were man-
dated to undertake by citing the founding fathers of international law, Hugo 
Grotius and Emerich de Vattel, both of whom had granted states the right to 
intervene in cases where natural law was being severely violated.47 Accord-
ingly Stephen drew the conclusion: “If we have reasoned thus far justly, the 
Slave Trade is contrary to the law of nature; it is an enormous violation of 
that law; all nations have a right, all who safely can, are bound in duty to 
suppress it; and Africa is an object of this duty.” 48 Since the slave trade was 
now recognised internationally as standing in glaring contradiction to nat-
ural and international law, one was obliged to fight actively against human 
trafficking. Stephen once again emphasised this crucial notion by stating that
[t]o maintain the law of nature and of nations, to punish, or at least restrain, enormous 
violations of it, to succour an unhappy people oppressed by such offences, to promote 
by all means in our power the social and moral improvement and happiness of other 
countries, are duties, and therefore rights, not peculiar to Great Britain, […] but belong 
to all the branches of the human family, and pre-eminently to every civilized nation.49
With this line of argument, based on natural and international law, the law-
yer provided a legal justification for the practice of military intervention by 
states against the slave trade in the name of common humanity.
In practice Great Britain implemented this emerging concept with its 
naval strike against Algiers in August 1816, when the Royal Navy destroyed 
almost the entire pirate fleet, liberated over 1.600 European slaves and forced 
the ruling dey to sign a treaty on the unqualified end of the enslavement 
46 James Stephen, An Inquiry Into the Right and Duty of Compelling Spain to Relinquish her Slave 
Trade in Northern Africa (London 1816), 13, 20, 59.
47 Ibid., 18–20, 33.
48 Ibid., 49.
49 Ibid., 50.
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of Christians.50 By its intervention against the leading Barbary state, which 
Castlereagh later even characterised as a “war of justice and humanity”,51 
London sent the clear message that it would not hesitate to use military 
means to enforce its new foreign policy paradigm of universal abolition. 
However, the Algiers episode marked only the prelude to a much larger 
development. In the wake of the Congress of Vienna, as discussed above, 
the British government initiated diplomatic negotiations to install an inter-
national machinery of enforcement.52 Thus, a model of combining military 
and legal enforcement measures that had been discussed in Vienna found its 
way into an international treaty network between the United Kingdom and 
various other countries.
The first two of these agreements were the legally binding treaties in 
1817 with Portugal and Spain, which both referred directly to the principles 
stipulated in the Vienna declaration.53 The treaty with Spain even explicitly 
stressed this commitment of the Spanish crown by declaring:
His Catholic Majesty concurs, in the fullest manner, in the sentiments of His Britannic 
Majesty, with respect to the injustice and inhumanity of the Traffic in Slaves […]. And 
His Catholic Majesty, conformably to the spirit of this Article, and to the principles of 
humanity with which He is animated, having never lost sight of an object so interesting 
to Him, and being desirous of hastening the moment of its attainment, has resolved 
to co-operate with His Britannic Majesty in the cause of humanity, by adopting, in 
concert with His said Majesty efficacious means for bringing about the abolition of 
the Slave Trade.54
50 On this naval strike, see Parkinson, Pellew, 457–464; Perkins / Douglas-Morris, Gunfire in 
Barbary, 107–132. 
51 “Speech of Castlereagh Before the House of Commons”, 3 February 1817, in Hansard, Parlia-
mentary Debates XXXV (1817), 177–179.
52 For the beginning of these negotiations from 1816 to 1819, see The National Archives of the UK 
(TNA), Foreign Office (FO) 84/1 and TNA/FO 84/2; “Note sur le projet d’une ligue maritime 
pour assurer l’abolition de la traite et la repression de la piraterie des Barbaresques”, n. d, Le 
Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Archives des Affaires Étragères (MAE), MD A15; Paul M. 
Kielstra, The Politics of Slave Trade Suppression in Britain and France 1814–1848. Diplomacy, 
Morality and Economics (Basingstoke 2000), 64–67.
53 “Additional Convention to the Treaty of the 22nd January 1815, between His Britannick Majesty 
and His Most Faithful Majesty, for the purpose of preventing their Subjects from engaging 
in any illicit Traffic in Slaves”, 28 July 1817, TNA, FO 84/2; “Additional Convention to the 
Treaty concluded at Madrid, on the 5th of July 1814, between His Britannic Majesty and His 
Catholic Majesty, for preventing their Subjects from engaging in any illicit Traffic in Slaves”, 
23 September 1817, ibid.
54 Ibid.
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With their signature each of the respective treaty parties agreed to grant the 
other a mutual “right to visit” their merchant ships in international waters 
during peacetime. This amounted to no less than the surrender of sovereign 
rights and was, in Castlereagh’s view, critical for the fight against the slave 
trade: “It is the basis of the whole without which treaties to abolish it [the 
slave trade] are mere waste paper.”55 These treaties granted the navies of the 
respective countries the right in specified zones to stop ships suspected of 
slave trade, inspect them, and – if slaves were found on board – to confiscate 
them. Only warships with the required special authority, documented in the 
languages of both parties to the treaty, were permitted to engage in such 
activity under strict adherence to the common instructions.56 In this way, a 
notable standardisation in the use of military executive force by the navies of 
three different countries was created, with the clear aim to avoid diplomatic 
complications from the outset and to conduct international cooperation as 
smoothly as possible.
Moreover, these treaties stipulated the creation of the so-called “Mixed 
Commissions for the Abolition of the Slave Trade”.57 The sole purpose of 
these international commissions was to guarantee the adjudication of cases 
of captured ships. Similarly to the military measures, the treaty partners 
established a standardisation that stipulated a uniform set of practices, 
functions, and procedures for all of the mixed commissions eventually estab-
lished throughout the entire Atlantic area. The treaty countries were equally 
represented on each commission by a commissary judge and a commissioner 
of arbitration, whereas the state on whose territory the mixed commission 
was seated appointed a secretary.58 In this respect, the commissions are to be 
viewed as the first system of international jurisdiction.59 Under the leadership 
55 “Letter from Viscount Castlereagh to Wellesley”, 24 July 1817, TNA, FO 72/196.
56 “Instructions Intended for the British and Portuguese Ships of War Employed to Prevent the 
Illicit Traffic in Slaves”, TNA, FO 84/2; “Instructions for the British and Spanish Ships of War 
Employed to Prevent the Illicit Traffic in Slaves.” Ibid.
57 “Article 8 of the Additional Convention”, 28 July 1817, TNA, FO 84/2; “Article 12 of the Addi-
tional Convention”, 23 September 1817, ibid.
58 For mixed commissions, see Leslie Bethell, “The Mixed Commissions for the Suppression of 
the Slave Trade in the Nineteenth Century”, in The Journal of African History 7 (1966), 79–93; 
Farida Shaikh, “Judicial Diplomacy. British Officials and the Mixed Commission Courts”, in 
Keith Hamilton / Patrick Salmon (ed.), Slavery, Diplomacy and Empire. Britain and the Sup-
pression of the Slave Trade, 1807–1975 (Brighton 2009), 42–64.
59 On the definition of the mixed commissions as “international courts” see exemplary the report 
of the British Commissioner in Luanda, Edmund Gabriel: “That the Mixed Commissions […], 
being international Courts, created for a definite and special purpose, and existing solely in 
consequence of precise treaty stipulations, cannot be constituted or governed by the laws 
of either country”, in Edmund Gabriel, “Opinion of Her Majesty’s Acting Commissioner, 
20th December 1856”, in Foreign Office (ed.), Correspondence With the British Commission-
ers at Sierra Leone, Havana, The Cape of Good Hope, and Loanda; and Reports From British 
Naval Officers, Relating to the Slave Trade, From April 1, 1857, to March 31, 1858 (London 
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of the United Kingdom an international enforcement machinery was thus 
developed, based on the idea that an internationally stipulated humanitarian 
norm was to be implemented by combined military and judicial means.60
In the course of diplomatic negotiations lasting several decades, Great 
Britain successfully managed to establish a comprehensive international 
treaty network to enforce abolition. This included almost all states in Europe 
and the Americas as well as several African kingdoms.61 However, powers 
such as France and the United States of America persistently rejected the 
idea of granting a mutual “right to visit” its merchant ships and of joining 
a common system of international courts, mainly due to their traditional 
suspicion towards the foreign policy agenda of their old maritime rival Great 
Britain. Instead, Paris and Washington deployed their own navy squadrons 
to West African waters to capture slave ships sailing under their flags and 
accordingly to hand them over to French and US national courts for adjudi-
cation.62 But despite their reluctance to join an international system led by 
the United Kingdom, neither France nor the United States disagreed on the 
fundamental notion that the slave trade constituted a serious crime. Thus, by 
the mid-nineteenth century an international moral consensus had emerged 
that human trafficking was indeed a gross violation of common humanity 
and justified the employment of violent means.
1858), 60. See also Eugene Kontorovich, “The Constitutionality of International Courts: The 
Forgotten Precedent of Slave Trade Tribunals”, in University of Pennsylvania Law Review 158 
(2009), 39–115.
60 Fabian Klose, “Humanitäre Intervention und internationale Gerichtsbarkeit – Verflechtung 
militärischer und juristischer Implementierungsmaßnahmen zu Beginn des 19. Jahrhunderts”, 
in Militärgeschichtliche Zeitschrift 72 (2013), 1–21.
61 For this international treaty regime against the slave trade, see Ethan A. Nadelmann, “Global 
Prohibition Regime: The Evolution of Norms in International Society”, in International Organ-
ization 44 (1990), 479–526, on pp. 491–498; Edward Keene, “A Case Study of the Construction 
of International Hierarchy: British Treaty-Making Against the Slave-Trade in the Early Nine-
teenth Century”, in International Organization 61 (2007), 311–339; Matthew Mason, “Keeping 
Up Appearances. The International Politics of Slave Trade Abolition in the Nineteenth-Cen-
tury Atlantic World”, in The William and Mary Quarterly 66:1 (2009), 809–832; Robin Law, 
“Abolition and Imperialism. International Law and the British Suppression of the Atlantic 
Slave Trade”, in Derek R. Peterson (ed.), Abolitionism and Imperialism in Britain, Africa, and 
the Atlantic (Athens, GA 2010), 150–174. For an overview of all treaties concerning the salve 
trade in the period between 1776 to 1863, see “Slave Trade Suppression Tables; or A Chron-
ologically Arranged Statement of the Measures Taken by Different Nations for the Abolition 
of the Slave Trade”, in Her Majesty’s Stationery Office (ed.), Slave Trade Instructions, Being 
Instructions for the Guidance of the Commanders of Her Majesty’s Ships of War Employed in 
The Suppression of the Slave Trade (London 1865), 131–142.
62 On the operations of the French and US Navy, see Serge Daget, La répression de la traite des 
Noirs au XIXe siècle: L’action des croisières françaises sur les côtes occidentales de l’Afrique 
(1817–1850) (Paris 1997); Donald L. Canney, Africa Squadron. The U.S. Navy and the Slave 
Trade, 1842–1861 (Washington, DC 2006).
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This significant consensus also found its way into such a seminal text of 
international law as Henry Wheaton’s “Elements of International Law”, first 
published in 1836. The renowned US legal scholar, who justified US govern-
ment position against an international enforcement machinery and firmly 
endorsed national measures instead, explicitly stated in his study:
The African slave trade, once considered not only a lawful, but desirable branch of 
commerce, a participation in which was made the object of wars, negotiations, and 
treaties between different European states, is now denounced as an odious crime by 
the almost universal consent of nations.63
By referring directly to the Vienna declaration and the related international 
treaty regime he clearly underlined this position. Furthermore, in his later 
publications, he clearly denounced the slave trade even as a “crime against 
humanity”,64 using a legal term long before it became a crucial element of 
international criminal law of the twentieth century.65
4. Conclusion: 
The Ambivalence of Humanity as an International Norm
This chapter has surveyed the lasting consequences of theoretical debates 
about the concept of humanity for an interventionist practice in international 
politics in the course of the long nineteenth century. Using the case study of 
63 Henry Wheaton, Elements of International Law With a Sketch of the History of the Science 
(Philadelphia 1836), 114f.
64 “[…] a traffic so justly stigmatized by every civilized and Christian powers as a crime against 
humanity” and “Public opinion stigmatizing the traffic as a crime against humanity”, in Henry 
Wheaton, Enquiry Into the Validity of the British Claim to a Right of Visitation and Search of 
American Vessel Suspected to be Engaged in the African Slave Trade (Philadelphia 1842), 4, 16; 
id., History of the Law of Nations in Europe and America From the Earliest Times to the Treaty 
of Washington, 1842 (New York 1845), 594. Despite that Bruce Mazlish denies the importance 
of abolitionism in this context and argues that “ ‘crimes against humanity’ only enters the 
vocabulary as a legal assertion in the twentieth century”, cf., Mazlish, Idea of Humanity, 2. The 
British Navy officers Joseph Denman, who was on duty with the Royal Navy in West Africa, 
also used the term “crime against humanity” in his publication in 1850: “Public opinion urged 
on an unwilling government all the efforts against the traffic at the Congress of Vienna; which, 
in declaring it a crime against humanity and universal morality, spoke the sentiments of the 
people of England”, in Joseph Denman, The Slave Trade, the African Squadron, and Mr. Hutt’s 
Committee (London [1850]), 10.
65 For the further historical development of the term in international criminal law, see Kerstin von 
Lingen, “Fulfilling the Martens Clause: Debating ‘Crimes Against Humanity’, 1899–1945”, 
in this volume and Jenny Martinez, The Slave Trade and the Origins of International Human 
Rights Law (Oxford 2012), 114–116; M. Cherif Bassiouni, Crimes Against Humanity. Historical 
Evolution and Contemporary Application (Cambridge 2011).
Open-Access-Publikation im Sinne der CC-Lizenz BY-NC-ND 4.0
185“A War of Justice and Humanity”
the abolition of the slave trade, it has been shown that through the abolition-
ist campaign and the related enforcement of the ban on human trafficking, 
the concept of humanity increasingly developed from a moral category to 
a widely accepted norm in international politics. British abolitionists suc-
cessfully used the moral argument that the slave trade was contrary to all 
principles of humanity and finally received legal recognition of this funda-
mental notion with the Abolition Act of 1807. Pursuing efficient enforce-
ment, the United Kingdom initiated an international treaty network based 
on the emerging international consensus that human trafficking constituted 
a “crime against humanity”. The idea of protecting the emerging interna-
tional norm of humanity by force was thus established in the long nineteenth 
century. States now referred to the norm of humanity for the purpose of 
gaining authority and legitimation for their actions and their interventionist 
practices.
However, at this point it is absolutely crucial to bear in mind that the pro-
cess of establishing humanity as an international norm was by no means 
free of fundamental inconsistencies and ambivalences. Attacking the slave 
trade did not immediately and automatically lead to the end of the institu-
tion of colonial slavery itself. Great Britain could passionately fight for its 
foreign policy paradigm of abolishing human trafficking, but at the same 
time left colonial slavery untouched for nearly another two decades until the 
final Slavery Abolition Act of 1833. Other countries being also part of the 
international treaty regime waited even longer, until the second half of the 
nineteenth century, to abolish human bondage eventually, such as the United 
States in 1865, Spain in Cuba in 1886 and Brazil in 1888.66
Moreover, there is a string argument that the practice of intervening 
against the slave trade “in the cause of humanity” triggered a development 
in the exact opposite direction, thus revealing the ambivalence of humanity 
as a nineteenth-century norm. As shown in this chapter, the concept could 
be successfully used to support abolition and even its military enforcement. 
But at the same time abolishing the slave trade in the name of humanity could 
be an effective instrument for legitimising colonial and imperial conquest in 
Africa. The General Act of the Anti-Slavery Conference of Brussels in 1890, 
which was enthusiastically celebrated by the British prime minister, Lord 
Salisbury, as a “Conference […] for the purpose of promoting a matter of pure 
humanity”,67 reveals this ambivalence in the clearest way. The content of the 
general act officially contained an entire interventionist charter against the 
66 For the eventual abolition of slavery, see Drescher, Abolition, 245–266, 333–371; Blackburn, 
American Crucible, 391–454.
67 Quote by Lord Salisbury on the eve of the Brussels conference, 9 November 1889, in Gwendo-
len Cecil, Life of Robert Marquess of Salisbury, vol. IV: 1887–1892 (London 1932), 256.
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slave trade on the African continent based on the older tradition and efforts 
to ban it.68 In practice, however, this international agreement significantly 
contributed to the emergence of forced labour by indigenous peoples or what 
Kevin Grant so trenchantly called the “New Slaveries” in the European colo-
nies, with King Leopold of Belgium’s Congo Free State as the most atrocious 
example.69 Thus the issue of intervening against the African slave trade in 
the name of a common humanity reveals most vividly the close and infamous 
entanglement of European humanitarianism with nineteenth-century colo-
nialism and imperialism.70
68 For the “General Act of the Brussels Conference relative to the African Slave Trade”, 2 July 
1890, see BFSP 82, 55–78. On the consequences of the conference, see Marcel van der Linden, 
“Unanticipated Consequences of ‘Humanitarian Intervention’: The British Campaign to 
Abolish the Slave Trade, 1807–1900”, in Theory and Society 39:3–4 (2010), 281–298; Suzanne 
Miers, “The Brussels Conference of 1889–1890: The Slave Trade in the Policies of Great 
Britain and Germany”, in Prosser Gifford / William Roger Louis (ed.), Britain and Germany in 
Africa. Imperial Rivalry and Colonial Rule (New Haven, CT 1967), 83–118.
69 See esp. Jan-Georg Deutsch, Emacipation Without Abolition in German East Africa c. 1884–
1914 (Oxford 2006); Kevin Grant, A Civilised Savagery. Britain and the New Slaveries in 
Africa, 1884–1926 (New York 2005). On the Congo atrocities and the campaign against them, 
see Mairi S. MacDonald, “Lord Vivian’s Tears. The Moral Hazards of Humanitarian Interven-
tion”, in Fabian Klose (ed.), The Emergence of Humanitarian Intervention. Ideas and Practice 
From the Nineteenth Century to the Present (Cambridge 2016), 121–141; Daniel Laqua, The 
Age of Internationalism and Belgium, 1880–1930. Peace, Progress and Prestige (Manchester 
2013), 56–64; Kevin Grant, “Christian Critics of Empire: Missionaries, Lantern Lectures, 
and the Congo Reform Campaign in Britain”, in The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth 
History 29:2 (2001), 27–58; Andrew Porter, “Sir Roger Casement and the International Human-
itarian Movement”, in Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 29:2 (2001), 59–74.
70 For the significant entanglement of humanitarianism and European colonialism/imperialism 
in the nineteenth century, see Johannes Paulmann, “Humanitarianism and Empire”, in John 
M. MacKenzie (ed.), The Encylopedia of Empire (Oxford 2016), 1112–1123. Alan Lester / Fae 
Dussart, Colonization and the Origins of Humanitarian Governance. Protecting Aboriginies 
Across the Nineteenth-Century British Empire (Cambridge 2014); Rob Skinner / Alan Lester, 
“Humanitarianism and Empire: New Research Agendas”, in The Journal of Imperial and 
Commonwealth History 40:5 (2012), 729–747; Caroline Shaw, Britannia’s Embrace: Modern 
Humanitarianism and the Imperial Origins of Refugee Relief (Oxford 2015); Amalia Ribi 
Forclaz, Humanitarian Imperialism. The Politics of Anti-Slavery Activism, 1880–1940 (Oxford 
2015); Andrew Thompson, Humanitarian Interventions, Past and Present, in Fabian Klose 
(ed.), The Emergence of Humanitarian Intervention. Ideas and Practice From the Nineteenth 
Century to the Present (Cambridge 2016), 331–356; Michael Barnett, Empire of Humanity. A 
History of Humanitarianism (Ithaca, NY 2011), 29f., 47–94.
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Fulfilling the Martens Clause
Debating “Crimes Against Humanity”, 1899–1945
When, on 8 August 1945, the London Conference was concluded with the 
charter for the first international military tribunal to be held at Nuremberg, 
the document contained a small sensation. Among the three charges listed 
was a new term: the Nazi leaders would face punishment not only for war 
crimes, but also for crimes against peace and for crimes against humanity. 
The international community thus responded to one of the most horrific 
novelties of the twentieth century, the politically organized persecution and 
slaughter of people under one’s own control.1 The term originated in debates 
within the United Nations War Crimes Commission (UNWCC), founded in 
1943, which had been concerned with formulating a minimum standard in 
dealing with mass atrocities whilst the war still raged on. The community 
of transnational lawyers involved thus suggested that the wording later used 
at Nuremberg be set down in the London Conference. By doing so, the term 
“humanity” was given renewed prominence.2
The concept of “Crimes against Humanity” states that “citizens are under 
protection of international law even when they are victimized by their own 
compatriots”.3 The new concept had been added to the agenda “because 
it was feared that under the traditional formulation of war crimes, many 
of the acts of the Nazis would go unpunished”.4 The concept of Crimes 
against Humanity thus represents an important legal tool in the Nuremberg 
era, especially with regard to Holocaust-related crimes in Europe, and is 
a turning point in legal thinking. As a legal tool, it has acquired “enor-
mous resonance in the legal and moral imaginations of the post-World 
War II world”.5 Although often perceived as a Nuremberg “invention”, the 
concept of crimes against humanity was not introduced at the tribunal at 
1 David Luban, “A Theory of Crimes Against Humanity”, in: The Yale Journal of International 
Law 29 (2004), 85–167, on p. 94.
2 The text of the Nuremberg Charter / London Conference can be found at http://avalon.law.yale.
edu/imt/jack60.asp, the charges are under art. 6.
3 Beth van Schaack, “The Definition of Crimes Against Humanity: Resolving the Incoherence”, 
in Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 37 (1998–1999), 787–850, on p. 791.
4 Ibid., 789; Bassiouni, too, argues that the idea of “crimes against humanity” was the “product 
of exigent historical circumstances”, see M. Cherif Bassiouni, “The Need for a Specialized 
Convention”, in Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 31 (1993–1994), 457–494, on p. 472.
5 Luban, “A Theory of Crimes Against Humanity”, 86.
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Nuremberg,6 but can be seen as a fulfilment of the so-called Martens Clause 
of The Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and its underlying notion of 
humanity. The Martens Clause dates back to the nineteenth-century human-
itarian thinking and general international concerns like piracy and the slave 
trade. As this paper argues, the London Charter is the fulfilment of the moral 
approach towards the idea of humanity, and a transformation of this notion 
into a legal tool, into, as it were, a concept of Humanity.
The idea of humanity is rooted in Greek philosophy, Roman law and 
Christian theology and has found its noblest expressions in the Enlighten-
ment as well as in the French revolution. Bassiouni states that the idea of 
humanity emerged not only out of the history of the long and bloody twen-
tieth century, but had for centuries been shared “within laws and writings 
throughout western, Judeo-Christian, Islamic and other civilizations”, which 
expressed values and beliefs according to which “life, liberty, physical 
integrity and personal dignity are the fundamental rights of humanity”.7 As 
Mazlish observes, “humankind” and “humanity” as well as the “concept of 
Humanity” are terms that have core meanings, but changed over time, as 
they merged into one another, that have a certain ambiguity and are often 
used inconsistently in historical sources.8 Mazlish was the first to use the 
capital “H” to distinguish the concept, and observes: “The concept Humanity 
itself is a social construct, […] changing over time and place and only taking 
on legal and political actuality in the last half of the twentieth century.”9 
Legal norms play a key role within the concept of Humanity: Building on the 
assumption that humans are rational and equal, and given that laws ensure 
that equal rights are applied, he continues, “Humanity is rational, equal and 
legal in its existence”.10 He holds that the genesis of the concept of Humanity 
is intrinsically linked to the era of total war.11 McFarland also underlines that 
the concept of crimes against Humanity is an outcome of the violence and 
wars experienced in the first half of the twentieth century,12 or as Mazlish 
puts it: “The attempt to annihilate identified portions of humanity fosters an 
awareness for the opposite of such inhumanity: Humanity.”13
6 Id., “Theory of Crimes Against Humanity”, wrongly assumes that “no record exists of how the 
term crimes against humanity came to be chosen by the framers of the Nuremberg Charter”, 86.
7 Bassiouni, “Crimes Against Humanity”, 488.




12 Sam McFarland, “The Slow Creation of Humanity”, in Political Psychology 32:1 (2011), 1–20, 
on p. 8.
13 Mazlish, The Idea of Humanity, 36.
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However, the emphasis on the concept in the era of total war does not take 
its older roots into account, as this paper does, and fails to explain why the 
time was ripe during the Second World War to fulfil the humanitarian aspect. 
Judging from debates in the nineteenth century, the following model seems 
plausible: “Humanity” was first used in a moral sense, then became loaded 
with an additional political dimension during the Hague era before the first 
World War, and in the era of total war it was transformed into a legal tool for 
bringing the perpetrators of mass violence to justice.
The rise of the concept of Humanity thus took place within a judicial 
revolution over the course of nearly a century, and is an achievement fostered 
by international lawyers. In fact, its last protagonists are foregrounded in this 
chapter: the UNWCC’s legal committee, based in London and chaired by 
the Czechoslovakian representative Bohuslav Ecer with Egon Schwelb as its 
influential secretary, spearheaded the debate and played a key role in coin-
ing this concept. As will be examined later, the term surfaced in UNWCC 
meetings in 1944 and was adopted by the London Charter for the Nuremberg 
International Tribunal in 1945.
1. The Concept of Humanity and “Civilized Warfare”: 
From Abolition to the Hague Peace Conferences to Versailles
If we observe the use of the term “humanity” within the debate on the aboli-
tion of the transatlantic slave trade, as Fabian Klose points out in his chapter 
in this volume, the term “crimes against humanity” first shows up in the 
writings of Henry Wheaton, in his treatise “Elements of International Law” 
and later writings.14 Here, however, “humanity” is used as a moral category 
legitimizing humanitarian intervention, so to speak the Kantian imperative 
to act.
It first gained legal momentum in the courts for the abolition of the slave 
trade, the so-called Mixed Commissions, which used the term “crimes 
against humanity” in a broader sense.15 Martinez’s theory emphasizing the 
Mixed Commissions as the birth of the concept of crimes against humanity 
is however not entirely convincing: the idea behind this legislation was still 
deeply rooted in colonial reasoning, and emphasized the economic dimension 
14 See Fabian Klose, “ ‘A War of Justice and Humanity’: Abolition and Establishing Humanity 
as an International Norm”, in this volume. Klose refers to Henry Wheaton, Elements of Inter-
national Law With a Sketch of the History of the Science (Philadelphia 1836), 114f., as well as 
Wheaton’s Enquiry on issues related to slave trade issues of 1842. 
15 See Jenny S. Martinez, “Antislavery Courts and the Dawn of International Human Rights 
Law”, in The Yale Law Journal 117:4 (2008), 550–641; id., The Slave Trade and the Origins of 
International Human Rights Law (Oxford 2012), 115, 136. 
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of the slave trade. Prize courts dealt with ship loads and human trafficking, 
not with human suffering, although moral arguments were raised to justify 
intervention and abolition. It is thus misleading to date the origins of the legal 
dimension of “crimes against humanity” back to the anti-slavery courts.
Instead, the coining of a legal concept paralleled the drafting of the laws 
of war in the nineteenth century, and thus added to a moral concept a polit-
ical layer, and finally a legal one, making it possible to employ it as a legal 
tool. The idea of “civilized warfare” started as a kind of by-product of the 
foundation of the International Red Cross in 1863 and its idea to provide 
relief to wounded or imprisoned soldiers as well as civilians suffering from 
the horrors of war. Although at the time war was considered a legitimate form 
of achieving political goals, attempts were discussed to protect citizen form 
the effects of its violence. Debates developed in two directions: on one side, 
the jus ad bellum (the legality of entering into a conflict), on the other the jus 
in bello (rules for handling combatants and civilians), which is of interest for 
the nascent humanitarian law or law of armed conflict.
These attempts should be seen against the backdrop of the Victorian era 
and its imperialism. At the time, the world was perceived as belonging to dif-
ferent spheres of imagined standards of civilisation, and the Western coun-
tries wrapped their colonial interests in a mission to “civilize” other peoples 
and put their territories under supervision.16 In this regard, debates about 
civilizing warfare were reserved for conflicts amongst equal partners, but 
not binding for colonial warfare or wars outside of Europe. In the first half of 
the twentieth century, the two World Wars and the violence they unleashed 
between western partners destroyed this Eurocentric concept of civilisation, 
making room for more global approaches to humanizing wars, namely by 
establishing legal guidelines.17 The end of the Second World War thus also 
marks the end of “civilization” as a normative principle.18
There are, broadly speaking, three phases in the continuing effort by 
international lawyers to civilize warfare: after 1863, after 1919 and dur-
ing the Second World War (1939–1945). There had been ongoing debates 
since the mid nineteenth century19 to enforce what we would today term 
humanitarian standards.20 As Michelle Tusan underlines, the central point 
16 Gerrit W. Gong, The Standard of Civilization in International Society (Oxford 1984); Bruce 
Mazlish, Civilization and its Contents (Stanford, CA 2004), 73–90.
17 Mark Mazower, “The End of Civilization and the Rise of Human Rights”, in Stefan-Ludwig 
Hoffmann (ed.), Human Rights in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge 2010), 29–44, on p. 29.
18 Ibid., 30.
19 William Schabas, Unimaginable Atrocities. Justice, Politics and Rights at the War Crimes 
Tribunals (Oxford 2012), 52; Geoffrey Robertson, Crimes Against Humanity. The Struggle for 
Global Justice (New York 1999), 17–22.
20 Latest research in historical perspective offer Fabian Klose (ed.), The Emergence of Humanitar-
ian Intervention. Ideas and Practice From the Nineteenth Century to the Present (Cambridge 
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is the translation of nineteenth-century humanitarianism, often rooted in 
“strident evangelicalism and moralizing liberalism”, into “twentieth century 
modes of representation”.21 The London Charter of 1945 was the capstone 
of nearly a century of debates about one of the most contested parts of 
international law.
As the term indicates, the notion of humanity is engraved into the history 
of humanitarian law. After the foundation of the Red Cross 1863 in Geneva, 
some parallel developments of codification came into existence. The Lieber 
Code, issued for the American Civil War, constituted a first set of rules 
within war. Of particular importance to the advancement of the project were 
communities of experts, who had agreed early on that defining international 
standards proved crucial. In 1873, legal scholars founded the Institut de Droit 
international at Ghent in Belgium, seeking to form the “conscience of the 
civilized world and install an international code of law”.22 Among its founding 
fathers were Johann Caspar Bluntschli, then Professor in Heidelberg, lawyer 
Tobias Asser from Amsterdam, Gustave Rolin-Jaequemyns from Belgium, 
barrister John Westlake from London, Friedrich Martens from Russia and 
Gustave Moynier from Geneva, one of the founders of the Red Cross.23 As 
Martti Koskenniemi underlines, their “humanist vision of European civili-
zation” was the core element, to be exported as a sign of modernity to other 
parts of the world.24
Conferences became arenas of codification. The differences between 
what was later termed the Geneva Laws and the Hague Laws reflect the 
interests of those nations that dominated such international conferences, 
where these laws were drafted. While the Geneva laws are “characterized by 
strict, non-derogable prohibitions”, the Hague laws are permissive, “enabling 
powerful states to use the latest military technology with little regard for 
humanitarian consequences”.25 In the Geneva Convention of 1864 on the 
2016); Brendan Simms (ed.), Humanitarian Intervention. A History (Cambridge 2011); see 
also Jennifer M. Welsh (ed.), Humanitarian Intervention and International Relations (Oxford 
2006).
21 Michelle Tusan, “ ‘Crimes Against Humanity’: Human Rights, the British Empire and the 
Origins of the Response to the Armenian Genocide”, in American Historical Review 119:1 
(2014), 47–77, on p. 50.
22 Martti Koskenniemi, “Nationalism, Universalism, Empire: International Law in 1871 and 
1919”, Conference paper for “Whose International Community? Universalism and the Legacies 
of Empire” (Columbia Department of History April 2005), 14, http://www.helsinki.fi/eci/ 
Publications/Koskenniemi/Columbia%200405.pdf.
23 Id., The Gentle Civilizer of Nations. The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870–1960s (Cam-
bridge 2001).
24 Id., Nationalism, Universalism, Empire, 14.
25 Chris af Jochnick / Roger Normand, “The Legitimation of Violence: A Critical History of the 
Laws of War”, in Harvard International Law Journal 35:1 (1994), 49–95, on p. 52.
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“Amelioration of the Condition of the Sick and Wounded of Armies in the 
Field”, this notion of humanity was for the first time invoked. The relevant 
article runs:
The denunciation shall […] in no way impair the obligations which the Parties to the 
conflict shall remain bound to fulfil by virtue of the principles of the law of nations, 
as they result from the usages established among civilized peoples, from the laws of 
humanity and the dictates of the public conscience.26
The notion of humanity gained momentum within legal debates, though it 
was still being employed more as a moral or political category. Important in 
this regard were the two Peace conferences at The Hague (1899 and 1907), 
where a Convention on the Laws and Customs of Warfare was agreed upon (a 
scheduled third Hague Conference, where legal measures should have been 
drafted, never took place due to the outbreak of war27). The clause had been 
intended as a diplomatic solution to a deadlock during the Hague Peace Con-
ference of 1899, when debates arose about the protection of the population 
of occupied territories, especially with view to their right to defend them-
selves.28 To overcome this impasse on partisan warfare and to assure that the 
conference proceeded smoothly,29 the leading Russian delegate, Baltic-born 
Friedrich von Martens suggested the following preamble (which later became 
known as the Martens clause), which evokes the “laws of humanity”:
Until a more complete code of the laws of war is issued, […] populations and belli-
gerents remain under the protection and empire of the principles of international law, 
as they result from the usages established between civilized nations, from the laws of 
humanity and the requirements of the public conscience.30
26 Art 63, quoted according to the Geneva Convention – 1864 – for the Amelioration of the Con-
ditions of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, http://www.un-documents.net/
gc-1.htm.
27 Arthur Eyffinger, “A Highly Critical Moment: Role and Record of the 1907 Hague Peace 
Conference”, in Netherlands International Law Review 54:2 (2007), 197–228, refers on 
pp. 234f. to the US-led plans for a third Hague conference, envisioned for 1915, as well as on 
the draft programme.
28 Theodore Meron, “The Martens Clause, Principles of Humanity and Dictates of Public 
Conscience”, in American Journal of International Law 94 (2000), 78–89, on p. 79.
29 Emily Crawford, “The Modern Relevance of the Martens Clause”, in ISIL Yearbook of 
International Humanitarian and Refugee Law 6 (2006), 1–18; Sydney Law School Research 
Paper 11:27, on p. 19, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1810177.
30 Martens Clause, quoted according to http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/
57jnhy.htm. There is a slight modification between the 1899 and 1907 version of the Martens 
Clause; the version of 1907 is cited here.
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Martens, an eminent international lawyer,31 with this term reveals his com-
mitment to international law, following Bluntschli’s theory of law of civilized 
nations, and also positioned himself as a modernist legal expert from Tsarist 
Russia, contributing to international law taking shape.32
The Hague Convention did not aim to provide a complete code of rules 
of warfare, but left it open to amendments by using this preamble.33 Cassese 
underlines that it served, above all, to exclude the argument that belligerents 
were free to behave if certain matters were not especially restricted by the 
Hague convention; on the contrary, they had to respect certain rules which 
were “no less binding than those motivated by other (e.g. military or political) 
considerations”.34
Although there are several versions of the Clause with different word-
ing (replacing “inhabitants” with “populations”, “requirements” with “dic- 
tates”35), the three consistent elements of the clause remain “the law of 
nations, as it results from the usages established between civilized peoples”, 
the “laws of humanity” and the “dictates of the public conscience”.36 Whilst 
the first is a circumscription of customary international law, which was often 
termed “law of civilized nations”, the latter is more amorphous. “Dictates 
of the public conscience” involve at least two perspectives, as Meron under-
lines: it could be seen as public opinion, shaping the conduct of all parties 
at war, or as a reflection of the opinio iuris.37 Both elements are inherent of 
the Martens Clause, and the moralist intent on public opinion is very clear, 
as the wording can be found in diplomatic declaration as well as in manuals 
of military law of the late nineteenth century. It was custom, judged by the 
manifold declarations, for example the aforementioned Geneva Convention 
from 1864 as well as the Declaration at St Petersburg in 186838 to invoke at 
31 On Martens’ role as a moderniser not only within international law, but also as a modernising 
agent of his country, see Martin Aust, “Völkerrechtstransfer im Zarenreich: Internationalismus 
und Imperium bei Fedor F. Martens”, in Osteuropa 60:9 (2010), 113–125; Martin Aust, “Das 
Zarenreich in der Völkerrechtsgeschichte 1870–1914”, in id. (ed.), Globalisierung imperial und 
sozialistisch. Russland und die Sowjetunion global 1851–1991 (Frankfurt/M. 2013), 166–181.
32 Aust, “Völkerrechtstransfer”, 125.
33 Ecer, Additional Note, 12.05.1944, UNWCC III/4, 7 pp., on p. 3, https://www.legal-tools.org/
doc/6335bd/.
34 Antonio Cassese, “The Martens Clause: Half a Loaf or Simply Pie in the Sky?”, in European 
Journal of International Law 11 (2000), 187–216, on p. 188.
35 Meron, “Martens Clause”, 79.
36 Crawford, “Modern Relevance”, 6.
37 Meron, “Martens Clause”, 83.
38 The Petersburg Declaration concludes with the following statement: “The Contracting or 
Acceding Parties reserve to themselves to come hereafter to an understanding whenever a 
precise proposition shall be drawn up in view of future improvements which science may effect 
in the armament of troops, in order to maintain the principles which they have established, and 
to conciliate the necessities of war with the laws of humanity”, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_
century/decpeter.asp, and printed as the “Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of 
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least rhetorically the principles of humanity.39 The Spanish manual of 1882 is 
an example for the use within military circles, as it notes that its rules were 
based on “the noble and eternal idea of humanity, justice and good faith”, and 
adds that “the principal authority, the most impartial and respectable judge, 
the organ and regulator, is public opinion”.40 The Manual thus attributed a 
power to the public conscience “not dissimilar to international law-making 
bodies”, as Crawford underlines.41
Though legal circles debated whether the preamble itself constituted law,42 
it was purposely placed “within a document which dealt with war crimes in 
the narrowest and technical sense”, thus undoubtedly giving it authority as 
a legal guideline for further war crimes regulations.43 The Martens Clause 
came to be accepted as a legal principle by repetition, in 1907 in the Hague 
Convention as well as in the Geneva Convention of 1929 on the Sick and 
Wounded44 and the Geneva Convention of 1949.45 As Michael Geyer states, 
the concept is a “longstanding feature of the western legal tradition”. He con-
cludes: “The notion of a set of crimes against all has prevailed, even as the 
idea of a ‘standard of civilization’ has receded.”46
Critics have noted that the Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907 led 
to no measurable results. In the absence of either explicit boundaries or an 
implicitly shared understanding, let alone regulations on punishment, bel-
ligerents would inevitably interpret these terms to suit their military needs. 
A comment by the British military delegation member, Sir John Fisher of 
Kilmuir, commanding officer of the British Navy at Gallipoli during the 
Great War, underscores this:
Explosive Projectiles Under 400 Grammes Weight”, Dec. 11, 1868, see Jochnick / Normand, 
Legitimation, 68.
39 Ibid., 84.
40 Reglamentos para el servicio de Campaña, art. 826 (1882), quoted in Meron, “Martens 
Clause”, 85.
41 Crawford, “Modern Relevance”, 13.
42 Ecer, Additional Note, 12.05.1944, UNWCC III/4, 7 pp., on p. 4, https://www.legal-tools.org/
doc/6335bd/. Ecer underlined that “Lord Cave in his article ‘War Crimes and their punishment’ 
(1923, Grotius Society, vol. 8, XXI) designated the laws of humanity and the requirements of 
the public conscience of the Preamble as lex non scripta, i.e. as law, and says expressly that this 
law is to be extracted”, and concluded that the Preamble was a part of International Law.
43 Schwelb in his report “Material for the Preparation of a Definition of crimes against humanity”, 
compiled by Egon Schwelb, III/33, 22.03.1946, 14 pp., on p. 1, https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/
c52df5/.
44 Bassiouni, “Need for Convention for Crimes Against Humanity”, 461.
45 Crawford, “Modern Relevance”, 1; see also Fabian Klose, “The Colonial Testing Ground: The 
International Committee of the Red Cross and the Violent End of Empire”, in Humanity 2:1 
(2011), 107–126, on p. 108. 
46 Van Schaack, “Definition of Crimes Against Humanity”, 796; Michael Geyer, “Crimes Against 
Humanity”, in Gordon Martel (ed.), The Encyclopedia of War, Wiley Online Library, http://
onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/9781444338232.wbeow146/full.
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The humanising of war! […] You might as well talk of humanising hell. When a silly 
ass at The Hague got up and talked about the amenities of civilised warfare and putting 
your prisoner’s feet in hot water and giving them gruel, my reply, I regret to say, was 
considered totally unfit for publication. As if war could be civilized! If I’m in com-
mand when war breaks out I shall issue my orders: “The essence of war is violence.” 
“Moderation in war is imbecility.” “Hit first, hit hard, and hit anywhere.”47
The handbook of the German General Staff, issued in 1902, also mirrors the 
perception that The Hague provisions consisted suggestions, but no binding 
law, and chivalry in warfare was the only guiding principle, apart from the 
concept of military necessity.48
The first diplomatic document to use the term “crimes of humanity” was a 
joint Allied declaration of May 1915, which accused the Ottoman Empire “of 
crimes against humanity and civilization” with regard to atrocities against the 
Armenians.49 Here, the concept of Humanity displays its political layer. In the 
telegram, which was issued by the French, British and Russians jointly, it was 
announced, “to hold personally responsible [for] these crimes all members 
of the Ottoman government and those of their agents who are implicated in 
such massacres”.50 There had been some controversy around the term “civili-
zation”, which the Russians wanted to replace with “Christianity”.51 Britain’s 
perceived double role as a “defender of oppressed Christian peoples” on the 
one hand and a “tolerant global Empire made up of many faiths” on the other 
had come under pressure during the First World War “and influenced think-
ing about an international justice at the moment when the world’s attention 
first turned to the Armenian massacre”.52
International lawyers emphasize that the Armenia telegram can be seen 
as the inception of the legal concept of crimes against Humanity,53 although 
47 Quoted in Daniel Marc Segesser, Recht statt Rache oder Rache durch Recht? Die Ahndung 
von Kriegsverbrechen in der internationalen fachwissenschaftlichen Debatte 1872–1945 
(Paderborn 2010), 28. Segesser makes reference to Reginald H. Bacon, The Life of Lord Fisher 
of Kilverstone, vol. 2 (London 1929), vol. 1, 121.
48 Deutscher Generalstab, Kriegsbrauch im Landkriege (Berlin 1902), 2.
49 The Armenia telegram can be found at FRUS, United States Department of State, Papers re - 
lating to the foreign relations of the United States with the address of the president to Congress 
December 7, 1915, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1915, p. 981, Telegram of US Ambassador 
Sharp to Secretary of State, 28 May 1915.
50 Daniel Marc Segesser, “On the Road to Total Retribution? The International Debate on the 
Punishment of War Crimes, 1872 –1945”, in Roger Chickering et al. (ed.), A World at Total War. 
Global Conflict and the Politics of Destruction, 1937–1945 (Cambridge 2005) 355–374, on 
p. 359.
51 Geyer, “Crimes Against Humanity”.
52 Tusan, “Crimes Against Humanity”, 51.
53 M. Cherif Bassiouni, Crimes Against Humanity: Historical Evolution and Contemporary 
Application (Cambridge 2011), 62. 
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it should be noted that the political dimension of the use of the term here is 
clearly much stronger than the legal aspect, which did not lead to punitive 
action and can thus not yet be considered a legal tool. The new moral aware-
ness was however developed further by a blue book documenting the crimes 
and accusing “the Young Turkish Ministers and their associates at Constan-
tinople” of being “directly and personally responsible, from beginning to end, 
for the gigantic crime that devastated the Near East in 1915”.54 The reference 
to the Martens clause is visible, and testifies to the contemporary opinion that 
the Ottoman Empire had put itself outside of the realm of the civilized world.
However, when war was over, the perceived need to amend international 
law and enforce the political will by means of a reliable legal tool vanished 
under the demands of realpolitik. In 1919, during the Paris peace confer-
ence, an Allied commission addressed the question of “Offences against the 
laws of humanity” and compiled a long list of atrocities committed during 
World War I.55 Although the so-called Versailles list represents a first step 
in coining a legal definition of a minimum standard of conduct in warfare, 
there was considerable resistance to using the term “crimes against human-
ity” in the commission’s report, and no clear agreement as on punishment 
of perpetrators.56 The US representative Robert Lansing in particular feared 
that this term would lead to a “confusion of moral precepts and legal writ”, 
and saw a “lack of legal precedence” and “subjective definition of the dictates 
of humanity”.57 Although Lansing confirmed that the First World War had 
given rise to a new class of crimes, which he termed “wanton acts which 
cause needless suffering” that were “perpetrated without adequate military 
reason”, he underlined that the prosecution of such “crimes against civili-
zation” must follow principles of legality rather than general principles of 
humanity.58 As a consequence, the term “crimes against humanity” was not 
mentioned in the relevant provisions.59
The peace treaty, in articles 228 to 230, laid the ground for the establish-
ment of the first war crimes tribunal, set up to try German war criminals.60 
These trials were held in Leipzig in the early 1920s and resulted in only a 
handful of convictions, thus constituting a grave setback to the idea of inter-
national criminal justice. But at least the trials confirmed and emphasized 
54 Tusan, “British Empire”, 62.
55 Van Schaack, “Definition of Crimes Against Humanity”, 796; Geyer, “Crimes Against Hu- 
manity”.
56 Bassiouni, “Need for Convention for Crimes Against Humanity”, 458.
57 Geyer, “Crimes Against Humanity”.
58 Ibid.
59 Van Schaack, “Definition of Crimes Against Humanity”, 797, see also Schwelb report on the 
definition of Crimes against humanity, 22.03.1946, 2, https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/c52df5/. 
60 William Schabas, “International Justice for International Crimes: An Idea Whose Time has 
Come”, in European Review 14:4 (2006), 421–439, on p. 421.
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the status of war crimes as subject to prosecution under international crim-
inal law.61 With regard to the Armenian cause, it was agreed in the peace 
treaty of Sèvres to form an Allied Court to punish Turkish atrocities (without 
mentioning – at the request of the US delegation – the term “crimes against 
humanity” or “laws of humanity at all”), however this never came into 
force.62 Instead, several trials were held between 1919 and 1922 under the 
Ottoman government, acting under British pressure, which resulted in the 
execution of three minor officials for “crimes against humanity”.63 However, 
both, the Leipzig and the Constantinople trials fell short of expectations.64 
The idea of an Allied High Court to prosecute war crimes, discussed during 
the 1919 peace negotiations in Paris, failed either with regard to German as to 
Ottoman defendants. Bassiouni underlines that the leading powers were thus 
allowed the period after the First World War to become a “bypassed occasion 
to establish definitive law”.65
2. Coining a Legal Norm of Humanity: 
Exile Lawyers During the Second World War
Until the Second World War, legal theory maintained that war crime trials 
could involve only atrocities that had been committed on a state’s own ter-
ritory or against its own nationals.66 However, the unprecedented record of 
crimes committed by Nazi forces made it necessary to extend the defini-
tion of war crimes to what was initially termed “war crimes and analogous 
offences”.67 Many crimes perpetrated by the Axis powers in the Second World 
War had entailed either attacking minorities within their own jurisdiction or 
annexing territories without even declaring war at all. The term attempted to 
encompass such diverse crimes as the persecution of political opponents, for 
example Communists or Social Democrats within Germany, the persecution 
of German Jews, and the crimes committed against civilians in occupied 
territories, for instance the Czechs during the so-called Sudetenland crisis in 
61 Id., “Introduction ICC”, 52.
62 Van Schaack, “Definition of Crimes Against Humanity”, 797.
63 Tusan, “Crimes Against Humanity”, 65.
64 James F. Willis, Prologue to Nuremberg: The Politics and Diplomacy of Punishing war 
Criminals of the First World War (Westport, CT 1982); Gerd Hankel, Die Leipziger Prozesse. 
Deutsche Kriegsverbrechen und ihre strafrechtliche Verfolgung nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg 
(Hamburg 2003); Vahakn N. Dadrian / Taner Akçam, Judgment at Istanbul. The Armenian 
Genocide Trials (New York 2011).
65 Bassiouni, “Crimes Against Humanity”, 466.
66 Arieh J. Kochavi, “Britain and the Establishment of the United Nations War Crimes 
Commission”, in English Historical Review (1992), 323–349, on p. 325.
67 Schwelb, “Crimes Against Humanity”, 185.
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1938. It even had a global dimension, as it was equally applicable to crimes 
committed against Chinese nationals by Japanese troops in Manchuria 1932. 
All these were crimes committed by a state against its own citizens, on its 
own territory, prior to an official state of war. Nevertheless, many scholars 
considered it “legally unsound to hold the Nazis responsible for crimes com-
mitted against Germans within the borders of Germany”.68
The call for a new definition of war crimes was already discussed dur-
ing the war, and the need to form an internationally accepted standard in 
dealing with mass atrocities was advocated. The unprecedented Nazi war of 
aggression and occupation formed the basis for growing concern amongst 
the governments of nine states forced into exile,69 and the call was made 
from London to set up new norms and establish a guideline for trials after the 
end of the conflict.70 One result of the political impact of these debates was 
the foundation of the United Nations War Crimes Commission (UNWCC) 
in 1943, which started work in early 1944.71 It formed an internationally 
accepted advising body and was concerned with formulating a minimum 
standard in dealing with mass atrocities during the ongoing conflict, bring-
ing together legal scholars from different countries and furthering discussion 
about justice for war crimes.
In London in the early 1940s, circles consisting of exiled lawyers from 
smaller Allied nations started debates over how to approach crimes commit-
ted in the ongoing war. Especially the Czech and Polish exile government 
representatives, echoed by their Belgian and Dutch counterparts, hoped that 
by establishing strict legal guidelines, the Nazis could be deterred from com-
mitting further crimes. Legal scholar Hersch Lauterpacht, himself at his time 
an émigré from Lemberg (Lviv) in the former Austro-Hungarian Empire, 
was particularly active in fostering the debate and became the host of the 
meetings. Since they first convened in 1941, these legal circles advocated 
new ideas of post-war justice within either UNWCC or its two forerunners, 
the “International Commission for Penal Reconstruction and Development”, 
centred on the faculty of law at the University of Cambridge (the so-called 
Cambridge Commission), and the “London International Assembly” (LIA). 
By analysing meetings and memoranda to detect the motivation and find 
68 Schabas, “Introduction ICC”, 42.
69 The nine countries were: Belgium, Czechoslovakia, France, Greece, Holland, Luxembourg, 
Norway, Poland and Yugoslavia.
70 Arieh J. Kochavi, Prelude to Nuremberg. Allied War Crimes Policy and the Question of Pun-
ishment (Chapel Hill 1998), 3; Kirsten Sellars, “Crimes Against Peace” and International Law 
(Cambridge 2013), 60. The term “war of aggression” is new, to distinguish the Nazi war from 
the earlier concept of bellum iustum, the just war, which was a war of defence only.
71 Dan Plesch / Shanti Sattler, “A New Paradigm of Customary International Criminal Law: The 
UN War Crimes Commission of 1943–1948 and its Associated Courts and Tribunals”, in Crim-
inal Law Forum 25:1 (2014), 17–43.
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an explanation for the turning point of the concept in this era, it becomes 
clear that these legal scholars were deeply marked by personal experience 
of forced exile, in the sincere attempt to find a viable means of bringing the 
criminals to trial.72 The task of coming to terms with war crimes was not 
easy, as their existing definition proved outdated.
Bohuslav Ecer, the chairman of the UNWCC legal committee, submitted 
a proposal to the UNWCC on 27 April 1944 dealing with the problem of 
wars of aggression and advocating the use of the new charge “crimes against 
humanity” in an international criminal court. However, the British repre-
sentative Arnold McNair rejected this proposal as too far-reaching.73 He was 
particularly opposed to Ecer’s idea of holding heads of states accountable 
and applying what he saw as retroactive legislation. Ecer, in return, felt it was 
unacceptable that those who had broken the law so many times should go 
unpunished simply because established national codes were not sufficient to 
deal with them. He held the position that the Second World War had created 
a new situation, with war crimes incomparable to earlier conflicts, and to 
which new legal responses had to be formulated. He wrote: “Preparation and 
launching of the present war must be punished as a crime against peace”, and 
“if there are gaps in law, it is our duty to fill them.”74
It can be proved that Ecer was not only inspired by his colleagues at Lon-
don and thus the legal debates in the West, but also closely followed academic 
developments in the other wartime ally, the Soviet Union. The contribution 
of the Soviet Union to the development of the legal framework of the war 
crimes trials after the Second World War and thus to a modern international 
law is unjustly forgotten. In 1944, its leading legal scholar, Aron Trainin, 
had issued an English translation of his book on the criminal responsibility 
of the “Hitlerites”, in which he made the case for aggression being the main 
charge in war crimes, as well as the legal tool of complicity, to bring the 
Nazi elites to justice.75 Its influence, however, was particularly strong on the 
Central European exile lawyers, and with growing disappointment over the 
weak British support for new legal ideas and still before the experience of 
double standards at Nuremberg, the Soviet approach to war crimes became 
an academic inspiration, if not an alternative for legal scholars like Ecer.76 
72 Kerstin von Lingen, “Setting the Path for UNWCC: The Representation of European Exile 
Governments on LIA and Cambridge Commission, 1941–1944”, in International Criminal Law 
Forum 25:1 (2014), 45–76.
73 Sellars, Crimes Against Peace, 58–64.
74 TNA London, FO 371/39005, UNWCC, minutes of 36th meeting, 17.10.1944; see also Sellars, 
Crimes Against Peace, 63, on the reference to Russian legal scholar Aron Trainin.
75 Aron N. Trainin, Hitlerite Responsibility Under Criminal Law (London 1944).
76 NAA Canberra, A 2937/273, Note of meeting with General de Baer, by Wright, 1.12.1944. 2. In 
this note, the later chairman of UNWCC expresses his fears that Ecer and Zivkovic turned over 
to the Soviets: “He had heard Ecer and Zivkovic express sentiments that they would prefer to 
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Trainin’s writings may have inspired Ecer to develop the legal concept of 
crimes against humanity further.
In a memorandum submitted to the UNWCC in May 1944, Ecer amended 
his earlier report, following two lines of argument. First, he underlined that 
the UNWCC was not in transgression of its competencies when it suggested 
that the further handling of the war crimes problem include broaden-
ing the whole concept. Second, he advocated the use of the term “crimes 
against humanity”.77 In assessing the historical record of Nazi crimes, 
Ecer stated that the UNWCC had received several accounts of the planned 
nature of Nazi warfare especially in Eastern Europe, where not only Jews, 
but also members of the Soviet Intelligence Services and civilians in the 
hinterland in general were slaughtered by SS troops without prior trial.78 
Reports had been received that a considerable number of crimes commit-
ted in occupied Poland had not even “a remote connection with military 
necessity”. The proposed new term “crimes against humanity” would, 
as Ecer underlined, cover these offences and draw a connection to the 
preamble of the Hague Convention – the Martens Clause – which he saw 
as of immense value for the work of UNWCC, as it referred to the term 
humanity.79 He made the point that in his view, crimes against human-
ity were the most important concept of all, as they had been committed 
“as the real cause of all the other crimes, as the source of the war, the 
malum in se”.80
In his memoirs, Ecer recalled his deep personal commitment: “The atmo-
sphere was tense, as in my opinion we discussed the whole rationale of the 
war in light of international law, that must necessarily lead to the victory of 
justice over the dark forces of evil and bring its perpetrators to the justice 
they deserve.”81 It seems that his initiative focused heavily on the Holocaust, 
which until then had been dealt with among the bulk of Nazi occupation 
crimes, minimizing its uniqueness – however, he was personally concerned 
with crimes against political opponents (in his proposal of 17 October 1944 
he speaks of “judicial murders committed on Czechoslovak territory”82), as 
remain on the Commmission in London, but if things went on as at present they would certainly 
turn to the strong Russian Commission.”





81 Ecer in his memoirs entitled Jak jsem je stíhal (= How I prosecuted them) (Prague 1946), 
quote trans. and cited by Eduard Stehlik, “Bohuslav Ecer and the Prosecution of War Crimes”, 
in European Conscience and Communism, Procedings of the International Conference of 
2–3 June 2008 at Prague (Prague 2008), 53–63, on p. 56.
82 Stehlik, “Ecer”, 57.
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he himself was a socialist party delegate, and had been imprisoned by the 
Gestapo in March 1938.83
The British government was still reluctant to respond to the new term. 
In a debate in the House of Commons on 4 October 1944, referring to the 
killings of political prisoners in the Buchenwald concentration camp, the 
foreign secretary, Anthony Eden stated: “Crimes committed by Germans 
against Germans, however reprehensible, are in a different category from 
war crimes and cannot be dealt with under the same procedure.”84 This notion 
was reaffirmed in a debate in January 1945.85 It was still some way to go to 
include the concept of crimes against humanity in international law.
3. On Road to Nuremberg: 
Implementing the Concept of Humanity as a Legal Tool
Finally, at the London conference of summer 1945, a statute for the upcoming 
tribunal at Nuremberg defined the structure and basis for the prosecution of 
the major war criminals in Europe.86 Debates were contested in two points, 
as Borgwardt underlined: would crimes against peace be declared war crimes 
to be dealt with by an international court, and how should the international 
community deal with state violence?87
The creation and outcomes of the International Military Tribunals in 
Nuremberg (IMT) and in Tokyo (IMTFE) are generally seen by scholars as 
a victory of the Anglo-American legal doctrine. It was, however, once again 
the Soviet legal scholar Aron Trainin’s definition of crimes against peace that 
found its place in the Charter of the IMT, which made aggressive war itself 
a criminal act.88 In 1945, Trainin was amongst the members of the Soviet 
delegation to London to formulate the principles laid down in the Charter for 
Nuremberg. Other definitions, such as the one of crimes against peace and 
war crimes, seem largely to follow the recommendations of the UNWCC, 
although it has not yet been possible to prove how the American judge 
Robert Jackson came to use the term. It is, however, plausible that Hersch 
83 Biographical sketch on Ecer see http://www.valka.cz/clanek_12304.html.
84 Cited after Schwelb report on the definition of Crimes against humanity, 22.03.1946, 5, https://
www.legal-tools.org/doc/c52df5/.
85 Ibid.
86 Bassiouni, “Need for Convention for Crimes Against Humanity”, 4.
87 Elizabeth Borgwardt, “Re-Examining Nuremberg as a New Deal Institution. Politics, Culture 
and the Limits of Law in Generating Human Rights Norms”, in Berkeley Journal of Interna-
tional Law 23 (2005), 401–462, on p. 403. 
88 Francine Hirsch, “The Soviets at Nuremberg: International Law, Propaganda and the Making 
of a Postwar Order”, in American Historical Review 113:3 (2008), 701–730. On the concept of 
Crimes against peace and Trainin, see also Sellars, Crimes Against Peace, 63.
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Lauterpacht might be the missing link,89 as he convened with Jackson before 
the London Conference and might have summed up the ongoing debates he 
had had with his colleagues, amongst them Ecer.
The IMT at Nuremberg (1945–1946) followed the statute drawn up at the 
London conference during the summer of 1945, which set the structure and 
basis for the prosecution of the major war criminals,90 and its main achieve-
ment consists of having formulated a first legal definition of “crimes against 
humanity”, although “crimes against peace” later became the cornerstone 
of the prosecution strategy and thus often referred as the main innovation 
at Nuremberg, considering its greater visibility.91 Crimes against humanity, 
however, was the legal tool with the longer-lasting implications, although it 
didn’t expand to its complete meaning in the Nuremberg era. Article 6 (c) of 
the charter defined crimes against humanity as
a distinct set of crimes, namely murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and 
other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, before or during the 
war, or persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds in execution of or in 
connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the tribunal, whether or not in 
violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated.92
The latter was decisive insofar as it “established the supremacy of interna-
tional over municipal law”.93 In this regard, Article 6 (c) reflects the tension 
in international law between state sovereignty and human rights as the over-
arching goal of the international system.94
Article 6 (c) of Nuremberg found its counterpart in Article 5 (c) of the 
Tokyo trial charter, and both charters were clearly connected by defining 
“aggression” and “war crimes” as well as “crimes against humanity”.95 This 
article of the charter reflects the desire of the Allies not to be restricted “to 
bringing to justice those who had committed war crimes in the narrower 
sense […], but that also such atrocities should be investigated, tried and 
punished as have been committed on axis territory, against persons of axis 
89 Martti Koskenniemi, “Gentle civilizer”, draws on Lauterpacht’s decisive role within the British 
prosecution, were he drafted the opening and closing speech, see the chapter: “Lauterpacht: 
The Victorian Tradition in International Law”, 388f.
90 Bassiouni, “Need for Convention for Crimes Against Humanity”, 4.
91 Form underlines the similar wording of the definition to crimes against humanity in both, 
UNWCC and the London Charter, as proof, see Wolfgang Form, “Strategies for Genocide 
Trials After World War II: How the Allied Powers Dealt With the Phenomenon of Genocide in 
Occupied Germany”, in Christoph Safferling / Eckart Conze (ed.), The Genocide Convention 
60 Years After its Adoption (The Hague 2010), 69–81, on p. 77. 
92 IMT Charter, Art 6 (c). Cited after Geyer, Crimes Against Humanity.
93 Van Schaack, “Definition of Crimes Against Humanity”, 791.
94 Ibid., 846.
95 Bassiouni, “Need for Convention for Crimes Against Humanity”, 463. 
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nationality”.96 The Nuremberg court could now, simply by using the new tool, 
also address “acts committed by Nazi perpetrators against German victims, 
who were thus of the same nationality as their oppressors, or against citizens 
of a state allied with Germany”.97
The judges at Nuremberg were nevertheless quite cautious in applying 
the new concept and treated it for the most part as subsidiary crimes con-
nected to other war crimes.98 The fact that crimes against humanity were 
only addressed as a subsidiary charge alongside conventional war crimes or 
crimes against peace has become known as the “war nexus”.99 The war nexus 
allowed the Allied legal staff to “condemn specific inhumane acts of Nazi 
perpetrators committed within Germany without threatening the entire doc-
trine of state sovereignty”.100 To avoid criticisms of retroactive law, during 
the IMT the new principle became bound to other charges, thus connecting 
it to a state of aggression. This so called war nexus later significantly limited 
the use of crimes against humanity in violence occurred during the wars 
of decolonisation,101 the dictatorship crimes of Latin America or Apartheid 
crimes in South Africa.102 Much to Ecer’s dismay, punishing crimes which 
had occurred prior to the state of war proved impossible: all crimes com-
mitted for example in Poland or Czechoslovakia (including the Sudetenland) 
prior to the outbreak of war in September 1939 could not be indicted, due 
to the lack of a war nexus, as “it has not been satisfactorily proven that they 
were done in execution of, or in connection with any such crime”.103
96  Schwelb, Crimes Against Humanity, 183.
97  Van Schaack, “Definition of Crimes Against Humanity”, 790.
98   Schwelb report on the definition of Crimes against humanity, 22.03.1946, https://www.legal-
tools.org/doc/c52df5/; Geyer, “Crimes Against Humanity”.
99  Van Schaack, “Definition of Crimes Against Humanity”, 791.
100  Ibid., 791.
101   Fabian Klose, Human Rights in the Shadow of Colonial Violence. The Wars of Independence 
in Kenya and Algeria (Philadelphia 2013); see also Klose, “Colonial Testing Ground”, p. 107.
102   Van Schaack, “Definition of Crimes Against Humanity”, 793. Humanitarian Intervention 
is defined as “the intervention by one state into the territorial integrity of another state in 
order to protect individuals who are the victims of abuses by fellow citizens that the state 
is unwilling or unable to protect.” If the drafters of the IMT charter would not have been so 
focused on the principle of sovereignty, but more on the protection of individuals, Schaack 
summarizes on, 847: “The doctrine of humanitarian intervention suggests that the existence 
of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population provides the hook on which 
international jurisdiction can hang.”
103   Schwelb report on the definition of Crimes against humanity, 22.03.1946, 11, https://www.
legal-tools.org/doc/c52df5/.
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Only with Control Council Law Number 10 (CCL 10), released by the 
Allies in occupied Germany in 1946, was the link between state of war and 
crimes against humanity dropped.104 In the British Zone of Occupation in 
Germany alone, courts applying CCL 10 held around 150 trials “exclusively 
involving crimes against humanity, committed between 1933 and the end 
of the war”, which addressed crimes against German or stateless victims, 
many of them Jewish.105
With regard to the charter for the International Military Tribunal at Tokyo, 
which was modelled after the Nuremberg Charter, it can be observed that 
crimes against humanity were also included, though the phrase “persecution 
on religious grounds” was omitted.106 In their definition, both charters clearly 
connected “crimes against humanity” to “aggression” and “war crimes”.107 
The term was also debated at the UNWCC sub-commission for the Far East 
in Chungking (Chongqing). When looking into the trial record of not only 
the Tokyo tribunal, but also the national war crimes courts set up in Asia, be 
it within the former European colonies or in China, it seems, however, that 
the courts were reluctant to use the concept crimes against humanity. In this 
regard, it becomes clear that also in Asia the war nexus prevailed.
Thus, the meaning of the term has met with considerable scepticism and 
has been “plagued by incoherence” since.108 Egon Schwelb tried to set the 
legal path (avoiding criticisms of retroactivity) very clearly in his “Report 
on the Meaning of ‘crimes against humanity’ ”, which he submitted to the 
UNWCC in March 1946. He stated that crimes against humanity had (a) been 
committed by defendants from the Axis states or their allies, could (b) be 
committed by individuals as well as by members of an organisation, and 
(c) separated into “crimes of the murder-type” and “persecution”.109 In this 
regard, it was irrelevant whether a crime of the “murder-type” had been 
committed before or during the war. “Persecutions”, in Schwelb’s definition, 
had to be committed on political, racial or religious grounds and in connec-
tion with any crime within the jurisdiction of the tribunal (crimes against 
peace, war crimes, or even crimes against humanity of the murder type).110 
104   Bassiouni, “Need for Convention for Crimes Against Humanity”, 464; Schwelb report on 
the definition of Crimes against humanity, 22.03.1946, 8, https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/
c52df5/; see also Geyer, “Crimes Against Humanity”.
105   Form, “Strategies for Genocide Trials”, 80.
106   Schwelb report on the definition of Crimes against humanity, 22.03.1946, 9, https://www.
legal-tools.org/doc/c52df5/.
107   Bassiouni, “Need for Convention for Crimes Against Humanity”, 463.
108   Van Schaack, “Definition of Crimes Against Humanity”, 792; Diane F. Orentlicher, “Settling 
Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a Prior Regime”, in The Yale 
Law Journal 100:8 (1991), 2537–2615, on p. 2585. 
109   Schwelb report on the definition of Crimes against humanity, 22.03.1946, 6, https://www.
legal-tools.org/doc/c52df5/.
110   Ibid., 7.
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Prosecution was to be extended not only to direct commission of, but also 
incitement to the aforementioned crimes, “by enacting legislation which 
orders or permits crimes against humanity”.111 However, Schwelb’s views 
came too late to influence the Nuremberg judgement.
It took a while for the concept to find its way into national jurisdictions.112 
After the foundation of the organization of United Nations in San Francisco 
in 1945, several commissions were set up to continue the work of both the 
UNWCC and other predecessors. The assembly of the United Nations con-
firmed its value to international law as early as 1946,113 and incorporated it 
into the Draft Code of Offences against the Peace and Security of Mankind 
of 1954, which was, however, left incomplete due to Cold War implications 
following the Korean War.114 As Borgwardt summarizes, “Nuremberg was an 
attempt to express moralistic ideas in a legalistic manner”.115
The concept of crimes against humanity had first fully been realized dur-
ing the Eichmann Trial in Jerusalem in 1961 (and thus became inextricably 
linked with Holocaust crimes), but the concept gained its wider meaning only 
in the 1990s, as an effect of the jurisprudence of the International Criminal 
Tribunals, for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY, 1993) and for Rwanda (ICTR, 
1994).116 Two factors contributed to this outcome, first the end of the Cold 
War, and second the powerful Human Rights movement, which had begun 
“to develop a victim-oriented discourse that required states to ensure that 
perpetrators of atrocities were brought to justice”.117
However, it was only half a decade after the IMT at Nuremberg, within 
the foundation of the International Criminal Court (ICC) and its statute laid 
down at Rome, that crimes against humanity became the subject of a compre-
hensive, multilateral convention.118 Only the ICC charter offered a consensus 
definition of the term crimes against humanity, and thus marks “the welcome 
culmination of a slow but steady process of erosion of the significance of 
state sovereignty in the process of international law formation”.119
111   Ibid., 14.
112   Kerstin von Lingen, “Crimes Against Humanity: Eine umstrittene Universalie im Völkerrecht 
des 20. Jahrhunderts”, in Zeithistorische Forschungen / Studies in Contemporary History 8 
(2011), 373–393.
113   Geyer, “Crimes Against Humanity”.
114   Ibid.; for the end to the work of the Law Commission, see M. C. Bassiouni, Crimes Against 
Humanity in International Criminal Law (The Hague 1999).
115   Borgwardt, “Re-Examining Nuremberg”, 452.
116   Geyer, “Crimes Against humanity”; Geoffrey Robertson, Crimes Against Humanity, 446–501.
117   William Schabas, “International Justice for International Crimes”, 422.
118   Van Schaack, “Defininition of Crimes Against Humanity”, 792.
119   Ibid., 850.
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4. Conclusion
The use of the concept of crimes against humanity as a legal tool in the 
tribunals of our times can thus be seen as the legacy of the idea of humanity 
in warfare, rooted in a moral approach to injustice, as reflected within the 
anti-slavery courts during the nineteenth century, and its political legacy as 
embodied in the Peace Conferences at The Hague (1899 and 1907) and their 
preamble, the Martens Clause. Only following the bittersweet experience 
of the First World War and its political failure to deter perpetrators from 
further crimes, the notion of Humanity was transformed into a legally sound 
concept, brought forward during the Second World War by exile lawyers 
who gained access with their ideas to political decision making circles. The 
long way from debates within the UNWCC however, which was an advising 
body that could not set international law, to the charters of Nuremberg and 
Tokyo, which indeed established international law reflects, I argue, the per-
manent tension between the ideas of justice, diplomatic considerations and 
geo-politics.
The evolving definition of crimes against humanity since the Nuremberg 
IMT court shows that the principles guiding the contemporary codification of 
international criminal law were shifting: had they previously been drafted to 
protect state sovereignty, the new principles were more concerned accounta-
bility of individuals.120 In this regard, Article 6 (c) reflects the tension in 
international law between state sovereignty and human rights as overarching 
goals of the international system.121
Meron holds that the principles of humanity as well as the dictates of pub-
lic conscience had proved “restraining factors on the freedom of states to do 
what is not expressly prohibited by treaty or custom”.122 The Clause itself had 
an impact on politics through its afterlife in diplomatic declarations and the 
media, and had thus been “a significant factor in the work of international 
standard-setting conferences, tribunals and UN-rapporteurs”, although it 
was less influential to actually restrain belligerents from violence.123 Cassese 
concludes that the Martens Clause,
inspite of its ambiguous wording, has responded to a deeply felt and widespread 
demand in the international community: that the requirements of humanity and 
the pressure of public opinion be duly taken into account when regulating armed 
conflict.124
120   Ibid., 795.
121   Ibid., 846.
122   Meron, “Martens Clause”, 88.
123   Ibid.
124   Cassese, “Martens Clause”, 212.
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As the judgment of one of the subsequent Nuremberg trials, the case against 
Krupp, made clear, the Martens Clause served as a legal yardstick:
The preamble is much more than a pious declaration. It is a general clause, making the 
usages established among civilized nations, the laws of humanity and the dictates of 
the public conscience into the yardstick to be applied if and when the specific provi-
sions of the Convention and the Regulations annexed to it do not cover specific cases 
occurring in warfare.125
The exile lawyers of the 1940s at London, who were excluded from political 
negotiations leading to the London Charter, were nevertheless satisfied with 
their new concepts being established.126 In looking back at the achievements 
of the London charter, Ecer was quite confident that crimes against humanity 
would have an enduring legacy to protect peace in future generations:
As far as crimes against humanity are concerned, I see the importance of this par-
ticular provision of the Charter and the verdict also in the fact that certain human 
rights, namely the right to freedom of thought and religious beliefs and the right to 
pledge allegiance to nation and race, are placed under the protection of the interna-
tional community and become articles protected under international law. I believe this 
has special significance for beyond the [Nuremberg] trial. The Charter itself will not 
protect elementary human rights all over the world, as it is primarily concerned with 
German crimes, but the Charter indisputably marked the start of the development of 
international law towards international protection of elementary human rights.127
Also Schwelb, after observing the Nuremberg trial as well as the setting-up 
of the Tokyo trial and municipal courts in different European countries, 
saw crimes against Humanity as the sober successor of the Martens Clause, 
“namely, the principle that the protection of a minimum standard of human 
rights should be guaranteed anywhere, at any time and against anybody”.128 
Schwelb set an agenda for later UN resolutions when he concluded that legal 
norm-setting was not enough if political implementation was missing, as 
he observed in 1946: “The task of making the protection of human rights 
general, permanent and effective still lies ahead.”129
125   Krupp case (1948), cited after Meron, “Martens Clause”, 80.
126   He was not present at the negotiations, as all the smaller countries, who had been so impor-
tant in drafting the war crimes policy, had been excluded from the conference. See William 
Schabas, “The United Nations War Crimes Commission’s Proposal for an International 
Criminal Court”, in Criminal Law Forum 25 (2014), 171–189, on p. 186.
127   Ecer in his memoirs entitled Jak jsem je stíhal (= How I prosecuted them), Prague 1946, cited 
by Stehlik, Ecer, 59.
128   Schwelb, “Crimes Against Humanity”, 225.
129   Ibid., 226.
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By this token, the criminalisation of Crimes against Humanity was intended 
“not only to punish World War II perpetrators, but to deter future human 
depredations and to enhance the prospects of world peace”.130 The use of the 
concept of crimes against Humanity in the tribunals of the 1990s is thus, in 
the views of Bassiouni, above all, “a reaffirmation of the world community’s 
condemnation of such acts, irrespective of the outcome”,131 or, as Luban puts 
it referring to the original moral implication, “something which we owe the 
millions of dead of crimes against humanity offences in the twentieth cen-
tury”.132
130   Bassiouni, “Need for Convention for Crimes Against Humanity”, 493.
131   Ibid., 494.
132   Luban, “Theory of Crimes Against Humanity”, 161.
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Esther Möller
Between Globalisation and Contestation
Humanity as a Polemical Concept Within the 
Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement
1. Introduction1
In his book A City in the Sky, the Lebanese author Issa Makhlouf lets his 
first-person narrator spend time in New York and watch the hustle around the 
United Nations building. He describes the scene as follows:
There is no place on earth where the word “peace” resounds more often than at the 
United Nations’ headquarters, this depository of wars where they are stocked from 
generation to generation. There are words that lose their content the more they are 
repeated, until their meaning becomes inverted.2
The same observation, that a term can lose its meaning through inflationary 
and institutionalised use, could be made for the Red Cross and Red Crescent 
Movement: there is rarely a place on earth where the word “humanity” and 
related notions like humane or humanitarian3 are used and pronounced more 
often. Yet this frequency of occurrence only partly led to a clarification of 
its meaning. Indeed, these terms appeared since the Movement was born 
in 1863 as the “International Relief Committee for Injured Combatants”, 
which would later become the International Committee of the Red Cross 
1 This paper is part of a larger project investigating the role of the Red Cross and Red Crescent 
in establishing and transforming a new international humanitarian order in the second half 
of the twentieth century. I am thankful to Martin Aust, Michael Geyer, Daniel Palmieri and 
Katharina Stornig, and also the editors of this volume for their helpful comments on this paper. 
The transcription of Arabic letters follows the IJMES transliteration system.
2 Issa Makhlouf, Une ville dans le ciel (Paris 2014), 15f.: “Il n’y a pas un endroit au monde où le 
mot ‘paix’ résonne davantage qu’au siège des Nations-Unies, ce conservatoire des guerres où 
on les stocke de génération en génération. Il y a des mots qui, à force d’être répétés, se vident 
de leur contenu et finissent par désigner le contraire de ce qu’ils invoquent.” 
3 Humanity, humane and humanitarian have the same etymological origin, although they carry 
different ideological backgrounds. For the relationship between human and humane see 
Christian Høgel, The Human and the Humane. Humanity as Argument From Cicero to Eras-
mus (Göttingen 2015), 11. Following Didier Fassin humanitarian, as derived from humanity, is 
understood best in a broad sense, encompassing mankind and humaneness. See Didier Fassin, 
La raison humanitaire. Une histoire morale du temps présent (Paris 2010), 8.
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(ICRC).4 This is also true for the little book A Souvenir from Solferino, 
considered the founding document of the Movement. Throughout the book, 
its author Henry Dunant, one of the founding members of the Committee, 
already made frequent reference to the notion of humanity.5 However, 
while humanity occurred regularly, the notion of humanitarianism did not 
yet appear prominently in the Red Cross’ early years. Throughout the rapid 
growth of the Movement, with the foundation of national Red Cross and Red 
Crescent societies worldwide, the reference to humanity remained central – 
in 1965, humanity even became one of the seven official principles of the 
Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and is often characterised as the 
most essential one because it serves as a kind of foundation for the other 
principles.6 Yet despite its ubiquity, there was far from being a consensus 
on this notion within the movement, neither on its definition nor on its use. 
Rather, as Ilana Feldman and Miriam Ticktin have underlined for the term 
of humanity more generally, it encompassed different and even contradictory 
meanings that resulted both from practices and theoretical considerations.7 
Indeed, the efforts to define humanity were paralleled by debates about its 
political and social scope.
In this article, I set out to trace the history of this concept and its place 
within the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement in the second half of the 
twentieth century. The focus will be on the years from 1948 to 1973, because 
this period covers significant references to humanity within the Movement 
both in discourse and in practice: indeed, the humanitarian engagement of 
the Movement in the Middle East, but also beyond, was paralleled by debates 
4 For example, in a letter to the personal surgeon of the Egyptian Khedive in 1870, the ICRC 
qualified the principles inscribed in the Geneva Conventions as the “core of humanity” (“noyau 
de l’humanité”), Archives of the Committee of the Red Cross in Geneva (henceforth ACIRC), 
AF 19, 2.1, 1: Egypte Copies Correspondances envoyées, letter from the ICRC to Burghières 
Bey, Geneva/22.2.1870. On the history of the Movement, see David Forsythe, The Humanitar-
ians. The International Committee of the Red Cross (Cambridge 2005).
5 See, for example, Henry Dunant, Un souvenir de Solférino, Geneva 1862, 121, footnote 1: “[…] 
ce qui est certes déjà quelque chose au point de vue de l’humanité.”
6 See Geoffrey Best, Law and War Since 1945 (Oxford 1997), 237. There is currently a common 
interest by the ICRC itself and scholars in the field to come back to the study of these principles, 
as a conference in Geneva in September 2015 illustrates, https://www.icrc.org/en/document/
new-report-connecting-past. The seven principles are: Humanity, Impartiality, Neutrality, 
Independence, Voluntary Service, Unity, Universality. See Daniel Palmieri, “Les principes 
fondamentaux de la Croix-Rouge: une histoire politique”, https://www.icrc.org/fr/document/
les-principes-fondamentaux-de-la-croix-rouge-une-histoire-politique, Jean-Luc Blondel, “The 
Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross and Red Crescent”, in International Review of the 
Red Cross 31:283 (1991), 349 –357; Jacques Meurant, “Principes fondamentaux de la Croix-
Rouge et humanitarisme moderne”, in Chrisophe Swinarski (ed.), Etudes et essais sur le droit 
international humanitaire et sur les principles de la Croix-Rouge en l’honneur de Jean Pictet 
(Geneva 1984), 893–911.
7 Ilana Feldman / Miriam Ticktin, “Government and Humanity”, in id. (ed.), In the Name of 
Humanity. The Government of Threat and Care (Durham, NC 2010), 1–26, on p. 2.
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at concrete events such as the Red Cross conferences in 1948, 1957, 1963, 
1965 and 1973.8 The paper argues that the reference to humanity fulfilled 
different functions within the movement, which went far beyond its defini-
tion as major principle. These different functions can be best systematised 
by analysing them on three different levels, namely the practical, the struc-
tural and the normative levels. On the practical level, the notion of humanity 
served as an appeal to humanitarian action, on the structural level humanity 
was debated as a principle, and on the normative level humanity was further 
integrated as a legal category of the Geneva Conventions. On all three levels, 
humanity was a polemical concept:9 The broad application of the term and 
its authority within the Red Cross Movement enabled the contestation and 
(re-) appropriation of its meaning in specific contexts. Furthermore, the dis-
cussions around the term of humanity testified to negotiations and frictions 
between the Movement’s leaders and the individual societies and their mem-
bers or between diverging political opinions. In analysing these debates, the 
relationship between Western and Non-Western branches of the organisation 
will be of special interest, with a focus on those in the Arab world and their 
various interactions with the movement. What happened when a European 
concept found application in a Non-European setting, shaped by colonial-
ism? How did colonial strategies of dealing with humanity in the juridical, 
political and social spheres influence these debates? And how did the ICRC’s 
attempt to globalise10 the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement in the 1950s 
in the sense of more deliberately integrating Non-Western actors and ideas 
influence its discourses and practices related to the term humanity? To what 
extent were these attempts contested or supported by the Non-Western actors 
in question? Did they “take its universalist rhetoric at face value” and “exploit 
8 It would be interesting to extend the analysis until the additional protocols of the Geneva 
Conventions 1977. In fact, more research has to be done on this crucial topic. For some first 
hints, see Geoffrey Best, Humanity in Warfare (New York 1980); Fabian Klose, “The Colonial 
Testing Ground. The ICRC and the End of Empire”, in Humanity 2:1 (2011), 107–126. Besides, 
historian Eleanor Davey is currently working on that theme.
9 One might also call it “magnetic concept”, as Irène Herrman did in an article on humanitarian-
ism and anti-Semitism in Switzerland in order to investigate the negative and positive attraction 
both terms have while also leaving much space for interpretation. Yet, in the present case, the 
critical positions vis-à-vis this notion persisted. See Irène Herrmann, “From Polemical Topics 
to Magnetic Concepts: Humanitarianism and Anti-Semitism in Switzerland”, in Journal of 
Political Ideologies 15:1 (2010), 51–68.
10 While there are different definitions and periodisations of globalisation, I am relying here on 
the specific dimension of globalisation after 1945, when, according to Jürgen Osterhammel 
and Niels Petersson, “a deliberate attempt is made to establish a better world order according 
to two competing models in two competing power blocks” and “at the same time […] people 
slowly perceive the world as a ‘Schicksalsgemeinschaft’, a community of fate threatened by 
nuclear annihilation and and confronted with environmental problems that transcend national 
borders.” Jürgen Osterhammel / Niels Petersson, Globalization, A Short History (Princeton, NJ 
2005), 29.
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[…] its mechanisms”, as Mark Mazower has shown for the “emergence of the 
global United Nations” after 1945?11 In short, how did the historical contexts 
of decolonisation and Cold War12 shape the Movement’s members’ references 
to humanity? In order to go deeper into the colonial and post-colonial dimen-
sions of the notion of humanity, the approach of Samera Esmeir’s book on 
Juridical Humanity seems very promising. It focusses on the establishment 
of European law in colonial Egypt in the nineteenth century. Esmeir argues 
that the British colonial administration introduced humanity as a juridical 
term in an inclusive sense by encompassing large parts of the Egyptian pop-
ulation. While this practice at first glance contradicted traditional colonial 
procedures, it nonetheless also meant an asymmetrical transformation of 
power in the Egyptian jurisdiction towards privileging European juridical 
norms and ideas.13 With regard to the topic of this paper, it will be interesting 
to ask how both Western and Non-Western Red Cross efforts to insist on 
an inclusive understanding of humanity still contained exclusive patterns. 
While in the context of International Humanitarian Law, the links to politics 
are evident, it seems that the Red Cross’ own humanitarian self-conception 
as a non-political body did not become more convincing by its insistence on 
humanity. It rather underlined the strong connection between humanitarian-
ism and governance, highlighted for example by Didier Fassin, Alan Lester 
and Fae Dussart.14
The sources used for this paper reflect the complex organisational struc-
ture of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement: besides archival material 
from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the League of 
Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, documents from different branches, 
specifically the British Red Cross and the Egyptian Red Crescent, will serve 
as a case in point for a Western and a Non-Western perspective. Next to these 
11 Mark Mazower, No Enchanted Palace. The End of Empire and the Ideological Origins of the 
United Nations (Princeton, NJ 2009), 188.
12 For the interrelatedness of decolonisation and Cold War, see among others Leslie James / Elisa- 
beth Leake (ed.), Decolonization and the Cold War. Negotiating Independence (London 
2015). For a more specific focus on the Middle East see Rashid Khalidi, Sowing Crisis. The 
Cold War and American Dominance in the Middle East (Boston 2009); Yezid Sayigh / Avi 
Shlaim, The Cold War and the Middle East (Oxford 1997).
13 Samera Esmeir, Juridical Humanity. A Colonial History (Stanford, CA 2012). Of interest is 
also Talal Asad’s work on the transforming power of British colonial jurisdiction in Egypt in a 
general sense, see Talal Asad, “Redeeming the ‘Human’ Through Human Rights”, in id. (ed.), 
Formations of the Secular. Christianity, Islam, Modernity (Stanford, CA 2003), 127–158; id., 
“Thinking About Law, Morality and Religion in the Story of Egyptian Modernization”, in 
Journal of the Interdisciplinary Study of Monotheistic Religions (JISMOR) 1, Special Issue 
(2005), 13–24.
14 Fassin, La raison humanitaire, 22; Alan Lester / Fae Dussart, Colonization and the Origins 
of Humanitarian Governance. Protecting Aborigines Across the Nineteenth-Century British 
Empire (Cambridge 2014), 1–5.
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unpublished sources, the different versions of the Geneva Conventions of 
1949 and the proceedings of Red Cross conferences between 1948 and 1973 
will be the object of study. With this diverse material, both from normative 
texts and inter-personal letters, official reports and personal statements, I 
intend to extend the analysis of humanity and the Red Cross as much as 
possible in order to mirror the complex position it occupies within the Move-
ment. The structure of this chapter follows the levels of practical, structural 
and normative concern, by considering humanity as an appeal, as a principle, 
the particular relationship between humanity and politics and finally the ref-
erence to humanity and the Geneva Conventions. Particular focus is put on 
the question of humanity as a principle because it best highlights the tensions 
of communication and the cross-cultural engagements implied in the concept 
of humanity within the Movement and which I have qualified as polemical.
2. Humanity as an Appeal
The notion of humanity was fundamentally used to motivate or justify 
humanitarian action within and beyond the Red Cross and Red Crescent 
Movement. As will be shown by different examples related to the Arab world 
in the aftermath of the Israel-Palestine-Conflict of 1948, European and Arab 
members of the Movement addressed people within and beyond the Red Cross 
Organisation to all for their own or others’ humanitarian action. Especially 
during the Israel-Palestine Conflict after 1948, humanity was referred to in 
order to mobilise both humanitarian actors and public opinion. Yet despite 
this intentional and partly even instrumental use, it seems that individuals 
also employed it to express their spontaneous reactions and intuitive despair, 
anger or hope. For example, in a speech addressed to the ICRC in a Pal- 
estinian journal article from 1950, a woman, in view of the thousands of 
refugees, asked “Where is justice, where is humanity, where is peace”?15
As for the more obviously instrumentalised reference to humanity in let-
ters and speeches, this was often employed by Red Cross or Red Crescent 
societies towards their governments, all over the globe. For instance, in the 
early 1950s the Egyptian Red Crescent repeatedly addressed the ministry 
of social affairs in asking permission to collect alms or other activities by 
explicitly referring to their “humanitarian project”, “humanitarian purpose” 
15 “Ayna al-ʿ adālah, ayna al-insāniyya, ayna al-salām?”, ACICR, G 59 I GC 65 (XVIII): Action 
pour les pauvres de Jérusalem, coupures de Presse, mai 1950, journal Phalastine of 5 May 
1950, article on “Risālat al-mar aʾt al- aʾrabiyyah ila munaṭamat al-salīb al-aḥmar” (“The Arab 
Woman’s Message to the Red Cross”). 
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or “humanitarian mission”.16 The same can be observed for a letter from the 
ICRC to the British government in 1948, in which the author speaks about 
the “customary humanitarian activities” of the ICRC in order to calm the 
reservations of London towards an engagement for the refugees in Palestine.17 
With other humanitarian activists, within or outside the movement, there was 
even more reference to humanity in order to mobilise the others’ help or to 
thank them for their support. For example, in a letter to the administration of 
the Indian Hospice in Palestine in 1950, the ICRC member Mr Gaberel asked 
the director to review his decision not to help which “does […] prejudice our 
reputation in the field of our humanitarian activities”.18 In the same vein, 
ICRC president Ruegger wrote to a collaborator who wanted to leave the 
organisation in 1949 that he hoped his correspondent would always remember 
“our common humanitarian ideal”.19 Between Red Cross and Red Crescent 
societies as well, the “spirit of humanitarian cooperation” is emphasised to 
seek support, like in the letter from the ICRC to the Egyptian Red Crescent 
in 1954.20 And when the latter granted its help, the ICRC thanked the sister 
society in Cairo for its “spirit of humanitarian understanding”.21 Yet the ICRC 
members were at times also aware of the misuse of humanitarian vocabulary. 
16 In Arabic “mashrū‘ insānī“ and “gharaḍ insānī”, see Dār al-Wathā‘iq / National Archives 
in Cairo (henceforth DWQ), 0075-057214: Jalasa majlis al-wuzarāʿ al-munʿ aqada […] 
1952, Letter of the Egyptian Red Crescent to the Minister of Social Affairs, Cairo/10. 
01.1952, no. 23; 0075-057412: Jalasa majlis al-wuzarāʿ al-munʿ aqada f ī yaw, 21.10.1951, 
no. 6, Wizāra al-dākhiliyya/idāra majālis al-mudīriyyat. Muḏakkira marfūʿa li-majlis al- 
wuzarā ,ʿ memorandum of the ministry of interior, September 1951.
17 ACICR, G 59 I GC 47: Correspondance avec la délégation de Londres, Notes reçues et expédiées 
08.01.–15.04. 48, Letter from Kune/ICRC to the British Government, 27.1.1948.
18 ACICR, G 59/I/GC/28: Mission de Mr Gaberel en Palestine février 1949–avril 50, Correspon-
dance générale, Letter from Gaberel to Ansari/Administrator of the Indian Hospice, Jerusa-
lem/1.2.1950.
19 ACICR, G 59 I GC 41: Mission de Mr. Pflimlin en Palestine mai 48–avril 1949, Correspon-
dance envoyée, letter from Ruegger to Pflimlin, Geneva/11.4.1949: he hopes that they will 
remain in contact in order to “conserver avec lui [that is the ICRC] des relations empreintes de 
cet esprit qui caractérise tous ceux qui ont consacré leur temps et leur dévouement à notre idéal 
humanitaire commun”.
20 ACICR, B AG 224.064.001: Situation de l’équipage du “Bat Galim”. Navire israélien et son 
equipage de dix marins arraisonné dans le Canal de Suez 1954–1955, letter from the Israelian 
legation to Ruegger, Bern/4.10.1954: Ruegger is asked to asked the Egyptian Red Crescent to do 
some investigation concerning the sailors who were accused of having opened fire on Egyptian 
fishermen and who had then been transferred to Cairo. Two days later, the ICRC sent a cor - 
responding telegram to the Egyptian foreign minister Fawzi and to Aʿzmi from the Egyptian 
Red Crescent. While in the telegram to Aʿzmi the ICRC wrote “Faisant appel a esprit cooper-
ation humanitaire croissant rouge égyptien […]”, this passage was missing in the telegram to 
Fawzi. 
21 ACICR, B AG 224.064.001: Situation de l’équipage du “Bat Galim”. Navire israélien et son 
equipage de dix marins arraisonné dans le Canal de Suez 1954–1955, letter from Gaillard to 
Boutros-Ghali, Geneva/1.12.1954: “[…] esprit de compréhension humanitaire très positive dont 
le Croissant-Rouge égyptien a su faire preuve dans cette affaire”.
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When in 1957 the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs asked the ICRC to let 
Arab countries pay for Arab families in Gaza, an ICRC delegate criticised 
this “false humanitarianism”.22 The reference to humanity and its related 
terms persisted after the Israel-Palestine Conflict and continued to play a 
role in the relationship between the ICRC and different Arab partners who 
apparently identified the Geneva committee with these terms. For example, 
in 1965, at a meeting between delegates from the ICRC and the Arab League 
in Geneva, the Arab representative used the reference to the Red Cross’s 
humanitarianism to stress the links between their organisations:
Don’t both our activities share a common link? And don’t they join each other in their 
finality? I would even make a comparison that is more audacious yet: you, humani-
tarian action by the ICRC in the Arab world, for the benefit of the Arabs; we, sharing 
our Arab cultural patrimony in Switzerland for the benefit of Switzerland. Result: 
consolidation of the relations between Switzerland and the Arab world.23
To sum up, activists within and beyond the Red Cross Movement identified 
the Movement with the notion of humanity and related terms. In fact, it was 
precisely due to this close connection that the appeals quoted gained force in 
practice and led to action.
3. Humanity as a Principle
The analysis of humanity as a principle of the Movement also has normative 
implications, but of interest here is its crucial meaning for the international 
structure and dynamics of the movement. On the structural level, meaning 
within the Movement, the notion of humanity was used by some delegates to 
create unity while others used it to criticise both each other and the orientation 
of the Movement. This was obvious with the establishment of and discussion 
about humanity as one of the seven Red Cross core principles. Reference to 
22 ACICR, B AG 280.065-008: Secours à la population égyptienne en territoire occupé 1957, 
letter from de Traz to the ICRC, Beirut/15.3.1957: “[…] monument de fausse candeur: sous 
couleur d’humanitarisme, il s’agissait de rien moins que de faire supporter par les pays arabes 
le soutien finanicer des nécessiteux de Gaza, alors occupé par Israel. Les chiffres sous lesquels 
l’opération à laquelle on nous demandait de participer ne portait pas moins que sur cinqante à 
cet [sic] mille livres sterling par mois.”
23 “Nos deux activités, n’ont-elles pas un lien commun? Et ne se joignent-elles pas dans leur 
finalité? Vous, par la voie humanitaire, nous, par nos efforts culturels? J’avancerai même une 
comparaison plus hardie: vous, action humanitaire du CICR dans les pays arabes, pour le bien 
des Arabes; nous, partage de notre patrimoine culture arabe Suisse au bénéfice de la Suisse. 
Résultante: consolidation des rapports entre la Suisse et le monde arabe.” Les liens entre la 
Ligue des Etats arabes et le Comité international de la Croix-Rouge (Geneva 1965), 8.
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humanity thus revealed both at once the strength and the weakness of the Red 
Cross and Red Crescent movement: indeed, the different branches and the 
movement as a whole showed strength by their ability to agree on these prin-
ciples and to demonstrate their orientation, yet it can also be seen as a sign of 
weakness because the movement apparently was in need of self-identifying 
or self-affirming itself.24
Before humanity was officially declared one of the seven Red Cross 
principles in 1965, there had been several preparatory steps. Of importance 
was a little book on The Red Cross Principles from 1955 by Jean Pictet, a 
Swiss jurist and Vice-President of the ICRC who had been one of the main 
authors of the Geneva Conventions of 1949. In his study from 1955, Pictet 
explained that although the notion humanity was central to the Red Cross, 
it had been neglected and he sought to give it its merited place. He defined 
it as “a sentiment of benevolence towards man”25 and deliberately skipped 
the dimensions of this definition as mankind or human nature.26 Pictet then 
implicitly referred to Dunant by introducing the parallel notion of charity,27 
but he rejected it immediately as a principle because the term charity carried 
the connotation of almsgiving, which might create confusion. Interestingly, 
he did not argue here that humanity was a notion much more compatible in 
religious, ideological or cultural terms,28 as he would do six years later. In 
1962 he reduced humanitarian morality to the following imperative: “do to 
others what you want them to do to you”29 and continued: “This precept is 
found in most of the big religions and it constitutes also the golden rule of 
24 For the difficult process of the ICRC’s self-identification after Second World War see Dominique 
Junod, The Imperiled Red Cross and the Palestine-Eretz-Yisrael Conflict 1945–1952. The 
Influence of Institutional Concerns on a Humanitarian Operation (London 1996), 2f., 30–32; 
Forsythe, The Humanitarians, 51–62; Catherine Rey-Schyrr, De Yalta à Bien Phu. Histoire du 
Comité international de la Croix-Rouge 1945–1955 (Geneva 2007), 37–48.
25 “Un sentiment de bienveillance envers les hommes”.
26 Jean Pictet, Les principes de la Croix Rouge (Geneva 1955), 14f. Interestingly, there is a slight 
reversion in an article from 1962 where he puts all three definitions on a more equal level: 
“Le mot ‘humanité’ a deux sens: il désigne, tout dʼabord, le genre humain, mais il signifie 
aussi un sentiment de bienveillance active envers les hommes. C e̓st dans ce sens que nous 
l e̓mployons ici.” Jean Pictet, “La doctrine de la Croix-Rouge”, in Revue internationale de la 
Croix-Rouge 44:522 (1962), 269–286, on p. 271.
27 See Henry Dunant, La charité sur les champs de bataille (Geneva 1864).
28 One also has to bear in mind different conceptions of humanity by the ICRC members. Ex-ICRC 
president Max Huber, for example, in a speech from 1952 put strong emphasis on the religious, 
and even Christian roots of humanity. See Max Huber, “Le droit des gens et l’humanité”, in 
Revue internationale de la Croix-Rouge 34:404 (1952), 646–669.
29 Matthew 7, 12. In Islam, there is no literary expression of the Golden Rule but certain Surahs 
like Surah 24,22 (“Let those among you who are bounteous and resourceful not swear to with-
hold giving to the kindred, to the needy, and to those who have forsaken their homes in the 
cause of Allah; rather, let them forgive and forbear. Do you not wish that Allah should forgive 
you? […]”) have been interpreted in this sense.
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the positivists.”30 After Pictet’s proposition of all seven principles, they were 
discussed at the council of delegates, proclaimed at the anniversary confer-
ence of the ICRC in 1963 and finally adopted by the Red Cross Conference in 
Vienna in 1965. The principle of humanity then read as follows:
The Red Cross, born of a desire to bring assistance without discrimination to the 
wounded on the battlefield, endeavours – in its international and national capacity – to 
prevent and alleviate human suffering wherever it may be found. Its purpose is to 
protect life and health and to ensure respect for the human being. It promotes mutual 
understanding, friendship, co-operation and lasting peace amongst all peoples.31
Scholars like David Forsythe,32 Daniel Palmieri and others have insisted 
upon the importance of the historical context in which the birth of these prin-
ciples must be read; the context of competition with the League of Red Cross 
Societies on the one hand, and the political context of decolonisation and the 
Cold War on the other. As to the competition with the League, Palmieri has 
shown that at a meeting of the Council of Governors in Oxford in 1946, the 
League challenged the institution of four traditional principles established by 
the ICRC since the 1920s by deciding to add 14 other fundamental principles 
which would be confirmed at the eighteenth Red Cross Conference in Toronto 
in 1952. With the help of the Japanese Red Cross, the ICRC responded to this 
challenge, charged Pictet with the study of the principles and was able to 
impose its position – represented by the reduction to a lesser amount of prin-
ciples – on the Movement.33 Concerning the context of decolonisation, the 
Cold War and “the intersections of these two historical ages”,34 the last sen-
tence of the definition of humanity as principle shows this clearly: after many 
debates, the notion of peace was integrated on the initiative of the Soviet 
Red Cross society.35 Indeed, there were many discussions about the notion of 
humanity within the Movement, which reflected political tensions of the Cold 
War and of decolonisation. The diverging opinions resulted in a debate about 
the non-political character, which the term of humanity and the movement 
itself were to uphold, but which was contested from within the Red Cross 
and Red Crescent Movement. Two different strategies can be observed in 
this context: the first, quite ambivalently, stressed the non-political character 
30 Pictet, “La doctrine de la Croix-Rouge”, 271.
31 Proceedings of the XXth Red Cross Conference in Vienna 1965, 7.
32 Forsythe, The Humanitarians; David Forsythe, “On Contested Concepts: Humanitarianism, 
Human Rights, and the Notion of Neutrality”, in Journal of Human Rights 12:1 (2013), 59–68.
33 Palmieri, “Les principes fondamentaux”.
34 James / Leake, “Introduction”, in James/Leake (ed.), Decolonization and the Cold War, 1–17, 
on p. 2.
35 Blondel, “The Fundamental Principles”, 355.
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of the Red Cross, yet its actors, mostly Western Red Cross participants, 
often at the same time made political statements. The other strategy aimed at 
underlining the political dimension of the organisation and was mainly used 
by Non-Western Red Cross or Red Crescent delegates.
4. Humanity and Politics
These different attitudes can be detected at all Red Cross conferences analysed 
here. At the conference of Stockholm in 1948, where the Israel-Palestine-con-
flict came up as a topic at several times and proved to be of crucial impor-
tance to the movement,36 the chairman of the conference and president of the 
Swedish Red Cross, Count Folke Bernadotte, insisted on the non-political 
character of this organisation and criticised that talking about the Palestinian 
issue would “leave outside the humanitarian field”.37 While Bernadotte tried 
to avoid the political dimension of the Palestinian topic, the delegate of the 
Egyptian government, Hussein Rady Bey, insisted on the humanitarian ori-
entation of the conference for a political statement: he made clear that the 
participation of Jewish delegates at this conference did not at all mean that 
they were politically recognised.38 In a similar logic, the Arab League, in a 
memorandum to the United Nations in 1948, accused the Jews in Palestine of 
“malicious, barbaric and inhuman methods of extermination […] in violation 
of the accepted rules of civilised or chivalrous warfare”.39 Beyond the con-
crete criticism of Israel’s behaviour in the conflict over Palestine, Egypt and 
other Arab states thus underlined once again their refusal to accept Israel as 
a state, which, in many cases, implied other political plans or aspirations.40
Similar politically motivated discussions happened at the Red Cross 
conference in New Delhi in 1957. This conference was dominated by topics 
linked both to the Cold War and violent conflicts of decolonisation: indeed, 
wars of decolonisation had just ended, like in Indochina in 1954,41 or were 
36 See Esther Möller, “Humanitarismus ohne Grenzen? Die Rotkreuz- und Rothalbmondbe-
wegung im Israel-Palästina-Konflikt 1948/1949”, in Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unter-
richt 66:1–2 (2015), 61–77.
37 Proceedings of the XVIIth Red Cross Conference in Stockholm 1948, 57.
38 Ibid., 67: “[…] participation of the Jewish authorities in Palestine in the work of this Confer-
ence in the capacity of observers does not involve their political recognition on the part of the 
Conference. My Government, realizing the splendid humanitarian work of this Conference 
and desirous not to weaken its activities by political discussions which are entirely without its 
province […]”.
39 League of Arab States (ed.), Jewish Atrocities in the Arab Land. Memorandum Presented by the 
Representative of the Arab Higher Commission for Palestine at U.N.O. (1948), 3.
40 See Ilan Pappé, The Making of the Arab-Israeli-Conflict 1947–1951 (London 1992), 25f.
41 See Martin Thomas, Fight or Flight. Britain, France, and Their Roads From Empire (Oxford 
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still going on, like in Algeria.42 Moreover, the Cold War impacted heavily on 
the conference, and revealed that despite the Non-Aligned Movement and its 
initial conference in Bandung in 1955, “Asia was deeply divided by the Cold 
War”.43 As a consequence, the emergence of two de facto independent states 
from one single state, Formosa/Taiwan (Republic of China) and the People’s 
Republic of China, and which to recognise,44 was a dominant topic in New 
Delhi in 1957.45 During this conference, the concept of humanity was mostly 
referred to as “mankind” or “the whole world”, especially in a negative sense: 
the scenario of nuclear weapons and the Cold War was instrumentalised to 
speak of “threats” and “dangers” to humanity.46 Every time they used this 
term, the different speakers tried to gain support for their cause by appealing 
for solidarity and underlining that all countries were concerned by the Cold 
War tensions. The delegate of South Korea, Hoon Kim, for example stated 
that apparently there were different understandings of humanity within the 
conference, and that he himself understood it as comprising all human beings 
and their relationships. Yet, while strengthening the non-political dimension 
of the term, he expressed his political opinion: by saying that the Conference 
was not the place to “explain how the People’s Republic of China feels about 
Formosa” and thus implicitly criticizing China,47 he endorsed the position of 
the USA to support Formosa/Taiwan.48
An even more explicit position regarding the relationship between human-
ity and politics was taken by the Indonesian Red Cross delegate Soemarno 
Sosroatmodje at the Anniversary Conference of the Red Cross in Geneva 
in October 1963. He directly pleaded for an extension of the principle of 
humanity in the sense that it implied politics. He also tried to overcome 
the idea that this connection would always be of harm to the Red Cross 
Movement:
2014), 131–163; Marc Frey, Dekolonisierung in Südostasien. Die Vereinigten Staaten und die 
Auflösung der europäischen Kolonialreiche (Munich 2006).
42 See Fabian Klose, Human Rights in the Shadow of Colonial Violence. The Wars of Indepen-
dence in Kenya and Algeria (Philadelphia 2013); Thomas, Fight or Flight.
43 Mazower, No Enchanted Palace, 187.
44 For the historical context see Christopher Miller, “From Foreign Concessions to Special 
Economic Zones: Decolonization and Foreign Investment in Twentieth-Century Asia”, in 
James / Leake (ed.), Decolonization and the Cold War, 239–253, on pp. 242–246.
45 On the conference itself, see Françoise Perret / François Bugnion, De Budapest à Saigon. 
Histoire du Comité international de la Croix-Rouge 1956–1965 (Geneva 2009), 105–123.
46 See Proceedings of the XIXth Red Cross Conference in New Delhi 1957, on p. 89. While both 
Eastern and Western bloc countries used the recourse to humanity, the Eastern side did so more 
often.
47 See Proceedings of the XIXth Red Cross Conference in New Delhi 1957, 81.
48 Frey, Dekolonisierung in Südostasien, 146.
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That is why the Indonesian Red Cross […] has more and more felt that the implemen-
tation of the Red Cross task should be based on a wider humanitarian scope reflecting 
the rising conscience of the universality of humanity and social consciousness of man. 
It is this conviction that caused me to join the Red Cross. How then can I separate the 
humanitarianism inspiring the Red Cross from the principle of humanity that is part 
of the drive behind the Indonesian revolution? If it is politics to respond in all possible 
ways, in all spheres of activity, to the call of humanity for deeper realization and wider 
practice of humanitarian principles, then truly do I think politics, feel politics, live 
politics. […] To the Indonesian Red Cross this is the way in which it might be possible 
to broaden the field of our humanitarian activities in the whole of the Red Cross Move-
ment without falling into the trap of discrimination or of favoring one political group 
at the expense of the other for reasons other than our humanitarian principles.49
Although scholars should t, for their part, be cautious of establishing direct 
links between this position and the political sphere, the arguments clearly 
translate current political issues of Indonesia at that time. First of all, the 
speaker, by highlighting the risk of favouring one political group against 
another, reflected the ideas of the Non-Alignment Movement in which 
Indonesia played a pivotal role.50 Moreover, in the sense of Esmeir’s argument, 
one can also deduce that, in the tradition of the Bandung conference, the 
Indonesian delegate criticised colonial practices and structures by declaring 
that only the Indonesian way of linking humanity and humanitarianism with 
politics would lead to a deeper realisation of humanitarian goals. Indeed, the 
Indonesian Red Cross had been founded one month after the unilateral dec-
laration of Indonesian independence from the Netherlands in August 1945, 
and thus clearly stands in an anti-colonial tradition, as the reference to the 
Indonesian revolution makes clear. It was also this revolution which Indone-
sian president Sukarno felt being threatened by the creation of the federation 
of Malaya by the British and which led to an armed conflict between by 
then independent Malaysia and Indonesia from 1963 to 1966.51 In making 
this statement at the conference in 1963, the speaker implicitly justified his 
government’s launching of the conflict as a humanitarian duty.
At the Red Cross conference in Teheran in November 1973, finally, the 
notion of humanity was equally prominent. For instance, the delegate of 
the North Vietnamese government, Nguyen Van Luu, reported on differ-
ent understandings of the notion of humanity within the Commission on 
49 Proceedings of the Centenary Congress of the International Red Cross in Geneva 1963, 88f. 
50 See Amit Das Gupta, “The Non-Aligned and the German Question”, in Nataša Mišković et al. 
(ed.), The Non-Aligned Movement and the Cold War. Delhi – Bandung – Belgrade (New York 
2014), 143–160, on p. 147f.; Jürgen Dinkel, Die Bewegung Bündnisfreier Staaten. Genese, 
Organisation und Politik (1927–1992) (Berlin 2015), 2.
51 For the whole context see Frey, Dekolonisierung in Südostasien, 295– 304.
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Humanitarian Law, which had had to prepare a resolution for the conference. 
He criticised existing hierarchies within the Movement by declaring that the 
report on these discussions privileged the “old understanding” represented by 
the ICRC and complained: “Priority is still given to the old ideas!”52 Looking 
at the report the delegate is referring to, it is difficult to find the exact passage 
he claims to be quoting. There is only one passage on definitions, which 
concerns the definition of “armed conflict” and where the “softer” position 
(probably represented by the ICRC) is perhaps given more weight than the 
more radical one:53 The report speaks about a delicate balance between the 
“claims of humanity” and the “corresponding requirements concerning the 
security of the state”. The North Vietnamese delegate then continues to 
report that the Commission had to choose between a narrower definition of 
the non-international armed conflict and a broad definition of the conflict, 
which would only give some general rules of protection. According to the 
report, some delegates voted for the narrow definition, while others declared 
themselves in favour of an application of the protocol to all non-international 
conflicts involving, on the one hand, governmental forces, and on the other 
regular or irregular military forces, i.e. to conflicts not covered by article 
two of all Geneva Conventions.54 The debate on the definition of armed 
conflicts to which the Geneva Conventions would apply was very harsh in 
the time period under question, and this was especially true for the conflict 
that in 1973 was still going between North and South Vietnam.55 The Paris 
Peace Accords of January 1973 had been unable to end the Vietnam War. 
North Vietnam’s international position was strengthened by its adherence to 
the Non-Aligned Movement in 1972,56 but its rejection by the United States 
affected its global standing. More generally, the newly independent states 
52 Proceedings of the XXth Red Cross Conference in Teheran 1973, 73. 
53 For the central role of the doctrine of armed conflict for the ICRC and the whole movement, see 
Best, War and Law Since 1945, 236f.
54 See ICRC Library Geneva / XXIIe conférence de la Croix Rouge, Teheran 1973, “Rapport de la 
commission du droit international humanitaire”, 9f.: “[…] équilibre délicat entre les exigences 
de l’humanité et les impératifs afférents à la sécurité de l’État […] il fallait choisir entre une 
définition étroite du conflit armé non international, assortie d’une réglementation très com-
plète et une définition large du conflit, assortie d’une réglementation plus modeste et ne posant 
que des règles générales de protection. Alors que certains délégués exprimaient le vœu de 
préciser l’article premier du projet de Protocole II […], d’autres, au contraire, se sont prononcés 
en faveur d’un article premier simplifié qui disposerait, en substance, que les dispositions du 
Protocole doivent s’appliquer à tous les conflits armés non internationaux mettant aux prises, 
d’une part, des forces gouvernementales et, d’autre part, des forces militaires régulières ou 
irrégulières, et auxquelles l’article 2 commun aux Conventions de Genève n’est pas applicable.” 
55 Marc Frey, “Das Scheitern des ‘begrenzten Krieges’. Vietnamkrieg und Indochinakonflikt”, 
in Zeithistorische Forschungen / Studies in Contemporary History 2 (2005), 17–34; François 
Bugnion, Le Comité international de la Croix-Rouge et la protection des victimes de guerre 
(Geneva 2000), 453.
56 See Dinkel, Die Bewegung Bündnisfreier Staaten, 180.
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were not able to impose their position directly. Their claim of extending 
Humanitarian Law to colonial and post-colonial conflicts only materialised 
in the Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of 1977.57 Yet, the 
link made by the North Vietnamese delegate also resounds in the claims of 
postcolonial researchers and contemporary activists who reject the notion 
of humanity as racist and exclusive and would like to replace it with other 
concepts.58
One can see that the reference to humanity within the Movement was 
marked by efforts both to split and unite the organisation. The elevation of 
humanity as a principle and the differentiation between humanity and poli-
tics only partly clarified this process.
5. Humanity in the Geneva Conventions
The historical context described in the last chapter was also decisive for the 
Red Cross Movement’s understanding of humanity in the discussions around 
the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, which renewed and extended the ear-
lier version of 1929. Through its participation in the diplomatic conferences, 
which adopt the text of the Conventions, the Red Cross Movement, with the 
ICRC as the protector of this kind of law, was and is deeply linked to this 
set of International Humanitarian Law.59 This is also obvious through a doc-
ument that enables a comparison of the text of the Geneva Conventions of 
1929, the Movement’s proposition to the Red Cross Conference of 1949, the 
decisions at this conference, and finally the text of the Conventions of 1949. 
By analysing the text of the Convention and its preparatory and post-process-
ing documents, we can see that there was both a narrowing and a broadening 
of the concept of humanity. Besides, we can observe that in 1949 the Red 
Cross Movement could only partly enforce its views.
In the four Geneva Conventions themselves, humanity is referred to in 
three principal ways: first in the sense of humanitarian (either humanitarian 
principles, humanitarian activities and humanitarian organisations such as 
57 See Best, War and Law Since 1945, 74. Yet Best is also very critical as to the real scope and 
applicability of these provisions.
58 These alternative concepts might be alterity or cosmopolitism. See the discussions in Feld-
man / Ticktin, “Government and Humanity”, 10f.
59 For a historical perspective on the ICRC’s involvement with the Geneva Conventions see 
Forsythe, The Humanitarians, 242–278; Jennifer Johnson, The Battle for Algeria. Sovereignty, 
Health Care, and Humanitarianism (Philadelphia 2015), 126–156; Klose, Human Rights in 
the Shadow of Colonial Violence. For a more general study of the Geneva Conventions see 
Mark Lewis, The Birth of the New Justice. The Internationalization of Crime and Punishment 
1919–1950 (Oxford 2014), 229–273; Andrew Clapham et al. (ed.), The 1949 Geneva Conven-
tions. A Commentary (Oxford 2015).
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the Red Cross; the two latter fields of words occurred the most frequently), 
second in the sense of (in-) humane treatment of people (prisoners, soldiers, 
civilians), and third in the sense of mankind (though this usage was less 
frequent).
To begin with the first one: concerning humanitarian organisations, the 
Red Cross Movement tried to maintain its position as the central agency, 
but had to accept that it was often only named as an example of an impartial 
humanitarian body, though this still implied a privileged position.60 The out-
standing position of the ICRC61 within the Movement can be detected when 
comparing the suggestions the organisation gave concerning the text of the 
Conventions of 1949: many of the propositions were followed and thus pre-
sented at the diplomatic conference of 1949.62
A clear effort to narrow the definition of humanity can be found in the 
reference to humane or inhumane treatment. In the preparatory documents 
for the diplomatic conference of 1949, different governments and organisa-
tions, like the Finnish government or the International Labour Organization 
(ILO), had insisted on the integration of these terms.63 In the final Conven-
tions, this concern has been respected with an effort to define more clearly 
60 A position against the privileged position of the ICRC was represented by e.g. the Italian gov-
ernment. In its memorandum to the Diplomatic Conference 1949, the Italian government, “in 
order not to prevent other impartial bodies from exercising their humanitarian activities for the 
benefit of prisoners of war”, suggested a change of art. 7 of the convention concerning prisoners 
of war which should henceforth speak of “the Red Cross or any other impartial humanitarian 
body”. See ICRC Library, Collection des documents préparatoires de la Conférence diploma-
tique pour l’élaboration de conventions internationales destinées à protéger les victimes de la 
guerre, 1949, Memorandum of the government of Italy. In the Geneva Conventions of 1949 this 
expression found wide application and thus both reduced and highlighted the pivotal position 
of the ICRC.
61 See for example art. 9, common to all four Conventions (art. 10 in the 4th Convention): “The 
provisions of the present Convention constitute no obstacle to the humanitarian activities which 
the International Committee of the Red Cross or any other impartial humanitarian organization 
may, subject to the consent of the Parties to the conflict concerned, undertake for the protection 
of wounded and sick, medical personnel and chaplains, and for their relief.” Another example 
would be art. 3, § 2, equally common to all four Conventions: “The wounded and sick shall be 
collected and cared for. An impartial humanitarian body, such as the International Committee 
of the Red Cross, may offer its services to the Parties to the conflict […].” 
62 For example, concerning the first Convention, five out of eight propositions of the ICRC were 
realised. Art. 22, for instance, contained a new passage of the “humanitarian activities” by the 
ICRC.
63 See ICRC Library, Collection des documents préparatoires de la Conférence diplomatique 
pour l é̓laboration de conventions internationales destinées à protéger les victimes de la guerre, 
Memorandum of the government of Finland: the Finnish government proposed to replace the 
notion of “ill-treatment” in the Convention for Civilian Persons in times of War, art. 13, § 2, by 
the notion of “inhuman treatment”. In its memorandum in the same collection, the ILO pointed 
out that in 1929 already, it had insisted on making working conditions during war times “as 
humane as possible”. Other NGO’s and IO’s statements are not reported here, but probably 
also expressed their opinion, given the intensive relationship between the ICRC and other 
international bodies. See therefore for example François Bugnion, “Le Comité international 
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what humane treatment means. Most prominent in this context is Article 3, 
also called the “convention in miniature”64 because of its far-reaching scope 
and because it is common to all four Conventions of 1949:65
Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who 
have laid down their arms and those placed “hors de combat” by sickness, wounds, 
detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without 
any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, 
or any other similar criteria.
While Article 2 of the Geneva Convention of 1929 only spoke about “humane 
treatment”,66 the version of 1949 at least tries to be more specific. The same 
efforts can be seen in articles like article 130 of the Third Convention on 
Prisoners of War, which prohibits
[…] inhuman treatment, including biological experiments, wilfully causing great suf-
fering or serious injury to body or health, compelling a prisoner of war to serve in the 
forces of the hostile Power, or wilfully depriving a prisoner of war of the rights of fair 
and regular trial prescribed in this Convention.67
Nonetheless, vague references to humanity remained within the Conventions, 
e.g. Article 108 in the Third Convention, which speaks of “requirements of 
health and humanity”. This is also true for the terms used in the field of 
Humanitarian Law and its blurred boundaries with humanity as a principle 
represented by the Red Cross. Indeed, there is a certain variety of expressions 
that may sometimes refer to International Humanitarian Law, sometimes to 
basic principles. This becomes more complex when comparing French and 
English versions of the preamble. In the suggestions by the Red Cross for 
the diplomatic conference of 1949 the French version of the preamble speaks 
about “droit humain”.68 The Conventions of 1949 did not integrate a preamble, 
de la Croix-Rouge et les Nations-Unies de 1945 à nos jours: oppositions, complémentarités et 
partenariats”, in Relations internationales 152:4 (2012), 3–16. 
64 J.H.W. Verzijl, International Law in Historical Perspective, vol. IX, Alphen aan den Rijn 
1978, 127.
65 The first convention concerned armies in the field, the second armies in the sea, the third 
prisoners of war and the fourth civilians.
66 Geneva Conventions 1929, art. 2: “Prisoners of war […] shall at all times be humanely treated 
and protected, particularly against acts of violence, from insults and from public curiosity. 
Measures of reprisal against them are forbidden.”
67 Geneva Conventions 1949, art. 130. This quotation provides an interesting link to the under-
standing of humanity in biological or technical terms, as highlighted by Feldman / Ticktin, 
“Government and Humanity”, 16–19.
68 ICRC Library Geneva, “Document de travail établi en vue de la Conférence diplomatique pour 
l’élaboration de conventions internationales destinées à protéger les victimes de la guerre, 
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but so did their additional protocols from 1977: in its English version there 
was a reference to “human rights” which in French would rather be “droits 
de l’homme” than “droit humain”.69 It seems that this shift of words could 
be linked to the growing influence of the Universal Declarations of Human 
Rights in 1948.70
After its adoption, the new Geneva Conventions were immediately con-
fronted with its practical application in a postcolonial setting and particu-
larly challenged by the violent wars of decolonisation, which they had not 
anticipated, contrary to other normative texts like the UN charter.71 This 
materialised for example when, after the capture and killing of Egyptian 
policemen by the British army in Ismailia near the Suez Canal in 1952,72 the 
Egyptian Red Crescent referred to these laws to criticise British behaviour in 
the Suez Canal zone.73 In a similar manner, in the following years, the Arab 
Red Crescent societies used the Red Cross conferences to condemn Israeli 
conduct towards Palestine as a violation both of the Geneva Conventions74 
and of the UN Human Rights Charter.75 This once again makes it clear that 
belonging to the same Movement and supporting the globalisation of its 
scope did not prevent the branches from criticising and contesting each other 
by making use of their common legal basis.
6. Conclusion
This analysis has shown that, although the notion of humanity fulfilled dis-
tinct functions on the three levels of practices, structures and norms, these 
levels also interacted: the principle of humanity also had a normative function, 
convoquée le 21 avril 1949 à Genève par le conseil fédéral suisse, Projet de convention pour la 
protection des personnes civiles en temps de guerre”, Préambule, 3.
69 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protec-
tion of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 8 June 1977, Preamble: 
“[…] ‘Recalling’ furthermore that international instruments relating to human rights offer a 
basic protection to the human person […]”.
70 See Forsythe, “On Contested Concepts”; Gerd Oberleitner, Human Rights in Armed Conflict. 
Law, Practice, Policy (Cambridge 2015), 46–51; Best, War and Law Since 1945, 72.
71 Johnson, The Battle for Algeria, 198; Klose, “The Colonial Testing Ground”.
72 For this incident see Thomas, Fight or Flight, 168.
73 ACICR, B AG 121 065–002: Généralités 19.02.1951–26.02.1953, letter from Gaillard to the 
ICRC, Cairo/8.5.1952. 
74 See e.g the discussions throughout the Fifth Regional Conference of Arab Red Cross and Red 
Crescent societies in Amman in April 1973. Archives of the Federation of Red Cross and Red 
Crescent Societies/Geneva, A 0768-1. 
75 See Ministry of Justice Riyad (ed.), Conferences of Riyad, Paris, Vatican City, Geneva, and 
Strasbourg on Moslem Doctrine and Human Rights in Islam Between Saudi Canonists and 
Eminent European Jurists and Intellectuals, Riyad 1975, Part One: Conference of Riyad on 
Muslim Doctrine and Human Rights in Islam, March 1972, 65.
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the quest for cooperation and solidarity was also important for the structural 
and normative levels. Moreover, the narrowing of the definition of humanity 
as a principle of the Red Cross Movement in practice did not prevent its 
extension in normative texts like the Geneva Conventions or in practices and 
discourses like statements at conferences. That is why humanity was indeed 
a polemical concept for the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement: it was 
used intentionally, it caused and represented divergent opinions, which were 
grounded in political opinions, and finally, it is difficult to define, similar to 
other normative texts on Humanitarian Law like the Marten’s clause.76 It thus 
helped to globalise the Movement, but also provoked contestation and made 
it difficult for the Movement’s members to find a common language.
Indeed, the ICRC’s attempt to strengthen its global applicability, for exam-
ple with regard to the seven Red Cross principles, as well as its insistence 
on the apolitical understanding of humanity was contested by other national 
societies: they strengthened their political comprehension of the principle 
of humanity and integrated it into their political struggles, in particular the 
emancipation from colonial power, as the Indonesian example has shown. 
Yet, one has to further differentiate, because throughout the debates there 
was not only and not always a distinction between Western and Non-Western 
national societies, but also according to political camps, in particular the two 
opposing sides in the the Cold War. Political as well as cultural sensibilities 
thus played a central role.
In this context, it seems important to come back to the question of the 
compatibility between Humanitarian Law and other Non-Christian or 
Non-Western cultures mentioned before. The aforementioned Jean Pictet, in 
a speech given in 1961, mentioned Non-Christian predecessors of Humani-
tarian Law like Saladin during the Crusades.77 While this point of view was 
shared by some Muslim scholars of the time, others insisted on the incompat-
ibility of Islam and Humanitarian Law.78 The debate continues until this day, 
including the discussions on compatibility between Islam and Human Rights, 
referred to earlier in this chapter as a topic closely related to humanity.79 In 
76 See the chapter by Kerstin von Lingen, “Fulfilling the Martens Clause: Debating ‘Crimes 
Against Humanity’, 1899–1945”, in this volume.
77 Jean Pictet, “Le droit de la guerre”, in International Review of the Red Cross 43:513 (1961), 
417–425, on p. 419.
78 See the diverging positions between, for instance, Christopher Weeremantry, pleading for a 
compatibility between Islam and Western Humanitarian Law, and Majid Khadduri, stressing 
also the particular context of the Islamic law. Christopher Weeramantry, Islamic Jurisprudence 
(New York 1988); Khadduri, The Islamic Law of Nations. Shabānī’s Siyar (Baltimore 1966). 
79 See for example the rather critical position of Ann Elizabeth Mayer, Islam and Human Rights 
(Boulder, CO 2007), 42. For the close though tense connection between Human Rights and 
Humanitarian Law see Bronwyn Leebaw, “Justice, Charity, or Alibi? Humanitarianism, 
Human Rights and ‘Humanity Law’ ”, in Humanity 5:2 (2014), 261–276, on p. 261f.
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order to resolve this dilemma, a look at historical actors’ understanding of 
humanity in practice and in discourses might help: It shows that there was no 
difficulty in accepting humanity as such, even as a principle of the Red Cross 
and Red Crescent Movement. The difficulty in accepting universal values 
lies in their legitimation. Indeed, one should be wary of jumping to hasty 
conclusions from historical to current legal frameworks, but instead care-
fully analyse historical genealogies.80 Moreover, as legal scholar Abdullah 
an-Na’im has argued,81 any attempt at universalisation should yield to the 
acceptance of diverse cultural and religious motivations. 
80 The Islamic Studies scholar Erwin Gräf has already suggested this in the 1960s, cf. Erwin Gräf, 
“Religiöse und rechtliche Vorstellungen über Kriegsgefangene in Islam und Christentum”, in 
Die Welt des Islams 3:8 (1963), 89–139.
81 Abdullah Ahmad An-Na’im, “Islam and Human Rights”, in John Witte (ed.), Religion and 
Human Rights. An Introduction (Oxford 2012), 56–70.
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Joachim Berger
“Une œuvre internationale d’un caractère humanitaire”
The Appeal to Humanity in International Masonic Relations
It is not surprising that Freemasonry1 as a type of association that grew 
rapidly in the century of the Enlightenment and whose language and activity 
was centered on the perfectibility of man should have adopted the “central 
virtue of the Enlightenment” as its ideal.2 More astonishing are the duration 
of and variety in the use of the word “humanity”, both in the overall spec-
trum of the various national umbrella associations and within the context of 
individual activities.
The European masonic movements reflect the broader trends in the history 
of the development of the concept of humanity.3 The three principal meanings 
of humanity, the ontological (human nature), the ethical (humanity as sympa-
thy and kindness towards fellow human beings) and the universal (the totality 
of mankind, “le genre humain”) influenced each other and overlapped in the 
general usage of the term. Also in the case of freemasons, humanity could 
relate to asymmetrical relationships – such as that between the affluent and 
civilised on the one hand and those in need of assistance and education on 
the other – or to symmetrical relationships, that is, to the community of all 
humans as equal beings, a concept which evoked sympathy and solidarity.4
The way in which the ubiquitous term “humanity” was employed by the 
European masonic movements is reminiscent of the function of an empty 
signifier as defined by Ernesto Laclau: a universal term intended to remove 
all internal differences within a system “if the signifiers empty themselves of 
their attachment to particular signifieds and assume the role of representing 
1 Note on capitalisation: I speak of “Freemasonry” when referring to the institution, its general 
organisational features and ideology, whereas the terms “freemasonry” resp. “freemasonries” 
denote national or regional branches with their peculiar shapes and characteristics (French, 
German, Latin, Christian etc. freemasonries).
2 Hans Erich Bödeker, “Menschheit, Humanität, Humanismus”, in Otto Brunner et al. (ed.), 
Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe. Historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in 
Deutschland, vol. 3 (Stuttgart 1982), 1063–1128, on p. 1076.
3 Cf. ibid.; Eilert Herms, “Humanität”, in Gerhard Müller (ed.), Theologische Realenzyklopädie 
(Berlin 1986), 661–682; Henri Duranton, “Humanité”, in Rolf Reichardt / Hans-Jürgen Lüse-
brink (ed.), Handbuch politisch-sozialer Grundbegriffe in Frankreich 1680–1820, vol. 19 
(Munich 2000), 9–51.
4 Cf. Thomas Zippert, “Humanität (Menschlichkeit). I. Dogmatisch. II. Ethisch”, in Hans Dieter 
Betz et al. (ed.), Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart (Tübingen 1998–2005), vol. 3, 1947f.
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the pure being of the system – or, rather, the system as pure Being”.5 In 
the following, I will try to show that while the appeal to humanity at the 
international level was intended to erase, conceal or bridge differences, it 
nonetheless made these differences conspicuous when attempts were made 
to derive universally valid recommendations for action from the ideal. In 
particular, the social-ethical standard of (brotherly and neighbourly) love 
as the expression of “true humanity” was directed into different fields of 
activity by the various masonic umbrella organisations. Consequently, 
masonic speech in the name of humanity developed into a field of negotiation 
between religious, ideological, social-political and national differences.6 In 
this chapter, this problem area is investigated for the example of masonic 
internationalism, which I understand as the interplay of bi- and multilateral 
relations with transnational movements and organisations. Therefore, I will 
analyse various national contexts with their individual linguistic variations 
in the appeal to humanity. Then I will delineate the contested fields of action 
with regard to international solidarity before discussing the effects of the 
appeal at the international level from the last third of the nineteenth century 
until the inter-war period.
1. Love – Charity – Solidarity: 
National Variations of the Appeal to Humanity
Two fundamental features of Freemasonry as an initiatory fraternity pro-
moted talk about humanity: first, the method of the gradual ethical per-
fectibility of the individual, and second, “brotherly love” as a special form 
of love for one’s neighbour. During initiation, a freemason took an oath to 
love and support his fellow lodge members as “brethren”.7 From this love, 
which was viewed as emerging from and also redeeming humanity, norms 
for dealings with fellow humans and for social action were derived. The 
justifications and target groups of this action throughout Europe were as 
variable as the use of the term “humanity” generally.8 “Practical” humanity 
5 Ernesto Laclau, Emancipation(s) (London 1996), 39.
6 Ilana Feldman / Miriam Ticktin, “Government and Humanity”, in id. (ed.), In the Name of 
Humanity. The Government of Threat and Care (Durham, NC 2010), 1–26, on p. 3.
7 Cf. August Wolfstieg (ed.), Bibliographie der freimaurerischen Literatur, vols 1–4 (Leipzig 
1911–1926), vol. 2: no. 22166–22311, vol. 4: no. 7000–7069.
8 See the tour d’horizon in Abigail Green, “Humanitarianism in Nineteenth-Century Context: 
Religious, Gendered, National”, in Historical Journal 57 (2014), 1157–1175, esp. 1160, 1169; 
Lynn Festa, “Humanity Without Feathers”, in Humanity 1:1 (2010), 3–27, http://humanity 
journal.org/issue-1/humanity-without-feathers/.
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encompassed relief for fellow masons in need and their families, aid and 
assistance to underprivileged groups in the service of social reform as 
well as solidarity with all forces in society that fought for peace, freedom 
(of conscience) and justice. The following comparison of three national 
forms of appropriation of humanity relates the semantic loading of the 
concept in masonic dictionaries and encyclopaedias to the norms propa-
gated in the rituals and the (discursive) practice in the national umbrella 
organisations.
Until well into the twentiethth century, among the German-speaking free-
masonries an understanding of humanity was prevalent which they attributed 
to the sometime mason Johann Gottfried Herder: anyone who improves the 
material circumstances of humans, for instance through charity, promotes 
humanity (Humanität) – as do those who elevate human morality through 
the “studium humanitatis”. Both of these aspects were taken up by German 
freemasons, albeit with varying emphases. Of all the German-language 
reference works, the Allgemeines Handbuch der Freimaurerei (published 
from 1865 to 1867) was the first to define the ideal of perfectibility referred 
to by the term “humanity”.9 According to this work, humanity referred to 
“the essence of human nature and simultaneously the pinnacle and goal to 
which all humanistic education must aspire”. This intellectual and aesthetic 
education (geistige Bildung) were the “dignity of humanity” upon which 
“human rights” were based – primarily “freedom of thought and conscience”. 
“Humanity thus consists firstly of human education and secondly of frater-
nity with humans or in general philanthropy […]. This pure goodwill then 
leads to good works, to sympathy towards all those in need.”10 The revised 
9 The entry “Humanität” is missing in Friedrich Mossdorf (ed.), Encyclopädie der Frei - 
maurerei, nebst Nachrichten über die damit in wirklicher oder vorgeblicher Beziehung 
stehen den geheimen Verbindungen, in alphabetischer Ordnung, von C. L. Lenning [sic], 
vols 1–3 (Leipzig 1822–1828); for Gädicke see below, footnote 20.
10 “[Humanität] bezeichnet das Wesen der menschlichen Natur und zugleich den Höhe- und 
Zielpunkt, nach dem alle Menschenbildung zu streben hat. [… Sie besteht] zuerst in der 
Entwicklung geistiger Bildung, in der Erkenntniss und Liebe des Wahren und Schönen, in 
der Erlernung und Betreibung der Wissenschaften und Künste. Diese edlere Menschenbildung 
wird auch als der Adel und die Würde der Menschheit bezeichnet […]. Auf diese Menschen-
würde gründen sich die Menschenrechte, und die beiden ersten und ursprünglichen Rechte 
des Menschen sind: seine Vernunft und seine Freiheit zu gebrauchen, d. i. Gedanken- und 
Gewissensfreiheit. […] Die Humanität besteht also erstens in Menschenbildung und zweitens 
in Menschenfreundlichkeit oder in allgemeiner Menschenliebe (Philanthropie), d. i. in 
freundlicher, liebevoller Theilnahme, in reinem Wohlwollen gegen jeden Menschen, so fremd 
oder fremdartig auch derselbe sein möge. […] Dieses reine Wohlwollen führt sodann zum 
Wohlthun, zum Erbarmen gegen jeden Nothleidenden.”, cf. Hermann Th. Schletter / Moritz 
Alex. Zille (ed.), Allgemeines Handbuch der Freimaurerei. Zweite, völlig umgearbeitete 
Auflage von Lenning’s Encyklopädie der Freimaurerei (Leipzig 1863–1867), vol. 2, 3–5.
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edition of the Allgemeines Handbuch published in 1900 summarises this 
chain of thought tautologically as follows: “Freemasonry should assist the 
humanisation of the person by developing his capabilities and encouraging 
true h[umanity].”11
In both editions, “Humanität” is only ostensibly defined in a secular way, 
as the entries for “Love” and “Brotherly Love” are presented from the per-
spective of the relationship between God and man. Love was introduced in 
1865 as one of the three theological virtues (faith, hope, and love [which in 
English is “charity”]) and as the third stave of Jacob’s Ladder. Only through 
could we “attain true humanistic education and philanthropy, that we attain 
true human dignity […]”.12 The entry for “Brotherly Love” describes a chain 
of argumentation that was very prevalent in German freemasonries: God is 
love, and love is also “moral perfection”. Love is described as raising man up 
to God, teaching man to recognise God and to become more like him. “The 
masonic confederation of love was after all founded for the sake of the love 
of mankind (humanity) generally, and brotherly love is just the means of 
practicing the former.” According to the entry, love for fellow humans could 
overcome all differences, so that humanity would resemble “a great family 
of God”.13 The argumentation comes full circle, returning to the entry for 
“Humanität”. This is defined as “a general love of fellow humans which rises 
above all separations and divisions between people”.14 The 1900 edition of the 
Allgemeines Handbuch from 1900 still retains this integrative interpretation 
11 “Die Freimaurerei soll zur Humanisierung des Menschen durch Ausbildung seiner Anlagen 
und Anbildung wahrer H[umanität]. dienen.”, in Verein Deutscher Freimaurer (ed.), Allge-
meines Handbuch der Freimaurerei. Dritte, völlig umgearbeitete und mit den neuen wissen-
schaftlichen Forschungen in Einklang gebrachte Auflage von Lennings Encyklopädie der 
Frei maurerei, vols 1f. (Leipzig 1900–1901), vol. 1, 466–468.
12 “Durch die Liebe erlangen wir wahre Menschenbildung und Menschenfreundlichkeit, erlangen 
wir die wahre Menschenwürde und befördern wir den Adel des Menschengeschlechts. Je lie-
bender der Mensch ist, desto mehr spiegelt sich in ihm das Bild der Gottheit, desto mehr wird 
er Gott ähnlich.” Schletter / Zille (ed.), Allgemeines Handbuch (1863–1867), vol. 2, 201–203, 
on p. 202.
13 Die “gemeinsame religiös-sittliche Ueberzeugung” der Freimaurer besteht darin, “dass sie 
Gott als die Liebe und diese Liebe zugleich als sittliche Vollendung erkennen und verehren.
[… D]urch die Liebe werden die Menschen zu Gott erhoben, indem die Liebe sie lehrt, Gott 
zu erkennen, zugleich aber auch sie anleitet, Gott ähnlich zu werden. […] Der Liebesbund 
der Freimaurerei ist ja um der allgemeinen Menschenliebe (Humanität) willen gestiftet, und 
die Bruderliebe ist nur das Mittel, um jene zu üben. […] Die Freimaurerei […] [lehrt], dass 
die Liebe in der gesammten Menschenwelt endlich alle Gegensätze überwinden […] wird, 
damit die Menschheit einen allgemeinen Bruderbund, eine grosse Familie Gottes darstelle.” 
Schletter / Zille (ed.), Allgemeines Handbuch (1863–1867), vol. 1, 140f.
14 “Die Humanität bezieht sich auf alle Menschen, ist allgemeine Menschenliebe, insofern sie sich 
über alle Trennungen und Spaltungen der Menschen erhebt.” Schletter / Zille (ed.), Allgemeines 
Handbuch (1863–1867), vol. 2, 3–5, on p. 5.
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of “Humanität” while noticeably toning down the cosmopolitan thrust of 
the older edition, which was published before the Franco-Prussian War of 
1870/71.15
The ritual texts of the German Grand Lodges that described themselves 
as “humanitarian” or “humanistic” are directed towards the ethical self-edu-
cation of the individual, which is described as providing a foundation for “the 
recognition of the moral ideas of pure human dignity, of true humanity, in all 
areas of human life”.16 The image of ritual construction work on the “temple 
of humanity”, the building blocks of which are the freemasons striving for 
their own perfection, connect the ontological and the ethical meanings of 
“Humanität”, which are prevalent in the reference works, with the universal-
ist meaning referring to the human race as a whole.17 The rituals of the grand 
lodges of Prussia, which viewed themselves as “Christian”, do not feature the 
buzzword “Humanität”. The concept did not have an integrative effect within 
German masonries, but instead highlighted differences. These differences 
lay not in the understanding of ethical self-education and its expression in 
charitable actions towards others, which both predominant camps derived 
from a Christian concept of love of one’s neighbour (Nächstenliebe).18 Rather, 
the “humanitarian” lodges gained this epithet by admitting members of 
other monotheistic religions, primarily Jews. In the aftermath of the First 
World War, the “Christian” lodges used the general lack of enthusiasm for 
universalistic buzzwords to accuse the “humanitarian” lodges of lacking 
patriotism.19
The English-language dictionaries provide little new information on 
the concept of humanity. Oliver’s A dictionary of symbolical Masonry 
(1855) adopts the tautological definition of the term from Gädicke’s 
15 Verein Deutscher Freimaurer (ed.), Allgemeines Handbuch (1900/1901), vol. 1, 466–468, 
615–617.
16 “Die Freimaurerbrüderschaft ist eine über den ganzen Erdboden, über alle Völker und Stände 
verbreitete, durch das Band treuer, männlicher Freundschaft geeinigte Vereinigung, deren 
gemeinsames, unablässiges Streben dahin geht, den sittlichen Ideen der rein menschlichen 
Würde, der wahren Humanität, in allen Kreisen des menschlichen Lebens Anerkennung zu 
schaffen […].” Ritual des Eklektischen Freimaurerbundes. Revidirt und genehmigt von der 
Grossen Mutterloge des Eklektischen Freimaurerbundes in Frankfurt am Main und den eklek-
tischen Bundeslogen im Jahr 1871 (Frankfurt/M. 1872), 41. Frankfurt/M. Loge “Zur Einigkeit”, 
Archiv (unfiled).
17 Cf. Klaus-Jürgen Grün, “Humanität”, in Helmut Reinalter (ed.), Handbuch der freimaure-
rischen Grundbegriffe (Innsbruck 2002), 57–61.
18 Cf. Joachim Berger, “ ‘une institution cosmopolite’? Rituelle Grenzziehungen im frei - 
maurerischen Internationalismus um 1900”, in Bernhard Gißibl / Isabella Löhr (ed.), Bessere 
Welten. Kosmopolitismus in den Geschichtswissenschaften (Frankfurt/M., New York, forth-
coming).
19 Cf. Wolfstieg (ed.), Bibliographie, vol. 2: no. 34610–34670. See Stefan-Ludwig Hoffmann, 
Die Politik der Geselligkeit. Freimaurerlogen in der deutschen Bürgergesellschaft 1840–1918 
(Göttingen 2000), 314–317.
Open-Access-Publikation im Sinne der CC-Lizenz BY-NC-ND 4.0
236 Joachim Berger
Frei maurer-Lexicon of 1818, which describes it as a fundamental concern 
of every freemason. The British edition of Mackey’s American A Lexicon of 
Freemasonry does not contain an entry for the term at all.20 The dimension 
ofhumanity is of course implied in the corresponding terms contained in the 
two triads of English freemasonry. The first triad contains the three princi-
ples of “Brotherly Love, Relief, and Truth”. These principles are reflected 
in the institutions established to improve the material and moral state of the 
“human race”. The “philanthropic tendency of masonry” manifests itself 
in the practice of assistance (“relief”) and in “Brotherly Love”, which bind 
the freemasons together like a family in an indissoluble bond of fraternal 
affection. These two behavioural standards realise the most important of the 
three theological virtues, which comes at the end of the second triad “Faith, 
Hope, and Charity” (1 Corinthians 13:1–2), “Charity” being another name 
for “that universal love of the human race”. The freemason does not limit 
the “sentiments of benevolence” to relatives or friends, but “extending them 
throughout the globe, he will love and cherish all who sit beneath the broad 
canopy of our universal lodge”.21 Both triads are introduced in the initia-
tion ritual of the English lodges; he who is “in Charity with all men” can 
find his way up the staves of Jacob’s Ladder into the kingdom of heaven. 
The rituals do not make reference to “humanity” either, speaking instead 
of “mankind” or, like the reference works, “the human race”.22 The latter 
term refers to the totality of humans, without having the ontological and 
the ethical dimension of the German term “Humanität”. The discursive 
practice in England follows the normative texts. In the proceedings of the 
English Grand Lodge, the term “humanity” is rarely used for the purposes of 
mobilisation.23
20 George Oliver, A Dictionary of Symbolical Masonry: Including the Royal Arch Degree; Accord-
ing to the System Prescribed by the Grand Lodge and Supreme Grand Chapter of England. 
Compiled, From the Best Masonic Authorities (New York 1855), 134, adopted from Johann 
Christian Gädicke (ed.), Freimaurer-Lexicon, nach vieljähriger Erfahrungen und den besten 
Hülfsmitteln ausgearbeitet (Berlin 1818), 262; Albert Gallatin Mackey / Donald Campbell, 
A Lexicon of Freemasonry: Containing a Definition of all its Communicable Terms, Notices 
of its History, Traditions and Antiquities and an Account of all the Rites and Mysteries of the 
Ancient World, 1st English ed., reprinted from the 5th American ed. (London 1860).
21 Mackey / Campbell, Lexicon, 42, 54, 286f., 349. 
22 The Perfect Ceremonies of Craft Masonry According to the Most Approved Forms as Taught 
in the Unions Emulation Lodge of Improvement for M[aster]. M[ason]’s. Freemasons’ Hall 
(London 1871), 51, 68, 122.
23 This observation is based on the entries concerning international relations in the Proceedings 
of the United Grand Lodge of England from 1869 to 1933 (see below, footnote 38). In the 
period 1813–1938, the term “humanity” occurs in 94 of the 652 documents of the Proceedings 
(usually pertaining to the quarterly meetings of the United Grand Lodge). I am indebted to 
Martin Cherry, The Library and Museum of Freemasonry (Freemasons’ Hall, London), for 
providing me with these figures. – On benevolence as aspect of Masonic ideology cf. Jessica 
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These differences from German-language usage became apparent when 
the leadership of the Prussian grand lodges visited London in June 1912. 
The visit was part of the efforts of the English leadership to overcome their 
“splendid isolation”, as the English Pro Grand Master Lord Ampthill put it. 
He asked the German freemasons for their “powerful assistance […] in our 
endeavours to promote the true and highest aims in Freemasonry […]. They are 
summed up in your one word ‘Humanity’, for which we have unfortunately no 
equivalent expression”. Was this a paradox? No – the Germanophile Ampthill 
gave his speech in German; the quote comes from a translation. Ampthill felt 
his English brothers lacked the “German methods of thought”, an ethical and 
intellectual self-reflection, which he believed could free English freemasonry 
from its self-absorption and open it to the social challenges of the present. 
As “citizens of the world” he argued, freemasons were obliged “to join the 
immense common task of social reform”. Class hatred must be counteracted 
and the divide between rich and poor closed.24 The officials of the Prussian 
grand lodges inspected various sites including the Royal Masonic Institution 
for Boys in Bushey, one of the largest charitable institutions of the United 
Grand Lodge of England. They described the institution as a manifestation 
of the Grand Lodge’s generosity “in the service of practical Humanity”, as 
the Prussians subsequently translated their German-language report for their 
English counterparts, thereby indirectly confirming Ampthill’s perception of 
a multi-layered German concept of humanity.25
Masonic charitable activity in Germany and Great Britain differed first in 
scale, being much larger in Britain, and second in the discussions on how to 
approach the social question, which were conducted much more intensively 
in the German lodges.26 However, the aims were similar. In both countries, 
the charity of the lodges was primarily directed towards providing for lodge 
members and their relatives, particularly in the form of assistance for the 
elderly, which harked back to the traditions of the pre-modern guilds and 
confraternities. Additionally, the English lodges in particular supported 
“profane” institutions such as hospitals. This form of “benevolence” was 
viewed as a means of stimulating the economy, promoting prosperity and 
Harland-Jacobs, Builders of Empire. Freemasons and British Imperialism, 1717–1927 (Chapel 
Hill, NC 2007), 69–72, quote on p. 370.
24 Address of The Most Worshipful The Rt. Hon. Lord Ampthill, G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., Pro Grand 
Master [print 1912, 3 pp., no pag.]. United Grand Lodge of England, The Library and Museum 
of Freemasonry, Freemasons’ Hall, London (hereafter: UGLE, FHL), Country Files, Germany, 
G.L. of The Three Globes.
25 Official Report of the Three Old Prussian Grand Masters On the Proceedings and Results of 
their Visit to the “Grand Lodge of England” from 18–22 June, 1912, n.D. [Berlin 1912, print, 
6 pp. – italics by the author], on p. 3. UGLE, FHL, Country files, Germany, G. L. of The Three 
Globes.
26 Cf. Wolfstieg (ed.), Bibliographie, vol. 2: no. 27972–28088, vol. 4: no. 8051–8123.
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avoiding social conflicts. In this way, masonic “benevolence” had at least an 
implicit social-political dimension.27 Pro Grand Master Ampthill wanted to 
make this dimension explicit, and to expand the scope and in particular the 
discussion about it.
In France, as in Italy, no masonic dictionaries or encyclopaedias were 
produced in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries; the dictionaries 
that were published shortly after 1800 and in 1921 did not deal with abstract 
concepts, but only with concrete objects, rituals and symbols.28 In the ritual 
texts and the constitution of the Grand Orient de France, the largest French 
umbrella organisation, the philanthropic side of French freemasonry, which 
corresponds to the practice of solidarity, is complemented by its philo-
sophical character, which is reflected in the search for truth and the study 
of morality. Philanthropy and philosophy were connected by the tendency 
towards progress: Freemasonry aimed at the intellectual, moral and material 
improvement and perfection of humanity. This concept of progress turns 
the Enlightenment aim of perfectibility from the individual to mankind as 
a whole. Freemasonry ought to expand the fraternal bonds between freema-
sons to “all members of humanity”.29 From the 1880s, the emphasis shifted to 
the extent that the practice of solidarity, which was thought of in a collective 
sense, replaced the practice of benevolence (bienfaisance), which can also 
refer to individuals. The Grand Orient connected “humanité” in the sense 
of the totality of mankind with a perfectibilist perspective on the nature of 
man. The ethical meaning of “humanité” (humanness, love for one’s fellow 
humans) is not invoked in these official documents, as the Grand Orient 
rejected “dogmatic” prescriptions and thus all “metaphysical” or transcen-
dent justifications of philanthropy and solidarity.30
27 Cf. Paul Calderwood, Freemasonry and the Press in the Twentieth Century. A National News-
paper Study of England and Wales (Farnham 2013), 228–235.
28 [Jean-Louis Laurens,] Vocabulaire des francs-maçons, suivi des Constitutions générales de 
l’Ordre de la Franche-Maçonerie, d’une Invocation Maçonique à Dieu, et de quelques pièces 
de Poésie inédites (Paris 1805, ND Paris 1980); [Quentin, Charles-François-Nicolas,] Diction-
naire maçonnique, ou Recueil d’esquisses de toutes les parties de l’édifice connu sous le nom 
de maçonnerie (Paris 1825); [Robert-Charles Yves-Plessis,] Petit memento maçonnique, rédigé 
en forme de dictionnaire à l’usage des Loges du Grand Orient (Paris 1921).
29 “La Franc-Maçonnerie, institution essentiellement philanthropique, philosophique et progres-
sive, a pour objet la recherche de la vérité: l’étude de la morale et la pratique de la solidarité; 
elle travaille à l’amélioration matérielle et morale, au perfectionnement intellectuel et social de 
l’humanité. […] La Franc-Maçonnerie a pour devoir d’étendre à tous les membres de l’humanité 
les liens fraternels qui unissent les francs-maçons sur toute la surface du globe.”, cf. Grand 
Orient De France, Cahiers des grades symboliques: Installation d’Atelier – Inauguration de 
Temple – Banquet – Pompe funèbre (Paris 1887), 7 (hereafter: Rituel Amiable).
30 Rituel Amiable, 7; Grand Orient De France, Constitution, statuts et règlements généraux de 
l’Ordre maçonnique en France (Paris 1875), 9, art. 1 (“l’exercice de la bienfaisance”).
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In the discursive practice of the Grand Orient, the combative appeal to 
humanity was prominent, and under its banner French freemasons opposed 
the dominance of the Roman Catholic Church – in line with their general anti-
clerical attitude – on the one hand, and injustice, inequality and the infringe-
ment of human rights on the other. Both of these directions in “humanitarian” 
commitment were reflected in their masonic triad – “liberté, égalité, fra-
ternité”.31 As a “progressive” institution, French freemasonry propounded 
a comprehensive understanding of social reform “dans le sens république et 
démocratique”, which connected it with other reform movements, and which 
went much further than the more palliative “benevolence” and “charity” of 
the English and the Germans.32 In France, both the integrative application of 
the target category of “humanité”, which viewed all humans as being on the 
path of progress, and the excluding, dualistic variant continued to have an 
impact.33 This dual nature, which emerged from the French late Enlighten-
ment, was, I argue, not easily comprehensible to the representatives of other 
masonic bodies at international forums.
The Grande Oriente d’Italia, to mention it only briefly, sought to bring an 
understanding of “humanity” (umanità) into its international relationships 
that promoted solidarity between all freemasons worldwide. The Grande 
Oriente also called for this solidarity in order to bolster its claim that it 
united all of the masonic groupings in Italy under its umbrella. From the 
1870s, the leadership of the Grande Oriente sought to transfer this impetus 
to international masonic relations. And it was in fact the Grande Oriente 
d’Italia that most frequently and consistently invoked solidarity between the 
masonic umbrella associations in Europe and throughout the world, while 
always portraying its interventions as impartial and motivated by pure human 
kindness.34
31 Duranton, “Humanité”, 27–33.
32 Cf. e.g. Bulletin du Grand Orient de France (hereafter: BullGODF) 52 (1896/97), 10f. (Conseil, 
1896-09-22). Grand Orient de France, Bibliothèque / Archives, Paris (Frankreich) (hereafter: 
GODF, Archives).
33 Cf. Duranton, “Humanité”, 40f.
34 See e.g. Processi Verbali delle sedute/dell adunanza/della Giunta (dell Consiglio dell’Or-
dine)/del governo dell’ordine/della Giunta Esecutiva del Grande Oriente d’Italia (1865–1925, 
manuscript, hereafter: GOI Processi Verbali) 2:1 (1865–1879), 1874-08-08, 1878-12-08. GOI 
Processi Verbali 2:2 (1879–1887), 1881-04-06. GOI Processi Verbali 1:1 vol. XXI (1896–1902), 
Bl. 227 (Giunta, 1901-11-28). Grande Oriente d’Italia (herafter: GOI), Archivio Storico, Rome 
(Italy).
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2. Contested Solidarity in International Masonic Relations
International solidarity was portrayed by mostly the French and Italian but 
also by the German and English freemasonries as a practical consequence of 
the masonic ideal of humanity. In the name of humanity, masonic umbrella 
organisations called for, first, vocal resistance to the enemies of progress and 
mankind / humanity, usually with an anticlerical thrust which was confined 
to the masonries of the so-called “Latin” countries; second, material assis-
tance to the victims of famine and natural disasters, and of war and oppres-
sion, and third, support for social-political movements that campaigned 
for peace.
In the case of each of these points, four problem areas were contentious:
Objects: Which groups of people in need should be supported – should 
one concentrate on freemasons and their relatives? Or should one assist 
broader circles within society?35 If so, then in the event of war, the question 
arose whether the lodges should exclusively assist wounded and captured 
soldiers or all individuals and groups in difficulty. A particularly conten-
tious issue was whether people from the opposing side should receive 
assistance, or whether assistance in the name of humanity should be lim-
ited to soldiers and civilians (or even just the masons among them) on one’s 
own side.36
Actors: Was it most appropriate for individual freemasons, their lodges 
and their umbrella organisations to provide assistance themselves, or 
should they assign this task to other civil society organisations or state 
institutions?
Scope: Should freemasons, before becoming involved in cross-border 
efforts, not dedicate their efforts primarily to helping the needy in their own 
area (through the local lodge) or in their own country (through the national 
umbrella association)?37
35 See Michael Barnett / Janice Gross Stein, “Introduction”, in id. (ed.), Sacred Aid. Faith and 
Humanitarianism (New York 2012), 3–30, on pp. 18f.
36 For example, the Grand Orient de France appealed in 1870 for an “œuvre d’humanité” to help 
the victims of the Franco-Prussian War. However, the Frankfurt Grand Lodge rejected an inter-
national masonic collection for the benefit of all the captured and wounded combatants of both 
sides, stating that efforts should concentrate instead on assistance for fellow masons, though 
masons in Germany could of course assist captive and wounded French freemasons there – and 
vice versa. BullGODF 26 (1870), 345f. (Circulaire, 1870-08-08). Protokoll der Großen Mutter-
loge des eklektischen Freimaurerbundes in Frankfurt a. M. (Frankfurt/M. 1871), 1870-08-26. 
Loge “Zur Einigkeit”, Archiv, Bestand Große Mutterloge des eklektischen Freimaurerbunds zu 
Frankfurt/M., Frankfurt/M. (Germany), 5.1.9., no. 355.
37 See, for example, the international masonic appeal by the Grande Oriente d’Italia for assistance 
for the victims of the earthquakes in the Strait of Messina and in Calabria in 1909: Rivista della 
massoneria italiana 40 (1909), 118–122, 231; Fulvio Conti, Storia della massoneria italiana. 
Dal Risorgimento al fascismo (Bologna 2003), 47, 199; Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preußischer 
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Spheres of influence: If an umbrella organisation decided to get involved 
in cross-border assistance, should it work together with all the other masonic 
associations in doing so? In particular, the British and the French frequently 
opted to limit their efforts to their own masonic “empires”, that is, to the 
territories over which their own state had sovereignty.38
In these problem areas, the umbrella organisations were presented with 
the challenge of setting priorities and defining loyalties that structured activ-
ities for the sake of and in the name of humanity – which were supposedly 
universal and not constrained by borders – in line with their own interests. 
Additionally, their own individual understanding of humanity determined 
the directions for action that they drew from the metaphor of the family of 
humanity. Freemasons were supposed to feel a graded sense of love and 
responsibility towards the members of this family in concentric circles, sim-
ilar to closer and more distant degrees of kinship.39
3. The Appeal to Humanity as a Transnational Tie?
Between 1855 and 1911, nine international congresses and conferences of 
the masonic umbrella organisations took place.40 In 1921, this transnational 
movement was reconfigured by the founding of the Association maçonnique 
internationale (A.M.I.), which organised international gatherings of its mem-
ber organisations as well. Of relevance to conceptual history is the fact that 
the proceedings of these international events were published in French, with 
the exception of the Rome congress of 1911. Contributions in other languages 
were translated into the lingua franca of masonic internationalism for pub-
lication. This had the effect of smoothing over connotations and semantic 
loading of the term “humanité” that were specific to individual languages.
I will preface the qualitative textual analysis with a quantitative over-
view of usage of the term “humanité” in the documentation of the fifteen 
congresses that occurred in 1855, between 1889 and 1910 and between 1921 
and 1932. A search was performed on this body of documentation for the 
Kulturbesitz, Berlin-Dahlem (hereafter: GStAPK), FM, 5.1.4. GNML 3WK, no. 7597, fol. 178, 
186f.
38 See, for example, the collection of the Grand Orient de France for those affected by recent 
fires in Constantinople in 1879; BullGODF 26:5 (1870), 344 (Circulaire, 1870-06-25). Another 
example is the assistance of the United Grand Lodge of England to the victims of a famine in 
India in 1874. Proceedings of the United Grand Lodge of Ancient Free and Accepted Masons of 
England, Minutes of Grand Lodge (1869–1876), 64 (1874-06-03). UGLE, FHL BE.140.Uni.
39 On this metaphor cf. Duranton, “Humanité”, 17f.
40 Not included are the international conference of the Supreme Councils of the Ancient and 
Accepted Scottish Rite (Lausanne, 1875; Brussels, 1907; Washington, 1912; Lausanne, 1922; 
Paris, 1929).
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term “humanité” and the hits were categorised on the basis of the three basic 
meanings and their hybrid forms of these.41 Three observations stand out: 
First, the universalist meaning of “humanité” as the totality of mankind is 
the dominant one, constituting almost half of all instances (46.5 %), and this 
does not include alternative terms such as “genre humain”. Second, in over 
one quarter (26.7 %) of the instances “humanité” (as the totality of mankind) 
was viewed from the perspective of the development of human nature or of 
the character of mankind which “humanité” meant the totality of mankind; 
this proportion of perfectibilist future prognoses rose significantly at the con-
gresses during and after the First World War. Not surprisingly, the ontologi-
cal meaning without normative content scarcely occurs at all (2.5%). Third, 
“humanité” has an ethical meaning (kindness, empathy, decency) without 
referring to the totality of mankind in at least one fifth of the instances of the 
term; no change over time was discernible in this regard. As is to be expected 
in the case of international congresses, these connotations document the spa-
tially unbounded, universal, ethically loaded mission of a global fraternity, 
which seeks to extend its principles to the whole of humanity.
Charity was the most important field of activity in which freemasons could 
interact with the “profane” world, that is, society. Prior to the First World 
War, to try to organise this activity transnationally on a permanent basis 
would have gone beyond the contemporary imagination. This was also the 
case with cooperation between other civil society actors and even assistance 
provided by states, which continued to be thought of in nation-state contexts. 
It was because freemasons did not expect their ideal of humanity to imply 
transnational action that charity limited in scope to national or local contexts 
seemed suitable for building bridges between the various directions, which 
were gradually hardening into distinct camps. As the Grande Oriente d’Italia 
was planning an international congress for 1900 in Rome, in addition to the 
promotion of peace it suggested masonic “benevolence” as an integrative 
topic of discussion.42 Were the Italians correct in their estimation?
The first two international conferences in the “era of internationalism” in 
Paris (1889) and Antwerp (1894) approached the topic defensively by lim-
iting discussion to the national contexts and to internal masonic affairs. At 
the Paris congress, which coincided with the Universal Exhibition of 1889, 
41 By the use of the Voyant Tool “Keywords in Context” (http://www.voyant-tools.org). Notwith-
standing the varying OCR-quality of the texts available (one of which, the Conférence maçon-
nique internationale de 1910 à Bruxelles. Compte rendu des séances les 9, 10 et 11 septembre 
(Brussels 1912)]), could only partially be digitised), the 252 hits on “humanité” do represent the 
proportionate relation between the different meanings of the term.
42 Ernesto Nathan / Ettore Ferrari (Grand Master & Grand Secretary of the GOI) to C. Roese (rep-
resentative of the GOI at the Große National-Mutterloge “Zu den drei Weltkugeln”), Rome, 
15.02.1899 (letter in German). GStAPK, FM, 5.1.4. GNML 3WK, no. 7597, fol. 90–95, on 
fol. 93.
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the Grand Orient de France as host reported on the charitable activities of 
its lodges, which included support for laicised schools and similar laicised 
institutions. The speaker delivering the report called upon the other dele-
gates to applaud the French “workers”, “who build up the steadfast temple 
of human morality and of universal fraternity”.43 The Antwerp conference 
(1894) concentrated on the “regulation of international masonic beneficence”. 
Discussion focused on the issue of travelling freemasons who purported to 
be in need of assistance and who abused the right to visit lodges in other 
countries. The relationship between voluntariness and controllability in 
internal-masonic charity was discussed.44 A freemason from Antwerp, who 
as a member of the “Anglo-Belge” lodge was a natural mediator with the 
English-speaking world, sought a middle path. He argued that “charité” and 
“bienfaisance” went hand in hand, that they were fruits of brotherly love 
that made the entire “human species” one family. For freemasons working in 
the “temple of humanity”, he argued, alleviating need was a “humanitarian 
humanitaire”. However, the virtue of “beneficence” could not be demanded, 
he concluded.45 The “Große Mutterloge des Eklektischen Freimaurerbun-
des” (based in Frankfurt on the Main) put it more forthrightly in its written 
submission, stating that Freemasonry is not an “institution of beneficence”. 
While it shows charity towards freemasons out of brotherliness and towards 
“profanes” out of love for all members of “humanity” (“humanité”), the way 
in which charity was shown must remain at the discretion of individual free-
masons, the submission argued. Lodges could of course support or establish 
institutions to assist the poor or to promote the expansion of the “culture of 
letters, sciences and arts” – the Frankfurt freemasons included educational 
work in the category of charity toward humanity. However, the submission 
argued, it would be impossible to establish binding rules for this, especially 
internationally binding ones.46
This prepared the way for the expansion of discussions. The subsequent 
conference in The Hague (1896) touched upon broader social topics and dis-
cussed how Freemasonry could contribute to an “international task with a 
43 Report on “l’histoire, les travaux, l’esprit et les aspirations des at. du G. O. de France”, Con-
grès maç. international du centenaire 1789–1889 tenu les 16 et 17 juillet 1889 (E. V.) à l’O. de 
Paris. Compte rendu des séances du congrès et discours prononcés dans cette assemblée (Paris 
1889), 110–138, on p. 138 (“[…] qui construisent le temple définitif de la moralité humaine et de 
la fraternité universelle!”).
44 Conférence maçonnique universelle d’Anvers du 21e au 24e jour du 5e mois 5894 (21 au 24 
juillet 1894) (Brussels 1894), 82f. (“Réglementation de la bienfaisance maçonnique inter-
nationale”).
45 Ibid., (“espèce humaine”; “temple de l’humanité”, “action humanitaire”).
46 Ibid., 85 (“institution de bienfaisance”; “expansion de la culture des lettres, des sciences et 
des arts”).
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humanitarian character” such as the protection of orphans.47 The care and 
education of children were closely connected with the issue of schooling, a 
central topic of the late nineteenth-century “culture wars”, i.e. the controver-
sies between the state and the (Roman Catholic) Church.48 A representative of 
the Grand Orient de France introduced laicistic suggestions; Belgian delegates 
stated that they had no scope for action on this issue as anyone in their coun-
try who wished to provide for orphans would have to send them to Catholic 
schools. The Dutch chairman of the conference recorded in conclusion that 
“international masonry” could not engage with this issue; instead, Freema-
sonry must exercise influence at the local level on the relevant associations 
dedicated to this matter. The second “humanitarian” topic on the agenda was 
also potentially divisive – how could Freemasonry intervene in the strug-
gle between the social classes.49 The Grand Orient de France quoted from 
its constitution: As Freemasonry aimed to improve the moral and material 
circumstances of “humanity” (“humanité”),50 it must mediate in the struggle 
between the classes in order to deprive the (Roman Catholic) Church of this 
role. The unilateral “beneficence” and “charity” engaged in by capitalists 
was only intended to alleviate the consequences of exploitation, it continued. 
The Grand Orient de France called for business owners and workers to find 
a shared basis for sustainable social peace. The German freemason Hugo 
Lissauer, on the other hand, pointed to the German model of social insurance 
for workers, which according to him was initiated by the freemason Emperor 
Wilhelm I, and which could become the “deliverance of humanity”.51
The topic of social reform was not discussed in depth again until the 
international congress in Rome in 1911.52 Speaking on behalf of the Italian 
hosts, Giovanni Antonio Vanni rejected the charity of the Christian churches 
because it subordinates this life to the life to come, which can only be 
reached by sacrificing the human “self”. This doctrine, he continued, had 
resulted in the suppression and brutalisation of peoples, with charitable 
activity only occurring fleetingly. He argued further that this narrow under- 
standing of “charity” (“carità”) comprised only individual acts, which were 
47 Conférence maçonnique universelle de La Haye. 25–28 juillet 1896 (La Haye 1897), 23–38 
(“La part que la Maçonnerie pourrait prendre à une œuvre internationale d’un caractère 
humanitaire comme la protection des enfants abandonnés”).
48 See Christopher M. Clark / Wolfram Kaiser (ed.), Culture Wars Secular-Catholic Conflict in 
Nineteenth-Century Europe (Cambridge 2003).
49 Conférence La Haye 1896, 116–129 (“Comment la Maçonnerie pourrait-elle intervenir dans la 
lutte entre les classes sociales?”).
50 Ibid., 119 (“l’amélioration morale et matérielle de l’humanité”).
51 Ibid., 125 (“salut de l’humanité”).
52 Congresso massonico internazionale a Roma. 50° anniversario della fondazione del Grande 
Oriente d’Italia. XX settembre 1911 (Rome 1913), 66–79 (“La pubblica beneficenza intesa 
come opera di solidarietà sociale diretta all’elevamento morale e materiale dei beneficati”). 
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not seen as the social duty of everyone towards everyone for the good of the 
whole. Instead of Christian charity in this narrow sense, Vanni proposed the 
public provision of care on the basis of human solidarity.53 This public relief 
(“assistenza pubblica”) would have to be both remedial and preventive in 
order to enable future generations to cooperate in the advancement of man-
kind – on the basis of the masonic triad (“Libertà, Ugualità, Fraternità”). 
Vanni developed these fundamental convictions into an anticlerical pro-
gramme for a social order which would withdraw all resources for public care 
provision from church institutions and centralise provision in the hands of the 
state. Joseph Junck from Luxembourg sought to narrow down these broad 
social-political aims. Freemasonry should by all means advocate for all social 
groups in need, he argued. But these measures do not impinge on masonic 
beneficence (“Bene ficenza Massonica”), which must remain spontaneous 
and discrete.54
After differences between French and German freemasons had occurred 
in 1894 and 1896 with the Belgians and the Dutch trying to mediate, it was 
the Italians who in 1911 highlighted the dividing lines between themselves 
and the Prussians and Scandinavians, who were overtly Christian, and the 
English, who operated on a (mono)theistic and implicitly Christian basis. 
The latter freemasonries may have viewed the anticlerical motivations of the 
Grande Oriente d’Italia as completely understandable in the Italian context. 
However, attempts to derive from this a programme of social reform that 
rejected Christian charity based on the relationship between God and man 
were always going to be problematic for them; to invoke “human solidarity” 
(“solidarietà umana”) as a universalist norm with this anti-Christian under-
tone seemed to them divisive and exclusionary.
After the war, the Grand Lodge of New York took it upon itself for a num-
ber of years to build bridges. According to two of its internationalists in 1921, 
if Freemasonry were to present itself as a united global association, it could 
become a force for the preservation of peace and “for practical human ser-
vice”.55 Shortly before this, the New Yorkers had played a central role in the 
establishment of the “Association maçonnique internationale” in Geneva. Its 
“declaration of principles” included key formulations from the constitution of 
the Grand Orient de France – Freemasonry works for the material and moral 
improvement, as well as the intellectual and social perfection of humanity 
53 Ibid., 67 (“una effimera esplicazione dell’azione caritativa”; “assistenza per dovere di soli-
darietà umana”).
54 Ibid., 68, 78 (“a concorrere al miglioramento del genere umano”; “nazionalizzazione della 
pubblica beneficenza, trasformata in pubblica assistenza”).
55 Arthur S. Tompkins (Deputy Grand Master) & Townsend Scudder to Robert H. Robinson 
(Grand Master Grand Lodge New York), New York 12.12.1921 (copy). UGLE, FHL, In Archives 
Store, AS BY 362/5 [location], Bundle “International Relations”.
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(“humanité”). This aim was loaded with the values of tolerance, respect and 
freedom of conscience; the exercise of beneficence (“bienfaisance”) was 
described as assisting “social progress”.56 The inclusion of these formulations 
suggested that the new association would be more activist and laicistic in 
character than the Americans and the Dutch had intended. Arguments quickly 
emerged regarding the direction of the association, including the issue of the 
religious foundations of Freemasonry. In this process, the unifying power of 
the appeal to humantiy clearly decreased, and this appeal noticeably receded 
after the founding congress in 1921.
In contrast with the pre-war congresses, action in the name of humanity 
was no longer included as an explicit discussion topic in the forums of the 
A.M.I., which after 1924 were dominated by the issues of masonic “regu-
larity” and “territoriality”. In view of the experiences of the pre-war period, 
topics that would have exposed the different understandings of masonic 
“external work”, and civil society engagement were evidently withdrawn. 
This applies in particular to questions concerning human rights. The intro-
duction by a Spanish Grand Lodge of a protest resolution against the suppres-
sion of the anti-Soviet rebellion in Georgia at the A.M.I. convention in 1924 
was a notable exception. The resolution described the fratricidal fighting as 
being unworthy of civilisation and of the peaceful era that was opening up 
to “humanity” (“humanité”).57 Discussing human rights issues would have 
made existing differences more conspicuous, while the appeal to humanity 
would not have been capable of bridging these differences.
4. Conclusion
In the international forums, it was possible to achieve temporal unity between 
the national umbrella organisations if there was no attempt to proceed from 
normative positions to concrete recommendations for action. This applies 
both to internal masonic relations and to masonic activity in broader society. 
However, the appeal to humanity regularly demanded such recommendations 
for action and thus exposed those fundamental differences that the appeal 
originally was intended to bridge.
This dialectic became apparent first of all with regard to the relation-
ship between masonic internal and external work. Speaking and acting in 
the name of humanity fluctuated between the development of the self and 
56 “Déclaration de Principes. Texte adopté par le Congrès Maçonnique international de Genève, 
19–23 octobre 1921”, in Bulletin de l’Association maçonnique internationale (hereafter: 
BullA.M.I.) 8:29 (1929), 21.
57 “Convent maçonnique international [Bruxelles, 25.–28.09.1924]”, in BullA.M.I. 3:12 (1924), 
1–17, on p. 10.
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internal masonic benevolence on the one hand and social activism in the form 
of philanthropy, solidarity and campaigning for human rights on the other. At 
times the appeal to humanity could conceal or bridge the divergent analyses 
of problems and proposed solutions for the charitable and social activity of 
freemasons. This in turn implied that charitable activities did not mobilise 
freemasons to the same extent that religious philanthropy mobilised inter-
national Judaism – and that they were not meant to mobilise them either.58 
At the international congresses before the First World War those “realistic” 
voices that confined masonic charity to voluntary actions of individual mem-
bers or local lodges prevailed.
Second, the semantics of humanity shed light on the mutual dependence 
between the Christian-religious and secular-ethical bases for the command-
ment to love one’s neighbour. As the Christological basis of the concept of 
mankind/humanity receded from the early nineteenth century onwards, 
Christian freemasons in Germany used the term less and less. By 1900, 
they were distancing themselves from the ubiquitous appeal to the ideal of 
“Humanität”, which they disparaged as “humanity claptrap” (Humanitäts-
duselei). English freemasonry had always preferred the corresponding terms 
“charity”, “brotherly love”, “relief” and “benevolence”. In the case of the 
French, Italian and some German “humanitarian” masons, a tendency towards 
the secularisation of concepts of love for one’s neighbour can be observed. 
At the same time, humanity was sacralised again, as French freemasons in 
particular – drawing on Auguste Comte – propagated the idea of a “religion 
de l’humanité” which would level all social differences in an ethical way.59
Finally, tracing the elusive concept of humanity and its implications on 
masonic practice may help to elucidate the aims of transnational coopera-
tion and, more generally speaking, the logic of internationalism. The gen-
eral observation that internationalisms were often based on “varying (and 
often exclusive) definitions of ‘mankind’ or ‘global society’ ”, “from which 
criteria for ‘humanitarian commitment’ were then derived”, which tended to 
have an exclusionary effect, also applies to Freemasonry.60 Thus the initial 
assumption has been confirmed: The appeal to humanity released those 
58 Cf. Abigail Green, “Old Networks, New Connections: The Emergence of the Jewish Inter-
national”, in id. / Vincent Viaene (ed.), Religious Internationals in the Modern World: Globali-
zation and Faith Communities Since 1750 (Basingstoke 2012), 53–81, on pp. 64f.; Jean-Philippe 
Schreiber, “Les élites politiques juives et la franc-maçonnerie dans la France du XIXe siècle”, 
in Archives juives 43:2 (2010), 58–69. 
59 Cf. Herms, “Humanität”, 670; Hans Joas, Die Sakralität der Person. Eine neue Genealogie der 
Menschenrechte (Berlin 2011), 87f.
60 Holger Nehring, “Internationale soziale Bewegungen”, in Jost Dülffer / Wilfried Loth (ed.), 
Dimensionen internationaler Geschichte (Munich 2012), 129–149, on p. 144, with reference 
to Jürgen Osterhammel, Die Verwandlung der Welt. Eine Geschichte des 19. Jahrhunderts 
(Munich 2009), 1173–1238.
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positions with which the concept had been filled. Humanity thus appears 
as an empty signifier to the extent that humanity, as an authority to appeal 
to, stood for the normative system “Freemasonry” as a whole. Thereby 
diverging objectives could at least partially be placed into a common frame 
of reference, and the diverse umbrella organisations with their local lodges 
and individual members could adhere to the utopia of a universal brother- 
hood.
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Katharina Stornig
Between Christian Solidarity and Human Solidarity
Humanity and the Mobilisation of Aid for Distant Children 
in Catholic Europe in the Long Nineteenth Century
In 1898, a Franciscan priest in Tunis sent a promotional leaflet to Rome for 
distribution.1 By so doing, Father Leonardo Maria tried to generate funding 
for a new orphanage that Italian Franciscans had established in the city of 
Tunis, then part of French North Africa and focal point of Italian settlement 
in the Maghreb. Interestingly, Father Leonardo explicitly advertised the 
orphanage as not only a philanthropic and religious but also a humanitarian 
enterprise that contributed to the general “moral and civil well-being” in 
Italy.2 Stating that Catholicism had produced a superior notion of charity, 
he moreover claimed that only the Catholic missions had always spread 
what he called “true civilisation” and “mutual love between humans” and 
thus fuelled the “civil and moral renewal of human society” at large.3 At 
first sight, the promotion of a Catholic charitable initiative by a Franciscan 
priest around 1900 as “humanitarian” sounds somewhat odd, because, in 
nineteenth-century Italy, the notion of humanity was prominently associated 
with nationalist activism and secular politics.4 However, this essay shows 
that Catholic philanthropists also employed the notion of humanity in their 
promotional campaigns. They particularly did so when aiming to expand 
charity towards children from domestic contexts to geographically distant 
settings in Africa and Asia. Attempting to mobilise support for children 
1 See Leaflet, Fr. Leonardo Maria, Orfanotrofio Maschile S. Antonio di Padova in Tunisi, APF, 
N. S., vol. 152, 374f.
2 “It is not only a philanthropic, but a religious and humanitarian work that aims at nothing else 
but the moral and civil well-being of our compatriots, […]”. (“È opera non solo filantropica, 
ma religiosa ed umanitaria che tende a null’altro se non al benessere morale e civile dei nostri 
connazionali, […].”) Ibid., 375.
3 “[…] the sublime school of the Catholic missions, which alone had always brought about true 
civilisation and mutual love between humans[,] and therewith the instant and beneficent restau-
ration, and civil and moral renewal of human society.” (“[…] la scuola sublime delle Missioni 
Cattoliche, le quali sole appunto hanno sempre apportato la vera civiltà e l’amore reciproco 
fra gli uomini e perciò di conseguente la restaurazione istantanea e benefica, e il risorgimento 
civile e morale della umana società.”) Ibid. 
4 For instance, “Giovane Europa”, the secret society led by Giuseppe Mazzini since the 1830s, 
promoted its nationalist and republican goals under the catchwords of “freedom”, “equality” 
and “humanity” (“libertà”, “uguaglianza” and “umanità”). See Andrea Weibel, “Junges 
Europa”, in Historisches Lexikon der Schweiz, http://www.hls-dhs-dss.ch/textes/d/D17237.php.
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who did not belong to their own religious, social or national group, Catholic 
philanthropists, going beyond an inner-confessional language and practice of 
solidarity,5 appealed to their readers’ sense of human solidarity with distant 
children, whom they constructed as the most helpless, needy and innocent 
part of humankind.
This article discusses the promotional campaigns of three Catholic asso-
ciations, the Holy Childhood Association, the Hilfsverein zur Unterstützung 
der armen Negerkinder (Aid Organisation for the Poor Negro Children) and 
the St. Petrus Claver Sodality, all of which were founded in the context of 
the burgeoning missionary movement in nineteenth-century Europe.6 While 
the associations studied here differed in terms of organisational form, size 
and focus, what they all shared was the aim of raising support for children 
in Asia and Africa, whom they construed as needy for religious, social and 
material reasons. They launched broad promotional campaigns and resorted 
to the massive use of cheap print in order to promote religious activism and to 
distribute particular narratives of need and relief. This article examines how 
the notion of humanity and its cognates featured in the narratives created and 
circulated by Catholic associations. In other words, it asks when and in which 
ways specific religious groups used and operationalised a language of human-
ity and what they aimed to achieve by doing so.7 Allowing for the key role of 
shared stories as vital resources of social movements, the essay approaches 
promotional narratives as an essential part of mobilising practices, and thus 
as texts that aimed both to create awareness (or even moral outrage) among 
readers and to elicit their active response.8 Although particular attention is 
5 As has been shown, religion and particularly confession held ground as an important base 
for active solidarity in nineteenth-century central Europe. See Rupert Klieber, “Von der 
Mildtätigkeit zum sozialpolitischen Engagement. Konfessionelle Antworten auf die soziale 
Frage der Habsburgermonarchie 1848–1918”, in Michaela Maurer / Bernhard Schneider (ed.), 
Konfessionen in den west- und mitteleuropäischen Sozialsystemen im langen 19. Jahrhundert. 
Ein “edler Wettkampf der Barmherzigkeit”? (Berlin 2013), 209–233.
6 This article is based on a range of published sources (i.e. promotional texts and reports) issued 
by Catholic associations as well as on research in the Archivio Storico di Propaganda Fide 
(APF), the historical archives of the Pontifical Association of the Holy Childhood (POSI) and 
the archives of the Archdioceses of Cologne (AEK). Translations from German and Italian 
sources are my own. I particularly thank Katharina Wolf, Esther Möller, Gregor Feindt, Fabian 
Klose, Mirjam Thulin, as well as all participants in the workshop for helpful suggestions and 
perceptive comments on earlier versions of this article. 
7 For similar approaches to (political) claims with reference to “humanity”, see Ilana Feld-
man / Miriam Ticktin (ed.), In the Name of Humanity. The Government of Threat and Care 
(Durham, NC 2010). The shifting meaning of humanity and human identity in various histor-
ical contexts since the enlightenment explores Joanna Bourke, What It Means to Be Human: 
Historical Reflections From the 1800s to the Present (Berkeley, CA 2013).
8 On mobilising narratives, see Janet Hart, “Cracking the Code: Narrative and Political Mobi-
lization in the Greek Resistance”, in Social Science History 16:4 (1992), 631–668. A more 
theoretical discussion provides Ronald N. Jacobs, “The Narrative Integration of Personal and 
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paid to the mobilising campaigns in German-speaking Europe, the following 
analysis, taking the fundamental transnational character of these associations 
and their religious networks into consideration, also includes texts in Italian, 
French and English.9
The article comprises four parts. It starts with a brief introduction to the 
historical beginnings of these associations, which relate to both the Christian 
endeavour to expand missionary work in Africa and Asia and the parallel 
growth of child-centred philanthropy and social activism in Europe. Particu-
lar attention is given to the peculiar program of saving far-off children, as 
several Christian associations developed and promoted it since the mid-nine-
teenth century. In its second section, the essay outlines a first key context in 
which the notion of humanity was employed in mobilising campaigns: as a 
reference to humankind. As such, it addressed both the explicit distinction 
made between humans and animals as well as the implications of this divide 
in terms of practical ethics. As will be shown, the promotional narratives 
not only emphasised the idea of shared humanity and human unity but also 
derived an ethical imperative with regard to far-off people from it. This arti-
cle argues that humanity as humankind was particularly appealed to when 
authors strove to mobilise readers to actively expand philanthropic action 
from local contexts to Asia and Africa. In turn, the third section of the essay 
examines another context of use of humanity, which evolved around a nor-
mative vision of human being, acting and feeling in general, and attitudes 
towards children in particular. Contrary to humanity as humankind, which 
invariably stressed human sameness, references to normative visions of 
human being potentially also encouraged the differentiation from others who 
allegedly violated these norms of human behaviour.
1. Saving Children in Far-Off Lands
Several scholars have argued that the nineteenth century saw the emergence 
of a new type of child-saving activities in Europe and North America. 
Accordingly, it was during the 1830s and 1840s, that the new ideology of 
childhood, as it had emerged since the Enlightenment, started to influence 
philanthropic action. This implies that the concerns of activists gradually 
exceeded the “traditional” concerns of church and state for souls and labour, 
Collective Identity in Social Movements”, in Melanie C. Green et al. (ed.), Narrative Impact. 
Social and Cognitive Foundations (New York 2002), 205–228.
9 An extended discussion of the emergence and expansion of Catholic internationalism at that 
time provides Vincent Viaene, “Nineteenth-Century Catholic Internationalism and its Prede-
cessors”, in id. / Abigail Green (ed.), Religious Internationals in the Modern World. Globaliza-
tion and Faith Communities Since 1750 (New York 2012), 82–110.
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respectively. In fact, philanthropic action towards children was increasingly 
inspired by new ideals and values assigned to childhood, which came to be 
understood as an innocent, vulnerable and formative stage in human life.10 
In the nineteenth century, growing numbers of adults in Europe and North 
America agreed on the fact that children, as helpless and innocent human 
beings, needed and deserved special protection and guidance by adults 
and institutions.
This was also true for religious activists, who launched initiatives focusing 
on poor, orphaned, neglected or “endangered” children. In several countries, 
philanthropists set up orphanages, schools, kindergartens and Rettungs-
häuser, as well as combatting phenomena such as cruelty to children, abuse, 
infant mortality, juvenile delinquency and later child labour.11 Significantly, 
most initiatives focused on children whose parents or families had already 
failed to provide their offspring with what child savers considered a protected 
and thus proper setting in which healthy children could be raised to become 
what they considered valuable members of society. However, while there is 
a rich historiography on the expansion of child saving in local and national 
contexts, we still know only little about the ways in which child-centred 
philanthropy was gradually universalised.12 In the mid-nineteenth century, it 
was particularly religious activists, who, inspired by the renascent mission-
ary movement, European imperialism and abolitionism, promoted the expan-
sion of philanthropy to far-off children in geographically distant settings 
in Africa and Asia.
The largest and most important Catholic association in this context was 
the Holy Childhood Association, which was founded in France in 1843 by the 
Bishop of Nancy. Inspired by missionary reports about infanticide and child 
abandonment in China, Bishop Charles de Forbin-Janson promoted the sav-
ing of Chinese children through the contributions and prayers of European 
10 See Hugh Cunningham, Children & Childhood in Western Society Since 1500 (London 
1995), 134f.
11 For instance, see Uwe Birnstein, Der Erzieher. Wie Johann Hinrich Wichern Kinder und 
Kirche retten wollte (Berlin 22008); Katherine S. Bullard, Civilizing the Child. Discourses of 
Race, Nation, and Child Welfare in America (Lanham, MD 2014); Richard Dickinson, The Pol-
itics of Child Welfare From the Empire to the Federal Republic (Cambridge, MA 1996), 1–34; 
Sabine Hering / Wolfgang Schröer (ed.), Sorge um die Kinder. Beiträge zur Geschichte von 
Kindheit, Kindergarten und Kinderfürsorge (Weinheim 2008); Ivan Jablonka, “Social Welfare 
in the Western World and the Rights of Children”, in Paula Fass (ed.), The Routledge History of 
Childhood in the Western World (London 22015), 380–399. 
12 Historian Dominique Marshall has proposed linking the internationalisation of child saving 
to the history of colonial expansion since the early modern period. See Dominique Marshall, 
“International Child Saving”, in Paula Fass (ed.), The Routledge History of Childhood in the 
Western World (London 22015), 469–490.
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Catholics in general and Catholic children in particular.13 Forbin-Janson suc-
cessfully launched the idea that Catholic actors (i.e. missionaries) in China 
should collect abandoned children or purchase unwanted babies from their 
parents, baptise them and raise the surviving children in Catholic children’s 
homes. All this was to be funded by European Catholics, who were invited 
to regularly give and pray for whom the association constructed as the needy 
and helpless children of China. What is important to us, the Holy Childhood 
Association was extremely successful from the start: Broadly supported by 
the clergy and laypersons, the donations rose enormously and the associa-
tion soon expanded all over Catholic Europe and North America.14 In the 
German-speaking lands, it opened branches in, to give but a few examples, 
Mainz, Munich, Freiburg, Vienna, Salzburg and Aachen, which, in its capac-
ity as a thriving centre of Catholic charity at that time,15 soon became its 
German headquarters.16 Altogether, the rapid expansion of the association 
was possible due to a range of factors, including, for instance, extensive 
travel on the part of its main protagonists, support from Rome and campaigns 
in the established Catholic media. In addition, publishing formed the most 
important means by which the Holy Childhood Association drummed up 
support. Its proponents in Germany translated key texts from France and 
issued charity appeals, leaflets, brochures, handbooks, books of sermons, 
reports etc. Ultimately, however, its expansion depended on the active par-
ticipation of volunteers and the regular contributions provided by many. But 
how did it manage to mobilise the Catholic masses?
The Holy Childhood Association successfully introduced a particular nar-
rative of distant suffering and relief to Catholic circles in Europe. According 
to numerous promotional texts issued all over Catholic Europe and beyond, 
“heathen” China was a setting marked by the extreme suffering of children, 
13 On the transnational history of the Holy Childhood Association in France and Europe, see 
Henrietta Harrison, “ ‘A Penny for the Little Chinese’: The French Holy Childhood Associa-
tion in China, 1843–1951”, in American Historical Review 113:1 (2008), 72–92; Sophie Hey-
wood, “Missionary Children: The French Holy Childhood Association in European Context, 
1843–1914”, in European History Quarterly 45:3 (2015), 446–466; Katharina Stornig, “ ‘Armes 
Kindlein in der Ferne – Wie machst du das Herz mir schwer!’ Kindermissionsvereine und die 
religiösen Verflechtungen des Helfens in Deutschland, Europa und der Welt, 1843–1920”, in 
Themenportal Europäische Geschichte, http://www.europa.clio-online.de/2015/Article=741.
14 For detailed information on the expansion of the Holy Childhood Association in terms of 
geography and fundraising, see Bernard Arens, Die katholischen Missionsvereine. Darstellung 
ihres Werdens und Wirkens ihrer Satzungen und Vorrechte (Freiburg im Breisgau 1922), 66–76.
15 Aachen as a thriving centre of Catholic charity around the middle of the nineteenth century is 
described by Relinde Meiwes, “Arbeiterinnen des Herrn”. Katholische Frauenkongregationen 
im 19. Jahrhundert (Frankfurt/M. 2000), 28–30.
16 See Wilhelm Jansen, Das Päpstliche Missionswerk der Kinder in Deutschland. Seine Ent-
stehung und seine Geschichte bis 1945 (Mönchengladbach 1970), 23–36.
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because cruel Chinese parents – out of poverty, superstition and/or barbari-
anism, or even on a whim – abandoned or even actively killed their children 
and particularly infants on a large scale, making them suffer a gruesome 
and non-Christian death.17 Attempting to induce a sense of solidarity with 
Chinese children, the authors primarily reminded their readers that Christ 
had died for “all humans without exception”.18 Besides, given the claimed 
inability or indifference of Chinese adults and institutions towards the suf-
fering of boys and particularly girls, the Holy Childhood Association called 
upon European Catholics to step in and to come to the aid of these children, 
to whom it explicitly referred as the most “helpless part of mankind”.19
2. Narrative Functions of Humanity as Humankind
In the Holy Childhood Association, references to children as both the most 
helpless and valuable part of humankind can be found over a long period 
of time. As the author of a German publication emphasised in 1845, God 
wants “the salvation of all humans and particularly of childhood”.20 In this 
context, the association established a historical narrative according to which 
Christianity constituted the most important spiritual and social force pro-
tecting children worldwide. It claimed that one of the largest benefits that 
Christianity had brought to humankind was the defence of childhood. Con-
trary to “heathen” societies, in which fathers supposedly enjoyed absolute 
power over the life and death of children, the incarnation of Christ in the 
body of a child had introduced dignity to childhood.21 To quote the same text 
from 1845: “Already at the nativity[,] His humanity sanctified infancy and 
17 Similar passages were endlessly repeated in French publications and translated into other 
languages. For instance, see Leaflet, Œuvre de la Sainte-Enfance ou association des enfants 
chrétiens, pour le rachat des enfants infidèles en Chine, et dans les autres pays idolâtres, POSI 
Série A Règlements et statuts – Généralités, 3 Documentation sur l’Œuvre.
18 “But my dear children, Christ wants to save these [the heathen] children as well; because he 
died for all humans without exception.” (“Doch meine lieben Kinder, Christus will auch diese 
selig machen; denn er ist für alle Menschen ohne Ausnahme gestorben.”) Winand Hubert 
Meunier, Das Werk der heil. Kindheit. Eine Sammlung von geistlichen Vorträgen über und für 
den Kindheitsverein (Cologne 21908), 14.
19 Institution of the Holy Childhood for the Redemption of the Children of Infidels (Montreal 
1860), original publication held by Bibliothèque nationale du Québec, https://archive.org/
details/cihm_94187, 3.
20 (“[…] das Heil aller Menschen und besonders der Kindheit […]”). Der Verein der Heiligen 
Kindheit (ed.), Der Verein der Heiligen Kindheit. Geschichte seines Entstehens, seines Wachs-
thums und gegenwärtigen Bestandes (Mainz 1845), 17.
21 Id. (ed.), Der Verein der Heiligen Kindheit. Kurze Darstellung seiner Entstehung und seines 
Zweckes, nebst Berichten über seine Wirksamkeit bis zum Jahre 1851 (Aachen 1852), 9f.
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spread the reflection of His glory over childhood […].”22 With this in mind, 
the Holy Childhood Association powerfully claimed that this dignified and 
special status of childhood was to be respected universally. It ascribed special 
spiritual power to the prayers of children and invited particularly the young 
to participate in its child saving venture.23 Some German authors even spoke 
of the “inalienable rights” of childhood, meaning the universal restriction of 
paternal (or adult) power over children by divine commandments.24 What all 
texts shared was the fact that authors largely ignored the existence of social 
phenomena such as child abandonment or infanticide in Christian Europe 
but rather located them in what they constructed as “heathen” parts of the 
globe. Similarly, they failed to report on both a well-established tradition of 
philanthropy in China and the fundamental criticism of practices like child 
abandonment, infanticide and the marketing of children on the part of the 
Chinese elites.25 Instead, the Holy Childhood Association reproduced the 
view that China in particular, according to a German text from 1845, “stands 
out painfully” in “carelessness and barbarity against childhood”.26 Thus, 
when the Holy Childhood campaigned against infanticide as “shame and 
scourge of humankind”,27 it simultaneously presented Christianity and Chris-
tianisation as the only effective way to introduce change.
22 (“Schon bei der Geburt des Heilands heiligte seine Menschheit das Kindesalter und verbreitete 
über die Kindheit einen Abglanz seiner eigenen Herrlichkeit, […].”) Id. (ed.), Der Verein der 
Heiligen Kindheit. Geschichte seines Entstehens, 7. 
23 Officially speaking, children under the age of twelve constituted the main target group of the 
association. However, many of the promotional texts actually addressed adults (i.e. parents, 
teachers, priests), and some letters of activists in Aachen suggest that the German branch was 
mostly funded by adults. See Letter of Sr. Alysia Vossen to Sainte Enfance Paris, 6 June 1998, 
POSI Série E Lettres des Directeurs nationaux, 3 Allemagne.
24 Several authors cited well-known bible passages mentioning children (such as, for instance, 
Mt 18,5 and Mt 19,14), and derived adult responsibilities and rights for children from that: 
“Such teachings and examples present to the world the dignity of childhood and not only 
restored its inalienable rights […].” (“Solche Lehren und Beispiele zeigten der Welt die Würde 
der Kindheit und gaben ihr nicht nur ihre unveräußerlichen Rechte zurück […].” Der Verein der 
Heiligen Kindheit (ed.), Der Verein der Heiligen Kindheit. Geschichte seines Entstehens, 7. 
25 See Harrison, “ ‘A Penny for the Little Chinese’ ”, 85; Caroline Reeves, “Developing the Humanitar-
ian Image in Late Nineteenth- and Early Twentieth-Century China”, in Heide Fehrenbach / Davide 
Rodogno (ed.), Humanitarian Photography. A History (New York 2015), 115–139, on pp. 118f.
26 “Especially it is China, which stands out painfully in its carelessness and barbarity against 
childhood”. (“Besonders ist es China, das sich durch seine Sorglosigkeit und Barbarei gegen 
die Kindheit auf eine schmerzliche Weise auszeichnet.”) Ibid., 8. Almost identical phrases also 
featured in other texts published by the association in Germany. For instance, shifting the focus 
from the human state of childhood to children, another book stated: “It is China in particular 
that stands out sadly in its barbarity against the children”. (“Besonders ist es China, welches 
sich durch seine Barbarei gegen die Kinder auf eine betrübliche Weise auszeichnet.“) Der 
Verein der Heiligen Kindheit (ed.), Der Verein der Heiligen Kindheit. Kurze Darstellung, 10.
27 (“[…] Schmach und Geißel der Menschheit […]”). Der Verein der Heiligen Kindheit (ed.), Der 
Verein der Heiligen Kindheit. Geschichte seines Entstehens, 26. 
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References to humanity as humankind were even more frequent in the 
publications of another Catholic association, the so-called Hilfsverein zur 
Unterstützung der armen Negerkinder. The Hilfsverein was founded in 1852 
in Cologne by clerics and laymen with the goal to save African child slaves. 
More particularly, the Hilfsverein promoted the ransoming, upbringing and 
education of child slaves from north-east Africa, who were seen as powerful 
agents in the future Christianisation of the continent.28 Practically speak-
ing, it launched campaigns and collected funds for individual Italian priests 
who engaged in the ransoming of child slaves in the vast territory that had 
become the Catholic Vicariate Apostolic “Africa Centrale” in 1846. During 
the 1850s, priests like the Genovese Nicolò Olivieri regularly visited slave 
markets in Egypt in order to ransom Sudanese or Ethiopian child slaves and 
to bring them to Europe, where the surviving children were to be brought 
up in Catholic institutions in Italy, France, Austria and southern Germany.29 
Other priests, in turn, such as the famous missionary to Sudan and later 
bishop of Khartoum, Daniele Comboni, promoted the freeing of African 
child slaves and their subsequent education in Catholic children’s homes in 
Upper Egypt.30 Importantly to this study, both priests were prominent figures 
in early Catholic activism against what they increasingly termed “African” 
slavery. Besides, the activities of both were to a considerable extent funded 
by the German Hilfsverein, which launched charity appeals and issued pro-
motional reports on a regular basis.31 In its publications, the Hilfsverein not 
only cited, translated and printed the writings of Olivieri, Comboni and oth-
ers, but also celebrated their supporters as “benefactor[s] of humankind”,32 
“relentless fathers of the Negroes”,33 “saviour[s] of so many Negro children” 
28 In particular, it was the aspired roles of these children as missionaries to Africa that was strongly 
emphasised. For instance, see Letter of the Hilfsverein to Johannes von Geissel / archbishop of 
Cologne, 19 September 1859, AEK, Nachlass Geissel 169. 
29 For a detailed discussion of Olivieri and his involvement with the Hilfsverein in Germany and 
Italy, respectively, see Ute Küppers-Braun, “P. Nicolò Olivieri und der (Los-) Kauf afrikani-
scher Sklavenkinder”, in Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Religions- und Kulturgeschichte 105 
(2011), 141–166; Katharina Stornig, “Figli della Chiesa. Riscatti e globalizzazione del welfare 
cattolico (1840–1914)”, in Genesis. Rivista della Società Italiana delle Storiche 14:1, 55–83.
30 On Comboni and his activities in Northeast Africa, see Gianpaolo Romanato, Daniele Com-
boni 1831–1881. L’Africa degli esploratori e dei missionari (Milan 1998). 
31 For instance, in 1870, the leading committee of the Hilfsverein sent a charity appeal to 69 Ger-
man Catholic journals in Europe and the United States. See “Vorbemerkung”, in Jahresbericht 
des Vereines zur Unterstützung der armen Negerkinder (1871), 1f.
32 (“[…] Wohlthäter der Menschheit […]”). “Die erste schwarze Colonie Central Africas zu den 
Füßen Pius IX”, in Jahresbericht des Vereines zur Unterstützung der armen Negerkinder 
(1868), 40–66, on p. 43.
33 (“[…] die unermüdlichen Negerväter […]”). “Jetzige Lage und fernere Entwicklung des 
Vereines”, in Jahresbericht des Vereines zur Unterstützung armer Negerkinder (1863), 1–9, 
on p. 9.
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and admirable men due to their “zeal and love for humankind”.34 Child slaves, 
in turn, depicted as poor, innocent and helpless, were consistently referred to 
as the “unhappiest of all humans”.35
Interestingly, compared to China, which, by the mid-nineteenth century, 
already held a firm position in Catholic mission history and probably was 
familiar ground to many European believers, the inclusion of African child 
slaves in Catholic charity seems to have needed more persuasion. This is at 
least suggested by the fact that, throughout the 1850s, 1860s and 1870s, the 
Hilfsverein never stopped emphasising that Africans were part not only of 
God’s redemptive plan but also of the human community. For instance, the 
authors of the 1871 annual report, which was forced to record setbacks in 
fundraising due to the Franco-Prussian War and increased needs at home, 
cautioned against forgetting Africa in charitable giving by proclaiming: 
“We must always remember that [Africa] is the tenth part of humankind!”36 
Generally speaking, the Hilfsverein made great narrative efforts to instruct 
readers about the evils of slavery and the slave trade. In this context, it also 
strove to deconstruct powerful narratives, such as those related to Noah’s 
curse in the Old Testament, by which also Christian groups had legitimised 
the enslavement of Africans for centuries.37 Overall, its authors never tired of 
emphasising that Christ, through his redemptive sacrifice, had re-established 
all of humanity in its original dignity.38 Besides, the Hilfsverein pointed out 
the violence inherent to the institution of slavery and referred to its continued 
34 For instance, a publication (1859) introduced Olivieri as follows: “Olivieri […] is the name 
of this generous venerable old man, this truly apostolic man, this rare philanthropist, this 
important benefactor and affectionate father, this savior of so many miserable Negro children, 
whose zeal and love for humankind is admired by many […]”. (“Olivieri […] ist der Name jenes 
hochherzigen ehrwürdigen Greises, dieses wahrhaft apostolischen Mannes, dieses seltenen 
Menschenfreundes, dieses großen Wohlthäters und liebreichen Vaters, dieses Erlösers so vieler 
elender Negerkinder, dessen Eifer und Liebe für die Menschheit viele Mitlebende anstaunen, 
[…]”). “Olivieri, die Neger und die Sklavenfrage”, in Jahresbericht des Vereines zur Unter-
stützung der armen Negerkinder (1859), 3–42, on p. 5. 
35 (“[…] die unglücklichsten aller Menschen […].”) Ibid., 5.
36 “Wir müssen immer daran denken, daß es der zehnte Theil des ganzen Menschengeschlechtes 
ist!”, see “Die Neger-Institute in Aegypten”, in Jahresbericht des Vereines zur Unterstützung 
der armen Negerkinder (1871), 21–63, on p. 59.
37 This theme is discussed in Stephen R. Haynes, Noah’s Curse: The Biblical Justification of 
American Slavery (Oxford 2002).
38 See “Bericht über die erste Expedition nach Africa, zum Zwecke kathol. Missionen, nach dem 
Plane Don. Comboni’s”, in Jahresbericht des Vereines zur Unterstützung armer Negerkinder 
(1868), 13f., on p. 13. In this context, some Catholic groups also referenced what many nine-
teenth century Europeans referred to as the low cultural state of African peoples. For instance, 
authors writing for the St. Petrus Claver Sodality, which raised funds for Catholic anti-slavery 
and missionary activity in Africa argued that not even the “culturally low-standing Negroes” 
(“die culturell tief stehenden Neger”) could be excluded from the Catholic “works of love” 
(“Liebeswerke”). See Karl Friedrich, Die Aufgabe der katholischen Frauen im Missionswerke 
(Salzburg 1910), 6.
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existence explicitly as a “stain on humanity”.39 Yet it is important to note that, 
while the publications from the 1850s still contained attacks on Christian 
slave holders in America, such references largely disappeared in later de-
cades, and Catholic authors gradually turned slavery into not only an African 
but also a “Muslim” or an “Arab” problem.40 This, in turn, must interpreted in 
the historical context of the nineteenth century, which not only saw abolition 
but also witnessed to the consolidation of a historical narrative, according to 
which “civilised and Christian Europeans” battled slavery among “barbarian 
Muslims”.41
However, there remains the question of how the Hilfsverein mobilised 
German Catholics to not only condemn slavery in theory but also support 
child slaves in practice? Significantly, it was particularly eyewitness reports 
from slave markets, which, depicting the suffering of human beings being 
brutally abused and treated like cattle, fulfilled important narrative func-
tions. Often, certain attitudes to the (gendered) human body and indif-
ference to human pain formed the core of what authors judged to be the 
inhuman treatment of Africans by slave traders or holders.42 For instance, 
in 1859, the Hilfsverein reported that in Central Africa, male and female 
slaves of all ages were “chased with a whip on markets”, where they were 
“bought, sold, treated [and] examined like pack animals or animals for 
slaughter”.43 In addition, authors expressed particular concern for the bodies 
and souls of girl slaves, whom they feared would be sexually exploited and 
end up in harems.44
39 (“[…] Schandfleck der Menschheit […]”). “Biographische Skizzen über die schwarzen Lehre-
rinnen des ersten Etablissements zu Cairo in Aegypten”, in Jahresbericht des Vereines zur 
Unterstützung der armen Negerkinder (1869), 43–61, on p. 45. 
40 For instance, see Alexander Halka, Was geht das uns an? Gedanken und Erwägungen über das 
Werk der Antisclaverei und die katholische Missionsthätigkeit in Afrika (Salzburg 1892), 12. 
The anti-Muslim bias in late nineteenth-century Christian activism against slavery has stressed 
Daniel Laqua, “The Tensions of Internationalism: Transnational Anti-Slavery in the 1880s and 
1890s”, in The International History Review 33:4 (2011), 705–726.
41 See Simone Priesching, Von Menschenfängern und Menschenfischern. Sklaverei und Loskauf 
im Kirchenstaat des 16.–18. Jahrhunderts (Hildesheim 2012), 1f.
42 The “new” sacredness of the human body since the late eighteenth century has been empha-
sised by Lynn Hunt, Inventing Human Rights. A History (London 2007), 82.
43 (“[…] mit der Peitsche auf die Märkte getrieben […]”); (“[…] gekauft, verkauft, behandelt, 
untersucht […] wie das Last- oder Schlachtthier.”). “Olivieri, die Neger und die Sklaven-
frage”, 8f.
44 See Stornig, “Figli della Chiesa”, 65f. However, Catholic activists treated gender-based experi-
ences of slavery largely as a moral issue and thus related sexual violence to what was seen as the 
sinfulness of extra-marital sexual relationships more generally. In fact, gender-based violence 
only became a humanitarian concern and human rights issue in the late twentieth century. See 
Miriam Ticktin, “The Gendered Human of Humanitarianism: Medicalising and Politicising 
Sexual Violence”, in Gender & History 23:2 (2011), 250–265, on pp. 251f.
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These eyewitness reports gained persuasive power from the fact that the 
authors reflected on their own affective response, when experiencing such 
scenes. For instance, the same publication quoted Olivieri, who commented 
on his visit to the slave market in Cairo as follows: “My feeling rebels and 
the pen refuses to depict the brutal treatment that the poor prisoners have 
to endure; the ways in which sellers and buyers alike examine their bodies; 
some to advertise their value, others to prove it.”45 The author concluded that 
Olivieri’s heart was “deeply moved” by this experience, and the Hilfsverein 
implicitly assumed that emotional turmoil was the only “proper” human way 
of responding to such scenes.46 This is indeed significant, for also the later 
founder of the largest international Catholic fundraising organisation for 
Catholic anti-slavery activism and missionary activity in Africa, the Austrian 
countess Maria Teresia Ledóchowska, explained the triggering experience 
for her engagement in similar terms. According to a speech she gave at an 
antislavery congress held in Vienna in 1900, it was the “deep shock” she 
felt when reading eyewitness reports about “the evils of slavery, [and] the 
physical and moral hardship of the poor Negroes in Africa” that moved 
her to action.47 In the late 1880s, Ledóchowska established the so-called 
St. Petrus Claver Sodality, which was to develop into a huge fundraising and 
publishing enterprise in the 1890s. Beside these efforts, Ledóchowska, still 
writing under the male pseudonym of Alexander Halka, published a booklet 
entitled “Was geht das uns an?” (“Why does this concern us?”), in which 
she argued that the existence of slavery concerned all people as (feeling) 
humans and as Christians.48 In the late nineteenth and early twentieth cen-
tury, Ledóchowska’s St. Petrus Claver Sodality issued promotional texts and 
literature not only in German, but also in Italian, French, English, Spanish, 
Polish, Czech, Slovenian and Hungarian.49
45 “Es sträubt sich das Gefühl und es weigert sich die Feder, die brutale Behandlung zu schildern, 
welche dort die armen Gefangenen erdulden müssen, die Art und Weise, wie die Gelaba und 
ihre Käufer ihre Körper untersuchen, die einen, um ihren Werth anzupreisen, die andern, um 
ihn zu erproben.”) “Olivieri, die Neger und die Sklavenfrage”, 8f.
46 Ibid., 9.
47 “The evils of slavery, the physical and moral misery of the poor Negroes in Africa, which I 
have read about, shocked my deeply”. (“Die Greuel der Sclaverei, das physische und mo ral-
ische Elend der armen Neger Afrikas, wovon ich darin las, erschütterten mich von Grund 
aus.”) Maria Theresia Ledóchowska, Die Antisklavereibewegung und die St. Petrus Claver 
Sodalität. Ansprache der General-Leiterin der St. Petrus Claver-Sodalität, Gräfin M. Theresia 
Ledóchowska. Gehalten in der III. Festversammlung des I. österr. Antislaverei-Congresses zu 
Wien am 22. November 1900 (Salzburg 1900), 3f.
48 Halka, Was geht das uns an?, 7 and 9.
49 A brief introduction to Ledóchowska’s enterprise can be found in Walter Sauer, “Schwarz-
Gelb in Afrika. Habsburgermonarchie und koloniale Frage”, in id. (ed.), k. u. k. kolonial. 
Habsburgermonarchie und europäische Herrschaft in Afrika (Vienna 2002), 17–78, on pp. 76f.
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Taken as a whole, Catholic anti-slavery narratives often culminated 
in direct addresses to readers, who were given the opportunity to actively 
change the lives of child slaves across large geographic distance by donating 
money and thus seeing to it that the children were ransomed and received “a 
new home, loving care and the blessing of Christian education” at Catholic 
institutions.50 Needless to say, while this language of “loving care“ indeed 
tells us something about contemporary Catholic visions of humane attitudes 
to children, it tells us next to nothing about the (often extremely bad) living 
conditions in those institutions.51
3. Humanity as a Normative Vision of Human Attitudes
As already indicated, the Hilfsverein, whether explicitly or not, characterised 
the actions and attitudes of slave traders and slavers as beyond the limits 
of the human(e). For instance, reporting on slave raids among children in 
Central Africa, a missionary spoke of “abysmal moral aberration” and the 
“abandoning of all humanity”.52 Here, the notion of humanity refers to a 
specific vision of the treatment humans in general and children in particular. 
Characterising slave traders as “cruel”, “tormentors” and “heartless egoists”, 
the authors suggested that there was something fundamentally wrong with 
these men, for they not only treated slaves and particularly child slaves in 
such a brutal and degrading way, but also lacked all proper “human” reac-
tions (e.g. compassion) to human suffering. In addition, the reports raised 
doubts with regard to the roles of African parents, who, according to the 
texts, either failed to protect their children from slave raiders or even actively 
sold them into servitude. In turn, while the authors fiercely attacked adult 
Africans and/or Muslims in often generalising terms for being either actively 
involved with or indifferent towards slavery, they consistently referred to 
African child slaves as “unhappy human beings”53 and “innocent victim[s] 
of covetous inhumanity”.54
50 (“[…] eine neue Heimath, die liebevolle Pflege und den Segen einer christlichen Erziehung 
[…]”). “Olivieri, die Neger und die Sklavenfrage”, 10.
51 Some studies have pointed out the difficult living conditions and high death rates among the 
girls rescued by Olivieri. See Küppers-Braun, “P. Nicolò Olivieri”, 151–163; Walter Sauer, 
“ ‘Mohrenmädchen’ in Bludenz, 1855–1858”, in Montfort 46 (2003), 293–300. On the Holy 
Childhood Associations children’s homes in China, see Harrison, “ ‘A Penny for the Little 
Chinese’ ”, 89–91.
52 (“[…] entsetzliche moralische Verirrung, […] Aufgeben aller Menschlichkeit […]”). “Biogra-
phische Skizzen”, 43.
53 (“[…] unglückliche Menschen […]”).“Olivieri, die Neger und die Sklavenfrage”, 7.
54 (“[…] unschuldige Opfer habsüchtiger Unmenschlichkeit […]”). “Die erste Blüthe der 
schwarzen Colonie zu Cairo”, in Jahresbericht des Vereines zur Unterstützung der armen 
Negerkinder (1869), 4–20, on p. 13.
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Significantly, the Holy Childhood Association employed a comparable 
narrative approach. Its promotional texts consistently qualified Chinese 
parents not only as “heathen” and “infidel” but also as “unnatural”55, “cruel”56, 
“heartless”57, “barbarian”58 and/or “inhuman” parents.59 For instance, an 
advertising brochure distributed in North America in 1856 defined the goal 
of the association as rescuing Chinese children from “the unhappy lot to 
which the cruelty of their inhuman parents daily abandons them”.60 Besides, 
the authors endlessly reproduced stories and alleged eyewitness reports in 
order to demonstrate what it explicitly or implicitly presented as the inhuman 
actions of Chinese fathers and particularly mothers. A booklet published 
in Montreal in 1860 apparently quoted a former China missionary saying 
that “he had frequently heard [Chinese parents] speak of murdering their 
children, with an indifference that made him shudder”.61 Another American 
publication (1861) described the goal of the association as the task of rescuing 
Chinese children from the “barbarity of their parents”.62
An advertising brochure published in Vienna in 1855 even spoke of 
“heathen dehumanisation” in China.63 Hence, these narratives, which were 
circulated well into the twentieth century,64 show that the association’s 
claim to the basic unity of humankind did not necessarily require a vision 
and language of human equality. Rather, constructing “heathen” Chinese 
adults as substantially different from Europeans, some authors explicitly 
55 Der Verein der Heiligen Kindheit (ed.), Der Verein der Heiligen Kindheit. Geschichte seines 
Entstehens, 5; id. (ed.), Der Verein der Heiligen Kindheit. Kurze Darstellung, 26; Institution 
of the Holy Childhood for the Redemption of the Children of Infidels, 5. 
56 Edmund Hager, Die Heilige Kindheit (Salzburg 1874), 15.
57 Ibid. 
58 Der Verein der Heiligen Kindheit (ed.), Der Verein der Heiligen Kindheit (Wien 1855), 42. 
59 Id. (ed.), Der Verein der Heiligen Kindheit. Kurze Darstellung, 3. Often, descriptions of the 
claimed “inhumanity” of parents was phrased drastically with the goal to outrage and mobilise 
readers. A booklet form 1852 stated: “Inhuman parents sell their children, throw them out of 
their houses und lock the door to them, [the parents] throw the most little ones onto the streets 
among the refuse or drown them in a river: Fathers and mothers slaughter or suffocate their own 
children!” (“Unmenschliche Eltern verkaufen ihre Kinder, weisen sie aus ihrem Hause hinaus 
und verschließen ihnen die Thüre, werfen die kleinsten derselben auf die Straße in den Unrath 
oder ertränken sie in einem Flusse: Väter und Mütter schlachten oder ersticken ihre eigenen 
Kinder!”). Id. (ed.), Der Verein der Heiligen Kindheit. Kurze Darstellung seines Entstehens und 
seines Zweckes, nebst Berichten über seine Wirksamkeit bis zum Jahre 1851 (Munich 1852), 3f.
60 Institution of the Holy Childhood (1856), original publication held by the Seminary of Quebec, 
https://archive.org/details/cihm_06605, 2.
61 Institution of the Holy Childhood for the Redemption of the Children of Infidels, 11.
62 The Society of the Holy Childhood (1861), original publication held by the University of Alberta, 
https://archive.org/details/cihm_64007, 14. 
63 (“Diesen entsetzlichen Zügen heidnischer Entmenschung […]”). Der Verein der Heiligen Kind-
heit (ed.), Der Verein der Heiligen Kindheit, 35.
64 See Franz Xaver Wetzel, Das goldene Jubiläum des Kindheit-Jesu Vereins. Ein Büchlein für 
Kinder (Freising 1893), 5–7.
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discussed their relation to what they normatively conceptualised as human 
behaviour and attitudes. This was, for instance, the case in a theater play for 
children that the Italian branch of the association issued in 1890.65 In the play, 
which had been performed in the North Italian town of Vicenza and was 
consequently distributed in order to attract Italian children to Catholic child 
saving, a group of girls discussed the fate of Chinese infants, untold thou-
sands of whom, according to the Holy Childhood Association’s narrative, 
were neglected, abandoned or murdered by their parents. Confronting these 
stories of parental indifference and brutality, and comparing them to animal 
social behaviour, one of the girls asked whether such parents were actually 
humans or not.66 Even though the question was answered in the affirmative, 
the girl speaking referred to Chinese parents as “barbarians”, “idolaters” 
and “non-Christians” who did not know “the true God”, which is why they 
lived “like animals” and acted even “worse”, for “animals do not do their 
children to death”.67
The authors of the Holy Childhood Association universalised a certain 
vision of treating children as the only humane (and civilised) way of deal-
ing with the young. In doing so, they contributed to a discourse that took 
the treatment of childhood and the status of child welfare as yardsticks of 
civilisation.68 Indeed, the Holy Childhood Association claimed that its goals 
were beyond critique even by secular or Protestant groups. Some authors 
promoted its endeavours explicitly as of general human concern. According 
to a booklet from 1855, Protestants and Muslims also contributed to the asso-
ciation by giving alms “on grounds of humanity”.69 Other texts claimed that 
the high aims of the association had actually produced cross-confessional 
cooperation. For instance, a Canadian booklet stated that in view of the suf-
fering of Chinese children, “Protestants forgot wherein they differed from 
65 See Annali della Santa Infanzia 221 (1890), 54f.
66 After listening to these descriptions, one girl exclaimed “Oh, barbarians! And are those parents 
humans?” (“Oh, barbarie! E sono uomini quei genitori?”) Ibid., 55.
67 “Yes, they are humans like us, sons of Adam; but they are barbarians, they are idolaters, they 
are not Christians. And for that they do not know God, for that they live like animals, and do 
worse things than animals, because the animals do not do their children to death.” (“Sì, sono 
uomini come noi, figli esse pure d’Adamo; ma sono barbari, sono idolatri, non sono cristiani. 
E per questo non conoscono il vero Dio, o perciò vivono come le bestie, e fanno cose peggiori 
delle bestie, perché le bestie non fanno morire i loro figli.”) Ibid., 55.
68 For a discussion of this theme, see Jablonka, “Social Welfare in the Western World”, 380.
69 (“[…] aus Menschlichkeit […]”). Der Verein der Heiligen Kindheit (ed.), Der Verein der 
Heiligen Kindheit, 25. Another promotional text posed the following question to the readers: 
“Should it be possible that anybody steps in the way of this association obstructively, who, I do 
not want to say is a Christian [or] a Catholic, but who has a feeling heart in his body?” (“Soll es 
also wohl möglich sein, daß jemand, ich will gar nicht sagen, der ein Christ, ein Katholik ist, 
sondern nur der ein menschlich fühlendes Herz in seinem Leibe trägt, diesem Werk hinderlich 
in den Weg trete?”) Hager, Die Heilige Kindheit, 14.
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Catholics, and had not scruple in associating with us in a cause which was 
that of humanity.”70 Similarly, already the first promotional booklet published 
in German in 1845 claimed that, given its “pure and selfless” objectives, 
hardly anybody could remain indifferent to the aims of the association and, 
certainly, “nobody could appear as its enemy”.71 The author explained this 
statement by pointing to a broad consensus on the importance and moral 
force of child saving, by asking his readers rhetorically: “Who would dare 
[…] to withhold an arm that was already lifted in order to save a child from 
dying, to turn back a hand that would have opened him heaven […]?”72 And 
the text continued, likewise appealing to the affective dimension of what was 
presented as an issue of general human concern: “Rather, let us hope that all 
noble and feeling hearts, that all men’s hearts, which are of Christian spirit, 
and all mothers’ hearts, which are inspired by faith and love, always turn 
to our work.”73
As this passage shows, women and particularly mothers constituted the 
association’s major target audience. Universalising contemporary Western 
ideals of parent-child relationships and related values (such as parental and 
maternal love) as both natural and human, the authors accentuated both the 
universal needs of innocent children and the otherness of Chinese mothers. 
In a German booklet published on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of 
the Holy Childhood Association in 1893, we read that child abandonment was 
a “national custom” in China, from which followed that “heartless mothers” 
were “not at all distressed” when deserting their new-borns.74
Hence, although it must be noted that, towards the end of the century, the 
reports of the association gradually acknowledged alternative (social) expla-
nations for child neglect (such as famines or conditions of extreme poverty), 
its promotional booklets nonetheless maintained this long-standing mobi-
lising narrative, according to which it was mainly a lack of maternal attitudes 
and sentiments that gave rise to such practices in non-Christian settings. This 
is indeed significant, for it suggests that it was precisely around this highly 
sentimental notion of gendered parenthood that collective narratives of dis-
tant child saving intersected with the personal lives (and stories) of ordinary 
70 Institution of the Holy Childhood for the Redemption of the Children of Infidels, 16.
71 (“[…] Niemand als Feind gegen es auftreten wird”). Der Verein der Heiligen Kindheit (ed.), Der 
Verein der Heiligen Kindheit. Geschichte seines Entstehens, 20f.
72 (“Wer dürfte es auch wagen […] einen Arm zurückzuhalten, der sich schon erhoben hatte, um 
ein Kind dem Tode zu entreißen, eine Hand abzuwenden, die ihm den Himmel eröffnet haben 
würde […]?”) Ibid., 21.
73 (“Wir wollen vielmehr hoffen, daß alle edlen und fühlenden Herzen, daß alle Männerherzen, 
die eine christliche Gesinnung hegen und alle Mutterherzen, die von Glaube und Liebe beseelt 
sind, sich stets unserem Werke zuwenden werden.”) Ibid., 21.
74 Wetzel, Das goldene Jubiläum, 7.
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Catholics in Europe.75 The promotional texts not only appealed to gendered 
notions of parenting and maternal care as part of (female) human nature, but 
also reproduced myriad stories of Catholic women all over Europe and North 
America who, “deeply affected at such narratives, would see at once that this 
was a means of re-placing these unnatural parents”.76
However, eventually it must be added that all associations understood 
and presented human ways of being and treating others as something that 
should and could be learned through Catholic education. This is why many 
authors balanced their reports about the inhuman attitudes of distant adults 
with extremely positive accounts of the life paths of the children saved. The 
Hilfsverein not only reminded its readers that “all nations and every single 
human being” were called to become “children of God”,77 but also empha-
sised the need to raise free and educated Africans, who were seen as key 
agents in the aspired Christianisation of the continent, which, in turn, would 
eventually cause abolition.78 It printed biographical accounts of the lives of 
saved children, and praised their transformation into pious Catholics. Simi-
larly, the Holy Childhood Association not only highlighted the collaboration 
of indigenous Catholics in collecting and caring for abandoned children, but 
also referred to the key roles that the saved children were to play in the future 
of their country. Besides, it always pointed to the great (spiritual) merits of 
active charity for European Catholicism and claimed that membership in the 
association especially improved young Catholics, by, for instance, inspiring 
“beautiful sentiments” and “edifying dispositions” in their minds.79 The 
St. Petrus-Claver Sodality argued on similar terms. While it stressed the 
agency of native converts in the evangelisation of Africa on the one hand, 
it pointed to the healing qualities of doing good and the revitalisation of 
religious life in Europe through active charity on the other. For instance, 
a booklet printed in 1892 proclaimed: “Through Africa, Europe itself, sick 
Europe, will recover and become truly Christian.”80 Hence, by promoting the 
saving of non-Christian people in distant lands, these associations not only 
75 Jacobs has argued that collective narratives work best when matched with personal ones. 
See Jacobs, “The Narrative Integration”, 208.
76 Institution of the Holy Childhood for the Redemption of the Children of Infidels, 16.
77 “He, who had announced true human freedom, by calling all nations and every single human 
being to become children of God, […]”. (“Er, der die wahre Freiheit des Menschen verkündigte, 
indem er alle Nationen und jedes einzelne Wesen zur Kindschaft Gottes berufen hat, […]”). 
“Biographische Skizzen”, 47. 
78 Most prominently, this idea formed the core of Comboni’s “Plan for the regeneration of Africa” 
(“Piano per la rigenerazione dell’Africa”), which foresaw that “Africa” was to be converted 
by native missionaries. See Dorothea McEwan, A Catholic Sudan – Dream, Mission, Reality 
(Rome 1987), 86–88.
79 Institution of the Holy Childhood, 3. 
80 (“Durch Afrika wird Europa selbst, das kranke Europa, echt christlich und gesund.”) Halka, 
Was geht das uns an?, 26.
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strove to introduce religious change at home but also to achieve what they 
perceived to be the moral and civil improvement of society at large. And it 
was precisely by this understanding of the relationship between humanity 
and Christianity as an organic connection, by which the Catholic authors, 
partly citing anti-liberal Catholic journals such as the Jesuit Civiltà Cattolica, 
distinguished themselves vehemently from secular humanitarians and what 
they rejected as an “empty human philosophy” and “enemy of the cross of 
Christ”.81 Without doubts, most of the authors quoted in this article shared 
Ledóchowska’s claim, according to which a “humanitarian basis” and “mere 
philanthropy” alone did not suffice to end slavery, for it was only religiously 
grounded philanthropy that, rooted in the love of God, would give rise to 
selfless deeds in the long run.82
4. Conclusion
In nineteenth-century Europe, Catholic child saving was expanded to distant 
children in Africa and Asia. Its ideas and practices relied on powerful notions 
of the rescue and care of fellow humans that had emerged in religious and 
secular historical contexts. As we have seen, in order to mobilise the Catholic 
public, Catholic associations established and circulated collective narratives 
in which the notion of humanity functioned in two principal ways.
First, it took the meaning of humankind. This was particularly the case 
in narratives promoting the extension of religious ethics and social practices 
of charity towards children from domestic contexts to geographically dis-
tant groups. With that, the authors not only stressed the universality of the 
redemptive act on an abstract level, but also derived concrete religious duties 
from it. Second, the notion of humanity came to describe particular human 
attitudes and sentiments. Utilised in that sense, the term and its cognates 
contributed to both the moral condemnation of distant adults and the con-
struction of distant children as key symbols of humanity.
81 Institution of the Holy Childhood for the Redemption of the Children of Infidels, 17. See also “La 
redenzione delle Morette per Opera del Sac. Nicola Olivieri”, in La Civiltà Cattolica, Seconda 
Serie 2, vol. Settimo, 337–348, on p. 338. Interestingly, the Hilfsverein rejected the activities of 
secular humanitarians (“modern benefactors of humans” / “moderne Menschenbeglücker”) on 
very similar terms. See “Olivieri, die Neger und die Sklavenfrage”, 4.
82 “Mere philanthropy is all very well for selfless speeches – but it will rarely cause selfless 
actions and never working self-sacrifice. Thus, wherever the antislavery movement had a 
merely humanitarian basis, one soon had to realise: ‘This house was built on sand’ ”. (“Die 
pure Menschenliebe ist gut für selbstlose Reden – zu selbstlosen Thaten wird sie es selten 
bringen, zur dauernden werkthätigen Selbstaufopferung niemals. Wo daher auch die Anti-
sclavereibewegung eine bloß humanitäre Grundlage erhielt, da mußte man leider bald wahr-
nehmen: ‘Dieses Haus war auf Sand gebaut’ ”.) Halka, Was geht das uns an?, 20. 
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Overall, we have seen that Catholic child saving in the nineteenth century 
was a highly ambivalent phenomenon. As much as it depended on the moral 
condemnation of non-Christian adults in China and Africa, it likewise pro-
duced the long-term commitment of Europeans to and the establishment of 
some sort of solidarity with distant children. Rather than promoting social 
or national group interests, this type of solidarity rested on a universalised 
notion of children as special human beings in need and worth of the protec-
tion by Catholic adults and institutions. However, given that baptism and 
Catholic instruction were inevitable parts of Catholic child saving in the 
nineteenth century, we have to note that religion and shared faith, ultimately, 
were important as a ground for this type of transnational commitment.
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The Unity of the Human Family
A Foundation for Global Justice
1. The Ongoing Discussion About Global Justice
One of the most important consequences of globalisation is the fact that 
national governments are no longer able to regulate the economy and social 
relations in their countries independently of what is going on in other 
countries or regions of the world. Necessary solutions for global problems 
cannot be found on the national level, but must be negotiated and imple-
mented at least on the regional, better still on the global level. Therefore, 
questions of social justice, too, can no longer only be addressed to the nation 
state, bust must be discussed among all nations, and solutions must be found 
that help make clear the responsibilities richer nations bear for other nations 
and the common good of all humanity.
Theories of justice must confront these problems and cannot limit the 
sphere of justice they reflect to the horizon of a single nation. They have 
to talk about “global justice”. For instance, to begin with the well-known 
theory of justice by John Rawls,1 the crucial question is whether the “original 
position” comprises only the members of one nation deliberating possible 
rules of justice behind a veil of ignorance, or whether we must think about 
an original position that contains all members of humankind living on the 
planet. As everybody knows, Rawls rejected this idea and proposed a two-
level procedure reducing global justice to questions of the law of peoples, 
so that his famous egalitarian difference principle cannot be applied to the 
global level.2 Some of his disciples3 however, propose exactly this idea of an 
original position assembling the whole of humanity. In my view, Catholic 
1 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA 2005).
2 Id., The Law of Peoples (Cambridge, MA 1999).
3 E.g. Christian Barry / Thomas Pogge (ed.), Global Institutions and Responsibilities: Achiev-
ing Global Justice (2005) and Thomas Pogge (ed.), Global Justice (Oxford 2001). For fur-
ther discussion of this topic see Elke Mack et al. (ed.), Absolute Poverty and Global Justice: 
Empirical Data – Moral Theories – Initiatives (Farnham 2009) and Gerald Hartung / Stephan 
Schaede (ed.), Internationale Gerechtigkeit: Theorie und Praxis (Darmstadt 2009). My own 
approach has been published as Gerhard Kruip, “Weltarmut und globale Gerechtigkeit. Wozu 
verpflichtet uns die Not der Menschen in anderen Teilen der Welt?”, in Christian Spieß (ed.), 
Freiheit – Natur – Religion: Studien zur Sozialethik (Paderborn 2010), 241–261.
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Social Teaching, which very often refers to the “whole human family”, sup-
ports this approach to global justice, too. But before examining the specific 
position of Catholic tradition on this point I should briefly explain what I take 
“Catholic Social Teaching” to mean.4
2. Catholic Social Teaching
Modern Catholic Social Teaching has its origins in the late nineteenth cen-
tury, when industrialisation and social change in Europe raised the so-called 
“social question”. Initially, this Church teaching was based on neo-scholastic 
doctrines and formed a fairly closed system of general social principles such 
as personality, solidarity, subsidiarity and the common good. Its central argu-
ments were related to natural law as it was conceived of in scholasticism, 
relating nature to the will of God, who is seen as the creator of all things. 
It proposed a kind of “third way” between liberal and socialist ideologies. 
During Second Ecumenical Council of the Vatican (1962–1965) the Church 
insisted on a dialogue between Church and society and a finely developed 
awareness of modernity. This is expressed very clearly in the constitution 
Gaudium et spes (1965)5 of Vatican II: “[…] the council focuses its attention 
on the world of men, the whole human family along with the sum of those 
realities in the midst of which it lives”6 and “can provide no more eloquent 
proof of its solidarity with, as well as its respect and love for the entire human 
family with which it is bound up, than by engaging with it in conversation 
about these various problems”.7 This method, which allows the Church to 
develop its own position for this conversation is no longer a scholastic deduc-
tive argumentation, but a path of induction:
4 Parts of the following chapters of my paper are based on Gerhard Kruip, “ ‘De Iustitia in 
Mundo’. Global Justice in the Tradition of the Social Teaching of the Catholic Church”, in 
Elke Mack et al. (ed.), Absolute Poverty and Global Justice, 79–90, but have been revised 
substantially. 
5 All Church documents can easily be found at www.vatican.va and are quoted in the English 
translations accessible there, http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/
documents/vat-ii_const_19651207_gaudium-et-spes_en.html. Another important source for 
Catholic Social Teaching is the “Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church”, published 
by the Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace, http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/ponti 
fical_councils/justpeace/documents/rc_pc_justpeace_compendio-dott-soc_en.html.
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To carry out such a task, the Church has always had the duty of scrutinizing the signs 
of the times and of interpreting them in the light of the Gospel. Thus, in language 
intelligible to each generation, she can respond to the perennial questions which men 
ask about this present life and the life to come, and about the relationship of the one to 
the other. We must therefore recognize and understand the world in which we live, its 
explanations, its longings, and its often dramatic characteristics.8
This opening was valid even for Joseph Ratzinger, later Pope Benedict XVI. 
In Libertatis Conscientia, a declaration about liberation theology published 
in 1986, he wrote:
Being essentially oriented towards action, this teaching develops in accordance with 
the changing circumstances of history. This is why, together with principles that are 
always valid, it also involves contingent judgments. Far from constituting a closed 
system, it remains constantly open to the new questions which continually arise; it 
requires the contribution of all charisms, experiences and skills.9
With these changes, the social teaching of the Church became more open 
to biblical roots, ecumenical and interreligious exchange, social sciences 
and modern philosophical thought. Furthermore, while the Catholic Church 
began to be a global religious institution present in all countries of the world, 
the particular perspectives of local Churches in poor countries became 
increasingly important and were reflected even in papal documents. With-
out neglecting the social teaching of local Churches or of lay groups within 
them, I will refer to some important documents published by the Popes and 
to the final document of the Roman Bishops’ Synod of 1971, because this 
text titled Justice in the World is the most important one when trying to learn 
something about the global perspective in the social teaching of the Catholic 
Church. But I shall also refer to the very recent encyclical Laudato si’ (2015) 
of Pope Francis. Talking about climate change and ecological responsibility, 
he emphasises the unity of the human family and on the responsibility of 
mankind for the future of the planet. In both cases it is the concept of the 
whole human family that defines the group of people that must be taken into 
account when applying rules of justice.
8 Ibid., 4.
9 Congregation of the Doctrine of the Faith, Libertatis conscientia (1986), 72, http://www.
vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_19860322_free 
dom-liberation_en.html. 
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But although I am concentrating here on Catholic Social Teaching, I should 
at least mention that in Protestant contexts, too, the unity of mankind was 
and still is an important issue, dating back at least as far as the missionary 
conference in Tambaram (1938). Earlier than the Catholic Church, Protestant 
churches reflected on the problem that the Christian view of the unity of 
mankind can be linked ideologically to Western modernisation, a connection 
which has been and still is criticised by various liberation and third-world 
theologies.10 This is probably due to the fact that in Protestant theology, crea-
tion theology and nature are not accorded the same importance as in Catholic 
theology and that the Protestant concentration on Christology can strengthen 
a tendency to see Christianity as the aim of universalisation. At the same 
time, the concept of the unity of the whole human family raised the question 
about the unity of Christian churches, so that the unity of mankind became a 
core ecumenical theme,11 ultimately leading to the more general question of 
an ecumenical union of all religions.12
3. The Concept of the Whole Human Family
In Catholic Social Teaching, the concept of the unity of the whole human 
family (with its synonyms “humankind” or “the human race”13) is directly 
related to the concept of the universal use of the goods of the earth, which 
is part of the theology of creation of St. Thomas Aquinas.14 It appears in 
10 Jacobus M. van’t Kruis, “The Church and the Unity of Humankind”, in A. J. G. van der 
Borght / Paul van Geest (ed.), Strangers and Pilgrims on Earth: Essays in Honour of Abraham 
van de Beek (Leiden 2012), 445–456.
11 See Libertus A. Hoedemaker, “The Unity of Humankind. Problems and Promises of an Indis-
pensable Ecumenical Theme”, in The Ecumenical Review 50:3 (1998), 307–314. In his apostolic 
exhortation Evangelii gaudium (2013) Pope Francis also saw ecumenism “as a contribution to 
the unity of the human family” (EG 245). There are similar reflections even in the Orthodox 
Churches: Geevarghese Mar Osthathios, “The Third Millennium and the Unity of Human-
kind”, in Mission Studies 18:1 (2001), 165–169.
12 This idea of the unity of mankind can be found in other religions, too. Cf. Michael Amaladoss, 
“The Utopia of the Human Family. Among the Religions of Humanity”, in Concilium 37:5 
(2001), 81–88.
13 The word family may have certain problematic implications when talking about the unity of 
humankind. There are two aspects to it: In the present context, the word family implies that 
all human beings are descendants from Adam and Eve, and should act in solidarity with one 
another. But in my view it is quite clear that this solidarity among all members of the whole 
human family does not have the same norms and structures as the solidarity among the mem-
bers of a small family consisting of parents (or one parent) with children (or one child). I cannot 
discuss gender issues here, either. Certainly, when speaking about “mankind”, women (and 
transgender people) are included, hence the term “humankind” is preferable.
14 This idea of the universal use or purpose of all goods of the earth plays an important role 
in Catholic doctrine on private property. See Christian Spieß, Sozialethik des Eigentums. 
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many texts in the tradition of Catholic Social Teaching and is used never 
as a descriptive concept, but as a normative one that not only makes moral 
demands on individuals but even more so on social institutions and struc-
tures. Humanity in the sense of the whole human family stands for the claim 
that all human beings must be included in a community of individuals who 
live in solidarity and justice and to whom general rules of justice must be 
applied. This is particularly important for distributional justice which cannot 
be limited to questions of distribution among members of one nation, but 
must be realised among all human beings on earth. I can only very briefly 
mention the most important texts.
In Rerum Novarum, the first social encyclical of 1891, Pope Leo XIII asks 
readers to “feel and understand that all men indeed have been created by 
God, their common Father; […] and […] that the goods of nature and the gifts 
of divine grace belong in common and without distinction to all humankind 
[…]”.15 In his defence of the right to private property against Marxist ideas, 
he refuses the use of the argument of universal ownership by God against pri-
vate ownership, although he does not deny the argument itself: “The fact that 
God gave the whole human race the earth to use and enjoy cannot indeed in 
any manner serve as an objection against private possessions.”16 On the other 
hand, the message of the encyclical is also different from liberal thought, 
because the idea of mankind as a whole as the ultimate beneficiary of God’s 
gifts puts private property into the perspective of social responsibility, which 
all property holders bear for the sake of the others and the common good. It 
is important to note that the context of these texts, as of later, similar texts 
like Quadragesimo Anno (1931)17 and the radio messages of Pius XII, is still 
clearly national. The idea of the unity of the human family was already used 
when the problems they referred to were still problems of distributive justice 
on the level of national societies. But in Mater et Magistra (1961), the first 
social encyclical of John XXIII, the pope complains about the unequal inter-
national relationship between political communities that are economically 
advanced and those in the process of development:
Philosophische Grundlagen  – kirchliche Sozialverkündigung – systematische Differenzierung 
(Münster 2004). It seems quite clear that the idea of the unity of the human family already has 
its roots in Stoic philosophy, for instance in the Meditations of Marcus Aurelius (121–180).
15 Leo XIII, Rerum novarum (1891), here 38, http://w2.vatican.va/content/leo-xiii/en/encyclicals/
documents/hf_l-xiii_enc_15051891_rerum-novarum.html. 
16 Ibid., 14.
17 Pius IX, Quadragesimo anno (1931), http://w2.vatican.va/content/pius-xi/en/encyclicals/docu 
ments/hf_p-xi_enc_19310515_quadragesimo-anno.html. 
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The solidarity which binds all men together as members of a common family makes it 
impossible for wealthy nations to look with indifference upon the hunger, misery and 
poverty of other nations whose citizens are unable to enjoy even elementary human 
rights. The nations of the world are becoming more and more dependent on one another 
and it will not be possible to preserve a lasting peace so long as glaring economic and 
social imbalances persist.18
It is important to note, that already here, the pope not only uses a theological 
and an ethical argument, but also the pragmatic and realistic argument of 
increasing interdependence, which implies that solidarity also can be founded 
on the particular self-interests of the parties concerned. It is not necessary to 
believe in God’s creation to understand the reason for necessary solidarity 
among all human beings.
The second encyclical of John XXIII, Pacem in Terris (1963) – the first 
encyclical addressed to “all Men of Good Will” – puts the same idea in rela-
tion to a right to immigration: “The fact that he [the migrant] is a citizen of 
a particular State does not deprive him of membership in the human family, 
[…].”19 According to this principle, the encyclical contains a reminder that
we must bear in mind that of its very nature civil authority exists, not to confine men 
within the frontiers of their own nations, but primarily to protect the common good 
of the State, which certainly cannot be divorced from the common good of the entire 
human family.20
Among the documents of the Second Vatican Council, the most important 
text is the pastoral constitution Gaudium et Spes: it testifies to an extension 
of the concept of the common good to a global level, once more using the 
argument of increasing interdependency:
Every day human interdependence grows more tightly drawn and spreads by degrees 
over the whole world. As a result the common good, that is, the sum of those conditions 
of social life which allow social groups and their individual members relatively thor-
ough and ready access to their own fulfillment, today takes on an increasingly univer-
sal complexion and consequently involves rights and duties with respect to the whole 
human race. Every social group must take account of the needs and legitimate aspi-
rations of other groups, and even of the general welfare of the entire human family.21
18 John XXIII, Mater et Magistra (1961), 157, http://w2.vatican.va/content/john-xxiii/en/encycli 
cals/documents/hf_ j-xxiii_enc_15051961_mater.html. 
19 John XXIII, Pacem in Terris (1963), 25, http://w2.vatican.va/content/john-xxiii/en/encyclicals/
documents/hf_ j-xxiii_enc_11041963_pacem.html. 
20 Ibid., 98.
21 Second Vatican Council, Gaudium et Spes, 26.
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This also concerns the distribution of goods and has important implications 
for the status accorded to private property, which in Gaudium et Spes is dis-
tinctly more qualified than in Rerum Novarum: “God destined the earth and 
all it contains for all people and nations so that all created things would be 
shared fairly by all humankind […]. Therefore everyone has the right to pos-
sess a sufficient amount of the earth’s goods for themselves and their family. 
[…] Persons in extreme necessity are entitled to take what they need from the 
riches of others.”22
Populorum Progressio (1967) is the first social encyclical of Pope Paul VI 
and the first social encyclical after the Second Vatican Council. It was pub-
lished in the context of worldwide decolonisation movements and gave an 
important impetus to the development of liberation theology. Here, the idea 
of the unity of the human family is related to the “right to development”23 of 
all peoples24 and is even extended to past and future generations: “[…] we 
have obligations towards all, and we cannot refuse to interest ourselves in 
those who will come after us to enlarge the human family.”25
During the long term of office of Pope John Paul II, a general return to more 
traditional positions can be observed. This is particularly true for questions 
of sexual morality and the doctrine about Church authority, but not concern-
ing social problems. Both in Sollicitudo Rei Socialis (1987) and Centesimus 
Annus (1991),26 the second and third social encyclicals of Pope John Paul II, 
the perspective is a truly global one. John Paul II protests against “the per-
sistence and often the widening of the gap between the areas of the so-called 
developed North and the developing South”,27 he talks about the “elements 
and aspects which render the social question much more complex, precisely 
because this question has assumed a universal dimension”.28 By using the 
term social question, the traditional concept referring to the problems of 
social justice during the industrialisation process in Europe in the nineteenth 
century, he also includes problems of distributive justice in his concept of 
global justice. He rejects the concepts of “the First World, the Second World, 
the Third World and at times the Fourth World. Such expressions,” – says the 
pope – “[…] are significant: they are a sign of a widespread sense that the 
22 Ibid., 69. 
23 Note that the UN resolution on the right to development dates from 1986 (resolution A/41/128), 
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/41/a41r128.htm.
24 Paul VI, Populorum Progressio (1967), 22, http://w2.vatican.va/content/paul-vi/en/encyclicals/
documents/hf_p-vi_enc_26031967_populorum.html. 
25 Ibid., 17.
26 John Paul II, Centesimus Annus (1991), http://w2.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/encycli 
cals/documents/hf_ jp-ii_enc_01051991_centesimus-annus.html. 
27 John Paul II, Sollicitudo Rei Socialis (1987), 14, http://w2.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/
encyclicals/documents/hf_ jp-ii_enc_30121987_sollicitudo-rei-socialis.html. 
28 Ibid., 14.
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unity of the world, that is, the unity of the human race, is seriously compro-
mised”.29 In his call for solidarity the pope claims “a new model of the unity 
of the human race, which must ultimately inspire our solidarity”.30
Benedict XVI, elected in 2005, follows the same lines: in his encyclical 
Caritas in veritate31 as well as in many other texts and, for instance, in his 
speech in the presence of the General Assembly of the United Nations in 
2008, he spoke about the “common good of the human family” and, con-
cerning the “responsibility to protect” against human rights violations, he 
referred to the “unity of the human family”.32 He insisted on the idea that 
global rules did not limit human freedom and therefore could not be rejected 
with recourse to freedom:
In the context of international relations, it is necessary to recognize the higher role 
played by rules and structures that are intrinsically ordered to promote the common 
good, and therefore to safeguard human freedom. These regulations do not limit free-
dom. On the contrary, they promote it when they prohibit behaviour and actions which 
work against the common good, curb its effective exercise and hence compromise the 
dignity of every human person.33
Nevertheless, Benedict XVI was less interested in social problems than John 
Paul II. Not only do statements of Pope Francis, elected in 2013, hark back 
to John XXIII and Paul VI, but he also uses essential concepts of liberation 
theology in his social teaching.
4. De Iustitia in Mundo: 
The Final Declaration of the Roman Synod of Bishops (1971)
The Roman Synod of Bishops in 1971 on Justice in the World took place 
during the first years after the Second Vatican Council, when bishops from 
developing countries made great efforts to implement the decisions of the 
council in their respective local contexts and when the conservative reaction 
against the council had not yet picked up the speed it attained after 1972. The 
synod was marked by many contributions of these open-minded third-world 
29 Ibid., 14.
30 Ibid., 40.
31 Benedict XVI, Caritas in Veritate (2009), http://w2.vatican.va/content/benedict-xvi/en/encycli 
cals/documents/hf_ben-xvi_enc_20090629_caritas-in-veritate.html.
32 Benedict XVI, Meeting With the Members of the General Assembly of the United Nations 
Organization. Address of His Holiness Benedict XVI (2008), http://w2.vatican.va/content/
benedict-xvi/en/speeches/2008/april/documents/hf_ben-xvi_spe_20080418_un-visit.html. 
33 Ibid.
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bishops, mainly from Latin America, who were influenced by the emergent 
liberation theology. The natural starting point of the bishops’ thinking was 
the unity of mankind and the idea of global justice in the whole world, which 
is expressed in a very direct, not primarily theological language.
As an assembly of bishops “gathered from the whole world, in communion 
with all who believe in Christ and with the entire human family”, from the 
beginning of their consultations, they aimed to fight for “justice in the 
world”34 and to “build a more human world”.35 “Since the Synod is of a uni-
versal character, it is dealing with those questions of justice which directly 
concern the entire human family.”36 The bishops started by analysing
the serious injustices which are building around the human world a network of dom-
ination, oppression and abuses which stifle freedom and which keep the greater part 
of humanity from sharing in the building up and enjoyment of a more just and more 
loving world.37
They observed a great paradox:
Never before have the forces working for bringing about a unified world society 
appeared so powerful and dynamic; they are rooted in the awareness of the full basic 
equality as well as of the human dignity of all. Since people are members of the same 
human family, they are indissolubly linked with one another in the one destiny of the 
whole world, in the responsibility for which they all share.38
On the other hand, in spite of these hopeful tendencies, global inequalities 
were growing, depriving poorer countries of the same possibilities for devel-
opment that the richer countries once enjoyed. One of the main problems of 
global justice – already seen one year before the famous Stockholm world 
conference on environmental problems – was “the danger of destroying the 
very physical foundations of life on earth”:39
Moreover, people are beginning to grasp a new and more radical dimension of unity; 
for they perceive that their resources, as well as the precious treasures of air and 
water – without which there cannot be life – and the small delicate biosphere of the 
whole complex of all life on earth, are not infinite, but on the contrary must be saved 
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and preserved as a unique patrimony belonging to all human beings. Furthermore, 
such is the demand for resources and energy by the richer nations, whether capitalist 
or socialist, and such are the effects of dumping by them in the atmosphere and the sea 
that irreparable damage would be done to the essential elements of life on earth, such 
as air and water, if their high rates of consumption and pollution, which are constantly 
on the increase, were extended to the whole of humanity.40
The bishops’ ethical conclusion is very demanding, because they call for 
global distributive justice: “Those who are already rich are bound to accept a 
less material way of life, with less waste, in order to avoid the destruction of 
the heritage which they are obliged by absolute justice to share with all other 
members of the human race.”41
Finally they make an earnest call for action:
We see in the world a set of injustices which constitute the nucleus of today’s problems 
and whose solution requires the undertaking of tasks and functions in every sector 
of society, and even on the level of the global society towards which we are speeding 
in this last quarter of the twentieth century. Therefore we must be prepared to take 
on new functions and new duties in every sector of human activity and especially 
in the sector of world society, if justice is really to be put into practice. Our action is 
to be directed above all at those people and nations which because of various forms 
of oppression and because of the present character of our society are silent, indeed 
voiceless, victims of injustice.42
The concrete measures they suggest appear quite innovative for 1971, and 
even in 2015 have been enacted only in small parts:
These [measures] include the transfer of a precise percentage of the annual income 
of the richer countries to the developing nations, fairer prices for raw materials, the 
opening of the markets of the richer nations and, in some fields, preferential treatment 
for exports of manufactured goods from the developing nations. These aims represent 
first guidelines for a graduated taxation of income as well as for an economic and 
social plan for the entire world. We grieve whenever richer nations turn their backs on 
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In the bishops’ understanding, campaigning for a “better world”44 was part 
“of the Church’s mission for the redemption of the human race and its liber-
ation from every oppressive situation”.45 For the bishops – and it is here that 
the influence of the burgeoning liberation theology can be detected – God 
reveals himself as the “liberator of the oppressed and the defender of the 
poor”. And the following statement encapsulates the key understanding of 
the relationship between the Christian faith and justice: “It is only in the 
observance of the duties of justice that God is truly recognized as the libera-
tor of the oppressed.”46
Regrettably, beginning with the year 1972 conservative tendencies in 
Latin America (guided by the later Cardinal Alfonso López Trujillo from 
Medellín in Colombia), together with ideologically anti-communist parts 
of the Catholic hierarchy in Europe, successfully tried to restrain liberation 
theology and its influence on the world Church. Therefore, the final docu-
ment of the bishops’ synod of 1971 has for a long time been the Church’s 
most progressive text on questions of global justice. Since 1972, no final 
document of a Roman bishops’ synod has been published directly after the 
event. Instead, the popes always insisted on redacting the proceedings and 
issuing a carefully worded document some months later, so as to exercise 
more control over worldwide deliberations among bishops. But this looks 
set to change under Pope Francis, elected in 2013, who appears both to allow 
much more controversial discussions and to value transparency.
5. The Most Recent Encyclical: Laudato si’ by Pope Francis (2015)
Pope Francis, the first pope from Latin America, from, in his own words, the 
“periphery”, has introduced concepts drawn from liberation theology and 
brought new perspectives into Catholic Social Teaching.47 But he remains 
quite traditional in appealing to the concept of human family when insist-
ing on global justice, as he does emphatically in Laudato si’,48 published in 




47 On this, see Gerhard Kruip, “Die Befreiung und die Förderung der Armen” (EG 187): Zum 
lateinamerikanischen Hintergrund von Papst Franziskus (Mönchengladbach 2014).
48 Francis, Laudato siʼ (2015), http://w2.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/encyclicals/documents/
papa-francesco_20150524_enciclica-laudato-si.html. On Laudato siʼ in general, see also 
Gerhard Kruip, “Ein dramatischer Appell. Die neue Umwelt-Enzyklika des Papstes”, in 
Herder Korrespondenz 69:7 (2015), 341–344 and id., “Buen vivir – Gut leben im Einklang mit 
Mutter Erde. Das kulturelle Erbe der Indigenen und die Suche nach einem anderen Fortschritt 
in Laudato siʼ ”, in AmonsInternational 9:4 (2015), 11–18. 
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change. I shall quote only some of the most important sentences of this 
encyclical, addressed to “all people living on planet Earth”: “The urgent 
challenge to protect our common home includes a concern to bring the whole 
human family together to seek a sustainable and integral development, for 
we know that things can change.”49 Or: “We need to strengthen the convic-
tion that we are one single human family. There are no frontiers or barriers, 
political or social, behind which we can hide, still less is there room for the 
globalization of indifference.”50 In the course of the ongoing (2015–) migra-
tion crisis, Europeans were reminded that in reality, there exist no frontiers 
behind which to hide. The pope further insists: “The natural environment 
is a collective good, the patrimony of all humanity and the responsibility of 
everyone.”51 In this context, he is emphasising intergenerational justice. The 
human family includes future generations, too.
But humanity is not only the sphere of common goods and of distributional 
justice. The pope also sees humanity as a subject of a common responsibility. 
Humanity must unite to act in its common interest. Pope Francis is cautiously 
optimistic about this:
Although the post-industrial period may well be remembered as one of the most 
irresponsible in history, nonetheless there is reason to hope that humanity at the dawn 
of the twenty-first century will be remembered for having generously shouldered its 
grave responsibilities.52
The encyclical drew responses ranging across the spectrum from politicians 
and scientists. Many critics, especially from the United States, questioned 
how Pope Francis could claim authority in matters of the natural sciences and 
ecology. But the call for dialogue and shared responsibility on the part of all 
mankind was never criticised.
6. The Problem of Universalisability of the Christian Concept 
of the Human Family as a Basis for Global Justice
In the teachings of the Catholic Church discussed here, the theological back-
ground is very clear and has already been stated. Gaudium et Spes is quite 
explicit: “God, who has a parent’s care for all of us, desired that all men and 
women should form one family and deal with each other as brothers and 
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sisters.”53 This attitude goes back to a universal demand at the very begin-
nings of Christianity, the commandment to missionary activity in Mt 28, 19 
to 20. It is quite clear that this universalistic ambition later came to support 
a very strong claim to absolute authority, as evidenced in the medieval orbis 
christianus and the claims to global power on the part of the papacy, for 
instance during the colonisation of the Americas, when the pope divided the 
World into two areas of influence, one for Spain, another for Portugal (Treaty 
of Tordesillas, 1494).54 But at the same time, the thought of Bartolomé de 
Las Casas and Francisco de Vitoria proves that another effect of this claim 
of universality was the idea of human rights and their extension to Native 
Americans.
Does this mean that these concepts of the unity of the human family were 
purely Christian concepts to be taken on faith, or can they also be grounded 
philosophically in the context of global justice theories as they are now dis-
cussed in political ethics? Grounding these concepts in Christian faith may 
be consoling for Christians, but is of little use in persuading others, no matter 
whether they are adherents of other religions or atheists. One indicator that 
this idea of the unity of mankind is not only a Christian thought seems to 
be the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which in its preamble refers 
to the “recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable 
rights of all members of the human family [, which] is the foundation of free-
dom, justice and peace in the world”.55
Some philosophers56 argue that a feasible approach would be to start from 
a universal “sense of justice”, which at its core seems to be common to all 
men and women among all religions and cultures. It should be clear that 
this sense of justice is not pre-cognitive but includes cognitive concepts of 
justice and at least implicit moral rules. Nevertheless, many philosophers, 
from David Hume to Paul Ricœur and Judith Shklar, have argued that it was 
easier to know what injustice is than to define what justice means. If all 
people, at least when themselves victims of injustice, are capable of moral 
indignation, and if more and more people feel affected by injustices commit-
ted all over the world, this universal sense of injustice today also includes 
53 Second Vatican Council, Gaudium et Spes, 24.
54 The Treaty of Tordesillas divided the newly discovered lands outside Europe between Portugal 
and the Crown of Castile shortly after Columbus had discovered the island of Hispaniola. Due 
to this treaty, Brazil became a Portuguese, not a Spanish colony. 
55 English text on http://www.unhchr.ch/udhr/lang/eng.htm. On the difficult relationship between 
the Catholic Church and human rights see Vasilios N. Makrides et al. (ed.), Christentum und 
Menschenrechte in Europa. Perspektiven und Debatten in Ost und West (Frankfurt/M. 2016); 
Samuel Moyn, Christian Human Rights (Philadelphia 2015). 
56 On the following section, see also the contributions to Ian Kaplow / Christoph Lienkamp (ed.), 
Sinn für Ungerechtigkeit: Ethische Argumentationen im globalen Kontext (Baden-Baden 
2005).
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a global perspective and calls for global action. The sense of injustice is at 
first individual and local, but a growing number of people are affected by 
injustices in faraway places. Indeed, in recent years it has been possible to 
observe that, owing to the mass media and the work of global civil society 
organisations a consciousness of global interdependence has been growing. 
Different processes of globalisation are leading to a world society.57
The concept of the unity of humankind nevertheless cannot be grounded 
on such a global sense of injustice, first because such a foundation in an 
empirical observation could be seen as a natural fallacy, second, and more 
importantly, because this sense of injustice will only work if the extension 
of justice, which makes it possible to speak of injustice, is a global one that 
integrates all human beings. Therefore, it must be grounded in the idea of the 
dignity of every person and the moral community that is formed in the con-
sequence of that dignity. Kant, in his second formulation of his categorical 
imperative, already seems to have had at least the whole human family in 
mind (and, taking the thought to its conclusion, every rational being), when 
he claims: “Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own 
person or in the person of any other, never merely as a means to an end, but 
always at the same time as an end.”58 Rainer Forst sees human beings as 
“justificatory beings”, i.e. able to justify, to take responsibility and to see the 
duty to give reasons to others and to justify moral norms. He thinks that this 
is the best possible way to reconstruct the Kantian categorical imperative to 
respect persons as end in themselves.59 This implies that all members of the 
human family must have the right to have moral and legal norms concerning 
them justified to them. In a globalised world all are concerned, and therefore 
this moral community of persons in the sphere of the right of justification 
must be a global one and include all human beings. Anzenbacher argues that 
this global extension of justice is even intrinsically linked to the concept of 
justice.60 For me, it seems quite obvious that theories of discourse ethics are 
particularly suitable for making clear what this could mean.61
57 Cf. Boris Holzer et al. (ed.), From Globalization to World Society: Neo-Institutional and Sys-
tems-Theoretical Perspectives (New York 2015).
58 Immanuel Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals (Indianapolis 31993), 36.
59 Cf. Rainer Forst, The Right to Justification: Elements of a Constructivist Theory of Justice 
(New York 2012). A similar argument is advanced by Stefan Gosepath, “Zu Begründungen 
sozialer Menschenrechte”, in Stefan Gosepath / Georg Lohmann (ed.), Philosophie der Men-
schenrechte (Frankfurt/M. 1998), 146–188.
60 Arno Anzenbacher, “Kooperation, Konflikt und Anerkennung. Zur Systematik des Gerechtig-
keitsbegriffs”, in Zeitschrift für Evangelische Ethik 46 (2001), 168–180.
61 Cf. Karl-Otto Apel, “Globalisierung und das Problem der Begründung einer universalen 
Ethik”, in Karl-Josef Kuschel et al. (ed.), Ein Ethos für eine Welt?: Globalisierung als ethische 
Herausforderung (Frankfurt/M. 1999), 48–75.
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7. Conclusion
Without any doubt, the concept of the unity of the human family has impor-
tant consequences in many fields of ethical reflection about global justice. 
The idea of the unity of human family should lead us to call for the univer-
salisation and globalisation of what is truly human.62 I must restrict myself 
here to some very short remarks about what these consequences should be: It 
seems quite clear that we have to guarantee a minimum allowing every man, 
woman and child to live in dignity, which implies a kind of social security 
system on the world level. We must find solutions for a more just distribution 
of goods, so that the poor can participate in the welfare of the rich instead of 
becoming increasingly poorer while the rich get richer. We need fair play in 
global trade, forcing the rich countries to reduce their protection policies in 
agriculture and to allow the poor countries – corresponding to their needs – a 
gradual and partial integration into the world market. We need just proce-
dures in global decision-making, so that the great number of the poor can 
be really represented proportionally in world institutions, which should be 
reformed as democratic institutions for global governance in benefit of all, 
and that means primarily for the poor. We need global policies to find the 
right regulation regimes for international financial markets to avoid financial 
crises and their terrible consequences in the future.
Looking to the burning questions of the recent past, which are likely to 
remain high on the agenda in the near future, too, I would like to address very 
briefly two major problems: climate change and migration.
Taking the unity of the whole human family as our starting point, it can 
easily be shown that there is a common responsibility of all human beings to 
find a way to survive on the only planet we have – and this in a way that per-
mits human rights and dignity for all. If the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights in article 28 proclaims that “everyone is entitled to a social and inter-
national order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration 
can be fully realized”, then this also means that everyone has the right to a 
global climate that permits future human life under conditions of dignity. 
Therefore, we need a better and more just distribution of the use of ecological 
resources so that opportunities remain for the sustainable development of the 
poorer population. Problems of global social justice and ecological justice are 
intertwined. By declaring that the climate of the planet is “a common good, 
belonging to all and meant for all”,63 Pope Francis alludes to the burning issue 
62 José I. González Faus, “The Utopia of the Human Family. The Universalization of the Truly 
Human as Real Globalization”, in Concilium 37:5 (2001), 97–104.
63 Francis, Laudato siʼ (2015), 23. Already in Evangelii gaudium and in similar terms, Pope 
Francis had underlined that “we must never forget that the planet belongs to all mankind and is 
meant for all mankind; the mere fact that some people are born in places with fewer resources 
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of “the global commons”, common goods for humanity as a whole, which 
cannot be produced by private initiatives in a free market, but need collective 
action and state regulation.64 Therefore, the pope insists: “What is needed, 
in effect, is an agreement on systems of governance for the whole range of 
so-called, global commons.”65 Ottmar Edenhofer, Christian Flachsland and 
Brigitte Knopf, three respected German researchers on climate change, 
agree that
elevating the status of the climate to a global commons would entail protecting the poor 
from climate change and a fair global sharing of the costs of mitigation, in particular 
by richer societies that are capable of doing so. This is an idea that some governments 
are obviously not keen to endorse, but which the pope’s encyclical puts prominently 
on the table.66
On the other hand, the figure of 60 million of migrants worldwide forces 
us to frame rules for international migration, not by starting with national 
sovereignty but with the understanding that national borders and migration 
policies must conform to a global social responsibility for the poor in other 
countries. Borders, like private ownership, ought to be subject to social obli-
gations. If in principle the goods of the earth belong to all, then there must be 
strict criteria for denying others the right to cross borders. Often, restricting 
migration, rejecting migrants and giving priority to nationals is legitimated 
with reference to the idea of special duties we have towards our fellow 
countrymen. But Goodin after having rejected other possible solutions has 
shown convincingly that these special duties are best reconstructed as conse-
quences of a moral division of labour concerning positive rights.67 In the case 
of negative rights there is no question who has the corresponding negative 
duties: simply all. But in the case of positive rights, it is not as clear. It can 
even be a problem if everybody wants to fulfil his positive duties, because 
this would not work for practical reasons. Therefore, this case requires a divi-
sion of labour, with this duty to organise help becoming a “mediating duty”.68 
or less development does not justify the fact that they are living with less dignity.” Francis, 
Evangelii gaudium (2013), 190, http://w2.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/apost_exhortations/
documents/papa-francesco_esortazione-ap_20131124_evangelii-gaudium.html.
64 Elinor Ostrom (ed.), The Drama of the Commons (Washington, DC 2002). See also Silke 
Helferich / Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung (ed.), Commons: Für eine neue Politik jenseits von Markt 
und Staat (Bielefeld 2012).
65 Francis, Laudato siʼ (2015), 174.
66 Ottmar Edenhofer et al., “Science and Religion in Dialogue Over the Global Commons”, in 
Nature Climate Change 5:10 (2015), 907–909.
67 Robert E. Goodin, “What is so Special About our Fellow Countrymen?”, in Ethics 98 
(1988), 663–686. See also Brian Barry / Robert E. Goodin (ed.), Free Movement: Ethical Issues 
in the Transnational Migration of People and of Money (Philadelphia 1992).
68 Henry Shue, “Mediating Duties”, in Ethics 98 (1988), 687–704.
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If we do not wish to limit our idea of the legitimacy of states to a mere con-
tractual theory of their founding, we can understand states (and particularly 
nation states) as solutions to the problem of organising the fulfilment of the 
positive rights of all human beings. Special duties, in the view of Goodin, are 
“merely devices whereby the moral community’s general duties get assigned 
to particular agents”.69 But cases where citizens are not protected and sup-
ported by their own states – which occurs very often in the present, deeply 
flawed assignment of responsibilities – they do not lose their positive rights. 
Their fulfilment becomes the “residual responsibility” of all.70 If the previous 
division of labour doesn’t work, a new one must be put in place. This is why 
states have to accept migrants from other, failing states. And if individual 
states feel that it is too much for them, they have to organize solutions on a 
regional or international level.
Finally, I want to emphasise one last idea: the Catholic Church could raise 
its credibility in this field by realising the unity of the human family in its 
own structures, procedures of decision-making, internal distributions of 
goods and by fighting for more global justice. The Synod of the Bishops of 
1971 expressed it well: “[…] unless the Christian message of love and justice 
shows its effectiveness through action in the cause of justice in the world, 
it will only with difficulty gain credibility with the people of our times.”71 
Therefore, the concept of catholicity must be changed, so that the Catholic 
Church becomes less western, less centralised and more open to all the dif-
ferent cultures of the human family.72
69 Goodin, “What is so Special”, 678.
70 Ibid., 684.
71 1971 Synod of Bishops, De Iustitia in Mundo (1971), 36.
72 See Robert J. Schreiter, “Globality and Catholicity as Unrenounceable Features of the Church. 
Two Discourses in the Church Today”, in ET-Studies 6:2 (2015), 185–196 and Gerhard Kruip, 
“Globale Herausforderungen – auch die Kirche selbst steht in der Pflicht!”, in Wort und Ant-
wort 56:3 (2015), 120–125.
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Humanity – Humanitarian Reason – 
Imperial Humanitarianism
European Concepts in Practice
Global humanitarianism seems self-evident against the current backdrop of 
refugee crises, civil wars and man-made or natural disasters, on which the 
media report from near and far. “Global Humanitarianism” is a ubiquitous 
term.1 We hear it in the context of humanitarian practice and public debate, 
read about it in scholarly books and find it in the titles of courses and semi-
nars.2 Yet the usage of the term global humanitarianism has implications that 
merit more in-depth reflections. When we talk about global humanitarian-
ism, we do not simply state a fact, namely, that humanitarian action is taking 
place all over the planet. Instead, global humanitarianism carries normative 
and political implications: it says “We should be active in all places where 
human beings are suffering”, and “Humanitarian activities have to be regu-
lated and coordinated”. In other words, when we talk about global humani-
tarianism, we are dealing with moral issues and with challenges of political 
governance.
On closer inspection, global humanitarianism is tautological. From 
a philosophical perspective and as an ideal, humanitarianism expresses 
the normative assumption that all human beings are of equal importance, 
1 I thank all members of the research group on “Concepts of Humanity and Humanitarian Prac-
tice” at the Leibniz Institute of European History for the discussions we had over the past 
years. My special thanks are due to Fabian Klose, Mirjam Thulin and Esther Möller for their 
very helpful comments and Bernhard Gißibl, who at an early stage commented on this essay, 
and as always made me improve it. The paper benefited from questions by the audience at the 
lecture series on “Global History”, organised by Roland Wenzlhuemer at the Cluster “Europe 
and Asia” at the University of Heidelberg.
2 See, for example, the Global Humanitarian Assistance Report 2015, published by the Global 
Humanitarian Assistance Programme run by Development Initiatives funded by the govern-
ments of Canada, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom – http://www.globalhuman 
itarianassistance.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/GHA-Report-2015_-Interactive_Online.
pdf; or the Global Humanitarianism Research Academy (GHRA), which offers research train-
ing to advanced PhD candidates and early postdocs and is organised by the Leibniz Institute of 
European History, the Imperial and Global History Centre at the University of Exeter, and the 
Archives of the International Committee of the Red Cross in Geneva – http://ghra.ieg-mainz.de/. 
Cf. Bruce Mazlish, The Idea of Humanity in a Global Era (New York 2009), 35, who regards 
the emergence of a concept of Humanity as closely connected to the era of total war.
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independently of their race, religion, class, gender or other such categories. 
This implies the obligation to help all those who are in distress. We are talk-
ing about a form of cosmopolitanism that assumes a moral claim that seems 
universal or, in other words, has a global reach.3 Global humanitarianism, 
however, is an overstatement; in practice, the concept has never been fully 
realised. Not all people in distress are equally objects of humanitarian aid. 
Some get more help than others. Nor does humanitarianism fully cover the 
globe. Some parts receive no relief at all. Discussing the development of 
global humanitarianism consequently means analysing it in terms of ideas as 
well as politics.
The contemporary use of the term is not a bad thing in itself. Humanitar-
ian actions after all are a matter both of morality and of politics – and, I may 
add, one of sentiments. When we discuss the history of humanitarianism, 
however, we need to be more careful which terms we are using. Particularly 
in a field of inquiry that is so obviously connected to present-day concerns, 
some reflection is appropriate in order not to write present ideas back into 
the past and thereby misunderstand it as scholars, and at the same time 
fail to notice dimensions that may be essential for analysing what happens 
in today’s world.
There are two notions embedded in the ubiquitous term used by today’s 
pundits. One is the issue of the global, the other that of humanity, i.e. the 
concept linked with humanitarian activities.4 Humanity comprises indeed 
three facets: the moral humanitarian principle, the attitude behind it, which 
motivates and justifies humane behaviour, and the conception of humanity as 
the collective body of humankind – the object as well as the potential scope 
of humanitarian action. This essay begins with an exploration of humanity 
as a concept in practice by looking at the historical lexica of humanity. I 
put forward four observations drawn from the contributions in this volume 
regarding the reliance of humanity on antonyms, the various functions of 
humanity, the dynamic nature of the concept, and the hierarchies of humanity. 
Following on from this, I will discuss the global dimensions by highlighting 
the contemporary formation of a new moral economy called humanitarian 
reason. The apparent consensus on global relief of human suffering is imbued 
with issues of power and (in)justice. It can be traced to imperial roots, which 
3 Cf. Iain Wilkinson, “Humanitarianism and Cosmopolitanism”, in Gerard Delanty (ed.), 
Routledge Handbook of Cosmopolitanism Studies (Abingdon 2012), 400–413; Thomas W. 
Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights. Cosmopolitan Responsibilities and Reforms (Cam-
bridge 2002).
4 Ilana Feldman / Miriam Ticktin (ed.), In the Name of Humanity. The Governance of Threat and 
Care (Durham, NC 2010), 4.
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provide a more suitable frame for understanding how concepts of human-
ity and humanitarian practice affect each other – in the past and in the 
present.5
The paper focuses on European or Western humanitarianism. I will clar-
ify this where necessary. This does not mean that humanitarianism was an 
essentially European concept and practice, let alone one that high-minded 
and well-meaning individuals hatched in a box called “Europe”.6 Indeed, as a 
European phenomenon it is something that has developed from Europe’s rela-
tions with the wider world. Religious or philosophical ideas about humanity 
and the obligations of individuals and groups are not exclusive to Europe-
ans but have been discussed in many cultures and societies. The European 
expansion in the modern period, however, increased the practical relevance 
of particular notions and led to ethical debates in political philosophy about 
the reach of obligations from the particular to the universal. Connected inti-
mately to European interests and power, humanitarian challenges of war, vio-
lence and imperial rule, their practical application was based on interaction 
with other peoples. Humanitarianism resulted from an asymmetrical flow of 
ideas across various kinds of social and political borders. Moreover, it rested 
on asymmetries of power, which brought forth humanitarian constellations 
through colonial wars or through economic and social marginalisation by 
colonial rule. These could be compounded, for example, by dual systems of 
legal rights and procedures. Yet from time to time, notions of humanity also 
served to criticise exactly these asymmetries. Global humanitarianism there-
fore is a case study that is particularly pertinent to a discussion of humanity 
as a European concept in practice
1. A Necessary Paradox of Humanity and Humanitarianism
The moral sentiment we call humanitarianism refers, at its core, to human-
itarian principles, humane attitudes, and humanity as a collective body. 
These are concepts that have had different meanings and functions during 
the course of modern European history so that we can study historical lexica 
of humanity and humanitarianism. In what follows, I will make a few sys-
tematic observations rather than describing the long history of the terms in 
5 See also Andrew Thompson, “Humanitarian Interventions, Past and Present”, in Fabian Klose 
(ed.), The Emergence of Humanitarian Intervention. Ideas and Practice From the Nineteenth 
Century to the Present (Cambridge 2016), 331–356.
6 See Kevin O’Sullivan / Matthew Hilton / Juliano Fiori, “Humanitarianism in Context”, in Euro-
pean Review of History 23:1–2 (2016), 1–15, and Paul Amar, “Global South to the Rescue. 
Emerging Humanitarian Superpowers and Globalizing Rescue Industries”, in Globalizations 
9:1 (2011), 1–13.
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detail.7 The perspective will not follow the crest of philosophical or theologi-
cal debates on humanity. The interest rather lies in the practical application of 
the concepts and, vice versa, the effects of humanitarian action on the notion 
of humanity and the shifting meaning for the governing mode that concerns 
people in precarious situations.
Concepts of humanity have represented values and norms guiding soci-
etal relations; they have served to legitimise or demand actions by the state, 
churches or other institutions; and they have inspired individuals to strive for 
what they hoped would be a better world. Humanity has therefore been a mal-
leable concept, which has been used and indeed abused not just in the past. 
It also lends itself to different purposes in the present. Various competing 
notions of what constitutes the character of humanity and how human beings 
ought to be treated existed side by side. 
As much as its European proponents seemed to make universal claims 
in the name of humanity, in practice there were limits not only to applying 
humanity as a principle but already to answering who belonged to humanity 
and what constituted it at a certain time and from a particular point of view. 
Moreover, concepts of humanity and humanitarian practices intersected with 
changing notions of differences in modern Europe. Fundamental changes 
effected a pluralisation of inequalities and ideo logically charged understand-
ings of otherness: the transition from a society based on estates to one based 
on classes, the debate regarding secularisation and re-confessionalisation, the 
dichotomy between nature and culture, and the emergence of nationalism, 
colonialism and imperialism. During these processes, in some cases new 
differences emerged, in other cases existing differences intensified and were 
ideologically charged.
Against this background, I suggest the following hypothesis: By referring 
to humankind as the ideal human collective, ideas of humanity and human-
itarian action ignore, voluntarily or involuntarily, differences of various 
kinds or attempt to transcend them while, at the same time, the practical 
application of these ideas gives rise to new differences. This happens on a 
very basic level, for example by distinguishing between helpers and those in 
need of assistance. Here is the paradox of generating differences by means 
of a governing idea such as humanity, which intends to bridge differences, 
yet results in an ambivalence between concepts and humanitarian practices. 
7 For example, for a history of the German and French term, see Hans Erich Bödeker, “Mensch-
heit, Humanität, Humanismus”, in Otto Brunner / Werner Conze / Reinhart Koselleck (ed.), 
Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe. Historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in 
Deutschland, vol. 3 (Stuttgart 1982), 1063–1128; Henri Duranton, “Humanité”, in Rolf 
Reichardt / Hans Jürgen Lüsebrink (ed.), Handbuch politisch-sozialer Grundbegriffe in Frank-
reich 1680–1820, vol. 19 (Munich 2000), 9–52. 
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On the one hand, internal European processes contributed to the growing 
importance of discussions of the concept of humanity and to the emergence 
of different understandings of humanity. On the other hand, the discourse 
on humanity changed through the encounter with non-European cultures, 
and contributed to the emergence of an understanding of humanitarianism 
perceived as “European”. The paradox appears, however, a necessary one, 
inasmuch as mobilising humanitarian action requires an overstatement to 
overcome existing differences in the name of humanity. It is open to debate 
whether this constitutes manipulation, exposes humanitarians to ridicule, or 
demonstrates a consciousness of the paradox and an insight into the necessi-
ties of constructing an inclusive idea of humanity.8
Investigating the modern period from the Humanists and early European 
expansion to the second half of the twentieth century and touching on con-
temporary issues in the immediate past, a number of general observations 
follow. They relate to the reliance of humanity on antonyms, various func-
tions of humanity, the dynamic nature of the concept, and to hierarchies of 
humanity.
2. Humanity and its Constitutive Antonyms
In a general way, humanity in English carries two meanings, which in the 
German language are conveyed by two different words: humanity as an object 
or collective body (Menschheit) and as an attitude that guides behaviour 
(Menschlichkeit).9 The antonymous character of the concept becomes imme-
diately recognisable when we think of humanitarian action, which addresses 
someone who is in need of assistance. How the people receiving help in the 
name of humanity were conceived of varied over time and depended on 
political, socio-economic and cultural context. In particular, various degrees 
of agency have been attributed depending on whether the “needy” were 
addressed as “victims”, “recipients” or “beneficiaries”. In development aid, 
“counterpart” refers to those local intermediaries who support or implement 
measures by foreign aid agencies and therefore possess greater agency than 
“sufferers”.
The “other” of humanity, which as a collective body is supposed to be of 
the same kind, does not only show itself in the terms used for the objects of 
humanitarian sentiment. The opposite of humaneness also becomes apparent 
8 See Johannes Paulmann (ed.), Dilemmas of Humanitarian Aid in the Twentieth Century (Oxford 
2016), 1–3.
9 For the usage of the two meanings in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century abolitionist writings 
see Lynn Festa, “Humanity Without Feathers”, in Humanity 1:1 (2010), 3–27, on pp. 7f.
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in breaches of appropriate behaviour. Humanitarianism produces third par-
ties beyond the humanitarian workers and the beneficiaries, implicitly and 
explicitly placing them outside humanity. Prominent historical cases of inhu-
man perpetrators were slave traders and slaveholders. During the nineteenth 
century, the abolition of slavery developed into a marker for the standard of 
civilisation a nation or society had achieved in the eyes of European public 
opinion.10 This standard, founded in the idea of the human likeness to God, 
referred mostly to Christian ideals of charity and narratives such as that 
of the Good Samaritan and contained a strong missionary element. In the 
historic self-image of Europe, branding slaveholding as inhuman signified 
the beginning of modern humanitarianism. Yet this is a largely Protestant, 
Anglo-American idea of Europe and the West. Before its proponents invented 
this modern narrative, which historical scholarship on the late-modern 
period tends to support, “Europe’s moral universe was anything but empty”, 
as Thomas Weller writes.11 His analysis of Spanish discourses on slavery in 
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries shows that some theologians, law-
yers and missionaries criticised the enslavement of Africans as not being 
justified according to Canon law and scholastic tradition. As human beings 
and particularly as Christians, the Africans possessed a right to freedom. 
Although these critics did not question the institution of slavery per se, they 
still insisted that non-Christian slaves captured in a “just war” or condemned 
to servitude for committing a crime at least deserved a humane treatment 
even if they did not have the same right to freedom as Christians.
A highly gendered condemnation of inhumane behaviour emerged in the 
context of nineteenth century Catholic associations for the “rescue” of dis-
tant children. As Katharina Stornig shows, the stories about Chinese mothers 
abandoning, selling, or even killing their offspring characterised them not 
merely as “barbarian” but as “unnatural” and “inhuman”.12 In the mid-nine-
teenth century, fund raising brochures spoke of “heathen dehumanisation” 
in China. Towards the end of the century, Catholic authors turned on slavery 
and declared it a particularly “Muslim” or “Arab” problem making it an 
10 Fabian Klose, “ ‘A War of Justice and Humanity’: Abolition and Establishing Humanity as an 
International Norm”, in this volume; see also Gerrit W. Gong, The Standard Civilization in 
International Society (Oxford 1984).
11 Thomas Weller, “Humanitarianism Before Humanitarianism? Spanish Discourses on Slavery 
From the Sixteenth to the Nineteenth Century”, and Mariano Delgado, “ ‘All People have Rea-
son and Free Will’: The Controversy Over the Nature of the Indians in the Sixteenth Century”, 
in this volume. For the structural similarities between early modern criticism of slavery and 
Anglo-American abolitionism, see also Peter Stamatov, The Origins of Global Humanitarian-
ism. Religion, Empires, and Advocacy (New York 2013).
12 Katharina Stornig, “Between Christian Solidarity and Human Solidarity: Humanity and the 
Mobilisation of Aid for Distant Children in Catholic Europe in the Long Nineteenth Century”, 
in this volume.
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ethnic and religious issue. Child abandonment or infanticide shifted from 
being a concern within Europe to one in the distant, “heathen” parts of the 
globe. The treatment of children served as another yardstick of civilisation. 
The Catholic charities established a mobilising connection between inhu-
manity and Christianity, suggesting that only the advance of Christianity 
among heathens overseas and the strengthening of it in European society by 
acts of human solidarity would save humanity at large from that “other” in- 
humane behaviour.
A later major instance of inhumane behaviour, which signifies the “other” 
of humanity, have been the crimes against humanity committed by troops 
as well as genocides instigated and administered by politicians and offi-
cials. Both concepts were introduced into international law in the 1940s but 
already had a history reaching back to the nineteenth century.13 As Kerstin 
von Lingen shows, the concept of “crimes against humanity” was a legacy 
of the earlier attempts to safeguard humanity in warfare put forward in the 
Geneva Conventions of 1864 and particularly the 1899 and 1907 Hague Con-
ventions on the Laws and Customs of Warfare. The notion had a moral and 
political grounding connecting it explicitly to public conscience, customary 
international law and “the laws of humanity”.14 Only in 1945 did lawyers and 
politicians succeed in transforming it into a legal tool for bringing perpetra-
tors to justice because “war crimes” alone did not suffice to cover the horrific 
deeds committed by German forces during the Second World War. It seems, 
though, that the blend of politics, morality and legal norms connected with 
crimes against humanity is inextricable and offers scope for varying inter-
pretations. The notion of genocide exemplifies this when politicians distin-
guish between application of the concept to history and the legal applicability 
of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide in order to avoid compensation claims for crimes committed before 
the Convention.15
13 Kerstin von Lingen, “Fulfilling the Martens Clause: Debating ‘Crimes Against Humanity’, 
1899–1945”, in this volume; cf. for the use in the context of the international treaty regime 
against the slave trade Klose, “A War of Justice and Humanity”, in this volume. Cf. also Daniel 
Marc Segesser, “Die historischen Wurzeln des Begriffs ‘Verbrechen gegen die Menschlich-
keit’ ”, in Jahrbuch für juristische Zeitgeschichte 8 (2006 / 07), 75–101.
14 Quote from the “Martens Clause” in 1907 Hague Convention, https://www.icrc.org/eng/
resources/documents/misc/57jnhy.htm.
15 See, for example, a debate in the German parliament on the genocide in the former German 
South-West-Africa (today Namibia) when Professor Dr. Egon Jüttner (CDU / CSU) stated: 
“Meine Damen und Herren, es ist wohl unbestritten, dass das, was vor 111 Jahren in Namibia 
geschehen ist, nach heutigen Maßstäben des Völkerrechts als Völkermord bezeichnet wird. 
Die Rechtsnorm des Völkermords wurde allerdings erst 1948 geschaffen, sodass ein Rück-
bezug nicht möglich ist und Rechtsansprüche daraus auch nicht hergeleitet werden können.” 
Plenarprotokoll Deutscher Bundestag – 18. Wahlperiode – 124. Sitzung. Berlin, 24. Sept. 
2015, 12086–12091, here p. 12088, http://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btp/18/18124.pdf#P.12088. 
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Beyond these delimitations in interactions, concepts of humanity in 
historical usage explicitly defined who belonged and who did not belong 
to humanity in anthropological or transcendental ways. The constitutive 
antonyms of humanity and humaneness reveal various and historically 
changing divisions. The implications for humanitarian action and practices 
were partly determined by these conceptually in-built differentials. Often 
(but not always) the differentiation rested on dichotomies. Following the 
historian Francisco Bethencourt,16 the big historical divisions of humankind 
were, first, Free people / Slaves. Europeans transferred this ancient legal divi-
sion to the Americas and thereby transformed it into something of a law of 
nature. Europeans themselves debated this first with regard to indigenous 
Americans and then African Slaves in the Americas as early as Bartolomé 
de Las Casas in the sixteenth century.17 They fundamentally challenged 
slavery from the eighteenth century onwards so that it could no longer claim 
public currency, although the reality of slavery and servitude exists to this 
day. Second, Civilised / Barbarians: This second ancient distinction gained 
prominence in Europe through the application to peoples on the European 
continent as well as to peoples beyond its shores. It served to distinguish 
one’s own community and created identities; in religious terms, it separated 
(Christian) believers from heathens. Civilisation reached salience from the 
second half of the nineteenth century well into the twentieth century. Since 
the 1960s and 1970s, as a consequence of decolonisation, its recognition has 
significantly diminished again, giving way to ideas of cultural relativism and 
the notion of diversity as an asset to all of humankind.18 Third, White / Black 
or Coloured: European ethnocentric racism developed on the Iberian Penin-
sula in the context of the Reconquista, with reference to the “tainted blood” 
of the Moriscos, and of oceanic expansion. It was reflected in manifold cate-
gorisations and hierarchical tables. Theorised in the nineteenth century, race 
saw its scientific character discredited during the later twentieth century. 
Fourth, Male / Female and Adults / Children: The division of humankind into 
For the history of the genocide in 1904 / 08, see Jürgen Zimmerer / Joachim Zeller (ed.), Völker-
mord in Deutsch-Südwestafrika. Der Kolonialkrieg in Namibia (1904–1908) und die Folgen 
(Berlin 32016), and in general, The Oxford Handbook of Genocide Studies, ed. by Donald Blox-
ham and A. Dirk Moses (Oxford 2010), and A. Dirk Moses (ed.), Empire, Colony, Genocide. 
Conquest, Occupation, and Subaltern Resistance in World History (New York 2008).
16 Francisco Bethencourt, “Humankind: From Division to Recomposition”, in this volume.
17 Delgado, “ All People have Reason and Free Will”, in this volume.
18 See Andrea Rehling, “ ‘Kulturen unter Artenschutz’? Vom Schutz der Kulturschätze als 
Gemeinsames Erbe der Menschheit zur Erhaltung kultureller Vielfalt”, in Jahrbuch für 
Europäische Geschichte. European History Yearbook 15 (2014), 109–137; cf. Mark Mazower, 
“The End of Civilization and the Rise of Human Rights. The Mid-Twentieth-Century Disjunc-
ture”, in Stefan-Ludwig Hoffmann (ed.), Human Rights in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge 
2011), 29–44, who treats the end of civilisation as an ordering principle developed in response 
to the violence of the World Wars. 
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men and women with different rights, characters or natures ruled by various 
regulations has a long history. In itself, the gender division was addressed 
fundamentally in Europe and Western societies only during the twentieth 
century. Indeed, nineteenth-century Christian charity for children had rein-
forced the division by targeting mothers – as donors as well as in the women 
in China or Africa who would not fulfil their maternal role as part of female 
human nature.19 Fifth, Rich / Poor: People ranked and classified society in 
various social hierarchies. In Europe, groups and individuals experienced 
social segregation and exclusion, often linked with political exclusion, for 
many centuries. The prominence of these divisions changed. During the 
nineteenth century and again around the turn of the present century social 
inequality has figured high in public debate on divisions within European 
societies, between them and in comparison to the poorer countries outside 
the “developed” world. A variety of this basic division in the humanitarian 
sphere was the opposition between the affluent and the starving. Differences 
in this respect seem not to have diminished, indeed, they are increasing and 
social hierarchies persist.
There are two further divisions that we may add to Bethencourt’s list, the 
human / animal divide and the division between men and God. Both are ante-
cedent to the distinctions mentioned so far. On the one hand, they conceive of 
humankind as a unity, each member of which is either an animal rationalis or 
created in God’s own image. It merits further attention how these categories 
cut across other constitutive antonyms and what determined their histori-
cally varying effects in practice, i.e. when did they work rhetorically and 
who made them applicable in political and judicial terms. On the other hand, 
Europeans used both divisions to deny or debate the human status of specific 
groups and persons or made room for hierarchies. The human / animal divide 
served in practice as an exclusion mechanism for slaves or the colonised by 
referring to these groups as “savages” or “beasts”.20 However, particularly 
brutal treatment of people could also arouse humanitarian feeling, as did 
the “animalisation of slaves”, which the Dominican missionary Epifanio 
de Moirans condemned in the late seventeeth century when he became an 
eyewitness to conditions in the West Indies.21 The division was not always 
clear-cut, though, nor was it one-directional. In a different setting, Protestant 
19 Stornig, “Between Christian Solidarity and Human Solidarity”, in this volume.
20 Besides several references in contributions to the present volume see, for example, Karl Jacoby, 
“Slaves by Nature? Domestic Animals and Human Slaves”, in Slavery & Abolition 15:1 (1994), 
89–99; for the colonial setting Clapperton Chakanetsa Mavhunga, “Vermin Beings. On Pestif-
erous Animals and Human Game”, in Social Text 29:1 (2011), 151 –176, and generally Joanna 
Bourke, What It Means to Be Human: Historical Reflections From the 1800s to the Present 
(Berkeley, CA 2011).
21 Weller, “Humanitarianism Before Humanitarianism?”, in this volume.
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missionaries, confronted with fluid boundaries between humans and animals 
in Hindu India, were disgusted by the better treatment of animals than of low-
er-caste humans.22 Yet, they still described certain groups in Indian society 
as “animal-like”, in particular those Hindus who resisted or hindered evan-
gelisation. In their minds, the definitions of human and Christian became 
closely linked, so that the opposite of “animal” for them was “Christian”. 
Finally, the human / animal divide begs the question of its moral relevance. 
Debates on “speciesism”, originating from animal rights advocates in the 
1970s, have revolved around the issue whether categorisation by species 
assigns different values and obligations or whether moral obligations reach 
beyond species. Doubts have been expressed whether the inclusive character 
of “human speciesism” should exclude non-human species from protection 
and rights.23
The other additional fundamental division stemmed from religion, par-
ticularly the monotheist Christian, Jewish and Islamic religions. This was 
the fundamental division of the last resort, which is the division between 
man and woman on the one side, and God on the other. Religions in modern 
Europe recognised a transcendental relation of humans with their creator. 
Yet in the long term, we see a fundamental change in modern Europe in this 
respect. Europeans moved from a notion of humanity that was at its core 
defined by man’s or woman’s relation to God to an anthropocentric concept 
of humanity. Mihai-D. Grigore highlights the transformation in his analysis 
of the humanist Erasmus of Rotterdam who opened ways of thinking about 
humanity as a quality inherent to the human presence in the world not exter-
nally determined by God.24 The theologian insisted that Christian humanity 
was indispensable for redemption but as humanist he recognised that the 
realisation of political humanity based on similarity, solidarity and common 
interests was a first step. The two kind of humanitas, the Christian and the 
political, were interwoven but distinct.
This historical change was not an exclusive, linear development.25 
God-centred and anthropocentric notions of humanity have existed side-by-
side since the age of the Renaissance humanists and could complement as 
22 Judith Becker, “Conceptions of Humanity in Nineteenth-Century German Protestant Missions”, 
in this volume.
23 From the numerous publications, see for example Peter Singer, “Speciesism and Moral Status”, 
in Metaphilosophy 40 (2009), 567–581.
24 Mihai-D. Grigore, “Humanism and its Humanitas: The Transition From Humanitas Christiana 
to Humanitas Politica in the Political Writings of Erasmus”, in this volume.
25 See, for example, Hans Joas, The Sacredness of the Person. A New Genealogy of Human 
Rights (Washington, DC 2013 [originally published in German, Berlin 2011]); cf. Stephen D. 
Moore / Mayra Rivera (ed.), Planetary Loves. Spivak, Postcoloniality, and Theology (New York 
2011).
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well as compete with each other. Humankind has been conceived of as a 
species and as Christian humanity. In particular, missionaries in the nine-
teenth century harboured the belief in the unity of all humankind as created 
in God’s image and as of the same blood; they consequently saw all people 
as equal forming, in the Christian sense, a community of sinners in equal 
need of redemption.26 As Judith Becker explains, leading Protestant mission-
ary theologians were well aware of the political notions of humanity and 
human rights expressed during the American and French Revolutions and the 
ideas of philanthropy and humanity expressed in the abolition movement.27 
While they underlined the difference from Christian notions of humanity, 
they also managed to see the liberal ideas as an instrument used by God 
to raise interest in coloured people and thereby open a way for Christian 
missions. Humanity in terms of missionary practice then encompassed first 
of all spiritual relief from the danger of eternal death but it also comprised 
relief from physical distress as this also helped the spread of Christianity. It 
would warrant further investigation how European concepts confronted, in 
practice, non-European, non-Christian ideas of humanity.28 Specifically in 
humanitarian activities from the West, tensions have arisen between secular 
concepts and religiously based notions in societies that receive assistance.
3. Varying Meanings and Functions of Humanity
While the constitutive antonyms reveal the paradoxical effects of bridging 
differences within and across societies, the meanings of humanity also 
varied over time and served various functions depending on circumstances. 
“Humanity” entered lexica in the eighteenth century. It was Samuel Johnson 
in his Dictionary of the English Language, published in 1755, who gave three 
key meanings for the word relevant for our inquiry: First, the “nature of man”; 
second, “Human kind; the collective body of mankind”; third, “Benevolence; 
26 On the ambivalence of the Christian understanding of man as an image of god and the equality 
of humans on the one side, and the dogma of the original sin on the other cf. Jörn Rüsen, “Homo 
Humanistus? Towards a Universal History of Humanism”, in Mihai I. Spariosu / Jörn Rüsen 
(ed.), Exploring Humanity – Intercultural Perspectives on Humanism (Göttingen 2012), 29–44, 
on p. 34. 
27 Becker, “Conceptions of Humanity in Nineteenth-Century German Protestant Missions”, 
in this volume; see also id., Conversio im Wandel. Basler Missionare zwischen Europa und 
Südindien und die Ausbildung einer Kontaktreligiosität, 1834–1860 (Göttingen 2015); id. (ed.), 
European Missions in Contact Zones. Transformations Through Interaction in a (Post-)Colo-
nial World (Göttingen 2015).
28 See Zhang Longxi (ed.), The Concept of Humanity in an Age of Globalization (Göttingen 2012), 
and Stefan Reichmuth / Jörn Rüsen / Aladdin Sarhan (ed.), Humanism and Muslim Culture. His-
torical Heritage and Contemporary Challenges (Göttingen 2012).
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tenderness”.29 In addition to the natural characteristics of individual human 
beings as well as the collective noun for the body of the whole human species, 
the dictionary referred thus to the practice of humane action. The entry in 
the 1765 Encylopédie by Diderot also linked “Humanité” to social practice 
by describing it as “a feeling of good will toward all men”. “Great and sen-
sitive souls” are indeed “tortured by the sufferings of others” and the urge 
to provide relief, which makes them “traverse the world in order to do away 
with slavery, superstition, vice, and misfortune”.30 These seminal lexical 
entries, reflecting the eighteenth century “sentimental revolution”,31 define 
humanity as a quality of human beings or as desirable behaviour. These most 
basic meanings centred on individual actors, reflecting the anthropocentric 
transformation of the term.
Beyond this, humanity has carried several abstract meanings and served 
various functions, as the present collection illustrates. Within a Christian con-
text, Catholic associations used “humanity” explicitly in nineteenth-century 
campaigns to mobilise donations for children when promoting the extension 
of religious ethics and social practices from European problems to distant 
children in Asia or Africa. The narratives of “abandoned” children thereby 
stressed the universality of the redemptive act and the scope of religious 
duties. As Stornig demonstrates, humanity was linked to missionary pur-
poses and supplied with Christian values and gender norms, especially when 
the Catholic notion of humanity was declared distinct from secular “empty 
human philosophy” of “moderne Menschenbeglücker” (modern would-be 
benefactors of humanity).32 Protestant missionary histories put forward simi-
lar arguments along religious lines when they distinguished political and lib-
eral ideas of humanity (“Humanität”) from religious notions of humankind 
29 See the entry “Humanity”, in Samuel Johnson, A Dictionary of the English Language: in Which 
the Words are Deduced From Their Originals, and Illustrated in Their Different Significations 
by Examples Form the Best Writers, vol. 1 (London 1755). The fourth definition to which the 
dictionary referred was “Philology, grammatical studies”. See also Fabian Klose and Mirjam 
Thulin, “ Introduction: European Concepts and Practices of Humanity in Historical Perspec-
tive”, in this volume.
30 “HUMANITÉ, f. f. (Morale.) c’est un sentiment de bienveillance pour tous les hommes, qui 
ne s’enflamme guere que dans une ame grande & sensible. Ce noble & sublime enthousiasme 
se tourmente des peines des autres & du besoin de les soulager; il voudroit parcourir l’univers 
pour abolir l’esclavage, la superstition, le vice, & le malheur.”, in Denis Diderot / Jean Baptiste 
le Rond d’Alembert (ed.), Encyclopédie ou Dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts et des 
métiers, Tome Huitieme, Paris 1765, 348. Emphases in the original. For the English translation 
The Encyclopedia of Diderot & d’Alembert Collaborative Translation Project, trans. by Nelly 
S. Hoyt and Thomas Cassirer (Ann Arbor, MI 2003). Web. http://hdl.handle.net/2027/spo.
did2222.0000.172.
31 Lynn Hunt, Inventing Human Rights. A History (New York 2007).
32 “Olivieri, die Neger und die Sklavenfrage”, in Jahresbericht des Vereines zur Unterstützung 
der armen Negerkinder (1859), 3–42, on p. 24, quoted by Stornig, “Between Christian Solidar-
ity and Human Solidarity”, in this volume. Cf. Feldman / Ticktin (ed.), In the Name of Humanity. 
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(“Menschheit”).33 Some, like the late nineteenth-century scholar of mission 
studies Gustav Warneck, however, acknowledged that secular enlightenment 
ideas made it easier for Christian missionaries to claim the right of all human 
beings to hear the Gospel.
The relation of Christian ideas to secular notion plays also a role on the 
human rights discourse after the Second World War. Robert Brier analyses 
the use of “human dignity” by the Catholic Church and Catholic intellectu-
als.34 On the one hand, the term helped in adapting human rights, which the 
Church had rejected officially with reference to the danger that freedom of 
religion posed to the Catholic faith, to an essentially conservative discourse. 
Human dignity was conceived of as coming from God and thus placed it 
in a social and natural order governed by divine law and safeguarded by 
institutions like the family and the Church. On the other hand, the two most 
relevant declarations Pacem in terris (1963) and Dignitatis humanae (1965) 
grounded the notion not only in revelation but also in anthropology and phi-
losophy, which came as close to a fundamental reconfiguration of doctrines 
as the official bodies could get. It was a step towards an understanding of 
dignity as resulting out of human autonomy, or it at least opened windows 
for a variety of progressive groups campaigning for peace, social justice and 
human rights, such as Pax Christi or the liberation theology. The bishops 
allowed similar changes and opened windows during the same period with 
regard to global justice, as discussed by Gerhard Kruip under the heading 
of “The Unity of the Human Family”.35 The process, which was in full force 
during the 1960s and 1970s, was highly contentious and the practical conse-
quences were so controversial that it is difficult to speak of one single Catho-
lic notion of humanity. Neither did the changes do away with former notions: 
It was exactly the openness of “human dignity” that had made it attractive 
for various sides.
When conceived of as a collective singular denoting unity, humanity 
becomes an actor on its own and an authority for appeal, for example in 
instances in which humanity is called to action. In 1957, the philosopher 
33 See Gustav Warneck, Abriß einer Geschichte der protestantischen Missionen von der 
Reformation bis auf die Gegenwart. Mit einem Anhang über die katholischen Missionen (Berlin 
91910), 81: “So revolutionär auch jene Ideen auftraten, und so wenig die Forderung allgemeiner 
Menschenrechte religiös begründet wurde, so leisteten sie der Missionsbewegung dennoch 
dadurch Wegbereiterdienste, daß sie in Verbindung mit den Rousseauschen Naturidealen einen 
Umschwung in der Schätzung auch der nichtchristlichen und nichtzivilisierten Menschheit 
herbeiführten, und daß sie den christlichen Kreisen die Geltendmachung des Rechts aller Men-
schen auch auf das Evangelium wesentlich erleichterten.”, quoted in Becker, “Conceptions of 
Humanity in Nineteenth-Century German Protestant Missions”, in this volume.
34 Robert Brier, “From Emancipation to Transcendence? Dignity, Catholicism, and the Changing 
Imageries of Humanity in Post-War Europe”, in this volume.
35 Gerhard Kruip, “The Unity of the Human Family: A Foundation for Global Justice”, in this 
volume.
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and medical doctor physician Albert Schweitzer broadcast an “Appell an die 
Menschheit” (the literal translation “appeal to humanity” was at the time 
replaced by “Declaration of Conscience”) in which he warned against the 
danger posed by radiation and nuclear armaments.36 A very different picture 
emerges when we look at humanities in the plural rather than the singular; it 
then represents a form of plurality. Historically, it has been a long way from 
competing concepts, which in the extreme could led to violent struggle, to the 
appreciation of plurality as an essential feature of humanity.
Finally, in terms of functionality it is worth considering that humanity 
need not have a specific meaning shared by those who use the term in politics 
or social dealings. Humanity can even serve as an argument of last resort 
or indeed a kind of “empty shell word” left unspecified by both sides in a 
conflict, filled with meaning only by one and left void by the other. Or peo-
ple used the term because other concepts were considered more contentious. 
Fabian Klose points out that the British abolitionists articulated their demand 
for the abolition of the slave trade from the 1780s in terms of humanity rather 
than rights because the latter would have involved legal disputes over prop-
erty rights and because they did not consider the African slaves civilised 
enough to enjoy civil rights immediately.37 Esther Möller explains that offi-
cially adding Humanity to the list of Red Cross principles in 1965 was an 
attempt by the ICRC to face the challenges to its identity and its role in the 
context of decolonisation and Cold War.38 It served the purpose better than, for 
example, “charity” because it appeared more compatible in diverse cultural 
and religious settings. Yet the political conflicts of the times and the debates 
within the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement still turned “humanity” 
into a contested term. While the ICRC and many Western representatives 
used it to highlight the non-political character of their actions, non-West-
ern delegates explicitly linked it with political efforts. The latter thus also, 
on occasion, sought to reject the notion as a colonial normative instrument 
of governance.
36 See Thomas Suermann, Albert Schweitzer als “homo politicus”. Eine biographische Studie 
zum politischen Denken und Handeln des Friedensnobelpreisträgers (Berlin 2012), 219–240.
37 Klose, “A War of Justice and Humanity”, in this volume. 
38 Esther Möller, “Between Globalisation and Contestation: Humanity as a Polemical Concept 
Within the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement”, in this volume. See also David Forsythe, 
“On Contested Concepts. Humanitarianism, Human Rights, and the Notion of Neutrality”, 
in Journal of Human Rights 12:1 (2013), 59–68; Daniel Palmieri, “Les principes fondamen-
taux de la Croix-Rouge. Une histoire politique” (2015), in https://www.icrc.org/fr/document/
les-principes-fondamentaux-de-la-croix-rouge-une-histoire-politique; Jean-Luc Blondel, “The 
Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross and Red Crescent”, in International Review of the Red 
Cross 31:283 (1991), 349 –357.
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Actors sometimes resolved differences and best achieved humanitarian 
purposes or at least unity among themselves by not explicitly spelling out 
the meaning of “humanity” because of its inherent ambivalence. As Joachim 
Berger shows, Freemasonry ran into difficulties precisely when it tried to find 
an internationally binding definition of humanitarian action in pursuance of 
the brotherly love to which its members subscribed.39 Neither the protection 
of orphans nor social reform could serve as an international platform before 
the First World War because the so-called “culture wars”, particularly in 
Catholic Italy and secularist France, forced the national Freemasons to take a 
stance vis-à-vis the churches. On this, there was no international agreement. 
This also demonstrated that the link between a Christian and a secular-ethical 
base of neighbourly love had weakened. After the Great War, the Association 
maçonique internationale wisely avoided the discussion of issues of civil 
society engagement, which would have exposed different understandings of 
the practical application of humanity. At least the idea of universal brother-
hood thriving for the improvement of humanity as the totality of humankind 
could survive as a joint frame of reference, even if mostly an empty one 
which could not mobilise philanthropy to the same extent as religion.
During the twentieth century, the political left and right made different 
claims by reference to humanity. At its beginning, pacifists employed the 
term to describe the ecumenical and peaceful alternative to integral nation-
alism, imperialism, and the struggle for the survival of the fittest.40 After 
the Second World War, conservatives integrated humanity, a concept they 
had largely shunned, into Christian Democratic projects, the idea of Euro-
pean distinctiveness or even the defence of colonial positions.41 Paul Betts’ 
analysis demonstrates also that the humanity need not be congruent with the 
universal. After the First World War, when nationalism rose to its apogee, 
the first president of independent Czechoslovakia for example contended that 
humanity was not supra-national but the organisation of individual nations. 
In the interwar period advocates of minority right also referred to humanity, 
thereby linking it to territorial claims or self-determination. The latter played 
an important role in decolonisation. Parallel to the return of the emphatic use 
of the term during the 1940s, the political organisation that came closest to 
representing humankind was after all the United Nations.
39 Joachim Berger, “ ‘Une œuvre internationale d’un caractère humanitaire’: The Appeal to 
Humanity in International Masonic Relations”, in this volume.
40 Paul Betts, “Universalism and its Discontents: Humanity as a Twentieth-Century Concept”, in 
this volume.
41 See also Brier, “From Emancipation to Transcendence”, and Kruip, “The Unity of the Human 
Family”, in this volume.
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4. Humanity as a Dynamic Concept and 
the Hierarchies of Humanity
On first sight, humanity implicitly appears to be a static concept, implying 
that humanity has existed since the beginning of man / woman. Yet, looking 
at concepts of humanity in practices reveals quite a different kind of quality 
of the term. Humanity is often understood as a societal space in which princi-
ples of humanity are still to be applied. Humanity may be a quality of human 
beings practiced by many but it remains at least as much a desired behaviour. 
From this perspective, humanity is a goal not yet achieved on earth. The use 
of the concept therefore triggered dynamic processes. As Klose also demon-
strates, in the context of abolitionism humanity became transformed from 
a moral argument in the late 1780s into a legal norm nationally in 1807 and 
then internationally in 1814 / 15, going on to become the basis for intervention 
by naval force during the nineteenth century.42 Several contributions to this 
volume demonstrate that humanity was also a dynamic concept by referring 
to a process. We see this in terms linked to humanity such as perfectibility, 
education, particularly with reference to children.43 In the past, major players 
in this respect were the Renaissance Humanists, who like Erasmus acknowl-
edged that all human beings by birth possessed humanity but insisted that 
they must educated to develop it fully.44 Later the Pietists put an emphasis 
on discipline and missionaries claimed to take care of both body and soul 
of the “uncivilised” and other recent converts. Eighteenth century philos-
ophers also understood humanity in a dynamic manner, as being on the 
path to enlightenment. Freemasonry, as an enlightened type of association, 
epitomised this with its understanding of humanity not merely as general 
philanthropy but foremost as human education.45 Protestant missionaries in 
the nineteenth century believed that only the Christian religion would lead 
to individual and collective progress, but conversion did not automatically 
transform heathens in Africa and Asia into full humans. In a paternalistic 
fashion, they considered education in Christian principles of humanity nec-
essary to turn the “saved souls” into “adults”. In particularly, they regarded a 
sedentary lifestyle as the essential link between Christianisation, civilisation 
and humanisation.46 In the twentieth century, The United Nations Educa-
tional, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) took on the task of 
promoting peace through educational, scientific and cultural reforms. Yet it 
42 Klose, “A War of Justice and Humanity”, in this volume. 
43 Stornig, “Between Christian Solidarity and Human Solidarity”, in this volume.
44 Grigore, “Humanism and its Humanitas”, in this volume.
45 Berger, “Une œuvre internationale d’un caractère”, in this volume.
46 Becker, “Conceptions of Humanity in Nineteenth-Century German Protestant Missions”, in 
this volume.
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unhinged the dynamic element of the concept in a manner. In particular, the 
world heritage programme, the roots of which lay in the post-war legal prin-
ciple of the Common Heritage of Mankind, embraced cultural diversity and 
multiculturalism in the context of decolonisation and a shift to anthropologi-
cal concepts of culture. Heritage of Mankind thus became a resource of par-
ticular cultural identity that was then elevated to a universal human right.47 
This proved attractive for intellectuals like Peng-Chun Chang or Léopold 
Sédar Senghor from countries then called the “Third World”, because the 
claim to the universal value for humankind of all cultures buried the imperial 
idea of progress through the spread of European civilisation.
At least temporarily, many if not most concepts of humanity have hier-
archies embedded at their core. This is an implication of the dynamic con-
ception of humanity but also of the dichotomous divisions mentioned above. 
These hierarchies overlap, change in relevance over time and contradict each 
other with various effects in practice. Although the Catholic missionaries 
to the Americas in principle recognised that the indigenous population also 
descended from Adam, they still developed a differentiated anthropology 
with several kinds of Barbarian categorised according their religious beliefs, 
the existence of a written language and the various forms of government. 
They also applied the catechetical method differently.48 While all had the 
capacity for belief in God, the missionary idea still implied a distinction 
between human beings as children of God and (Catholic) Christians in 
particular, a division still prominent in radical antislavery pamphlets from 
seventeenth-century Spain.49
Within a secular context, the hierarchies did not disappear either. To quote 
one example from the late nineteenth century that also illustrates the way 
the concept of humanity had been transformed since Samuel Johnson and 
Denis Diderot, we may take the Scottish legal philosopher James Lorimer, 
Regius Professor of Public Law and the Law of Nature and Nations at the 
University of Edinburgh. In his seminal book The Institutes of the Law of 
Nations, published in 1883–84, he divided humanity into the three spheres 
of “civilized humanity”, “barbarous humanity”, and “savage humanity”. In 
terms of political recognition, he concluded that to these zones “whether aris-
ing from peculiarities of race or from various stages of development in the 
same race, belong, of right, at the hands of civilised nations, three stages of 
recognition – plenary political recognition, partial recognition, and natural or 
47 Betts, “Universalism and its Discontents”, in this volume, and Rehling, “Kulturen unter Arten-
schutz”, 109–137. 
48 Delgado, “ All People have Reason and Free Will”, in this volume.
49 Weller, “Humanitarianism Before Humanitarianism?”, in this volume.
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mere human recognition.”50 Lorimer exemplifies the ideological supercharg-
ing of otherness and inequalities in terms of race and culture based on the late 
modern differentiation between nature and culture and the establishment of 
imperialism. Other significant hierarchies of humanity exist to this day, some 
older, some more recent. The notion of a common humanity based on respect 
for the dignity of all human beings has not wholly overcome them, although 
this notion has gained ground and ousted particularly the late nineteenth-cen-
tury racial hierarchies from public debate. Hierarchies manifest themselves, 
for example, in humanitarian interventions, which are publicly justified by 
humanitarian reasons, but ultimately rest on an unequal assessment of the 
lives of civilians who suffer severely from the military strikes.51
One main conclusion that derives from the historical lexica of humanity 
is that humanity in practice did not require equality, sometimes not even a 
language of equality. Quite on the contrary, for long periods and in many 
contexts concepts of humanity neither implied nor were they based on social 
and economic similarity, on religious ecumenism, or on equal rights. There-
fore, the moral impetus that “we should be active in all places where there 
is suffering” needed not to be based on the notion that all humans are equal. 
Considering the double meaning of humanity, humaneness needs no language 
of equality while humanity as a collective body holds the potential for claims 
to equality even if the language establishes hierarchies and differentiations.
We can further conclude that humanity has been a malleable concept that 
was used and indeed abused in the past and still serves different purposes in 
the present. Concepts of humanity have never been merely lofty ideas dis-
cussed by intellectuals and theologians alone. They have rather represented 
values and norms guiding societal relations; they have served to legitimise 
or demand actions by the state, the churches or other institutions; and indi-
viduals have been inspired by them to strive for what they hoped would 
be a better world.
Finally, various competing notions of what constitutes the character of 
humanity and how human beings ought to be treated existed side by side. 
As much as its European proponents seemed to make universal claims in the 
name of humanity, in practice there were limits not only in applying humanity 
as a principle but already in answering who belonged to humanity at a certain 
time and from a particular point of view. In terms of European relations with 
the rest of the world, Europeans have often taken on the role of the advocates 
50 James Lorimer, The Institutes of the Law of Nations. A Treatise of the Jural Relations of 
Separate Political Communities, vol. 1 (Edinburgh 1883), 101.
51 Didier Fassin, “Inequality of Lives, Hierarchies of Humanity. Moral Commitments and Ethical 
Dilemmas of Humanitarianism”, in Feldman / Ticktin (ed.), In the Name of Humanity, 238–255, 
here 255. On the controversial issue of humanitarian intervention, see also Klose (ed.), Emer-
gence of Humanitarian Intervention.
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of humanity giving a voice to those who could not speak but also thereby 
drowning out the (subaltern) voice of humanity itself. This relationship is 
something in need of further historical exploration. Suffice it to say at this 
point that politics, again, played a role. Humanitarian advocacy, for example 
by non-governmental organisations, has been a matter of governance within 
the field of providing succour and in the relation with the suffering human 
beings. It concerns the humanitarian agents as well as those people who are 
in precarious situations.52
5. Humanitarian Reason
As we have seen so far, the ubiquitous and seemingly self-understood combi-
nation of global humanitarianism has a rather complex conceptual dimension 
in terms of humanity and humanitarianism. The global dimension is equally 
problematic. Starting from the practice rather than the concept of humanity, a 
contemporary basic, almost everyday definition focuses on the mundane side 
of humanitarian relief by speaking of “assistance given to people in imme-
diate need resulting from natural or man-made disaster”.53 This definition of 
humanitarian relief has strong conceptual overtones. It implies an emergency 
suggesting that need arises suddenly and unpredictably while simultaneously 
locating the situation in a specific place disconnecting it from global inter-
actions. Causes are attributed to forces of nature or the evil nature of man so 
that disasters are naturalised and appear as a sort of normal incident to distant 
observers. Responding to them by quickly delivering assistance worldwide 
has become one of the modalities of globalisation carrying moral imperatives 
for immediate action.54
52 Didier Fassin, Humanitarian Reason. A Moral History of the Present (Berkeley, CA 2012), 
ix–x. 
53 Jonathan Benthall, “Relief”, in The Palgrave Dictionary of Transnational History, ed. by Akira 
Iriye and Pierre-Yves Saunier (New York 2009), 887–893.
54 Craig Calhoun, “The Imperative to Reduce Suffering. Charity, Progress, and Emergencies in 
the Field of Humanitarian Action”, in Michael Barnett / Thomas G. Weiss (ed.), Humanitarian-
ism in Question. Politics, Power, Ethics (Ithaca, NY 2008), 72–97. In contrast to the apparently 
clear-cut definition of relief, a recent review of anthropological studies of humanitarianism 
emphasizes the blurring of boundaries of humanitarianism and the overlapping between 
humanitarian relief, human rights, development, and humanitarian intervention. Delimitations 
appear to be breaking down in the last decade, see Miriam Ticktin, “Transnational Humanitar-
ianism”, in Annual Review of Anthropology 43 (2014), 273–289; see also Johannes Paulmann, 
“Conjunctures in the History of International Humanitarian Aid During the Twentieth Cen-
tury”, in Humanity 4:2 (2013), 215–238; Bronwyn Leebaw, “Justice, Charity, or Alibi? Human-
itarianism, Human Rights and ‘Humanity Law’ ”, in Humanity 5:2 (2014), 261–276; Michael 
Geyer, “Humanitarianism and Human Rights. A Troubled Rapport”, in Klose, Emergence of 
Humanitarian Intervention, 31–55.
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In a systematic fashion, the anthropologist and sociologist Didier Fassin 
therefore defines humanitarianism as a moral landscape. He sees it as made 
up of two dimensions today; one feature is the “global spectacle of suffering”, 
and the other is the “global display of succour”.55 Leaving aside for the moment 
the issue of the global, we learn that Fassin regards “humanitarianism” as a 
“mode of governing that concerns the victims of every situation character-
ized by precariousness”.56 His analysis focuses on the decades since the end 
of the Cold War and leads and him to the conclusion that humanitarianism 
in this period has become a language that not only links values and affects 
and “serves to define and justify discourses and practices of the government 
of human beings”.57 Humanitarianism has also reconfigured previous vocab-
ularies of social critique, so much so that we now have a “new lexicon of 
moral sentiments”; this new language affects public action and individual 
practices.58 “Inequality is replaced by exclusion, domination transformed 
into misfortune, injustice is articulated as suffering, violence is expressed in 
terms of trauma”, according to Fassin.59 He concludes that humanitarianism 
is morally driven, politically ambiguous and deeply paradoxical. Fassin pro-
poses to call this new consensual force “humanitarian reason”; it forms the 
centre of a new moral economy, which has emerged in recent decades. “The 
politics of compassion”, as Fassin summarises the character of the present 
mode of governing, is paradoxical because it involves a politics of inequality 
and at the same time a politics of solidarity.60 The resulting tension between 
the two, between a relation of domination and a relation of assistance, is 
constitutive of all humanitarian government.
Taking the cue from Fassin’s contemporary analysis of “humanitarian 
reason” and the paradoxical politics of compassion (with its uneasy mixture 
of inequality and solidarity) allows us to combine the historical analysis of 
governance and power relations between states, international institutions and 
non-governmental organisations with the changing humanitarian narrative 
and take the latter seriously as a force to be reckoned with. Humanitarian 
narrative here means the rhetoric and visual means employed to form a bond 
between those who are suffering and those who care to help. The particular 
descriptions of suffering act as an imperative to mobilise individuals and 
55 Fassin, Humanitarian Reason, ix.
56 Ibid., x. Precariousness for Fassin encompasses the domestic sphere as well as distant lands and 
may result from structural inequalities in societies as well as from catastrophic events.
57 Fassin, Humanitarian Reason, 6.
58 For a similar argument in the context of late eighteenth and early nineteenth-centuries aboli-
tionism see Thomas L. Haskell, “Capitalism and the Origins of the Humanitarian Sensibility”, 
in American Historical Review 90:2 (1985), 339–361 (part 1), and American Historical Review 
90:3 (1985), 547–566 (part 2).
59 Fassin, Humanitarian Reason, 6.
60 Ibid., 3.
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societies. They present a narrative, which tells the reader or spectator that 
ameliorative action is possible, effective and therefore morally required.61 As 
historical research and the contributions to the present volume show, this is 
by no means a contemporary phenomenon but one with a long history – a 
history entangled particularly with European expansion and empires.
6. (Post) Imperial Histories of Humanitarianism
To move from the history of humanity to global history seems but a small 
step when we take humankind to denote the body of the human species. Of 
course, we are then conceiving of the globe as the potential sphere of action, 
as it appeared in Fassin’s definition of a moral landscape with the two dimen-
sion of the global spectacle of suffering and the global display of succour. 
This is global in the spatial sense of the planetary. Global history is thus char-
acterised as large-scale and spacious dealing with long-distance or inter-con-
tinental relations and movements of people, goods and ideas. This is, largely, 
a useful delineation when describing a suitable topic for investi gation. There 
are methodological problems involved with this kind of research, which are 
beyond the remit of this paper. Global in the sense of planetary does not 
provide a particular theoretical orientation.
However, we may also understand global in the sense of the universal.62 
Global history then investigates the structures and principles of human 
development (and in a wider sense the living world, i.e. animals, plants, earth 
and climate). It encompasses the emergence of connectivity, from isolated 
ephemeral instances and more or less stable bundles of links to the structural 
entanglement and unification we know today – the emergence, or perhaps 
better the ebb and flow of connectivity takes centre place in the ensuing his-
torical narrative. In the narrowest sense, this is the history of globalisation. 
In a less restrictive manner, this means looking for the links, contemporary 
and past, that connect a research topic and localities over long distances. In 
the widest sense, global history serves as a term for writing particular his-
tories against a general interpretative background of similar cases elsewhere 
in the world – a kind of global comparative history.63 On a very basic level, 
61 See Thomas W. Laqueur, “Bodies, Details, and the Humanitarian Narrative”, in Lynn Hunt 
(ed.), The New Cultural History (Berkeley, CA 1989), 167–204, and Richard Ashby Wilson / 
Richard D. Brown (ed.), Humanitarianism and Suffering. The Mobilization of Empathy (Cam-
bridge 2009).
62 For a discussion of universal history see Ernst Schulin, “Universalgeschichte und abend-
ländische Entwürfe”, in Heinz Duchhardt / Gerhard May (ed.), Geschichtswissenschaft um 1950 
(Mainz 2002), 50–64, and Ernst Schulin (ed.), Universalgeschichte (Cologne 1974).
63 Sebastian Conrad, Globalgeschichte. Eine Einführung (Munich 2013), 7–28; Bruce 
Mazlish / Akira Iriye (ed.), The Global History Reader (New York 2005), and Douglas Northop 
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the driving force behind universal history for earlier generations in Europe 
was, as a matter of course, God (in which case global actually would mean 
worldly as opposed to transcendental); for later ones reason, the “Weltgeist”, 
material progress and class conflict, or natural selection explained the course 
of history. In the present, the planetary expansion of a science and technology 
driven capitalism represents the motor of history. Some emphasise the force 
of notions such as liberty and democracy, others the empathy with the suffer-
ing human being and the urge to provide succour.
This is of course a pointed description of global history. Nevertheless, 
I think the global is, just as much as humanity, a hyperbolic term. I have 
tried to highlight this by my reference to universal history. The global always 
contains a claim – be it a claim for global power, global business, global 
justice,64 global relief, or for that matter, a claim for writing global histo-
ry.65 The normative claim in the later instance is that because the present is 
global, historical research must be globally organised and deal with global 
topics, otherwise it is supposed to be no longer relevant or up-to-date. The 
overstatement and exaggeration helps us to recognise the gap between what 
was actually realised politically, economically or otherwise in the past, 
and what on the other side was not achieved or remained to be expected or 
simply utopian.
Turning to what was realised in the history of humanitarianism, I suggest 
speaking of imperial humanitarianism rather than global humanitarianism 
for most periods of modern European history.66 It started with the colonial 
roots of humanitarianism since the early European expansion, followed by 
the build-up of religious, secular and administrative structures in the impe-
rial humanitarianism of the nineteenth century. A major conjuncture in the 
establishment of humanitarian organisations and structures beyond imperi-
alism happened in the wake of imperial collapse after the First World War. 
Decolonisation, internationalisation and the legacies of imperial humanitari-
anism shaped the most recent period almost up to date.
(ed.), A Companion to World History (New York 2012); cf. A.G. Hopkins (ed.), Globalization in 
World History (London 2002).
64 Kruip, “The Unity of the Human Family”, in this volume.
65 Cf. for example Akira Iriye, Global Community. The Role of International Organizations in the 
Making of the Contemporary World (Berkeley, CA 2002).
66 See Rob Skinner / Alan Lester, “Humanitarianism and Empire. New Research Agendas”, in 
Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 40:5 (2012), 729–747; with a focus on Italian 
anti-slavery campaigns Amalia Ribi Forclaz, Humanitarian Imperialism. The Politics of 
Anti-Slavery Activism, 1880–1940 (Oxford 2015). Cf. O’Sullivan / Hilton / Fiori, “Humanitar-
ianism in Context”, 5, and Mark Mazower, No Enchanted Palace. The End of Empire and the 
Ideological Origins of the United Nations (Princeton 2013).
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The relationship between colonial practices and humanitarian action has a 
complex history, which can only be related very briefly here.67 The concern 
for distant strangers originated in colonial and missionary encounters, its 
development depended on imperial infrastructures and its justification was 
strongly imbued with imperial ideologies and civilisational hierarchies. In 
turn, humanitarianism strengthened imperial governance, even prolonging 
imperial ideas and practices beyond decolonisation. Yet it also contributed 
to anti-colonial sentiment and provided support for liberation movements. It 
manifested itself in a broad field of activities, with blurred rather than clearly 
delimited conceptual and practical boundaries. Humanitarian engagement 
encompassed campaigns for the abolition of slavery, the protection of indige-
nous populations, missionary work, famine relief, provision of shelter, health 
and rehabilitation for those suffering from war, humanitarian intervention by 
military force and the advocacy of human rights and development. Human-
itarianism influenced the formation of European and Western civil society 
as its proponents were not only present in traditional organisations such 
as churches but also organised themselves nationally and internationally 
around particular humanitarian causes. Religious and secular motivations 
often intermingled. National governments and imperial administrators also 
took up the cause of humanity at times. So did international governmental 
organisations, which, together with decolonisation and the transformation of 
colonial missions, carried humanitarianism beyond empire in the twentieth 
century.68 Humanitarianism shaped relations between colonisers and the col-
onised in the long term. In particular, media representations and campaigns 
for humanitarian causes formed the image of “donors” and “recipients” which 
today still underlies global asymmetries of the concern for distant strangers.
Perhaps the most recent phase of humanitarianism since the end of the 
Cold War clash between American and Soviet Empires and the acute crisis 
of the European Empire (named the European Union), should be viewed as 
yet another post-imperial period. We can see that the concept of humanity 
has also changed in the present. This may explain why we experience a surge 
of humanitarian issues and debates and why a new moral economy, which 
Didier Fassin has called “humanitarian reason”, has emerged. A history 
of imperial humanitarianism needs to be critical of empire and its power 
relations, the violence imperialists have exercised and the exploitation that 
went with it. Bearing in mind Frederick Cooper’s statement,69 we should 
67 This abstract is based on Johannes Paulmann, “Humanitarianism and Empire”, in The Encyclo-
pedia of Empire, vol. 2, ed. by John M. MacKenzie (Oxford 2016), 1112–1123.
68 Cf. Kruip, “The Unity of the Human Family”, in this volume, for a contemporary request 
directed at the Catholic Church to adapt its structures to its own claims for global justice.
69 Frederick Cooper, “Writing the History of Development”, in Journal of Modern European 
History 8 (2010), 5–23.
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however also recognise that empire provided the framework for claims, the 
development of rights, and the evolution of humanitarian organisation. The 
sociologist Krishan Kumar speaks of “Empires as bearers of global ideas 
of humanity”.70 While this could be taken as an argument in defence of 
Empire, it would be more accurate to state that, with the demise of European 
empires, responsibilities became diffuse. Humanitarianism consequently 
acquired a systemic function in European relations with the “Third World” 
it had not had quite in the same manner under imperial rule. Moreover, 
in the present post-Cold War period, the emphatic concept of humanity 
underlying humanitarianism has probably been lost. The universalist appeal 
to humanity, Alain Finkielkraut points out in his Humanité Perdue, has 
given way to the notion of suffering humanity.71 In practical terms, human-
ity appears to have been reduced at present to “benevolence” in Samuel 
Johnson’s eighteenth-century vocabulary, while “humankind” serves at best 
in political rhetoric.
This essay has charted concepts of humanity by investigating how they 
shaped practices and how these practices themselves informed ideas. Based 
on the contributions to the present volume, it covered the modern period from 
the humanists and the early European expansion to the second half of the 
twentieth century, thus touching also on contemporary issues in the imme-
diate past. By placing Europe firmly in the context of its relations with the 
wider world, we see that European expansion and imperial rule as well as 
its formal demise combined with claims for universal humanity in various 
shapes and forms. This accounts historically for the present ubiquity of the 
notion of “global humanitarianism”. The history of imperial humanitarianism 
and its hyperbolic side of a global history of humanitarianism demonstrate 
that humanitarian action necessarily, so it seems, needs a utopian reference in 
the form of a concept of humanity. It can thereby seek to bridge the manifold 
differences in practice. If the “other” were not a human being, why should 
we do something about his or her suffering? The exaggeration of a unified, 
equal humanity gives humanitarianism a sort of manipulative character 
which serves sometimes to ridicule it as ineffective and idealist: in German 
“Humanitätsduselei” (sentimental humanitarianism), a term denouncing 
people who allegedly fail to see political or economic realities. Yet, if we 
are aware of the gap between, for example, imperial humanitarianism and 
the claim for equal human rights for all subjects of particular empires, the 
70 Krishan Kumar, “Empires as Bearers of Global Ideas of Humanity”, in Longxi (ed.), The Con-
cept of Humanity in an Age of Globalization, 189–216.
71 See Betts, “Universalism and its Discontents”, in this volume, and Alain Finkielkraut, L’hu-
manité perdue. Essai sur le XXe siècle (Paris 1996), 117–136 (trans. into English as In the Name 
of Humanity. Reflections on the Twentieth Century [London 2001]).
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reference to a common humanity constitutes a political use of the term. If it 
were not for the utopia, how could a practicable goal be achieved? Indiffer-
ence and cynicism certainly have less appeal than humanitarianism. Perhaps 
the notion of “Humanitarian Cosmopolitics” could serve as an alternative to 
the imperial humanitarianism of the past as well as to “humanitarian reason” 
as the present form of governance.72
72 Cf. Wilkinson, “Humanitarianism and Cosmopolitanism”, and Pogge, World Poverty and 
Human Rights.
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